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Abstract 
 
International humanitarian law (IHL) must be disseminated as widely as possible, and 
integrated into programmes of military instruction or training. The obligation to train the 
military in IHL is a laconic norm of prevention: it offers scant guidance, in a branch of 
international law which lacks transparent oversight and monitoring. Once assumed, a 
causal relationship between IHL training, prevention and compliance is now in doubt. 
Deficient military training in IHL has been implicated in the wilful killing of civilians 
and the torture of detainees; but scholarship has gradually acknowledged the 
insufficiency of IHL training to prevent violations, while interdisciplinary research 
suggests that military culture, moral disengagement and discourse about law and enemy 
forces may be more powerful causal factors for IHL violations than ignorance of the 
law. There is a conundrum between IHL training, prevention and compliance, which  
this thesis seeks to solve. 
 
There are four contributions. First, via a genealogy of the IHL training obligation and a 
synthesis of legal and interdisciplinary literature, the thesis builds standards for military 
training in IHL based on group and individual factors, soldiers’ understanding and their 
willingness to comply. Second, by integrating the training obligation with IHL’s other 
preventive norms, including command responsibility and the duty to disobey unlawful 
orders, the thesis crafts a theory of prevention in IHL. Third, it offers an adapted 
compliance theory, drawing on constructivist communities of practice, which 
acknowledges seven distinctive challenges for compliance in IHL. Fourth, a case study 
of the British Army’s IHL training finds recurrent assertions that the training was taking 
place or reforms implemented; recurrent patterns of violations and limited transparency; 
plus a ‘legal siege’ discourse which resists accountability and risks alienating soldiers 
from IHL. The most recent, belated reforms provide for comprehensive instruction in 
IHL, just beginning to connect training, prevention and compliance. 
4  
Contents 
Abstract 3 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ 7 
Chapter 1. Introduction ............................................................................................. 8 
1.1 International Humanitarian Law at the ‘Vanishing Point’ of Compliance ............. 8 
1.2 Dissemination and Military Instruction in International Humanitarian Law ... 22 
1.3 Definitions and Choice of Terminology 27 
1.4 Scholarly Context.............................................................................................. 35 
1.5 Ethics, Methodology and Sources ..................................................................... 54 
1.6 Scope, Research Questions and Structure .......................................................... 65 
Part I. The Conundrum between Military Training in International Humanitarian 
Law, Prevention and Compliance ........................................................................... 70 
Chapter 2. A  Genealogy  of  the  Obligation  to  Instruct  the  Armed Forces in 
International Humanitarian Law ............................................................................... 70 
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................... 70 
2.2 The Evolution of the Obligation in International Armed Conflicts ..................... 70 
2.3 Dissemination and Training in Non-International Armed Conflicts ...................... 76 
2.4 Narrow and Broad Readings of the Obligation ................................................... 80 
2.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................ 87 
Chapter 3.  Towards   Standards   for   Military  Training  in International 
Humanitarian Law ...................................................................................................  90 
3.1 Introduction  ...................................................................................................... 90 
3.2 A Chronology of Literature and Historic Insights Lost ................................... 93 
3.3 Insights from Interdisciplinary Works ........................................................... 102 
3.4 An Evolution of Practice by the ICRC and Geneva Call ............................... 111 
3.5 Standards to Build Understanding and Willingness to Comply ..................... 119 
3.6 Conclusion to Part I ........................................................................................ 126 
Part II. Building Theories of Prevention and Compliance in International 
Humanitarian Law ................................................................................................. 129 
Chapter 4.  Laconic Norms of Prevention in International Humanitarian Law129 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 129 
4.2 Norms of Prevention, Monitoring and Enforcement ...................................... 130 
5  
4.3 Integrating the Training Obligation with IHL’s Other Norms of Prevention 135 
4.4 Implications for Theory and Practice ................................................................ 143 
4.5 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 145 
Chapter 5. Towards a Compliance Theory for International Humanitarian Law 
146 
5.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 146 
5.2 General and IHL-Specific Compliance Theories ............................................ 147 
5.3 Does International Humanitarian Law Need its Own Compliance Theory? .. 154 
5.4 Theorising Training and Compliance in International Humanitarian Law ...... 160 
5.5 Conclusion to Part II ....................................................................................... 161 
Part   III.   A   Case   Study   of   the   British   Army’s   Training   in  International 
Humanitarian Law ................................................................................................. 163 
Chapter 6. The  Conundrum  in  Practice:  The  British  Army  and Deficits in 
Training, Prevention and Compliance ................................................................. 163 
6.1  Introduction .................................................................................................... 163 
6.2  A History of the British Army’s Training in International Humanitarian Law 
165 
6.3 Patterns of Violations and Institutional Response .......................................... 173 
6.4 Court-Martial Prosecutions and Public Inquiries ........................................... 176 
6.4.1 Camp Breadbasket .................................................................................. 176 
6.4.2 R v. Payne and the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry ...................................... 177 
6.4.3 The Al-Sweady Public Inquiry................................................................ 181 
6.4.4 R v. Blackman.......................................................................................... 187 
6.5 Theory-Testing: Does the Case Study Solve the Conundrum? ...................... 191 
6.6  Conclusion ...................................................................................................... 195 
Chapter 7. Towards a Solution? Belated Reforms to the British Army’s IHL 
Training in a Time of ‘Legal Siege’ .......................................................................... 198 
7.1 Introduction .................................................................................................... 198 
7.2 Recent and Ongoing Investigations .................................................................. 199 
7.3 ‘Addressed’ versus ‘Implemented’: Belated Reforms to IHL Training .............. 215 
6 
 
7.4 Analysis of Training Materials ......................................................................... 221 
7.4.1 The Operational Law Training Directive 2014 .......................................... 223 
7.4.2 Military Annual Training Tests on the Law of Armed Conflict ................. 232 
7.4.3 A Note on Unavailable or Restricted Materials ......................................... 236 
7.5 Theory-Building: New Insights from the Case Study on Training, Prevention 
and Compliance ......................................................................................................... 238 
7.6 Conclusion to Part III ........................................................................................ 246 
Chapter 8.  Conclusion: Solving the Conundrum .................................................. 251 
8.1 Findings and Contributions ............................................................................... 251 
8.2 Limitations and Impact ..................................................................................... 257 
8.3 Further Research .............................................................................................. 259 
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 261 
Appendix 309 
Table of Abbreviations ............................................................................................... 309 
Table of Treaties ........................................................................................................ 311 
Table of Cases ............................................................................................................ 313 
7  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Research for this thesis would have been impossible without funding from the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (AHRC); and training opportunities offered by Research 
Councils UK, SOAS and the wider University of London. I am grateful for comments on 
works-in-progress presented at the American Society of International Law Research Forum; 
the Society of Legal Scholars UK meeting; the University College London School of Law 
Postgraduate and Early Careers Conference; Ulster University Postgraduate Symposium on 
Occupation, Transitional Justice and Gender; the International Society of Military Law and 
the Laws of War; the SOAS School of Law PhD Colloquium, the International Law 
Association British Branch, the University of Toronto (Sociological Inquiries into 
International Law II), and the University of Nottingham Security Group. 
 
I am grateful to my supervisor, Iain Scobbie for his integrity, knowledge and support. 
Sincere thanks are due to Lutz Oette and Catriona Drew for their feedback and strategic 
sense. For his support on research ethics, I also thank Stephen Hopgood. Numerous scholars 
and practitioners have commented on conference papers, articles, and qualitative research 
tools. I am grateful to Andrew Bell, Brenna Bhandar, Auriane Botte, Jutta Brunnée, 
Matthew Craven, Anthony Cullen, Charles Garraway, Gina Heathcote, Moshe Hirsch, Kim 
Hutchings, Jenny Kuper, Fionnuala Ni Aolain and Stuart Wallace; and to Vincent Bernard 
and Geoff Loane of the ICRC. A number of serving members of the armed forces have 
asked not to be named in acknowledgements, but I am thankful for the military acronyms 
explained, and the context built through discussions with them. 
 
Throughout 2016, I was on leave from this research to foster a baby boy. He became our 
son through adoption shortly before the thesis was complete. This work is dedicated to 
my husband Justin and our little boy. 
8  
 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 International Humanitarian Law at the ‘Vanishing Point’ of Compliance 
 
 
If the Convention is to be implemented, its spirit must be introduced into the 
customs of soldiers and of the population as a whole. Its principles must be 
popularised through extensive propaganda.
1
 
 
If the legal norm, enacted by the legislator, provides sanctions, and if such a “law” 
becomes the content of a man’s consciousness, it can very well become a motive of 
his behaviour and hence a cause of his … abstaining from theft and murder.
2
 
 
…the lawyer must do his duty regardless of dialectical doubts, though with a 
feeling of humility springing from the knowledge that if international law is, in 
some ways, at the vanishing point of law, the law of war is, perhaps even more 
conspicuously, at the vanishing point of international law.
3
 
These quotations sketch three facets of a conundrum between military training in 
international humanitarian law (IHL), the prevention of violations and compliance 
(behavioural conformity) with the law in armed conflict. The first quotation, from Henri 
Dunant’s colleague and rival Gustave Moynier, argues that dissemination of international 
humanitarian law (IHL) is a necessary condition for its implementation, and links IHL’s 
ethos to repeated behaviour (‘its spirit must be introduced into the customs of 
soldiers…’). It is the first iteration of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC)’s historic approach to dissemination: the belief that increasing awareness of IHL 
rules among soldiers and civilians is a prerequisite for the implementation of those rules 
during armed conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
Gustave Moynier, ‘Si l’on veut que la Convention soit efficace, il faut en faire pénétrer l’esprit dans 
les mœurs des militaires et dans celles des populations tout entières. Il faut en vulgariser les principes 
par une propagande active.’ Second International Conference of the Red Cross, Berlin, 1869, Compte- 
rendu des travaux de la Conférence internationale tenue à Berlin du 22 au 27 avril 1869 par les 
délégués des gouvernements signataires de la Convention de Genève et des sociétés et associations de 
secours aux militaires blessés et malades (J.F. Starcke 1869) 74 
Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Anders Wedberg trans, Lawbook Exchange 2007) 166 
Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War’ (1952) 29 British Yearbook of 
International Law 360, 382 
9  
The second quotation, from Hans Kelsen’s General Theory of Law and State, 
acknowledges the possibility of legal rules shaping human thought, agency and action,  
in a critique of O.W. Holmes’ view that domestic legal rules do not cause changes in 
behaviour.
4   
This  process  is  doubly  contingent:  on  sanctions  and  on  law        being 
internalised into ‘consciousness’; and it assumes the effectiveness of sanctions: ‘[i]f the 
legal norm… provides sanctions, and if such a “law” becomes the content of a man’s 
consciousness…’ It is clearly limited to the domestic law context (‘enacted by the 
legislator’) and sees individual ‘sanctions’ as one of two prerequisites for law 
motivating action. Yet Kelsen’s critique is enigmatic. It does not express how law might 
enter into human agents’ consciousness. In modern terminology from constructivist 
international relations (which considers that norms constitute and explain states’ 
behaviour and identity within the international order, and studies the mechanisms by 
which this occurs),
5 
this is how norms might be ‘internalised’, becoming ‘taken-for- 
granted’ by states and individual actors.6 Nor does Kelsen address how a combination of 
sanctions and conscientious internalisation can motivate an individual’s subsequent 
behaviour. There are explanatory gaps between promulgated or disseminated rules on 
the one hand and human consciousness and agency on the other. The relationship 
between IHL rules and subsequent individual or regimental conduct in armed conflict 
needs to be explored. The brief extract from Kelsen illustrates the need to disaggregate 
questions of compliance,
7 
and at times to reorient questions of norm internalisation  and 
behaviour from the state to the soldier and officer; or in non-international armed  
conflict, also to the member of an armed group. 
 
The third extract acknowledges that the structure and content of IHL presents distinctive 
challenges for the military legal adviser. It concludes Hersch Lauterpacht’s 
problématique on the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949. Having identified ‘gaps, 
 
 
 
 
Kelsen (n 2) 
Martha Finnemore and  Kathryn  Sikkink,  ‘Taking  Stock:  The  Constructivist  Research  Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics’ (2001) 4 Annual Review of Political Science 391; Jutta 
Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope, ‘Constructivism and International Law’ in Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark A. 
Pollack (eds), Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State 
of the Art (Cambridge University Press 2012) 
Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Why Do Nations Obey International Law?’ (1997) 106 Yale Law Journal 2599; 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998) 52 
International Organization 887, 895 
Michael P. Scharf, ‘International Law in Crisis: A Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the Compliance 
Debate’ (2009) 31 Cardozo Law Review 45 
10  
compromises, obscurities…’ in the treaty texts,
8 
Lauterpacht lists at length the matters   left 
unregulated or unsettled in the Four Geneva Conventions, and recommends evolving 
clarification of IHL as weapons develop and conflicts become more complex. The extract 
considers the role of military legal advisers some twenty-five years before states adopted 
Article 82 of Additional Protocol I to the Four Geneva Conventions, which requires states 
parties to make legal advisers available to commanders, to advise on the application of the 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, and on ‘appropriate instruction’ to troops in 
IHL.
9  
IHL’s flaws do not require its    ‘mere exposition’ in military manuals and textbooks, 
but ‘a critical spirit’ from the legal adviser.
10 
In Lauterpacht’s view, the progressive 
development  of  IHL  is  poorly  served  by  presenting  contested  interpretations  as settled 
law.
11  
The  ‘humility’  Lauterpacht  suggests  reflects  IHL’s  indeterminacy  and  hints   at 
caution in the relationship between legal adviser and commander, or between legal adviser 
and the officers or soldiers he or she trains. 
 
Lauterpacht’s ‘vanishing point’ is a nod to the Oxford legal theorist Thomas Holland.
12 
Holland believed that international law could not be subject to the fiat of a sovereign, as 
John Austin had argued, without international law either becoming part of domestic law,  or 
requiring an entity to arbitrate disputes and enforce its norms.
13 
IHL’s functioning as a legal 
system, and implicitly states’ compliance with it, is at a ‘vanishing point’, although 
interdisciplinary compliance theory postdates Lauterpacht’s observations by some 
decades.
14 
His notional legal adviser has duties despite this, to clarify and disseminate    the 
law to governments, the armed forces and ‘others’, ‘with determination though without 
complacency and perhaps not always very hopefully…’
15 
Training and advice in IHL 
involves communicating an imperfect, contested set of norms to an audience of soldiers 
 
 
 
 
 
Lauterpacht (n 3) 380; Hersch Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (1933; 
reprint, Oxford University Press 2011) 412, n 2 
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of 
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered into force 7 December 1978) 
1125 UNTS 3 (AP I) art 82 
Lauterpacht (n 3) 380 
ibid., 379 
Thomas E. Holland, Elements of Jurisprudence (9th edition Oxford University Press 1900) 369, cited in 
Richard Collins, ‘No Longer at the Vanishing Point? International Law and the Analytic Tradition in 
Jurisprudence’ (2014) 5 Jurisprudence 265, 268 
ibid., per Collins 
1.4 (henceforth, cross-references to other sections in the thesis appear in this form) 
Lauterpacht (n 3) 382 
 and officers who may not fully understand these norms, or may express a contingent 
willingness to comply. 
 
These three extracts begin to sketch a conundrum (an intricate and durable problem, but not 
an insoluble one) between military training in IHL, prevention and compliance: the 
relationship between these three concepts is neither fully theorised nor empirically proven. 
From Moynier, dissemination may be necessary, but can it be sufficient to prevent IHL 
violations and ensure compliance? This theme recurs in 1.2 below. Applying Kelsen, how 
do individual soldiers, officers and armed group fighters internalise IHL norms, and to what 
extent can the norms be said to cause subsequent behaviour? These questions return in 1.4 
below. And prompted by Lauterpacht: how does IHL’s indeterminacy affect IHL training? 
What else is distinctive about modern IHL that places it at the ‘vanishing point’ of 
international law compliance? The following paragraphs address these questions, finding 
seven distinctive challenges for compliance in IHL. 
 
First, contested norms: just as Lauterpacht emphasised ‘gaps, compromises, 
obscurities…’, Dill finds ‘structural indeterminacy’ in IHL, so that its norms depend for 
their meaning on the ‘interpreting agent’s conception of utility and reasonableness’.16 
Diplomatic consensus to include ‘excessive’ or ‘reasonable’ in IHL treaty norms 
delegates considerable authority to individual soldiers’ and officers’ judgement. Dill 
finds it ‘puzzling’ that simultaneously, not much is expected of individual combatants’ 
reasoning and application of IHL in the stress of battle, and that IHL leaves so much to 
individual agents’ moral discretion.17 
 
All branches of law include indeterminate or contested norms, where lawyers on either side 
of a dispute can expand or contract definitions to support an arguable case. The need to 
interpret legal texts is the rule, while clarity is the exception.
18 
In IHL, however, the human 
stakes are higher and bloodier than in other areas of law. Although not all of IHL is 
contested (the protections granted to prisoners of war in the Third Geneva Convention are 
not the subject of dispute), many IHL norms are poised between rival interpretations, with 
military necessity on the one hand and humanity on the other. These norms have 
 
 
Janina Dill, Legitimate Targets? Social Construction, International Law and US Bombing (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 352 
ibid., 306 
Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca, The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation 
(Wilkinson and Weaver trans, University of Notre Dame Press 1969) 126 
11 
 been stretched or contracted for operational or judicial reasons, with force protection 
arguments  weighing  military  necessity  more  strongly  than  civilian  protection,
19  
or the 
principle of humanity weighing civilian protection more strongly than military necessity.
20 
Individual IHL concepts can be ambiguous or contested, from the breadth of the   definition 
of   a   military   advantage   differing   between   states;
21   
the   open-textured   principle of 
proportionality – a prospective comparison of two qualitatively distinct predicted 
outcomes;
22 
and the complexity in the principle of distinction where civilians take a direct 
part in hostilities.
23 
Ambiguity is a common result of treaty negotiation, as states ‘find it 
easier to build consensus at a higher level of abstraction.’
24 
As Gillon and Waldron both 
point out, there are different types of indeterminacy and norm contestation. Gillon proposes 
tests to distinguish ambiguity, generality and indeterminacy,
25 
while Waldron differentiates 
between ambiguity, contestability and vagueness.
26 
Waldron argues that ambiguous laws do 
not by themselves undermine law’s capacity to guide conduct, as individuals can employ 
practical   reasoning.   However,   Waldron   believes   that   deliberate   attempts   to exploit 
ambiguity in the definition of ‘severe …pain and suffering’ which is part of the  prohibition 
on torture have undermined international law’s capacity to guide conduct.
27 
It is the 
coexistence of indeterminacy within the law and irresponsible rhetoric about it that risks 
compliance. If multiple states engage in similar rhetoric, shrinking ambiguous   prohibitions 
in international law to suit their policy preferences, 
 
 
 
Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, ‘Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective’ (2005) 4 
Journal of Military Ethics, 3, 11, 20. For a critique: Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Fault Lines in the Law of 
Attack’, in Susan C. Breau and Agnieszka Jachec-Neale (eds), Testing the Boundaries of International 
Humanitarian Law (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2006) 277, 294, 296-8; Ruvi 
Ziegler and Shai Otzari, ‘Do Soldiers’ Lives Matter? A View from Proportionality’ (2012) 45 Israel Law 
Review 1 
Henry Shue, ‘Civilian Protection and Force Protection’, in David Whetham (ed.), Ethics, Law and 
Military Operations (Palgrave Macmillan 2011) 135 
United Kingdom, Interpretive Statement on AP I, art 52(2), cited in Ministry of Defence, The Joint 
Service Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict (2nd edition, Oxford University Press 2004) 56; United 
States, Department of Defense Law of War Manual (2015) 5.7.7.2 
AP I, art 51(5)(b); Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law (ICRC, Cambridge University Press 2005) (ICRC Customary IHL Study) rule 14 
AP I, arts 48, 51(2), 51(3); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (adopted 8 June 1977, entered 
into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 609 (AP II), arts 13(2), 13(3); ICRC Customary IHL Study, 
rules 1, 6; ICRC (2009) Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law (ICRC Interpretive Guidance DPH) 
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights through International 
Law (Oxford University Press, USA 2013) 113 
Brendan S. Gillon,  ‘Ambiguity,  Generality, and Indeterminacy:  Tests and  Definitions’ (1990) 85 
Synthèse 391 
Jeremy Waldron, ‘Vagueness and the Guidance of Action’ in Andrei Marmor and Scott Soames (eds), 
Philosophical Foundations of Language in the Law (Oxford University Press 2011) 58 n 9 
ibid., citing the US anti-torture statute, 18 USC 2340 (1) 
12 
13  
contested norms can cause, in Brunnée and Toope’s words, ‘non-compliance or, if the 
contestation is widespread and sustained, a shift in the norm itself.’28 
 
Contested norms and rhetoric that undermines compliance can both affect IHL training. 
From the perspective of an individual soldier or armed group fighter, who may have 
limited education or literacy, the nuance of IHL’s indeterminacy is likely to be lost. 
Complex terminology in training may confuse instead of instilling understanding of IHL 
norms. If a decision is taken to impart IHL norms with simplicity and clarity, there may 
be less confusion, but selective understanding; with a risk of international law violations 
when troops are deployed. Where IHL training is squeezed in the curriculum for basic  
or annual training, contested norms may be misunderstood. Instead of practical 
reasoning, as Waldron asserts, the soldier or armed group fighter will rely on the ethos  
of his unit and recollections from his training to decide how to implement the law. IHL 
training operates in particular social and organisational contexts. Contested norms and 
institutional responses to them exemplify the gap between norms and behaviour that is  
at the centre of the conundrum between IHL training, prevention and compliance. This 
is why Lauterpacht urges the military lawyer to impart IHL ‘regardless of dialectical 
doubts’ and acknowledges the inevitable ‘humility’ that results from IHL’s problem of 
compliance. 
 
The  second  distinctive  challenge  for  compliance  in  IHL  relates  to  the  classification of 
conflicts.
29 
Non-international armed conflicts (NIAC – between one or more States and one 
or more armed groups, or between armed groups) now outnumber international armed 
conflicts (IAC – conflicts between states, and under Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I, 
wars of national liberation). There were 17 IAC and 38 NIAC in 2017.
30 
Yet the treaty  law 
for NIAC is less developed than that for IAC. Some NIAC are governed only by the 
minimum standards in Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions 1949. Others are 
regulated by Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II: where the latter is ratified, and 
where the conflict meets the three-part threshold in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol  II,
31
 
and exceeds the lower threshold in Article 1(2) of ‘internal disturbances and 
 
Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J. Toope. Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional 
Account (Cambridge University Press 2010) 124 
Elizabeth Wilmshurst (ed.), International Law and the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford University 
Press 2012) 
Annyssa Bellal, The War Report: Armed Conflicts in 2017 (Geneva Academy, March 2018) 29 
The NIAC must ‘take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces and 
dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which, under responsible command, exercise such 
14  
tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence…’. In response to this gap 
in regulation and protection, case law has begun to suggest that the distinction between 
IAC and NIAC is dissolving;
32 
and both states and non-governmental organisations 
seek to apply treaty provisions alongside customary IHL to enable selected provisions of 
IAC IHL to protect non-combatants in NIAC. This is not without controversy. The 2005 
Study on Customary IHL by the ICRC has encountered sharp criticism for including 
non-state actors and international organisations as sources of ‘other practice’ (but the 
Study itself acknowledges that the legal status of such practice is ‘unclear’), and for 
apparently conflating the separate criteria of state practice and opinio juris.
33
 
 
Third, despite a growing body of case law from the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) in particular, there is ongoing controversy on the co-applicability of and norm-by- 
norm interaction between IHL and international human rights law (IHRL), where a state has 
‘effective control’ of territory outside the borders of its state,
34 
or where its ‘agents exercise 
control and authority over an individual’.
35 
Military and political leaders in the UK persist 
in a strong interpretation of lex specialis derogat legi generali, as code for a rejection of the 
extraterritorial application of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and    the 
remedies that result, and a preference for IHL as the sole applicable body of law in armed 
conflict.
36 
Although there is still vivid debate on whether IHL and IHRL should be co- 
applicable,
37 
this thesis adopts the view that a strong interpretation of lex specialis is naïve 
and uninformative: that a norm-by-norm inquiry into how IHL and IHRL might be more 
mutually influencing,
38 
or a study of the situations 
 
 
 
control over part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations 
and to implement [AP II]’ (emphasis added) 
Prosecutor v Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction (ICTY 
Appeals Chamber) 2 October 1995 para 70 
Yoram Dinstein, ‘The ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law Study’ (2006) 82 International 
Law Studies (Blue Book) 99; John B. Bellinger and William J. Haynes, ‘A US Government Response to 
the International Committee of the Red Cross Study Customary International Humanitarian Law’ (2007) 
International Review of the Red Cross 443; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, ‘Customary International 
Humanitarian Law: A Response to US Comments’ (2007) 89 International Review of the Red Cross 473; 
Loizidou v. Turkey (Admissibility) (1995) ECHR 10; Cyprus v. Turkey (2001) ECHR 331; Bankovic and ors 
v. Belgium and Ors (Admissibility) (2001) ECHR 890; Issa v. Turkey (2004) ECHR 629 
Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom (2011) ECHR 1093, para 137; Jaloud v. Netherlands (2014) 
ECHR App. no. 47708/08, 20 November 2014 
7.5 
Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict (2nd edition, 
Cambridge University Press 2010) 24; Naz K. Modirzadeh, ‘The Dark Sides of Convergence: A Pro- 
Civilian Critique of the Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Law in Armed Conflict’ (2010) 86 
International Law Studies 349 
Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties: Law, Principles and Policy 
(Oxford University Press 2013) 232; Hassan v The United Kingdom (2014) ECHR 936 
15  
in which either IHL or IHRL might be the dominant interpretive tool are more 
productive.
39
 
 
More importantly for IHL training, prevention and compliance, a state’s rejection of the 
co-applicability of IHL and IHRL could entail a failure to consider the norms shared 
between the two branches of law.
40 
For example, IHL prohibits torture and outrages 
upon personal dignity, cruel or humiliating and degrading treatment in international and 
non-international armed conflicts,
41 
and these prohibitions must be included in military 
instruction in IHL. IHL’s prohibitions on torture and inhuman treatment (as variously 
described)  are  mirrored  by  IHRL’s  prohibitions  on  torture  and  cruel,  inhuman   or 
degrading treatment or punishment.
42  
The Convention against Torture (CAT)   requires 
states parties to train ‘military’ law enforcement and anyone who might have custody of 
a detainee in these prohibitions.
43
 
 
The fourth and fifth challenges for compliance in IHL are closely linked to the problems of 
contested norms, conflict classification and the co-applicability or convergence or IHL and 
IHRL. The fourth, interoperability, relates to the effect of these controversies when several 
states work together in multinational deployments. Where states hold differing 
interpretations of IHL norms and their interaction with IHRL; where states in a coalition 
have not all ratified the same IHL treaties, or have differing beliefs as to the status of 
customary IHL norms, soldiers will be trained in the interpretation preferred by their state, 
commanders and superiors. As Abbott notes, the jurisprudence of the ECtHR risks 
‘strain[ing]’ or ‘sever[ing]’ cooperation between North American and European states 
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within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), because different states apply 
distinct rules of engagement on the use of force: either a conduct of hostilities 
framework (governed by IHL) or a law enforcement framework (influenced by ECtHR 
case law).
44    
Zwanenberg points to the crisis of confidence caused by a US directive to 
target opium producers in Afghanistan, owing to the US interpretation that it is lawful to 
target ‘war-sustaining’ objects as a military objective. After resistance from European 
states, this directive was withdrawn.
45  IHL’s interoperability challenges  also relate   to 
compliance: Zwanenberg argues that where one state believes that an IHL norm applies 
and another coalition state does not, the first state is bound to urge the other to comply 
with the disputed norm, pursuant to the obligation in Common Article 1 of the Four 
Geneva Conventions 1949 to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for the Conventions ‘in all 
circumstances’. Similarly, he believes that individual criminal responsibility for IHL 
violations is more likely in multinational operations where states disagree.
46 
This  could 
be because of IHL’s contested norms, questions of conflict classification or IHL and 
IHRL co-applicability. Zwanenberg sees common training programmes, and the 
development of common rules of engagement (ROE) as potential but minimalist 
solutions to this problem of interoperability,
47  
but IHL training and compliance    could 
also be adversely affected by confusion and disagreement among states, especially if 
these common ROE (and the mission-specific training that results) uses ambiguous 
phrasing in order to gain consensus. 
 
The fifth reason why IHL is at the ‘vanishing point’ of compliance is its strong 
disaggregation to soldiers, officers, civilian authorities with responsibility for ROE or a 
proportionality calculus; and in NIAC, armed group fighters. Strong disaggregation is 
the term used in this thesis to differentiate between the relevance of individual actors in 
international law in general,
48 and the extent of IHL’s reliance on individual actors.49  It 
is a version of the agent/structure problem in constructivist international relations 
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theory;
50 Scharf’s call to consider elite individual actors in studies of international law 
compliance;
51 and Besson’s call to ‘lift the state veil’,52 moving beyond the fiction of a 
single meta-state. 
 
The problem of the ‘strategic corporal’ exemplifies the problem of IHL’s strong 
disaggregation in modern, asymmetric conflicts. Where there may be multiple armed groups 
fighting a coalition of states and/or other armed groups across one or more states; and where 
the intensity of these conflicts may vary over time and within a small area, soldiers and 
officers must understand the IHL of IAC and of NIAC, and the relevant principles of IHRL 
that also apply, in peacekeeping or law enforcement situations. Krulak coined the concept of 
the ‘three block war’ to describe these rapidly-changing factual and legal circumstances of 
deployment; and the ‘strategic corporal’ who must react swiftly and lawfully, with legal and 
moral expertise  intact.
53  
Carswell applies these  complexities to IHL training.     He  urges 
against simplistic approaches in IHL training, and training that excludes IHRL. Soldiers 
must ‘grasp the legal nuances associated with the sliding scale of conflict’, because if they 
do not, ‘drastic consequences’ can result.
54
 
 
But soldiers, officers and fighters in armed groups need not only understand IHL’s 
complexities, they must also accept that IHL binds them, even if enemy forces violate the 
law. The relics of reciprocity in IHL, and its many misunderstandings (where violations are 
perpetrated in revenge or as tit-for-tat punishment) constitute the sixth challenge for 
compliance in IHL. Reciprocity is said to underpin the treatment of prisoners of war in 
international armed conflicts. One state is encouraged to treat prisoners of war lawfully, as 
they would wish opposing forces to do if they or their comrades were detained.
55 
In White’s 
words,  reciprocity  works  best  in  IAC,  or  symmetrical  conflicts;  while  NIAC  requires 
‘centralised enforcement’.
56 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, parties to an 
international armed conflict could employ belligerent reprisals which 
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themselves violated IHL in response to an IHL violation by enemy forces. The purpose 
of these belligerent reprisals was to secure future compliance (and the cessation of 
ongoing violations) by the violating state. This doctrine fell out of favour following the 
Second World War, so that by the mid-1970s, some states believed it should be 
expressly prohibited in Additional Protocol I.
57
 
 
The current position is that IHL’s humanitarian provisions should not depend on reciprocity. 
In particular, the obligation to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for IHL ‘in all circumstances’ 
does not depend on reciprocity; and this also applies to NIAC governed by Common Article 
3.
58 
Provost disputes this trend to reject reciprocity out of hand. He believes that reciprocity 
can be a tool for IHL compliance in both symmetric IAC and asymmetric NIAC, if we 
recognise that individual agents and armed groups all have a role in promoting IHL 
compliance, through communities of practice.
59 
This original viewpoint places  compliance 
at the centre of the reciprocity problématique, but it confuses problems and solutions (where 
perceived reciprocity and the potential for reprisals are the problem and compliance is a 
solution). More persuasive is Aldrich’s prediction that ‘disrespect for the law breeds further 
disrespect’. Where IHL’s monitoring tools are insufficient (as the next paragraph shows  
they are), ‘notions of reciprocity … lead …into a downward spiral … of expanding 
noncompliance with the law.’
60  
Benvenisti and Cohen offer a subtle explanation. They 
argue that in practice, armed forces rarely have ‘ample information confirming the 
opponent’s intention’ in relation to IHL compliance, so they are apt to interpret the enemy’s 
actions  as  deliberate  IHL  violations.
61   
This  leads  to  Aldrich’s  ‘downward  spiral’    of 
violations perpetrated in revenge. Such violations are not only perpetrated by individual 
soldiers, they are also occasionally encouraged by commanders. Mackmin cites General 
Patton’s speech to Allied troops in Sicily in 1943, that ‘no mercy’ should be shown to the 
enemy because he had ‘killed thousands of your comrades’. Shortly afterwards, American 
soldiers murdered 70 
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prisoners of war.
62 
Misunderstood reciprocity and violations motivated by revenge are 
an important reason why IHL is at the ‘vanishing point’ of compliance. 
 
IHL’s absent or disused monitoring mechanisms are the seventh and final reason why IHL  
is at the ‘vanishing point’ of compliance. IHL lacks a system for independent or transparent 
oversight of state practice. The IHL of IAC has three distinctive mechanisms which might 
have been used to improve compliance, but all of these depend upon state consent during an 
armed conflict, and in practice they have been rarely, if ever, called upon. Under the Four 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, there is a sharply limited role for  
‘Protecting Powers’ (a neutral state or states) to cooperate and scrutinise the application of 
IHL in international armed conflicts.
63  
However, Protecting Powers ‘shall not in any   case 
exceed their mission’, and must ‘take account of the imperative necessities of security’ in 
the state in which they operate.
64 
In practice, Protecting Powers are seldom used, with the 
last recorded instance being in the Falklands War.
65 
An enquiry procedure might also take 
place  into  alleged  violations  of the  Geneva  Conventions, at the  request of a  party to  an 
international armed conflict,
66 
but none of the admittedly few attempts to launch this   have 
succeeded.
67   
The  International  Humanitarian  Fact-Finding  Commission  (IHFFC)    was 
established by Article 90 of Additional Protocol I to investigate grave breaches and other 
serious IHL violations in IAC. It continues to exist, but in practice has never been used. As 
Pejic points out, no other branch of international law relies on state consent to trigger 
monitoring mechanisms to this extent.
68 
The Four Geneva Conventions and their Additional 
Protocols lack a reporting and monitoring process, in contrast to the mechanisms relating to 
conventional weapons,
69 
landmines, 
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 cultural property and children and armed conflict,
70 
which exist, but do not necessarily 
yield comprehensive or informative state reports.
71
 
 
The absence or disuse of compliance tools in Geneva law, the absence of monitoring 
tools for NIAC, and states’ resistance to further treaty negotiations which might have 
established binding compliance mechanisms led the 31
st 
International Conference of the 
Red Cross and Red Crescent (RCRC) to establish consultations with states to strengthen 
compliance with IHL.
72 
This initiative, led by the ICRC and the Government of 
Switzerland, held nine meetings with states from 2012-2015,
73 
and a variety of bilateral 
and regional outreach meetings.
74 
The phrasing of Resolution 1 - ‘invites’, ‘encourages’ 
illustrates the consensual and voluntary nature of the consultation process. There were 
no plans to revisit treaty texts. All views expressed in the publicly-released updates are 
unattributed to particular States.
75 
Early meetings removed from the agenda discussions 
of legal opinions, country visits, urgent appeals and an early warning function.
76
 
Consultations did move forward on periodic reporting, although discussions on  fact-finding 
were postponed until states might agree on an institutional structure.
77 
Meetings of States, 
voluntary reports on the implementation of IHL, and thematic discussions resulted in   some 
consensus.
78  
Delegates  were  keen  to  avoid  both  politicisation
79  
and  excessive  use   of 
resources;
80  
some states were especially keen to    avoid establishing the IHL equivalent of 
the UN Human Rights Council. Delegates agreed that no legally binding mechanism would 
be established. It would be state-driven, voluntary and based on consensus. State delegates 
preferred  a  ‘non-contextual  and  non-conflict  specific  basis’  to  the  discussions.
81 
Early 
consultations suggested a preference among some states for 
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thematic discussion, as a means to avoid potentially politicised state-specific evaluation. 
Views differed on whether or not civil society observers should be invited to the 
meetings of States, with some delegations opposing this as they feared the meetings 
might be ‘politici[sed]’. Discussions on any involvement of non-state actors, as a means 
of improving compliance in non-international armed conflicts were postponed until the 
conclusion of the consultation phase. Prior to the 32
nd 
meeting of the RCRC, a  Meeting 
of States was supported as a ‘central pillar’ of compliance initiatives, and ‘most States’ 
agreed that voluntary reporting on national practice in IHL, and a separate process for 
thematic discussion ‘should be established’. A fact-finding mechanism was a possibility, 
to be ‘added over time if there is State agreement’.82 If voluntary reporting had been 
accepted, states might have shared their practice inter alia on IHL training using a 
collaborative reporting rubric.
83
 
 
Before the 32
nd  
RCRC, the Strengthening Compliance Initiative had become a    discussion 
not about IHL or compliance, but how a state-led, thematic and voluntary process might be 
constructed by consensus. Consensus-based negotiations are problematic because a few 
vocal resisters can stall progress, and this is what happened at the 32
nd 
RCRC, when the 
resolution that stemmed from the Strengthening Compliance Initiative was rejected in the 
late stages of negotiation. The USA, UK, and France had supported it, but the Russian 
Federation drafted a resolution, supported by Syria and India, that proposed ongoing 
intergovermental dialogue, and confidential bilateral meetings between states and the 
ICRC.
84 
Pakistan announced that it could not support the ICRC’s resolution by   consensus, 
so  a  shorter,  compromise  resolution  was  drafted  by  the  Organisation  of  the     Islamic 
Conference  (OIC)  and eventually agreed.
85  
There  had  been concerns that the    proposed 
reporting mechanism might be similar to the universal periodic review mechanism 
established by the UN Human Rights Council; and the Arab Group of states in particular 
was concerned that the process would become politicised.
86
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22  
Despite the demise of the ICRC-sponsored resolution, intergovernmental meetings 
continue under Resolution 2, at approximately six-monthly intervals, with the first 
Meeting of States held in November 2016.
87 
No updates on these meetings are  released 
to the public. The results of these meetings will be presented to the 33
rd 
Meeting of the 
RCRC in 2019.
88 
Also at the 33
rd 
meeting, a range of states, the EU and NATO will 
report to the ICRC on pledges made at the 32
nd 
Meeting,
89 
which included specific 
commitments on IHL dissemination and training.
90 
The usual approach is for the ICRC 
to send surveys to states and National Red Cross or Red Crescent Societies,   requesting 
brief reports on pledges made at the previous Meeting. Effective monitoring of IHL 
training would depend upon the agreement of states to share more than platitudes and 
assertions of good practice in these brief reports. The best way to do this is the creation 
of a collaborative rubric of standards on IHL training.
91 
There is some potential that 
state practice on IHL dissemination and training will be open to intergovernmental 
scrutiny at the 33
rd Meeting of the RCRC. In contrast, states’ unwillingness to agree to 
evaluation or transparent oversight of their record in IHL in general is a perennial 
problem, contrasted by their willingness to assert good practice in IHL’s laconic   norms 
of prevention, including dissemination and military training in IHL. 
 
 
1.2 Dissemination and Military Instruction in International Humanitarian Law 
 
 
States must disseminate IHL ‘as widely as possible’, ‘including to the civilian   population’, 
and integrate it into programmes of military instruction,
92 
or training.
93 
The   dissemination 
and training obligation applies in peace and war, unusual for IHL which generally applies 
only during armed conflict or belligerent occupation. In IAC where 
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23  
Additional Protocol I is ratified, dissemination should encompass both military and civilian 
authorities, so that all of those with responsibility for applying IHL are ‘fully acquainted’ 
with treaty texts.
94 
The obligation to disseminate ‘the text’ of the Four Geneva Conventions 
includes the dissemination of Common Article 3, so NIAC IHL is part of the dissemination 
and training obligation.
95 
An obligation to disseminate IHL also appears in NIAC regulated 
by Additional Protocol II,
96 
so that armed groups are also obliged to disseminate IHL  once 
a NIAC begins. Archival research suggests that the reference only to dissemination and not 
to military instruction was a hurried diplomatic compromise to agree the text of the Protocol 
rather than a substantive intention to restrict the obligation to that of dissemination instead 
of military instruction.
97
 
 
The obligation to instruct military personnel in IHL is laconic (simply stated); with only 
recent treaties and soft law adding detail on how it should be implemented.
98 
It is, in the 
words of a recent commentary, a ‘due diligence’ obligation, ‘not one of result.’99 This is 
not an asset. It means that IHL does not provide ‘criteria, indicators or standards’ to  test 
state  practice  in   dissemination  and  military  instruction.
100   
With  the  absence      of 
transparent monitoring of state practice in IHL, the extent of states’ compliance with 
their dissemination and military instruction obligations is lost to scrutiny, but so is the 
scope for sharing best practice. It also means that scholarly interpretations of the 
dissemination and instruction obligation are apt to be dismissed as lex ferenda, losing 
their scope to improve state practice in this respect. 
 
The simplicity of the treaty norm and its emphasis on ‘dissemination’ continues to reflect 
Moynier’s assumption that dissemination was a prerequisite for compliance with IHL. The 
Pictet Commentaries saw dissemination and military instruction in IHL as logically 
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prior to the duty to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for the Geneva Conventions of 1949 ‘in 
all circumstances’;101 while the 2016 ICRC Commentary still sees it as a ‘corollary’   of 
the duty to ‘respect and ensure respect’.102 At the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva 
1974-1977,  ICRC  and  state  representatives  spoke  of  dissemination  and       military 
training’s  contribution  to  compliance  for  IHL,103  an  idealism  which  grounded  the 
diplomatic  debates.  There  is  a  fallacy  in  this  idealism:  while  ignorance  of  IHL is 
plausibly a contributing cause of some violations,
104 
and IHL dissemination and  
training   are   mentioned   every   time   IHL’s   implementation   is   on   the diplomatic 
agenda,
105 
it does not follow that civilian dissemination and military instruction will 
prevent future IHL violations. Relying on civilian dissemination as a preventive tool is a 
dated form of magical thinking for those states which no longer rely on mass 
conscription and national service. There is evidence that the civilian dissemination 
obligation is implemented intermittently, with warped understandings of IHL prevalent 
and not adequately countered in the media. More specifically, while more than two- 
thirds of a large and diverse sample of civilians thought the Geneva Conventions were 
still useful, 44% of those surveyed who were aware of the IHL prohibition on torture 
thought that torture was still sometimes acceptable.
106 
This was a higher proportion 
than those the ICRC surveyed in 1999, proving a shift in a contested norm. 
 
Causal uncertainty is therefore one aspect of the conundrum between military training in 
IHL, the prevention of violations, and promotion of compliance. Deficient military 
training in IHL has been implicated in the wilful killing of civilians and the torture of 
detainees;
107 
but scholarship has gradually acknowledged the insufficiency of IHL 
 
 
GC I - GC IV, common art 1; Jean Pictet (ed.), Commentary to the Four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 
1949, vol I (1952), 347-349, vol II (1960) 257-259, vol III (1960) 613-615, vol IV (1958) 580-582 
Muller (n 95) 
Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva (ORDCG) 1974-1977, vol VIII,  Summary 
Record, 37
th 
Meeting, 2 April 1975 (CDDH/I/SR.37), 383, draft art 72 of AP I – Dissemination, paragraph 55; 
vol IX, Summary Record, Third Session of Committee I, 59th Meeting, 17 May 1976 (CDDH/I/SR.59) 241- 
244, draft art 37 of AP II – Dissemination, CDDH/1, CDDH/226.Corr.2 
Sylvie-Stoyanka Junod, ‘La Diffusion Du Droit International Humanitaire’ in Christophe Swinarski (ed), 
Etudes et Essais sur le Droit International Humanitaire et sur les Principles de la Croix-Rouge en 
l’honneur de Jean Pictet (Martinus Nijhoff 1984) 359 
ibid., 360 
ICRC, ‘People on War’ (2016) 
Peers Inquiry, ‘Report of the Department of the Army Review of the Preliminary Investigations into the My Lai 
Incident (1970); Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, ‘Dishonoured Legacy: 
The Lessons of the Somalia Affair: Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to 
Somalia’ (1997); Major-General Antonio M. Taguba, ‘US Army Report of Abuse of Prisoners in Iraq’ (MacMay 
2008); Sir William Gage, ‘The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report’ (The Stationery Office 2011); US Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central 
 training to prevent violations,
108 
while interdisciplinary research suggests that moral 
disengagement and discourse about law and enemy forces may be more powerful causal 
factors for IHL violations than ignorance of the law.
109 
A further aspect of the   conundrum 
is this gulf between understanding, knowledge and recall of IHL on the one hand, and 
willingness to comply or ‘a favourable attitude’ towards IHL on the other.
110 
If a 
communicated norm does not cause subsequent compliance, then what else is needed? 
 
The literature on IHL training has been built interstitially, with some historic insights  about 
individual and social psychology forgotten by modern scholars.
111 
Early authors did 
recognise that the aim of IHL training was not mere dissemination, but the development   of 
‘psychological resistance’ to ‘contemplated’ IHL violations;
112  
while  others thought    less 
plausibly that dissemination alone might build a ‘reflex of solidarity’, overcoming brutal 
instincts.
113 
Recent works by military trainers, academic researchers and civil society 
groups recommend that IHL training promote attitudinal change
114 
and the ‘internalisation’ 
of norms so that they become second nature.
115 
These authors recognise that IHL training 
needs to take place in a context which facilitates both understanding and a willingness to 
comply.  They believe  that  IHL  training  needs  interdisciplinary insights  from  education 
theory,
116 
organisational theory,
117 
and ethics;
118
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and that ‘barracks culture’ and competing priorities can jeopardise training.119 More 
applied accounts encourage an approach where soldiers encounter moral dilemmas in 
practical exercises, so that these dilemmas can be lawfully addressed ‘in the chaos of 
conflict.’120  Potential  modalities  for  IHL training in  the twenty-first  century  include 
battle inoculation training at distributed simulation sites,
121 
integrating IHL in computer 
games as a tool of IHL dissemination to civilians, and to future and current soldiers,
122 
and moral competence training.
123 Notwithstanding the ICRC’s recent emphasis on 
‘integrating’ IHL in all aspects of military ‘doctrine, education, training and  equipment, 
and/or sanctions’,124 the IHL training obligation is still without a complete blueprint   to 
guide state practice. The literature hints at but does not define an interdisciplinary 
component to good practice in IHL training. 
 
A careful synthesis of interdisciplinary insights is needed to address the conundrum  
between military training in IHL, prevention and compliance. The conundrum is 
characterised by a laconic norm of prevention in a branch of international law that lacks 
transparent oversight and monitoring. It is influenced by assumptions first that ignorance of 
IHL causes violations, and that mere dissemination will help prevent them. The historic 
assumption that dissemination and training are themselves preventive is now in doubt. 
Military training in IHL is thought necessary but insufficient for prevention and compliance. 
Further aspects of the conundrum are the explanatory gaps between communicated norm 
and subsequent behaviour, and between understanding and willingness to comply. Where,  
as in IHL, norms are contested and indeterminate, and responsibility for compliance is 
delegated to soldiers, officers and armed group fighters, the conundrum between training, 
prevention and compliance is also about interpretation, 
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the clear but not oversimplified communication of complex norms, and strong 
disaggregation.
125
 
 
1.3 Definitions and Choice of Terminology 
 
 
International Humanitarian Law vs. Law of Armed Conflict 
 
 
The choice of ‘international humanitarian law (IHL)’ instead of ‘the law of armed 
conflict (LOAC)’ positions the thesis in the civilian scholarly mainstream. While Fleck 
sees the two terms as interchangeable, ‘like fraternal twins’; in his view, ‘international 
humanitarian law’ ‘better conveys’ that some obligations persist in time of peace, 
including dissemination, instruction and training; and the obligation in Common Article 
1 of the Four Geneva Conventions to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for their provisions ‘in 
all  circumstances.
126   It  follows  that  ‘IHL’  is  a  better  terminological  choice    than 
‘LOAC’ for this research project. 
 
However, it is still very much a choice. Benvenisti sees the terminological preference 
between IHL and LOAC as ‘camps’,
127 
where labels are clues for interpretive preferences. 
The ICRC and the UN choose ‘IHL’.
128 
Military interlocutors tend to prefer ‘LOAC’ over 
‘IHL’, usually because not all of this body of law is humanitarian in ethos (although a 
NATO document on military training posits that ‘LOAC …regulates only those aspects of 
the  conflict  which  are  of  humanitarian  concern’).
129  
For  Dinstein,  the adjective 
‘humanitarian’ is misleading, as it ignores the centrality of military necessity in many 
LOAC/IHL rules.
130  
Roberts acknowledges the omission of the laws of neutrality and 
arguably the principle of military necessity from the term ‘humanitarian’. Dill shares this 
scepticism, noting that targeting rules do not have humanitarianism as their object and Some 
commentators go further in their rejection of the term ‘international 
purpose.
131
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humanitarian law’. In a somewhat overblown account, Wilson considers that ‘IHL’ was 
a conscious rebranding of ‘LOAC’ by the ICRC and then human rights organisations, to 
justify what she identifies as their intrusion into the actions of the armed forces. Wilson 
claims unpersuasively that ‘IHL’ is a ‘myth’: not ‘a body of law at all’ but ‘a political 
project’132 by these human rights organisations. 
 
There are better approaches to this semantic issue. One is to acknowledge that ‘IHL’ is of 
recent coinage, dating approximately from the Additional Protocols I and II of 1977, and 
that a variety of actors were involved in the development of the term and its ethos.
133
 
Another is to acknowledge that not all of IHL is ‘humanitarian’ in orientation; nor is all of 
‘LOAC’ about the conduct of hostilities. Military necessity and humanity are in frequent 
tension throughout the rules on targeting, while humanitarian goals are more apparent in the 
treatment of civilians, or former fighters who are hors de combat through detention or 
wounds.   Moreover,   some   IHL  norms  contain  rival   interpretations,
134   
with   military 
advantage  on  the  one  hand  and  the  principle  of  humanity on  the  other.
135  
As  well as 
presenting a marked challenge for compliance, as 1.1 explored, this indeterminacy shows 
IHL’s moral compromise, which has been starkly criticised. Weizman sees all of IHL as a 
‘lesser evil’, where treaty norms authorise what would otherwise be morally 
unacceptable.
136  
On this view, the adjective ‘humanitarian’ hides IHL’s contestation    and 
moral compromise. Af Jochnick and Normand offer a stronger critique, arguing that states 
deliberately constructed IHL to favour military necessity over humanitarian considerations: 
the widespread perception that IHL is a humanitarian triumph therefore allows states to 
conceal civilian suffering under a ‘façade of legitimacy’.
137 
This echoes 
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Kennedy’s  seminar  feedback  on  an  early version of this work. Research on    military 
training in IHL is, he asserted, ‘a wildly dehumanising project’;138 on the    premise that 
the armed forces cannot be partners in IHL compliance, and to acknowledge this 
possibility (or the idea that IHL scholars should work with military interlocutors for 
improved compliance)
139  
is     to be part of humanitarianism’s ‘dark side’.140  Kennedy 
argues that international humanitarian lawyers should recognise the power they wield 
when embedded as advisers to military or political authorities, just as military officials 
should add a personal, subjective sense of moral responsibility to the law-talk that 
pervades military discourse. 
141 Kennedy’s latter point is a wise reminder to   individual 
professionals, but his initial critique is unproven, failing to acknowledge the scope for 
variation between individual armed forces personnel and scholars in terms of the depth 
of their commitment to humanitarian goals. Kennedy’s critiques of the language of IHL 
are more developed: he argues that law discourse only occasionally leads to 
accountability for violations, and does not encourage political and military actors to take 
responsibility for the suffering their decisions cause. Simply labelling a violation of IHL 
or a particular military target detracts (for Kennedy) from the experience of 
responsibility.
142 In a related point, Scarry points to the ‘active redescription’ of the  act 
of injuring during battle, and the reconfiguration of language, including legal  language, 
to elide the bodily harms caused by both armed conflict and torture.
143 
This is a 
counterpoint  to  Cover’s  account  of  law’s  violence,  the  personal  harm  done        by 
(domestic) legal language and procedures.
144 
Weizman, Scarry and Cover remind those 
of us who prefer ‘international humanitarian law’ over the ‘law of armed conflict’ that 
the law itself sanitises and legitimises what would otherwise be prohibited, through the 
combatant’s dubious ‘privilege’ lawfully to kill and to be killed. 
 
What of variant terms? The term ‘laws of war’ is considered archaic,145 as are the Latin 
jus in bello, and a distinction between ‘humanitarian’ ‘Geneva law’ (the Geneva 
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Conventions  and  their  Additional  Protocols)  and  ‘Hague  law’  on  the  conduct     of 
hostilities, as Geneva law also regulates the conduct of hostilities,
146 while ‘Hague law’ 
includes   provisions   which  intend  to   limit,   for  example,  superfluous   injury    and 
unnecessary  suffering.
147   ‘Conflict  law’,148   and   the   ‘international   law   in armed 
conflict’149 are new coinages, intended to demonstrate the complexity of IHL and IHRL 
applying together, which need more time to embed in practice and scholarship before 
they become mainstream terms of art. In Part III, the terms LOAC and ‘operational law’ 
appear in analysis of the British Army’s own training materials. ‘LOAC’ is the MoD’s 
preferred term, while the Army’s current ‘operational law’ training includes the law of 
armed conflict (in international and non-international armed conflict), the use of force 
(with standards from IHL, IHRL and domestic criminal law), and on the treatment of 
prisoners of war and other detainees or internees (which also combines IHL with 
selected prohibitions from IHRL). 
 
Dissemination, Instruction and Training 
 
 
‘Dissemination’ is defined as spreading awareness of IHL, a thin measure which aims at 
general knowledge rather than in-depth scholarly attention or practical skills. This draws on 
the OED definition of the same term: ‘The act of spreading …information, widely; 
circulation.’
150   
Treaty   provisions   require   that   IHL   is   disseminated   ‘as   widely  as 
possible’:
151  
this term suggests breadth and superficiality rather than depth and    reflection 
on dissemination’s purpose and modalities. The Commentary to Article 83 of Additional 
Protocol I refers to dissemination as an obligation of result, that of ‘sowing the seeds’ of 
IHL compliance.
152 
This speaks to the conundrum between mere dissemination of IHL  and 
the prevention of violations or future compliance with IHL, because it leaves 
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unexplained the processes that might lead from awareness of IHL norms to subsequent 
behaviour. 
 
Both military ‘instruction’ and ‘training’ in IHL are lex lata obligations, but ‘instruction’ 
appears more frequently. ‘Training’ appears in treaties on the protection of cultural 
property,
153   
and  in  weapons  treaties.
154   
‘Instruction’  implies  passive  learning,     with 
classroom-style teaching. Classroom teaching is experientially distanced from the kinetic 
realities of deployment, and passive learning does not encourage the practical application of 
IHL norms. The shorthand adopted in this thesis of an ‘IHL training obligation’ reflects a 
reasoned preference for ‘training’ instead of ‘instruction’. Military personnel undergo initial 
and continuation training in a range of skills and subject-matter. Moreover, unlike the 
classroom-based, top-down ‘instruction’, IHL ‘training’ is the preferred term, as training is 
pragmatic and focused on future action. It can include classroom instruction, discussion, 
simulations or practical exercises, debriefing and crucially, repetition or drills, so that IHL 
norms are internalised; compliance as a behavioural reflex. Educational theory defines 
‘training’ as the correct term where a specific performance is the goal, and where repetition 
is the method.
155 
Intellectual understanding matters less than correct performance in the 
theory  on   ‘training’,   but   ‘the  trainee’s  underlying  knowledge   and   understanding’  is 
developed through practice.
156 
‘Training’ is therefore compatible with a repeated exposure 
to IHL norms in practical or simulation-based training. 
 
Prevention and Compliance 
 
 
Traditionally, scholars and practitioners refer to IHL’s ‘implementation’ and ‘enforcement’. 
Draper sees a variety of measures open to states as part of IHL’s ‘implementation’ 
(including legislation to provide for penal sanctions for grave breaches of the Four Geneva 
Conventions, and IHL dissemination and training); while ‘enforcement’ (which can include 
prosecution for grave breaches) is relevant only if implementation fails.
157  
For the    ICRC, 
the domestic implementation of IHL includes participating in treaties, translating and 
disseminating their texts, and legislating inter alia 
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for the protection of the Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red Crystal emblems, for the 
repression of war crimes, and the protection of children. Domestic implementation also 
includes positioning military installations away from civilians.
158
 
 
While implementation and enforcement are valid descriptors and an established terminology 
in IHL, IHL lacks ‘prevention’ as a term of art, and it also lacks a theory of prevention. One 
exception is the ICRC’s recent use of ‘prevention’ in its interdisciplinary Prevention Policy. 
This is a broad interdisciplinary toolkit, that aims to ‘foster an environment conducive to 
respect for the life and dignity of persons affected by armed conflict and other situations of 
violence’ and to ensure that armed actors respect the  ICRC’s role.
159  
It includes    bilateral 
dialogue with states and armed groups, support for domestic legislation, and attempts to 
reduce public rhetoric that encourages the violation of IHL.
160 
These largely hidden 
processes do aim to prevent violations. The latter may not encompass the anti-IHRL   ‘legal 
siege’ rhetoric that has emerged in the UK.
161 
However, the ICRC’s approach to prevention 
is practical, not theoretical; and is distinct from IHL’s norms of prevention. It does not itself 
explain the conundrum between military training, prevention and compliance. This thesis 
takes a more doctrinal, theoretical approach to prevention and compliance in IHL. As 
chapter 4 argues, IHL’s norms of prevention (including the duty to ‘respect and ensure 
respect’,
162  
command responsibility,
163  
the provision of legal advisers,
164    
dissemination 
and training,
165 
and the duty to disobey manifestly unlawful orders)
166 
are often treated   as 
discrete duties, and the lack of attention to prevention as a term of art is a potential cause of 
this. 
 
In this thesis, ‘prevention’ is defined as the treaty norms and actions of states and armed 
groups which aim to reduce the incidence of future IHL violations. ‘Compliance’ with 
IHL is behavioural conformity with IHL norms. While ‘prevention’ refers to prospective 
norms and actions, ‘compliance’ occurs in the present or past tense. As IHL is strongly 
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disaggregated to individuals and small units of fighters, the behavioural conformity is that  
of agents (individuals) as well as structures (armed forces, states and armed groups). 
 
Effectiveness 
 
 
A central aspect of the conundrum is the gap between (disseminated) norm and subsequent 
behaviour. This is not ‘compliance’, but ‘effectiveness’. ‘Effectiveness’ has always hinted at 
the consistent or expansive application of law, but the term has undergone considerable 
evolution that still does not capture fully this explanatory gap between norm and subsequent 
conduct. Kelsen defined an effective legal system as one whose norms are applied in 
practice.
167   
A  legal  system’s  validity  depends  on  its  norms  having  been  made  ‘in   a 
constitutional way’, and on its norms being applied: ‘Every single norm loses its validity 
when the total legal order to which it belongs loses its efficacy as a whole.’
168 
A system can 
be  effective  if  some  of  its  individual  norms  are  not  applied,  but  a  rule  will   become 
ineffective  if  it  is  never  applied  (desuetudo).
169  
In  contrast,  Lauterpacht’s  principle of 
effectiveness is a function of judicial interpretation which aims at ample readings of states’ 
treaty obligations; unless there is evidence that the obligation should be read  
restrictively.
170  
Lauterpacht’s principle of effectiveness favours international norms    over 
state discretion: he sees restrictively-phrased obligations, ‘artful devices’ in domestic 
legislation, and ‘deliberate inconclusiveness’ in treaty texts as ‘dangers’ for international 
law.
171 
The principle of effectiveness allows international judges to emphasise international 
law over these risks to its implementation. 
 
 
‘Effectiveness’ still relates to the application of international law norms and the (perceived) 
policies behind them, but its modern usage is built from interdisciplinary scholarship in 
international relations and international law. Raustiala recognises a continuum of 
effectiveness, defined as ‘the degree to which a legal rule or standard induces desired  
change in behavior.’
172  
In their review of an emerging literature, Raustiala    and Slaughter 
define effectiveness as: ‘the degree to which a rule induces changes in 
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behaviour  that  further  the rule’s goals;  improves the  state  of the  underlying problem; or 
achieves its policy objective’.
173 
This definition hides an epistemological objection, that 
individual scholars will define the ‘goals’, ‘problem’ and ‘policy objective’ of a particular 
branch of international law, assessing effectiveness in accordance with their own bias. In the 
IHL context, where norms are sharply contested, prevention, compliance and effectiveness 
might be identified differently by scholars who favour the principle of humanity over that of 
military necessity and vice versa, meaning that assertions of IHL’s effectiveness become 
unstable. This epistemological distinction is subtly distinct from Koskenniemi’s critique of 
‘effectiveness’ scholarship, explored in 1.5 below. 
 
Dill also focuses on the enigma between international law and state or military behaviour, 
but her definitions do not refer to policy objectives.
174 
She distinguishes, as do Raustiala 
and Slaughter,
175  
and Meyer, 
176  
between effectiveness as    a causal inquiry whether IHL 
norms change agents’ behaviour (and if they do, what normative effect results),
177 
and 
compliance, where behaviour matches a legal norm. In Dill’s work, compliance refers only 
to  the  ‘initial  act  of  drawing  on  a  legal  rule  when  faced  with  the  task  of  making   a 
decision’
178   
(a  narrower  and  more  formal  definition  than  the  one  in  this  thesis); 
convergence means behaviour that happens to be consistent with a norm ‘for reasons   other 
than recourse to law’;
179 
and effectiveness refers to whether IHL makes a difference for 
behaviour. Dill’s concept of convergence can be used to address an objection from logic  
that the presence of military instruction in IHL and broad compliance by a state could be 
correlation  rather  than  causation.  This  causal  effect  of  military  training  in  IHL  on the 
prevention of violations and compliance in armed conflict is the behavioural problématique 
where inquiries into training or instruction in IHL begin. 
 
Understanding and Willingness to comply 
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 In this thesis, ‘understanding’ and ‘willingness to comply’ are easy-to-communicate 
shorthand for two aims of IHL training built in chapter 3: the cognitive and volitional 
internalisation of IHL norms. ‘Understanding’ is under-inclusive because IHL training 
should aim at understanding, knowledge and recall; while ‘willingness to comply’ 
appears out of place in a military chain of command, where soldiers must comply with 
lawful orders: they do not have discretion to assert their individual willingness or 
unwillingness to comply. However, soldiers are not automata, and IHL compliance 
depends upon volition as well as upon understanding, knowledge and recall of IHL. If 
we acknowledge (as we must) that some IHL violations are the result of individuals’ or 
groups’ deliberate actions while others stem from a rejection or resentment of the law, 
then individual willingness to comply with IHL instead of violating it is a relevant goal 
of IHL training. 
 
1.4 Scholarly Context 
 
 
To explain the conundrum between IHL training, prevention and compliance, this thesis 
builds insights from four interdisciplinary sub-fields: constructivist compliance theory 
from international relations, political science research on IHL compliance, the social 
psychology of violations of IHRL and IHL, and historical works on military training and 
on the UK’s record in IHL. This section outlines and begins to synthesise relevant 
concepts from these fields. Four more are marginally relevant, arising to explain specific 
points on military training or emergent findings from the case study. These are military 
ethics, organisational learning, epistemic injustice, and the barely cohesive field of 
states’ rhetorical responses to calls for accountability for IHL and IHRL violations. 
These marginal fields are defined briefly in what follows. 
 
Compliance Theory 
 
 
Compliance theory seeks to explain why and to what extent states adhere to international 
law. It began with a range of meta-state conceptions, viewing the state as a unitary, rational 
actor, for which international law was epiphenomenal, or only a coincidental restraint on 
preferences and power.
180 
Influenced by Austinian positivism, and the 
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absence of a sovereign or sanction in the international legal system, Cold War realists 
argued that power, not international law, would determine if states might comply with 
international  law.
181  
Among  the  modern  exponents  of  realism  are  Goldsmith   and 
Posner,
182 whose rejection of international law’s power to bind states coincided with  
the  George  W.  Bush  administration’s  attempted  redefinition  of  the  prohibition   on 
torture.
183 
Realism has now ceded to rational choice approaches, which apply game 
theoretical perspectives to states’ choices to comply with international law. Guzman’s 
schema of reciprocity, retaliation and reputation exemplifies sophisticated rational 
choice  approaches  to  inter-state  cooperation.
184  
From  the  1960s  onwards,  the New 
Haven school of McDougal and Lasswell argued that international law is characterised 
not by rules, but by authoritative decision-making.
185 
In effect, law was subordinate   to 
policy.
186 
In contrast, the international legal process school, whose proponents included 
Abram Chayes and Louis Henkin, argued that international legal rules have a modest 
effect, but it is states’ participation in an international legal and organisational process 
that  assists  compliance,  by  operating  as  a  constraint  on  states’ decision-making.187 
Henkin believed that realism was a ‘cynic’s formula’; and that: 
 
it is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of 
international law and almost all of their obligations almost all of the time.
188
 
Subsequently, liberal compliance theorists focused on differences in states’ domestic regime 
type (democracies versus non-democracies) to explain state practice in international law.
189 
Slaughter  argued  from  the  premise  that  international  law  compliance  is  more likely in 
liberal democratic states:
190 
a premise countered by Alvarez for its US- 
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centricity.
191 
The same criticism has been applied to realist, rational choice, 
international legal process and New Haven schools; but not to the constructivist 
approach explained below.
192  Slaughter’s contention has been nuanced by   subsequent 
research, including Hillebrecht’s identification of ‘begrudging’ compliance with human 
rights judgments by some established democracies;
193 and by Simmons’ correlation 
between  recent  democratisation and improved human rights compliance.
194   
Slaughter 
was the first liberal institutionalist to call for a ‘disaggregated’ state,195 recognising the 
role of transnational ‘networks’ of compliance between ‘parts of states’ (e.g. judges 
cooperating  internationally in  horizontal  networks),
196  
and  supranational compliance 
mechanisms such as the EU and ICC (vertical networks).
197 
This elite disaggregation is 
too remote from a soldier or officer’s understanding of IHL, but it begins a useful 
inquiry into the principal/agent problem in international law compliance. 
 
From this broad and varied field, constructivist approaches are the most relevant to the 
relationship between military training, prevention and compliance in IHL, because of 
constructivism’s emphasis on  the  relationship between norm  and state  behaviour.
198   
For 
constructivists, norms help to constitute states’ identities in the international order, so 
constructivism might be said to reverse the compliance inquiry from whether states adhere 
to norms to how states’ behaviour is constructed by norms. It is the norm-to-behaviour 
inquiry that begins to address Kelsen’s problématique of individuals internalising municipal 
law,
199  
although  the  norm  internalisation in  constructivist  compliance  theory is  that  of 
states and not individuals, and the norms are those of international rather than domestic 
(criminal) law. Unlike realists, rationalists and the New Haven and international legal 
process schools, constructivists argue that rules and norms have a causal impact on 
behaviour, and see norms as intrinsic to states’ shifting preferences. Norms, learning, 
ideology and culture interact on constructivist accounts;
200
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and ‘norms’ are left undefined, with an uncertain relationship to binding rules,  
principles and standards. This has led to the criticism that with the exception of 
Finnemore,  constructivists  fail  to  account  for  how  international  law  is  binding.
201
 
Where the term ‘norms’ appears in this thesis, it refers to binding IHL rules (whether 
from treaty or custom), not to binding law and nonbinding standards together. 
 
Specifically, the thesis focuses on constructivist norm internalisation and communities of 
practice to articulate standards for military training in IHL. It is sensible to note that 
constructivists have co-opted both these ideas. Constructivism is a broad and eclectic field  
in itself, making constructivist compliance theory a new sophisticated mainstream.
202 
Norm 
internalisation appears both in Koh’s transnational legal process and in constructivist 
compliance  theory;
203   
and  communities  of  practice  appear  first  in  social  theories    of 
learning,
204 
and then in constructivist international relations by Adler and Pouilot.
205 
Sikkink’s   nascent   concept   of   ‘agentic   constructivism’   is   relevant   to   IHL’s strong 
disaggregation to individual soldiers, officers and fighters in armed groups.
206
 
 
In Koh’s transnational legal process, norm internalisation follows states’ interaction and 
prior interpretation of a norm. As the norm is internalised, it is incorporated into a domestic 
legal system:
207 
a process that assumes dualist legal systems and may not be generalised  to 
monist or civilian systems, where ratified treaties and customary international law are 
considered integral to municipal law without the need to incorporate these norms by statute. 
More useful is Finnemore and Sikkink’s constructivist approach to norm internalisation. 
They posit a two-stage process of ‘norm emergence’ and ‘norm cascade’, whereby state 
leaders and other ‘norm entrepreneurs’ persuade other states to accept a norm, which is then 
diffused through (or increasingly accepted) by other states until it becomes ‘taken-for- 
granted’.
208 
Finnemore and Sikkink acknowledge that this 
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progress narrative does not always occur, and the linear model can be interrupted.
209 
This 
state-based model is only a starting-point. An account of individual soldiers’ and officers’ 
internalisation of IHL norms in military training requires a less stylised account,  which 
takes account of individual agents’ understanding and their willingness to comply. 
 
This thesis applies norm internalisation to individual soldiers and officers, and the military 
culture in which they undergo training and deployment. The thesis argues that in this 
context, the process by which norms become ‘taken-for-granted’ is not merely cognitive 
(involving the understanding, knowledge and recall of IHL). If it were merely cognitive, 
then the dissemination model of military training in IHL, or one that depends solely on 
classroom instruction would be sufficient to ensure the prevention of violations and 
compliance with IHL norms. It must also have a volitional aspect, that takes account of the 
risks to IHL compliance revealed by the social psychology of military training and armed 
conflict (see below). In differentiating between cognitive and volitional aspects of IHL  
norm internalisation (in layman's terms, understanding and willingness to comply with  
IHL), the thesis nods to the legal theory on normativity, thus beginning to close the gap 
between  constructivism  and  accounts of international  law's bindingness.  It  does this  via 
H.L.A. Hart’s ‘internal aspect of rules’: which he defines as ‘a critical reflective attitude to 
certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard’, evidenced by ‘criticism (including 
self-criticism), demands for conformity’, and a recognition that certain conduct is 
binding.
210  
MacCormick  argues  that  Hart’s  ‘internal  aspect  of  rules’  hides  an implicit 
distinction between the cognitive and the volitional,
211 
and it is his argument that provides 
the  theoretical  justification  for  the  distinction  between  understanding and willingness to 
comply developed in this thesis. Of course, Hart doubted (but did not dismiss)
212 
whether 
international law was a legal system, so it is unorthodox to apply Hart to any account of 
international law compliance. However, Hart’s doubts on international law have been 
critiqued, not least by Waldron, who believes that Hart merely ‘ran out of steam or 
inclination’ to address international law substantively.
213 
Hart did not consider his 
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‘internal aspect of rules’ in relation to international law, so there is scope for an account 
of military training in IHL that does so.
214
 
 
Returning to constructivism, Adler and Pouilot’s work on communities of practice 
provides the justification for an inquiry into individual and group norm internalisation. 
They argue that international action is both agential and structural, and that agents’ 
actions are constituted by their communities of practice; with communities of practice 
mediating  the  relationship  between  the  agential  and  the  structural.  
215  
Wenger had 
defined communities of practice in three dimensions, comprising shared knowledge, a 
‘social fabric of learning’, and shared practice that embodies that knowledge.216 Again, 
this is a stylised account without a clear empirical basis, but it opens an inquiry into the 
interaction between shared knowledge, groups of individuals engaged in learning, and 
their practices that promote that knowledge, all of which can assist our understanding of 
military training, prevention and compliance in IHL. Over time, the definition of 
communities of practice has sharpened, and the differentiation of communities of 
practice from related concepts of epistemic communities and interpretive communities 
has become clearer. Briefly, epistemic communities tend to relate to elite knowledge;
217
 
while  interpretive  communities  (a  concept  originally  from  literary  criticism) decide 
upon relevant and irrelevant, valid or invalid views of a treaty;
218 
while communities of 
practice can encompass both senior and junior ranks, structured militaries and less 
structured armed groups, because their focus is on shared practice. 
 
Brunnée and Toope apply communities of practice to international law in their 
interactional account of compliance. They believe that the focus on shared practice in 
communities of practice can be distinguished from shared ‘values or goals’.219 This 
distinction may not fit an IHL context, given the high degree of unit cohesion which is 
the aim of military training, and the shared values imparted as a result. Nonetheless, 
Brunnée and Toope attempt a theory of obligation and not merely compliance in their 
constructivist, interactional account: the absence of a theory of normativity is one of the 
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critiques they apply to existing constructivist accounts of international law. Extending 
Fuller’s  Morality  of  Law  to  international  law,220   they  hold  that  reciprocity      and 
interaction between participants in a ‘continuous practice of legality’ helps to build 
compliance. For Brunnée and Toope, compliance results from ‘broad participation’, 
‘shared understanding’ by communities of practice; a ‘congruence’ between social 
practice   and   legal   norms,
221   
and   the   frequent   reassertion   of   norms;   not their 
imposition,
222 or a simple ‘teaching’ of norms.223 Theirs is a horizontal, not a top-  
down approach; constructivist because the ‘practice of legality’ builds state action, in 
contrast to realist or rational choice approaches, where state preferences are set prior   to 
encountering norms and other actors. This horizontal approach is consistent with what 
chapter 5 calls the ‘strong disaggregation’ or delegation of authority in IHL to multiple 
individual sub-state actors and the units in which they serve. 
 
There is a recent but growing body of work on compliance with IHL, including Dill’s 
constructivist theory of US air targeting and IHL compliance in international armed 
conflict;
224 
and significant studies by Krieger and Jo and Bryant on compliance with IHL in 
‘areas of limited statehood’, which find that many state-based rationalist compliance  
theories need finessing when applied to armed groups and areas where state control is  
absent or undermined. Dill finds that IHL’s contested or indeterminate norms make it harder 
to predict law’s behavioural effect, and that IHL cannot be viewed separately from actors’ 
prior interests and beliefs about norms. Krieger concludes that international criminal law, or 
the possibility of UN sanctions for IHL violations help constructivist persuasion and  
rational choice incentives to work better.
225 
Jo and Bryant find the relative centralisation of 
an armed group and the extent to which it seeks legitimacy predict compliance with IHL  
and IHRL norms, and that a range of coercive or incentive-based behaviours work together 
with constructivist ‘persuasion’ to encourage compliance.
226
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Yet these works on compliance do not systematically address preventing violations in 
armed conflict: the stage logically and chronologically prior to deployment when much 
peacetime dissemination and/or pre-deployment training takes place. 
 
Political Science 
 
 
There is a larger body of work from political science on states’ and armed groups’ 
compliance  with  IHL.
227  Most  relevant  to  this  thesis  is  Andrew  Bell’s qualitative, 
constructivist research on IHL training, principally in the US armed forces. He finds that 
a military culture that emphasises civilian immunity norms shapes soldiers’ and  
officers’  preferences,  steering  them  towards  compliance  with  IHL.228  The  work of 
quantitative scholars is less central to this thesis, but still relevant to building a 
compliance theory for IHL. Using different quantitative datasets, Valentino et al and 
Downes sought to explain ‘civilian victimization’ in international armed conflicts. 
Valentino and co-authors found that neither joint ratification of IHL treaties nor regime 
type (democracies versus non-democracies) promote compliance with civilian  
protection  norms.
229  
Nor  did  these  factors  combined  offer  a  statistically significant 
protection for civilians. Downes found that democracies and non-democracies were 
equally likely to target civilians, but he found that democracies target civilians in 
conditions  of  ‘desperation’  to  end  a  ‘war…  of  attrition’.230  There  was  a  possible 
selection bias: a number of asymmetric, lengthy conflicts were included in his dataset of 
‘interstate war’ from 1816 to 2003. Downes also found that ‘the intention to annex 
conquered territory significantly increase[d] the likelihood of civilian victimization.’ A 
quantitative scholar’s significant increase might be a qualitative scholar’s marginal 
increase, as the threshold for statistical significance is usually set at 5%. 
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The scholars’ conceptual definitions vary, both as between Downes and Valentino et al, 
and between the two political science outputs and IHL. Downes’ definition of civilian 
victimization is significantly broader than violations of the principle of distinction: it 
includes ‘aerial, naval and artillery bombardment of civilians; sieges, naval blockades 
and economic sanctions that deprive non-combatants of food; massacres; and forced 
movements or concentrations of populations.’231 Downes also adds a third category   of 
quasi-combatants (e.g. munitions workers), which risks confusion on the principle of 
distinction,
232  
while  not  considering  the  contested  notion  of  direct  participation  in 
hostilities (DPH).
233 Valentino’s definition of ‘intentional civilian fatalities’ includes 
deliberate targeting of civilians but also deaths from thirst, hunger or disease as a result 
of   policies   aiming   to   ‘undermine   civilian   morale   or   otherwise   coerce civilian 
populations’.234  Valentino’s definition echoes  without acknowledging  the  prohibition 
on ‘spread[ing] terror among a civilian population’,235 or a teleological reading of 
economic and social rights combined with occupation law. Just as international lawyers 
reading  Downes’  and  Valentino  et  al’s  work  should  not  conflate  ‘significant’ with 
‘strongly likely’, readers also should not confuse this quantitative work with a   study of 
the causes of wilful killing of civilians in international armed conflict. 
 
 
Morrow’s early work presents some conceptual problems from an international lawyer’s 
perspective, where the definition of ‘compliance’ depends on his ex post facto four-point 
scale from full compliance to noncompliance (denoting ‘major and frequent’ violations).
236
 
International law tends towards binary measures of compliance and violation, but 
interpretive controversies make any quantitative analysis reductive at best. In 2007, Morrow 
found that ratification of IHL treaties by both parties to a conflict did reduce the likelihood 
of violations; and that ratification is particularly important for democracies, which commit 
more violations if they do not ratify treaties.
237 
Early twentieth century prohibitions on 
chemical and biological weapons in the Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925 were generally 
implemented in Morrow’s dataset, while compliance was 
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lower for the protection of civilians.
238 
While Morrow does focus on ratification in his 
dataset, he seems not to take account of cumulative normativity: as the twentieth century 
continued  concepts  of  IHL and  definitions  of  compliance  or  violation  grew  as new 
norms were promulgated and new treaties ratified. Morrow’s omission of customary 
IHL is understandable, given its contested methodology and content,
239 
and the 
impossibility of parsing that controversy in quantitative analysis, but it too limits the 
validity of his dataset. 
 
With all these methodological critiques, how is political science research useful for a study 
on IHL training, prevention and compliance? Morrow’s more recent work offers some 
subtle distinctions and policy suggestions. There is a stronger dichotomy in his monograph 
than in his earlier article between violations directed by a state and violations committed by 
individual  soldiers.
240  
Joint  ratification  of  treaties,  he  argues,  works  best  to  deter  the 
former, while military training in IHL is one modality to address the latter. This helps to 
explain his earlier finding that the norms against chemical and biological weapons were 
largely complied with, while prohibitions on targeting civilians were not. The former would 
involve a state-directed violation, where ‘military authorities have the greatest   control’,
241
 
while the latter would combine planned targeting (where civilian leaders or military 
commanders might direct an unlawful airstrike) and opportunistic targeting (where a soldier 
or officer’s understanding of IHL matters for compliance). Soldiers, he argues, are more 
likely to violate IHL in retaliation where opposing forces commit perfidy, as an expectation 
of reciprocity is undermined. Training can help address this: ‘A limited battlefield is created 
through training and sustained through discipline against those who break the rules.’
242  
For 
Morrow, IHL compliance depends on reciprocity, training, punishment by courts-martial, 
and  states’  ‘self-restraint’.
243   
Morrow’s  work,  to  a  greater  extent  than  Downes’,     or 
Valentino et al’s, offers insight into the necessity but insufficiency of military IHL training 
for compliance. Morrow does not, 
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however, inquire into the dangers of misunderstood reciprocity, or violations committed 
in revenge. 
 
Social Psychology 
 
 
The social psychology of military training, and of violations of IHL forms a third 
relevant field. Unlike much literature from international relations and political science, 
social psychologists do consider the cognitive and social perspective of the individual 
soldier, officer or armed group fighter, but in relation to others. Social psychology offers 
valuable context to the learning that occurs in groups or military units, and the culture 
that is imparted through training. Other social psychological works approach the 
conundrum between training, prevention and compliance from the opposite perspective 
to compliance theorists, offering an anatomy of atrocity and its causal mechanisms; a 
theory of non-compliance in all but name. Social psychological insights can help build 
standards for effective military IHL training. Oft-quoted findings on obedience to 
authority,
244 
and conformity to an in-group
245 
are relevant starting points, but they   are 
givens in a structured, centralised military force, so less illuminating for a study on 
military IHL training than for research into torture by law enforcement officials or 
criminal assault by gangs. 
 
Bandura’s social learning theory departs from an individual, experiential model of learning, 
and argues that ‘virtually all learning phenomena … can occur on a vicarious basis through 
observation’ of others.
246 
It is this observation, Bandura argues, that enables individuals  to 
perceive actions and their consequences; so, in the IHL context, if officers treat IHL training 
as a mere bureaucratic requirement, or if new recruits observe the chain of command 
speaking against accountability for IHL violations, then IHL compliance will be perceived 
as peripheral or antagonistic to military culture. Social learning theory is one of the 
mechanisms by which the rhetoric that the UK armed forces are ‘under legal siege’ from 
human rights litigation (often on the IHRL norms that are shared with IHL) risks 
undermining soldiers’ willingness to comply with IHL.
247
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Bandura’s ‘moral disengagement’ also helps to develop a concept of soldiers’ and 
officers’ willingness to comply with IHL. ‘Moral disengagement’ is: 
 
…the cognitive restructuring of inhumane conduct into a benign or worthy one 
by moral justification, sanitizing language, and advantageous comparison; 
disavowal of a sense of personal agency by diffusion or displacement of 
responsibility; disregarding or minimizing the injurious effects of one’s actions; 
and attribution of blame to, and dehumanization of, those who are victimized.
248
 
 
A specific dimension of this ‘cognitive restructuring’ can be seen when instances of IHL 
violations are dismissed as the work of ‘a few bad apples’. Bandura argues that ‘foggy 
nonresponsibility’ results when a few subordinates are blamed for publicised harm, and 
when the cause is attributed to ‘isolated incidents arising from misunderstandings of what 
has been authorized’.
249  
These rhetorical tendencies are  found  in the    UK’s  institutional 
response to the Camp Breadbasket incident and the death of Baha Mousa and torture of 
other Iraqi civilians in British military custody in Iraq.
250 
Moral disengagement has been 
applied in studies of former fighters’ attitudes to IHL. In the first ICRC study into the Roots 
of Behaviour in War, moral disengagement has two dimensions: a) the justification of 
violations by a fighter’s own group (which in turn correlates with group cohesion), and 
the dehumanising of the enemy.
251 
The study found that knowledge of the law and 
attitudes consistent with a risk of violations can occur together,
252 
offering evidence of 
dissemination or training’s insufficiency to ensure respect for IHL. In this thesis, the 
case of Alexander Blackman (Marine A) is the clearest evidence that ‘moral 
disengagement’ can coexist with knowledge of IHL and creates a risk of violations.253 
 
The Roots of Behaviour in War study has been subject to critique, including by Stephens, 
who argues that it neglected ‘social and moral inquiry’ as mechanisms to improve 
compliance with IHL, and was overly positivist in relation to IHL, perceiving it as value- 
neutral.
254  
The present author disagrees with Stephens in part. The Roots of Behaviour    in 
War study wisely identified that military and armed group values shift with ideology and 
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circumstance, and that an emphasis on the ‘values’ underpinning IHL might undermine 
IHL’s normativity. It was published too early to benefit from political science findings 
on military culture and legitimacy-seeking behaviour, as distinct from shifting values. A 
second study, on the Roots of Restraint in War, is due to be published in 2018.
255 
It will 
address both ‘formal’ and ‘informal norms’, including values held by fighters’ peer 
group, and will evaluate the impact of IHL training and dissemination, and the ICRC’s 
integration model.
256  
The changed  focus of the new ICRC study does  not     invalidate 
moral disengagement’s relevance to IHL violations. 
 
In 1958, Kelman developed notions of ‘compliance’, ‘identification’ and ‘internalization’ 
that are distinct social psychological contributions to this research problem. The ‘z’ spelling 
will be retained to differentiate Kelman’s ‘internalization’ from norm internalisation in 
constructivist compliance theory. For Kelman, these three concepts are three stages of 
‘attitude   change’.
257   
In   ‘compliance’,  an   individual  accepts   influence   from  another 
individual or group on a reward or sanction basis; then in ‘identification’, an individual 
accepts influence so that he or she can gain 'a satisfying self-defining relationship' with 
another individual or group; and finally, in ‘internalization’, conduct is 'integrated with the 
individual's existing values' and is 'intrinsically rewarding'.
258 
These insights can be applied 
to the motivations of individual recruits to armed forces or armed groups, and to the social 
psychology of military training in general. 
 
Subsequently, Kelman and Hamilton conducted survey research on US citizens’ views of 
the trial of Lt William Calley for the My Lai massacre in Vietnam.
259 
Calley was convicted 
of 22 counts of murder under the US Code of Military Justice, having been charged with 
102 counts; his co-defendants were acquitted.
260 
Noting conflicting evidence as to  whether 
the killings and rape of civilians was expressly ordered by Calley’s superiors, Kelman and 
Hamilton class the killings as a ‘sanctioned massacre’, in which civilians were ‘viewed as 
expendable’, and their deaths ‘strategic necessities’.
261 
Kelman and Hamilton argue that 
implicit or explicit ‘authorization’, the ‘routinization’ of killing, 
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and  ‘dehumanization’  of  victims as  a  category are  the  combined  causes for  sanctioned 
massacres,  from  the  Holocaust  to  My Lai.
262  
Their  survey research,  whose participants 
showed considerable deference to authority and sympathy for Lt Calley, led Kelman and 
Hamilton to reason that ‘rule and role orientations … foster a tendency to obey without 
question’ while ‘value orientation’ encourages ‘personal responsibility for actions taken 
under superior orders.’
263  
Similar concepts might be used in armed forces recruitment 
screening, where outlier responses reflecting a very strong role orientation, but very little 
value orientation might be flagged on a soldier’s personnel file, for future discussion and 
careful checks on that soldier’s perceptions of international law. A tendency  to 
‘dehumanize’ enemy forces or enemy civilians could be flagged as a more serious risk for 
compliance on operations. Kelman’s later work reveals ‘authorization’, ‘routinization’ and 
‘dehumanization’ as causes of torture at Abu Ghraib. For Kelman, torture is another ‘crime 
of obedience’, triggered by the perception that the State’s security is under threat, and that 
an extensive State ‘apparatus’ must be created to counter this threat.
264
 
 
Shalit, an Israeli military psychologist, writes that the Lebanon War of 1982 led to internal 
critique and a reduced concern for the dead and wounded. Veterans wrote that they felt 
compelled to adopt ‘little head’: a low-profile reneging of responsibility which Shalit sees  
as caused by failures of leadership.
265 
In addition, the soldiers believed the IDF doctrine  of 
‘purity of arms’ (that all weapons must be discharged in the spirit of the Geneva 
Conventions) had changed into a sarcastically-termed ‘purity of the finger’ (in which a 
soldier  must  fire  continuously  and  without  discrimination).
266   
Shalit’s  research,     like 
Kelman and Hamilton’s, shows that deference can govern operations, which might involve 
soldiers and officers implementing unlawful orders without challenging them. His 
reflections point to the potential antagonism between military training in general and 
training on IHL. He argues that military ‘drills’ can create quick decision-making, but not 
moral courage, or the ability to apply that moral courage to novel    situations.
267  
Similarly, 
casting the enemy as cruel rather than clever ‘creates a critical characteristic that cannot 
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be handled’.268 A link might be drawn between Kelman and Hamilton’s 
‘dehumaniz[ation]’ and this tendency to stereotype the enemy. 
 
Historical Research 
 
 
In a similar way, historical research indicates that the aims of basic training (desensitisation, 
breaking down a soldier’s inculcated reluctance to kill, unit cohesion and obedience to the 
command chain) are antagonistic to those IHL norms that emphasise restraint and the 
principle  of  humanity.
269   
Holmes  observes  that  '[t]here  is  a  direct  link  between    the 
harshness of basic training and the cohesiveness of the group which emerges from it',
270 
showing unit  cohesion as  an  explicit  aim  of basic training.  The  drill-sergeant’s insults to 
new  recruits  were  a  model  for  subsequent  behaviour.
271  
Bourke’s  archival  research of 
twentieth century military training reveals three purposes to demoralising verbal abuse: i) to 
break down troops so they would take orders, ii) to undermine soldiers’ self-esteem so they 
would hope to improve the esteem their commanders held for them, and finally iii) to instil 
hatred as a reaction to the fear that might make service personnel ‘freeze’ on deployment, 
thus  reducing  casualties.
272   
Battle  inoculation  (realistic  practical  training  intended   to 
prepare troops for the sensory realities of battle) was adopted in part because ideological 
training could not defeat troops’ fear.
273 
Holmes cites the British Army’s abandoned 
approach to battle inoculation training in 1941-1942, which used animal carcasses and 
exercises ‘designed to inoculate hatred and aggression’.
274  
Bayonet training was    retained 
during the First World    War, Second World War and Vietnam War, with hard wood placed 
in sacks to mimic the feeling of bones against the bayonet.
275 
Archives from a documentary 
on My Lai reveal a military trainer who favoured the ‘spirit of the bayonet’, identifying the 
purpose  of military training to  break  down  an  individual  human  being’s  willingness  to 
kill.
276
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This approach prizes efficiency in killing and swift compliance with orders; treating 
recruits to be broken and remoulded, with hatred supposedly masking or eradicating 
inevitable fear. Instilling hatred as a means to overcome hesitation might also override 
the hesitation needed to recall and implement IHL training. Hatred of the enemy is in 
tension with the humane treatment of detainees and wounded enemy forces. Finally, 
subjecting soldiers to brutality through their training can imply that the armed forces 
authorise prohibited acts on prisoners of war, internees or detainees in NIAC. The Baha 
Mousa Public Inquiry found that personnel subjected to ill-treatment as part of conduct- 
after-capture training were not always aware that the treatment to which they were 
subjected  is  prohibited  in  IHL.
277  
Brutal  training  dehumanises  recruits  and  risks a 
cognitive and empathic ‘distancing’ from those they encounter in armed conflict. A 
distinct mechanism of cognitive ‘distancing’ has been shown to result from equipment 
which masks the humanity of the enemy. Anecdotally, soldiers who wore helmets in the 
Second World War were more likely to be attacked in face-to-face combat than those 
without, or with a ‘humble cap’, suggesting that equipment can ‘distance’ the soldier 
from the humanity of enemy personnel.
278
 
 
There is a small but growing subfield of work on UK state practice in relation to IHL, and 
the UK’s relations with the ICRC.
279 
These historical works, and one contemporaneous 
account,
280 
bolster the findings of recurrent patterns of IHL and IHRL violations against 
detainees, and of institutional denial and resistance to accountability when these violations 
come to light. Historical works offer limited detail on military training in IHL, with Bennett 
in particular noting gaps in the archive on this point.
281
 
 
Marginally Relevant Fields 
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Military Ethics 
 
 
At an early stage of literature review, works on military ethics training were sought to 
provide comparative context on military training in IHL. This was a false lead. A close 
reading of the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry report reveals the dangers in relying on 
education  in  military  ethics  to  teach  IHL  compliance.
282  
The  literature  on military 
ethics training has at least two principal debates with some relevance to this thesis: 
283 
first, whether training is capable of instilling ethical conduct, and second, whether 
military  ethics  training  should  train  soldiers  in  independent  reflection,  given      the 
importance  of  group  cohesion  and  the  command  chain.  As  to  the  first,  Lovell   is 
sceptical: ethics and empathy are ‘partly a function of cognitive development and not 
simply of education’;284 and education itself is too distanced from the ‘stress, grief   and 
rage’ of the battlefield to be sufficient to instil compliance.285 Van Baarda agrees: 
‘moral competence’ cannot be trained formally in a discrete session of classroom 
instruction, but instead it is an ongoing personal chronology of learning, or an éducation 
permanente.
286 
The British armed forces opt for what Robinson, de Lee and Carrick 
term a ‘pragmatic’ approach, in which an ‘ethos’, not ethics, is ‘caught’, not taught.287 
This approach leaves too much to chance. It is problematic to assume that training in 
military ethics reinforces IHL training. If military ethics training does not include a duty 
to disobey manifestly unlawful orders, or to report upon violations of IHL, it fails to 
reinforce IHL compliance as an ethical goal. This scepticism contrasts with the  
empirical findings of Wortel and Bosch, showing a beneficial impact of ethics in a ‘train 
the trainers’ scheme in the Netherlands armed forces.288 
 
As to the second debate, Moseley suggests that the command chain is not always in favour 
of instruction programmes that might encourage independent thought.
289 
He argues that 
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 commanding officers should accept that military ethics instruction encourages ‘unlimited 
criticality.’290 According to some US scholars, training in military ethics should not 
encourage ‘knee-jerk moral certainty’291 but instead should support a degree of moral 
autonomy;
292 
a concept disfavoured by traditional military training and deference to the 
chain of command. This debate offers little of value on the relationship between IHL 
training,  prevention  and  compliance,  except  to  highlight  a  possible  resistance  in the 
command chain  to  independent  thinking by subordinates.  Independence  of thought  is 
arguably a prerequisite for reporting violations a soldier has witnessed; and for seeking 
clarification as the lawfulness of an order. 
 
 
Organisational Learning 
 
 
Literature on organisational learning in the British Army provides limited context in 
chapter 6’s historical review of UK state practice in IHL. Foley points to the limited 
centralisation of doctrine in the British Army during the First World War, and the 
tendency  to  rely  on  individual  commanders’  initiative.293   Nolan  found  failures    in 
organisational learning on counterinsurgency in Kenya, Malaysia and Cyprus. The 
British Army preferred flexibility and ad hoc doctrinal developments, meaning that 
strategic approaches to counterinsurgencies were absent from institutional   memory.
294
 
Applying social learning theory, Catignani finds similar failings in organisational 
learning  on  counterinsurgency  in  Afghanistan.
295  
He  employs  a  distinction between 
‘formal learning systems’ (centralised doctrine, adversely affected by many classified 
documents and the limitations of the Defence Intranet)
296 and ‘informal learning 
systems’ (learning from colleagues or from social networks; a form of learning adversely 
affected by unit turnover),
297 
which might be applied to the evaluation of military IHL 
training programmes. 
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Epistemic Injustice 
 
 
Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice is cited in relation to the Al-Sweady Public 
Inquiry.
298  
In  the  course  of  reading  the  Inquiry  Report,  it  became  clear  that Iraqi 
witnesses as a group were considered untrustworthy in relation to all their allegations, 
when only some had been proven to have lied about their membership of an armed  
group and their presence at the Battle of Danny Boy. In contrast, soldiers were (with  
few exceptions) considered honest witnesses, and their actions were cast in an 
honourable light, with inconsistencies in their evidence largely dismissed. The report’s 
findings of ‘ill-treatment’ of detainees appear marginalised, and the extra-legal term ‘ill- 
treatment’ is used throughout, explicitly without reference to IHL and IHRL 
prohibitions, and with adjectives such as ‘trivial’ applied to this extra-legal analysis. 
Fricker’s epistemic injustice is ‘a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity 
as knower.’299 It has two components: 1) ‘testimonial injustice’ (where a speaker is 
given less credibility than he or she deserves) and 2) ‘hermeneutic injustice’ (where a 
concept is not shared by the speaker and hearer; in Fricker’s book, often because the 
concept has not yet been developed).
300 
The Al-Sweady Public Inquiry Report    reveals 
more evidence of testimonial injustice than of hermeneutic injustice, but the use of 
extra-legal terminology and minimising language in relation to ‘ill-treatment’ reveals a 
concerning attitude in relation to IHL compliance. 
 
States’ Rhetorical Responses to Violations of International Law 
 
 
This is a disparate field, not yet cohesive in its terms of art. Vennesson and Rajkovic 
assert that a ‘coercive language game’ results when transnational human rights 
organisations challenge states on their compliance with international law, resulting in 
duelling framings of facts and legal argumentation.
301 
Such a framing is found in the 
assertions that armed groups sue Western militaries, or otherwise invoke international 
legal institutions to achieve strategic goals;
302 
and that in the UK context, the 
extraterritorial effect of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the co- 
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applicability of IHL and IHRL, and the availability of domestic jurisdiction in relation to the 
ECHR has placed the armed forces ‘under legal siege’.
303 
A variant of this is the concept of 
the  ‘juridification’  of  the  armed  forces.
304   
These  concepts  support  Vennesson       and 
Rajkovic’s assertion, but more is needed to explain the conundrum; in particular, how  
states’ responses to alleged or proven violations of IHL affect their policy choices on IHL 
training, and the future prevention of violations. In the British context, reforms to IHL 
training have been asserted as a panacea for future violations, while Parliamentary and 
media rhetoric has pitted litigation as an ongoing harm to the armed forces. This composite 
rhetoric avoids genuine questions about the limits of IHL training to prevent violations; 
reveals an institutional resistance to transparency and civil accountability; and risks 
undermining the legitimacy of the IHL norms trained to armed forces personnel. 
 
1.5 Ethics, Methodology and Sources 
 
 
This thesis was to have been a qualitative study, focused on British Army’s IHL training in 
the present tense; and comprising structured surveys to soldiers and officers on their 
understanding of IHL norms, and semi-structured interviews to members of Army Legal 
Services (ALS) and others involved in the design and implementation of IHL training. That 
proposed qualitative study would have been part of a growing interdisciplinary trend in 
international law scholarship; one that builds ‘midrange theorizing’ by synthesising 
empirical  (in  this  case  qualitative)  findings  with  abstract  theory.
305   
This       proposed 
qualitative research was ethically approved by SOAS, University of London, but was 
blocked by the Ministry of Defence (MoD) after two years of training, research, preparation, 
and informal meetings with military lawyers who had welcomed the study. It was decided 
that the surveys and interviews could not take place because the Operational Law Training 
Directive had not been implemented by the summer of 2014, contrary to more sweeping 
assertions in Parliament that all reforms to IHL training following the Baha Mousa Public 
Inquiry  had  been  ‘addressed’  or  ‘implemented’.
306  
Following  this  decision,  the  thesis 
became a partly archival study, using genealogical method to study the evolution of the IHL 
training obligation; more abstract theorising on 
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the relationship between the IHL training obligation and other norms of prevention in 
IHL, and on the relationship between IHL training and compliance; and a mix  of 
archival and present-day analysis of the British Army’s training in IHL. This represents 
a transition from qualitative to partly historical methods, taking account of an historicist 
trend in international law scholarship,
307 
but the interdisciplinary work which   inspired 
the original qualitative research design remains part of the thesis’ scholarly   context.308 
Nonetheless, this thesis is a work on international humanitarian law. It uses archival 
analysis to add historical depth, and relevant insights from international relations, 
political science and social psychology to explain the relationship between IHL training, 
prevention and compliance. 
 
The following paragraphs reflect on research ethics and military gatekeepers, academic 
freedom and a methodology constructed and reworked; and on the ethics of using an 
archival and public inquiry dataset. Under the subheading ‘Methodology’ below, there  
is a précis of the literature on international law’s many methods, and on the 
interdisciplinary trend in international law research; followed by definitions of 
genealogical and archival research, and of critical case study method as used in this 
project. The thesis’ interpretivist stance is explained, alongside the mixed inductive and 
deductive approach which emerged from the case study. The final paragraphs reflect on 
the potential and limits of the available sources, acknowledging the gaps and availability 
biases that might result from training documents gained through Freedom of  
Information (FOI) requests, and from the few cases that have generated public inquiry 
testimony; and the value of a detailed single case study which may have limited 
generalisability. Themes emerge of limited institutional transparency and a resistance to 
scrutiny by military gatekeepers. These ethical and methodological reflections are 
findings in themselves, consistent with many of the findings in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Ethics 
 
 
Following ethics approval of the proposed surveys and interviews by SOAS, University 
of London, a research protocol was submitted under the Ministry of Defence Research 
Ethics Committees (MoDREC) process,
309 
and was successful at a first stage review by 
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the Army Scientific Assessment Committee (ASAC) in the summer of 2014. Minor 
amendments were made to the research protocol which was scheduled to be presented at 
a meeting of MoDREC in Whitehall in autumn 2014. At first stage review, ASAC noted 
that it was necessary for all research on the armed forces to have a Ministry of Defence 
(MoD) sponsor, who would be responsible for facilitating access, supervising consent 
and confidentiality protocols, for ensuring that the research offered ‘organisational 
benefit’ to the MoD, and (in a task not openly stated in the MoDREC guidance) for 
‘authoris[ing] publications’ from the research in accordance with ‘guidelines’.310  These 
‘guidelines’ were sought but not provided. 
 
The latter two criteria gave pause in terms of research ethics. It was not clear how 
‘organisational benefit’ might be construed, as distinct from the ever-applicable 
requirements to avoid harm to participants, to ensure their understanding and informed 
consent to the study, and the confidentiality of their data. Academic research is subject  
to peer review before publication, but publication does not, and must not, depend on the 
authorisation of a public official. Conditional publication presents risks for the 
objectivity and independence of a scholar’s analysis, as research ethics are pitted against 
the need to publish as a precondition for an academic career. The supervisory committee 
and the Associate Dean for Research provided advice. The second version of the 
MoDREC research protocol and a letter written by the Faculty’s Associate Dean for 
Research made clear that SOAS’s ethics approval, and the implicit conditions on which 
Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) funding was granted required no 
embargo or restriction on publication and the substance of the analysis.
311
 
 
The need to seek permission from powerful institutional gatekeepers presents closely related 
ethical and methodological concerns. Research ethics codes are premised on the researcher 
being relatively more powerful than a potentially vulnerable participant whose informed 
consent and welfare must be carefully assessed prior to the research taking place.
312   
While 
every research project requires that potential harm to research participants is assessed, 
individual informed consent secured, and data anonymised, encrypted and 
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securely stored, the power imbalance is counter-intuitive where gatekeepers are 
involved. These gatekeepers can prevent or impose conditions on empirical research. 
Goodhand signals the intersubjectivities of research on violence and conflict, arguing 
that researchers are rarely seen as ‘neutral or altruistic’. He argues that conflict leads to 
an ‘information economy’, where the powerful control the information which is 
disseminated.
313 Although service personnel’s individual informed consent to   invasive 
medical research is strongly emphasised in the MoDREC guidance, in other contexts  
and perhaps in other armed forces, it would raise concern in relation to research ethics if 
a commanding officer were to endorse or direct subordinates’ participation in a research 
project. The pressure (implicit or otherwise) exerted by the chain of command on 
individual informed consent must be kept in mind in any research project involving 
military gatekeepers. 
 
It became difficult to find an MoD sponsor who was willing to fulfil the tasks stipulated 
by ASAC. An MoD expert in IHL welcomed the substance of the study, and later 
provided collegial assistance with Freedom of Information requests, and with contextual 
information to aid interpretation of documents on the Army’s IHL training. In the 
summer of 2014 however, this official decided that the research could not offer 
‘organisational benefit’ for the MoD, as the Operational Law Training Directive of 
February 2014 was not yet implemented. This decision meant that the research protocol 
was rejected, although ASAC had formed a positive view of the quality of the research. 
 
The reason given - that the Directive was then-unimplemented - was factually correct  
but partially contradicted Ministerial statements to Parliament, and arguments in 
litigation that all but one of the recommendations of the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, 
including those relating to IHL training, had been ‘implemented’.314    There is slippage 
between the term ‘implemented’, which implies that policies have already been put into 
practice, and ‘addressed’, which might refer to ongoing or future implementation.315 As 
the Operational Law Training Directive has been implemented from 1 April 2015,
316 
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reworked research protocol will be resubmitted to ASAC/MoDREC for a postdoctoral 
project, ideally with a small research team which is able to conduct comparative 
research.
317  
In  view of  deadlines  set  by SOAS  and the  AHRC, it  was  infeasible  to 
conduct the qualitative research during the PhD, so a critical case study method was 
chosen instead (see ‘Methodology’ below). The critical case study includes data from 
archives, public inquiry materials, Parliamentary reports and debates, and IHL training 
materials obtained through FOI requests. 
 
Ethics remain relevant to archival and documentary research. Care must be taken with 
the attribution of intent or culpability to any named official in resources that are often 
scraps of paper lacking context, or opinionated letters lacking replies. Trouillot notes 
that archives are pre-selected and sifted.
318 
The archives consulted, at the Imperial  War 
Museum, the British Red Cross, and the Liddell Hart archive at King’s College London, 
were catalogued to varying degrees, depending on the availability of archivists and a 
backlog of work. Truth is partially constructed by the availability of materials before the 
researcher begins his or her interpretation. Where the subjects of archives are deceased, 
Alcoff’s ‘problem of speaking for others’ is even more acute,319 as the context they 
might have offered if asked is forever lost to the public record. The dataset includes 
public inquiry testimony, where witnesses are not always anonymised as participants in 
social science research must be, and where a researcher might infer individual 
culpability without rules of evidence and criminal burdens of proof. 
 
Methodology 
 
 
MoDREC’s decision conceals the perspectives of soldiers and officers on their 
understanding of IHL, and those involved in the design and implementation of IHL training 
reforms in the British Army. The surveys aimed at ‘thin’, easily comparable data on the 
consistency and frequency of IHL training, while semi-structured interviews aimed to give 
‘thick’  (more  detailed  or  nuanced)
320  
data  on  UK  perspectives  on  the  priority  norms 
included in training, on the training techniques used, and on any difficulties with 
implementation and evaluation of training policies. Semi-structured interviews have a 
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pre-determined list of questions with some flexibility in the conversation, so that the 
interview participant can add information which he or she considers relevant. The survey 
and interview questions were checked for reliability (consistency or replicability between 
each survey and interview) and validity (to ensure for example that survey questions were 
measuring soldiers’ understanding of IHL).
321 
Surveys and interview data might have  shed 
light on whether soldiers’ varied educational backgrounds and potential struggles with 
literacy are amply planned for in the context of IHL training, or if dry, classroom instruction 
is predominant instead. Surveys might have assessed how much soldiers and officers learn 
and remember about lawful targeting and civilian protection; whether they  internalise 
simple norms such as the principle of distinction more successfully than the more ‘open- 
texture[d]’
322 
principle of proportionality; whether they perceive some IHL norms as  more 
binding than others; and whether and how their learning is affected by interpretive 
controversies in IHL, changes in Rules of Engagement, military ethics and barracks culture. 
Qualitative social science method might have filled the gaps left by the legal and scholarly 
sources, offering nuanced answers on interpretation and normativity in IHL, and testing 
interdisciplinary hypotheses. The case study method chosen asks similar questions,
323     
but 
the perspective of individual soldiers and officers is missing as a result of the MoDREC 
decision to block the qualitative research. 
 
The original research design would have contributed to the current epistemological shift 
towards interdisciplinary collaboration and the use of empirical method in international 
law  scholarship.
324   
The  Chicago  School  of  quantitative  political  science   methods 
dominates more qualitative approaches, and it might appear that empiricism has become 
the new evidence in international legal thought. The dominance of quantitative 
approaches, especially in US scholarship, is open to question not only because 
quantitative method’s claim to objectivity might be in doubt,325 but also because of 
qualitative research’s natural concordance with legal method. Dobinson and Johns argue 
that all legal ‘doctrinal research is qualitative’, because of its focus on ‘selecting and 
 
 
Alan Bryman, Social Research Methods, (4
th 
edition, Oxford University Press 2012) Chapters 3 and 7 
Hart (n 210) 123, 128-136 
1.6 
Gregory Shaffer and Tom Ginsburg, ‘The Empirical Turn in International Legal Scholarship’ (2012) 106:1 
American Journal of International Law 1; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, David G. Victor, Yonatan Lupu, 
‘Political Science Research on International Law: the State of the Field’ (2012) 106:1 American Journal  
of International Law 47; Gregory Shaffer, ‘The New Legal Realist Approach to International Law’ (2015) 
28:2 Leiden Journal of International Law 189 
Wing Hong Chui, ‘Quantitative Legal Research’ in Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods 
for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 46-68, 48 
 weighing  materials…  [acknowledging]  hierarchy  and  authority…  social  context and 
interpretation.’326 Numerical accounts, which rely on statistical regression, correlation 
but not causation, lack a ‘thick’ or rich account needed to explain how international  law 
might  influence  individual  actors’  behaviour.327  Richness  is  needed  in  research on 
military IHL training, prevention and compliance. Behaviour cannot be explained by 
numerical datasets. 
 
Yet some scholars criticise any interdisciplinary approach to international law.
328 
These 
critics argue that interdisciplinary approaches to international law, especially those 
focused  on  international  law’s  effectiveness  (defined  in  1.3  as  norms’  effect      on 
behaviour) conceal two exercises of power. First, this scholarship allows legal   scholars 
to claim ‘definitional power…without much formal accountability but reputational’;329 
and second, interdisciplinarity risks ‘reproducing, or even strengthening, existing power 
relations', while failing to provide the best explanatory account of international   law.
330
 
In Koskenniemi’s words, effectiveness is ‘an apology for the interests of the 
powerful’,331 and compliance is a ‘new natural law’: undermining ‘responsibility’,332 
and  encouraging  managerialist  “balancing”,333  such  as  arguments  undermining  the 
absolute prohibition on torture with reference to a ticking bomb.
334
 
 
This critique is over-generalised, from what Roth-Isigkeit sees as a few historical 
antecedents (Carl Schmitt, Morgenthau, Lasswell and McDougal) identified by 
Koskenniemi as scholars seeking to use law as a tool of repressive power or geopolitical 
influence.
335  
It is an assertion too far that diverse interdisciplinary scholarship    (which 
might come from any school of international relations, political science, or social 
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psychology) has a single effect in reinforcing the status quo, and that all this work fails 
to provide a sufficient intellectual account. However, there is debate about the extent to 
which modern constructivist compliance theory is different from managerial 
instrumentalism: Koskenniemi asserts that it remains instrumentalist, both departing 
from formal legal sources and risking apologism, while Brunnée and Toope disagree.
336
 
Koskenniemi’s critique does useful work in reminding international legal scholars that 
states might misuse their conclusions, but he does not prove that i) ‘compliance’ is any 
more apologist than ‘responsibility’, and ii) all scholars seeking to improve international 
law compliance favour ‘balancing’ arguments. 
 
This thesis does not employ empirical methods, but it supports interdisciplinary 
scholarship in international law, and argues that IHL scholarship in particular needs to 
engage further with the pragmatic, compliance-focused ‘new legal realism’ that 
d’Aspremont and Klabbers dislike. The arguments that interdisciplinary scholarship 
deprives  international  law  of  its  normativity,
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or  that  it  reifies  existing     power 
relations, are unpersuasive, especially when research is directed at uncovering the 
‘internal point of view’338 of sub-state actors being trained in IHL. 
 
The change in research design marks a shift from a partly positivist, partly interpretivist 
epistemology to a stronger interpretivism; and from a deductive approach (building  
‘criteria’ for ‘effective’ military training in IHL, and testing pre-formed hypotheses) to one 
that blends inductive and deductive approaches. Positivism implies that research findings 
are value-neutral and objective, while interpretivism accepts that actors’ concepts and 
perspectives are relevant and contestable. The case study builds theory inductively from 
documentary sources: on recurrent themes of limited transparency, a tendency to 
conceptualise the prohibition on torture and other ill-treatment as ‘human rights’ rather than 
both IHL and international human rights law, and on a prevalent MoD discourse that human 
rights  litigation  has  placed  the  armed  forces  under  ‘legal  siege’.
339  
It  also  tests some 
hypotheses from the literature, such as the distinction between understanding and 
willingness to comply; and the roles of moral disengagement, 
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discourse about law, social learning theory and communities of practice on IHL 
training, prevention and compliance.
340
 
 
The methodology is partly genealogical and partly archival, with other case study 
methods rooted in the present. The genealogy of the IHL training obligation in chapter 2 
was chosen as an aspect of international law’s interpretive method, studying the 
diplomatic debates and successive drafts of treaty texts on the IHL training obligation to 
uncover its laconic, discretionary nature, and the historic assumptions that IHL 
dissemination and training would prevent violations and promote compliance. Similarly, 
the archival methods in chapter 6 give context to the UK’s delayed implementation of 
the IHL training obligation, and to its resistance, both to the application of IHL to non- 
international armed conflicts in the decolonisation era, and to external scrutiny of UK 
state practice in military detention. When combined with modern documentation, these 
historical methods offer depth and ‘thickness’ similar to Geertz’s account of qualitative 
methods. The case study shows recurring patterns of IHL violation where norms 
converge between IHL and IHRL, delay in implementing military  training,  and 
recurrent assertions that that training was taking place. The genealogy in chapter 2 and 
the archival methods in chapter 6 are logically consistent with one another; and 
consistent again with the critical case study method in chapters 6 and 7. 
 
Neither genealogy nor archival research is used as a standalone historical approach, but both 
are used to deepen an explanation of current practice. The genealogy of the IHL training 
obligation explores historic assumptions,
341  
and historic insights on     training,  prevention 
and compliance that were lost in subsequent scholarship;
342 
while the partly archival 
methods in chapter 6 explore the historical themes still resonant in the present.
343  
According to Delacroix, in genealogy, ‘history is at the service of an interpretation…
344  
But genealogy is not intentionally critical: it ‘seeks to trigger or renew reflections on the 
phenomenon to be explained’.
345 
This more neutral account of genealogy, as adopted in 
this thesis, differs from Foucault’s more stringently critical genealogy of current 
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assumptions and power structures.
346 
This is not the first use of genealogical method in 
IHL scholarship: previous works include Kinsella’s genealogy of the IHL principle of 
distinction,
347    
and   LeClerc-Gagné’s   unpublished   work   on   IHL   protections    of 
humanitarian actors.
348 
Both these works trace contingencies in the development of a 
norm, and the meanings actors imposed upon them, as well as (in Kinsella’s case) the 
hidden gendered assumptions in the principle of distinction. A similar archaeology of 
the IHL training norm is at work in this thesis. 
 
 
A critical case study method similarly uncovers hidden assumptions and offers depth or 
Geertzian ‘thick[ness]’ to the scholarly account. ‘Critical’ case study does not imply an 
intention to confront an institution’s practice, but instead implies that the researcher has a 
well-developed theory, and has selected a single case which illustrates that theory with 
explanatory  depth.
349  
Critical  case  studies  are  predominantly  deductive  (hypothesis- or 
theory-led); similar to genealogical method.
350 
Critical case studies are descriptive: they do 
not seek to compare or to make causal statements.
351 
As the case study findings continued, 
the number of insights and the complexity of investigatory and training materials    obtained 
made it infeasible to add another state for comparison of its military training in IHL; and 
illogical to draw causal inferences from the correlations identified. As a result, analytic 
induction,  which  seeks  to  increase  rigour  by  comparing  findings  across  cases;
352  
and 
process tracing, which examines necessary and sufficient causes,
353 
were both rejected as 
methods. The richness of the study justifies the choice of a single 
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case (and critical case study method, which assumes a single case), which would 
otherwise limit the external validity or generalisability of the research. Subsequent 
comparative research is suggested to test the generalisability of the findings in this 
thesis.
354
 
 
Sources 
 
 
The sources for the project are wide-ranging, but the available materials are incomplete, 
leading to findings on limited transparency, questions about unavailable materials, and 
practical challenges for the researcher. Archives are pre-sifted and incomplete, especially in 
the UK context, where there is a history of concealed archives;
355 
while an analysis of  FOI 
documents depends on the gulf between materials obtained and those in existence but not 
released to the public. Delay in releasing FOI documents has also been a feature of this 
study, with 4-6 months being typical between an initial request and the material being 
authorised for release. FOI requests have yielded Directives setting consecutive policy on 
IHL training; dated pamphlets and past papers, and several years of training materials for 
individual annual training in the law of armed conflict. Pre-deployment training remains 
classified unless it is disclosed some years after the fact to a court or public inquiry. ROE 
and the Targeting Directive remain inaccessible to researchers, the latter causing a partial 
redaction  to   the   Military  Annual   Training  Test   documentation   released  in  2015.
356
 
Materials from case law and public inquiries are radically incomplete, representing only 
those cases which have been heard, and allegations which have reached the public 
domain.
357  
Public inquiry documentation is similarly limited by the terms of reference    of 
each individual inquiry; and by the expertise of the Chair, counsel and those making 
submissions. Facts may be missing, and valid arguments left unmade or swiftly disregarded. 
The information released by the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) and the Systemic 
Issues Working Group (SIWG) is radically incomplete for another reason, the lack of 
transparency and qualitative  detail that the MoD has  chosen for     these  investigations.
358
 
Both these mechanisms employ numbered ciphers for allegations, making it difficult to  
trace a case between earlier litigation and these MoD investigations. 
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In addition, much MoD documentation exists in protected PDF format, ruling out the 
use of computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (through text searches, for example). 
These limitations on the dataset risk availability bias, but they are also consistent with 
the case study’s findings on limited transparency, and on the MoD’s resistance to 
civilian (judicial or academic) scrutiny of the armed forces.
359
 
 
1.6    Scope, Research Questions and Structure 
 
 
Scope 
 
 
With such varied methods and sources, the thesis’ scope must be closely defined. The 
focus is on military instruction or training in IHL (the rules relating to international and 
non-international armed conflicts), with literature on dissemination to armed groups part 
of the scholarly context and not the primary inquiry. Dissemination to the civilian 
population in general (as distinct from civilian authorities with responsibilities to apply 
IHL) fades into the background after chapter 2’s inquiry into the evolution and phrasing 
of the IHL training obligation in treaty law. The scope broadens with chapter 3. As the 
scholarship on the IHL training obligation is found wanting, insights from the archives, 
from the social psychology of the battlefield, and from constructivist compliance theory 
help to build standards on the internalisation of IHL norms. This norm internalisation 
has cognitive and volitional aspects; and takes account of individual learning and social 
pressures. Dissemination of and compliance with IHL in non-international armed 
conflicts is considered in both chapters 2 and 3. 
 
There is breadth too in chapter 4’s linkage of IHL’s norms of prevention, but the IHL 
training obligation remains the central focus, to which Common Article 1’s obligation to 
‘respect and ensure respect’ for the Four Geneva Conventions ‘in all circumstances’, the 
requirement in Additional Protocol I for qualified persons and legal advisers to the armed 
forces,
360  
command responsibility to  ‘repress grave breaches… suppress other   breaches’, 
‘take all feasible measures within their power to prevent or repress the breach’, and to  
ensure their subordinates know IHL; 
361 
and a duty to disobey manifestly unlawful 
orders
362
 are related. Chapter 5’s offering of a mature compliance theory for IHL is 
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nonetheless tightly defined. Motivated by seven distinctive challenges for compliance in 
IHL, chapter 5 seeks insights from existing compliance theory, argues that IHL does 
require an adapted compliance theory, and reflects upon the importance of norm 
internalisation and communities of practice (both constructivist compliance insights) to 
explain the conundrum. 
 
The case study in chapters 6 and 7 is more sharply defined, with reference to IHL 
training in the British Army; just one land force in a single state. There is the lightest 
contextual detail on IHL training in the Royal Air Force, Royal Navy and Marines; and 
just one heavily redacted source available on the state of civilian dissemination in the 
UK. A case study in a different state where civilians directly participate in hostilities 
would entail greater inquiry on the state of civilian dissemination. However, the case 
study does note a few instances of ignorance of IHL shown by civilian authorities 
(Ministers at the MoD) who have responsibilities under IHL and should be ‘fully 
acquainted’ with the Four Geneva Conventions  and Additional Protocol  I.363    Outside 
the scope of the study is the IHL training offered to intelligence personnel, special 
forces, and the training conducted by UK armed forces and private contractors for  
armed forces overseas. Some of the case study’s findings will not be generalisable, but 
they do offer explanatory depth, testing insights from the literature in chapters 2-3, and 
building new theory specific to the UK context. 
 
Research Questions and Structure 
 
 
The thesis has three research questions: 
 
 
What is the conundrum between military training, prevention and compliance 
in IHL? 
How can it be solved? (‘solved’ entails ‘explained’, but also hints at practical 
solutions); and 
What is the potential and what are the limits of the proposed solution? 
The first two sections of this chapter established the conundrum with their account of IHL’s 
distinctive challenges for compliance, and of the challenges posed by the IHL training 
obligation’s simple phrasing and causal assumptions. These sections answered in 
 
 
AP I, art 83(2) 
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the affirmative the question that is logically prior to research question 1), i.e. ‘Is there a 
conundrum between military training, prevention and compliance?’ 
 
Part I (chapters 2 and 3) continues to address the first research question and begins to 
answer the second. Chapter 2 explores how the IHL training obligation offers scant 
guidance to states, while its drafting history shows early assumptions that the 
dissemination of IHL, including to the military, would prevent future violations and 
improve compliance. This causal assumption is now in doubt, and IHL training based on 
dissemination has been found insufficient for prevention and compliance. Deficient 
military training in IHL has been implicated in the wilful killing of civilians and the 
torture of detainees; but, as chapter 3 demonstrates, scholarship has gradually 
acknowledged the insufficiency of IHL training to prevent violations, while 
interdisciplinary research suggests that military culture, moral disengagement and 
discourse about law and enemy forces may be more powerful causal factors for IHL 
violations than ignorance of the law. Chapter 3 selects insights from historic works, 
social psychology and constructivist compliance theory, and shows the broadening of 
practice from the ICRC and Geneva Call. It suggests standards that build soldiers’ and 
officers’ understanding, knowledge and recall of IHL (norm internalisation from a 
cognitive perspective); and their adherence or willingness to comply, which has both 
individual and group aspects (norm internalisation from a volitional perspective). 
 
Part II of the thesis (chapters 4 and 5) addresses all three research questions. The lack of 
synthesis between IHL’s norms of prevention (of which the IHL training obligation is 
one) and the absence of prevention as a term of art in IHL scholarship (as opposed to the 
practice of the ICRC) is the subject of chapter 4. Chapter 4 defines the laconic phrasing 
of IHL’s norms of prevention as one aspect of the conundrum between military training 
in IHL and the prevention of violations. There is too little guidance on how states should 
implement IHL’s preventive norms, leading to the risk that they are implemented 
piecemeal or perfunctorily. Relating the IHL training obligation to the obligation to 
‘respect and ensure respect’ for Geneva law; the availability of military legal advisers, 
command responsibility, and the duty to disobey an unlawful order adds strength and 
content to each of these obligations, and encourages states to see them as interlocking 
duties. This helps to solve the conundrum by encouraging more than lip service or a 
piecemeal approach to military IHL training. Chapter 5 addresses another distinctive 
challenge for compliance presented by IHL, that of its strong disaggregation to sub-state 
68  
actors (soldiers, officers and civilian authorities) and to non-state armed groups. This 
strong disaggregation requires that IHL norms be internalised by each of the actors 
responsible for IHL compliance, but traditional compliance theories, especially realist 
and rational choice accounts, are premised on the state as a single rational meta-actor. 
The complexity of modern conflicts also requires that soldiers and officers understand 
when rules on the conduct of hostilities apply, and when law enforcement standards 
govern the use of force. Chapter 5 considers arguments for and against a distinctive 
compliance theory for IHL, and finds seven strong arguments in favour, because of 
IHL’s distinctive compliance challenges (which range from its strong disaggregation, to 
debates on the classification of conflicts and the co-applicability of IHL and IHRL, to 
states’ resistance to transparency and external scrutiny of their practice in IHL). A 
constructivist account, focusing on norm internalisation and communities of practice, is 
the best available theoretical account of the relationship between IHL training and 
compliance, but it is not a complete solution to the conundrum. 
 
Part III (chapters 6 and 7) addresses the second research question (by continuing to explain 
the conundrum, offering examples of flaws and recent improvements in military IHL 
training), and the third (by testing the theory built in earlier chapters and offering new, 
context-specific insights). These chapters begin to sketch an explanation for the conundrum 
in institutional responses to past violations. The British Army case study shows that IHL 
training (or reforms to IHL training) was often asserted to take place, but this training was 
either absent or perfunctory, and reforms delayed. In the UK context, historic patterns of 
torture and inhuman treatment in military detention recur in subsequent decades, with the 
cause of this torture attributed to gaps in doctrine and training. Reforms to training are 
offered as an assumed panacea, while accountability for violations is repeatedly and vocally 
resisted. As a result, IHL training is forced to do greater explanatory and exculpatory work 
than it can. The British case study shows little awareness of the influence of social 
psychology, specifically of moral disengagement and discourse about law and enemy  
forces, as causal factors for IHL violations. It also demonstrates violations motivated 
through revenge or false perceptions of reciprocity, including the wilful killing of  an 
Afghan insurgent  by former Marine  Alexander Blackman.
364  
There is little     institutional 
awareness of the risks of a current discourse that the armed forces are under ‘legal siege’, or 
that civil litigation undermines operational 
 
6.4.4 
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effectiveness for soldiers’ and officers’ future compliance with IHL. The case study 
offers another example of the conundrum between IHL training, prevention and 
compliance: where a resistance to independent investigations, and to civil litigation 
against the armed forces is justified by assurances that reforms to IHL training are in 
place, and such violations will not occur again. But chapter 7 also reveals belated but 
genuine, comprehensive reforms to the British Army’s IHL training, on the treatment of 
prisoners of war and other detainees, on human rights standards applicable to the use of 
force  in  peacekeeping  or  law  enforcement/occupation  missions,
365  
with  the   recent 
addition of a Module on investigations and accountability.
366  
The case study does    not 
solve the conundrum by itself, but it offers a rich explanation of flaws in IHL training, 
absence of institutional reflection on training’s relationship with prevention and 
compliance, and a disconnect between political discourse against international law’s 
legitimacy and genuine reforms to IHL training by Army lawyers. 
 
The thesis conclusion, chapter 8, draws together insights from each chapter, and 
addresses each of the three research questions in turn. The thesis makes four 
contributions towards a solution to the conundrum between IHL training, prevention and 
compliance: i) the genealogy of the IHL training obligation and the synthesis from 
literature into standards for IHL training; ii) the sketched theory of prevention for IHL, 
which presents several preventive norms as interrelated obligations; iii) the adapted 
constructivist compliance theory for IHL; and iv) the insights built in the critical case 
study. Chapter 8 reflects on the limitations and possible impact of the study and calls for 
chapter 3’s standards to be translated into a rubric for states to share their practice in 
IHL training at the next meeting of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement in 2019. 
Finally, it suggests further research. 
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Part I. The Conundrum between Military Training in International 
Humanitarian Law, Prevention and Compliance 
 
Chapter 2. A Genealogy of the Obligation to Instruct the Armed 
Forces in International Humanitarian Law 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter offers a genealogy of the IHL training obligation, dissecting treaty texts and 
diplomatic history to investigate: i) the extent of the assumption that dissemination and 
military instruction would prevent violations in future conflicts; ii) states’ willingness to 
agree to a simply-stated obligation, which lacks criteria and a monitoring mechanism; and 
iii) the temporal and material scope of the obligation in IAC and NIAC - where lex lata ends 
and lex ferenda begins. It proceeds from the hypothesis that the simplicity of the treaty   
norm and its emphasis on ‘dissemination’ are evidence of an historic assumption that mere 
awareness of norms is necessary for compliance with IHL, without careful reflection on the 
modalities for training, prevention and compliance. 
 
2.2 The Evolution of the Obligation in International Armed Conflicts 
 
 
IHL’s earliest documents refer to dissemination of a then-novel set of norms, and to the 
assumption that spreading awareness of IHL among all citizens would prevent unlawful 
conduct by citizen soldiers.
1 
The Oxford Manual of War on Land 1880 is one such 
example,
2 
reflecting the recommendation from the Second International Conference of 
the Red Cross in Berlin in 1869 that knowledge of the Geneva Convention of 1864 be 
publicised as much as possible, especially among soldiers.
3 ‘[N]ecessary steps’ must be 
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taken to instruct troops in IHL under Article 26 of the Geneva Convention of 1906,
4    
while 
Article 1 of Hague Convention IV 1907 included an obligation to ‘issue instructions’ 
(meaning orders, rather than education in the law) to troops which were consistent with the 
Convention and its annexed regulations. Hague Convention X requires that ‘necessary 
measures’ be taken to bring its provisions ‘to the knowledge of their naval forces’, 
especially those who would be entitled to immunity.
5 
Instruction appears again in a stronger 
formulation in the 1929 Geneva Convention on the Wounded and Sick: 
 
 
The High Contracting Parties shall take the necessary steps to instruct their 
troops, and in particular the personnel protected, in the provisions of the present 
Convention, and to bring them to the notice of the civil population.
6
 
 
The ‘necessary steps’ suggests more than one administrative action to inculcate 
knowledge of IHL, and here (as in the earlier treaties), military instruction comes first, 
with civilian education a secondary issue. 
 
The Four Geneva Conventions of 1949 require States to disseminate their texts ‘as 
widely as possible’ (an approach consistent with breadth but superficiality), and ‘in 
particular’ to include their ‘study in programmes of military and, if possible, civil 
instruction’.7   The   text   of   the   obligation   ‘varies   lightly’8   between   each   of the 
Conventions, to allow for greater specificity as to the individuals, e.g. ‘civilian, military, 
police,  or  other  authorities’9   who  assume  responsibilities  therein.  Yet  these    dual 
dissemination and training duties are merely stated, with minimal guidance in the treaty 
text on how best to train military and civilian authorities in IHL. 
 
In placing ‘dissemination’ first, the articles hint that the same policies and practices 
should inform both civic learning and military instruction. In the phrasing of  each 
article, ‘so that the principles thereof may become known’ is stated as a result in itself. It 
may be true, as per the Pictet Commentary and the updated ICRC Commentary, that 
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dissemination and military instruction are closely related to the obligation in Common 
Article 1, to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for Geneva law ‘in all circumstances’;10 but   a 
simple norm, delegated to State discretion, without standards or a monitoring 
mechanism, is not ideally crafted for the prevention of violations. Nor is an emphasis on 
‘dissemination’ sufficient for military instruction or training.11 
 
The Pictet Commentary to Article 144 of the Fourth Geneva Convention offers some 
modalities to assist states, in an expansive reading of the treaty norm. It emphasises that 
the training obligation applies in peace and war, and that its purpose is to preclude the 
ignorance of those whose acts might lead to prosecutions and (implicitly) state 
responsibility. The Commentary recognises the importance of refresher training pre- 
deployment, of adapting training to soldiers’ individual ranks, and of ensuring that 
civilian officials are also aware of IHL. It is emphasised that civilian dissemination 
should not be thought ‘any the less imperative’ than military instruction. The words ‘if 
possible’ do not imply that civilian instruction is less important, but reflect the concerns 
of federal  states  on  education policy-making.
12  
The Commentary then  blends  jus   in 
bello with jus ad bellum: the aim of civilian dissemination is, apparently, to develop    ‘a 
pacific spirit among the peoples.’13 The Commentary leaves unexplained the processes 
that might lead from awareness of IHL norms to subsequent behaviour. 
 
Where ratified, Additional Protocol I adds substance to the obligation, providing a number 
of loosely-related norms of prevention. Article 6(1) of Additional Protocol I requires High 
Contracting Parties to ‘train qualified personnel to facilitate the application of the 
Conventions and of this Protocol…’ Article 82 specifies the role of legal advisers both in 
advising commanders on IHL compliance and in setting up military instruction  
programmes. Article 87 sets out the duties of commanders, which include an obligation to 
‘ensure that members of the armed forces under their command are aware of their 
obligations’  under  Geneva  law.
14   
Article  83  requires  that  ‘[a]ny  military  or    civilian 
authorities who … assume responsibilities in respect of the application of the Conventions 
and this Protocol … shall be fully acquainted with [their] text.’
15 
These are due diligence 
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obligations,
16 
but this is not an asset, because the results to be attained, and the 
relationship between awareness of a text and subsequent behaviour, are left under- 
specified. 
 
The obligation to disseminate IHL and include it in military instruction remains pithily- 
expressed and delegated to state discretion. The ICRC Commentary to Article 83 of 
Additional Protocol I defines dissemination as ‘sowing the seeds’ of IHL compliance (a 
brief expression of a process left undefined), and emphasises that the ‘…setting up the 
programme [of military instruction]… will probably require decisions at a ministerial 
level…’17 In Resolution 21 of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva 1974-1977,  States 
are ‘invite[d]’ to ‘encourag[e]…the authorities concerned to plan and to give effect’ to 
IHL training, with ICRC assistance if necessary, ‘in a manner suited to national 
circumstances’.18 As might be expected in a nonbinding Resolution, the verbs here   are 
permissive, not obligatory, reflecting some sharp criticism of Resolution 21. One 
delegate complained that it was ‘excessively didactic’ and ‘unbecoming to the 
conference’.19   But   this   sense  of  marginality  and  state   discretion   infuses    treaty 
obligations too. Bothe and colleagues argue that the use of the words ‘if possible’, and 
‘as widely as possible’ lend a contingency to the IHL training obligation, and (less 
plausibly) that the obligation for military and civilian authorities with relevant 
responsibilities to be ‘fully acquainted’ with the text of AP I is a dilution of the earlier 
obligation to  possess  the treaty texts.
20  On the contrary,  ‘fully acquainted’ imposes   a 
stronger obligation of result than merely possessing treaty texts, and the obligation in 
Article 83(2) of Additional Protocol I requires these authorities to have knowledge of  
the Four Geneva Conventions and AP I. Article 25 of the Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property (HCCP) 1954, and Article 6 of the Convention on 
Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) 1980 contain similarly drafted provisions.
21
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Discretion is not surprising. As Rowe notes, it is usual in international law for a state to 
‘decide for itself how its obligations may apply in the sphere of its own municipal 
law’.22   This   allows   for   treaty   obligations   to   be   adapted   to   states’   particular 
circumstances, and to their constitutional structures; so, for example, a federal state 
cannot make decisions about education policy that is the domain of regional  
government. However, in IHL, states’ resistance to standard-setting and to monitoring 
of treaty implementation is particularly acute, as noted in 1.1. Boothby acknowledges 
that ‘light regulation’ is the tendency in the laws of armed conflict ‘because 
implementation depends on what states will accept.’23 
 
Yet deference to state discretion is problematic in this context. States are willing to agree to 
laconic norms of prevention, including the IHL training obligation, in the context of 
assertions that it will prevent violations; but they are unwilling to agree to detailed guidance 
on how to implement the training, and to binding mechanisms to enable reporting and 
monitoring of these norms of prevention. A draft third paragraph in what became Article 83 
of Additional Protocol I would have provided for the evaluation of States’ IHL 
dissemination and training obligations through periodic reporting every four years. 
Following objections from the USSR and 16 other States in Committee    I,
24  
this provision 
was narrowly approved but later rejected in the plenary conference. Efforts to provide for a 
voluntary reporting mechanism on the national implementation of IHL in general (but 
including reports on IHL dissemination and training) have also failed, at the 1974-1977 
Diplomatic  Conference,  
25   
following  the  Intergovernmental  Group  of  Experts  for  the 
Protection of War Victims 1995,
26 
and the sudden demise of the proposed Meetings of 
States in the consultation phase of the Strengthening Compliance Initiative.
27
 
A closer look at Resolution 21 and the ICRC Commentary to Article 83 of Additional 
Protocol I reveals a nuanced institutional response: to accept states’ discretion in the 
implementation of IHL dissemination and training, while beginning to sketch best 
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practice in nonbinding documents.
28 
This tendency is also found in the Plan of Action 
annexed to Resolution 1 of the 27
th 
RCRC in 1999.
29 
It provides detailed guidance on 
IHL education to a range of decision-makers;
30 
and urges states to include IHL in   field 
manuals and command procedures; making it a ‘standard norm in command post and 
staff exercises as well as in military manoeuvres.’31 
 
The timing of the 1999 Plan of Action is informative, as in the 1990s, there was a subtle 
increase in the specificity of IHL treaty norms relating to dissemination and military 
training. Protocol IV to the CCW from 1995 includes a brief IHL training obligation, 
specifying military training as part of ‘all feasible measures’ to avoid weapons which cause 
‘permanent blindness to unenhanced vision.’
32  
Amended Protocol II 1996 (which    applies 
the CCW and its Protocols to NIAC as well as IAC)    requires ‘training commensurate with 
[soldiers’] duties and responsibilities…’;
33 
while Article 30 of the 1999 Second Protocol  to 
the Hague Convention of 1954 (also applicable, as is the Hague Convention 1954 to both 
IAC and NIAC) provides for co-operation between military and civilian authorities, 
UNESCO, and non-governmental authorities in dissemination and military instruction in 
peace and war. In particular, ‘guidelines and instructions on the protection of cultural 
property’ must form part of military regulations.
34
 
 
Yet this subtle increase in detail is context-specific and does not last, suggesting an absence 
of attention to the modalities of IHL training when subsequent treaties were negotiated. 
Protocol V to the CCW on Explosive Remnants of War 2003 returns to a simply-stated 
norm;
35  
keeping the phrasing of earlier Protocols that refer to  ‘instructions and    operating 
procedures’ as well as ‘training’. Additional Protocol III to the Four Geneva Conventions 
2005 on the protection of the Red Cross, Red Crescent and Red 
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Crystal emblems uses the phrasing of Additional Protocol I.
36 
The ICRC Commentary 
notes the importance of the emblem to the protection of ‘medical personnel, units and 
transports’, but does not offer modalities for dissemination and training that might assist 
with this.
37
 
 
A genealogy of the obligation in IAC shows a durable and frequent assumption that IHL 
dissemination and military instruction would prevent violations, without critical 
consideration of the relationship between communicated norms and subsequent 
behaviour. States were willing to agree to simply-stated norms on dissemination and 
IHL training, but there was some resistance to detailed prescription (leaving guidance to 
states in the ICRC Commentaries and non-binding RCRC resolutions); and conclusive 
resistance at the 1974-1977 Diplomatic Conference to a proposed reporting mechanism 
on IHL training. 
 
2.3 Dissemination and Training in Non-International Armed Conflicts 
 
 
The extent of the obligation to disseminate the IHL of NIAC, and to train troops in these 
norms has been the subject of debate. Although there is no enumerated IHL training 
obligation in Common Article 3 to the Four Geneva Conventions (which regulates non- 
international armed conflicts where Additional Protocol II has not been ratified or does not 
apply),
38 
Common Article 3 forms part of the whole of the Four Geneva Conventions   text, 
and it is this text that is the subject of the almost-common articles on dissemination and 
training in the Four Geneva Conventions. It follows that dissemination and training should 
include the protections and prohibitions in Common Article 3, and not merely the  
distinction between IAC  and  NIAC.
39  
This  approach is  supported  by the  newly-updated 
ICRC Commentary to the First and Second Geneva Conventions.
40 
As the Four Geneva 
Conventions are universally ratified, all states must disseminate the content of Common 
Article 3 and include its text in programmes of military instruction. 
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Article 19 of Additional Protocol II, applicable to some NIAC when ratified,
41 
provides 
simply that ‘This Protocol shall be disseminated as widely as possible.’42 There is 
nothing further: no specified obligation on states to instruct their armed forces, nor an 
obligation on other parties to a NIAC to train their fighters. However, delegates had 
previously agreed a detailed dissemination and military training provision for the 
Protocol. Article 19 was a casualty of the rush to simplify the text of the Protocol in 
order to ensure the final text would be passed; a process that took place late in the three- 
year diplomatic conference. The hurry to agree upon a consensus draft deprived the 
treaty text of an explicit obligation to include Additional Protocol II in programmes of 
military instruction. From April 1975 until May 1977, working groups and initial 
plenaries would have given Additional Protocol II a detailed dissemination and military 
instruction provision, the first paragraph dealing with dissemination and military 
instruction in time of peace, and the second with stronger training obligations once a 
NIAC had begun, for ‘military and civilian authorities and all persons subject to their 
control’.43 There was debate about the wisdom of insisting on civilian dissemination for 
Additional Protocol II, for educational reasons, and because of the structure of federal 
states, which could not set educational policy for their component parts. ‘[S]everal 
states’ were worried that the dissemination of NIAC IHL in peacetime ‘might encourage 
rebellion’, but the ICRC emphasised that the causes of conflict were entirely different.44 
 
Brazil successfully proposed the deletion of a peacetime obligation to include the Protocol 
in military instruction, so that ‘military instruction’ would appear only in the draft second 
paragraph, applicable once a conflict had begun.
45 
The Brazilian delegation had referred  to 
unspecified ‘difficulties of application’, and argued that it was undesirable for the text to  be 
‘too definite,’
46 
so there was nuance from some delegates about a detailed provision. The 
Philippines delegate believed the draft Article to be redundant, because it already instructed 
its military in  the  IHL of  IAC  and  NIAC.
47  
However,  no  delegates stated their outright 
opposition to military instruction in the provisions of Additional Protocol II, and there were 
emphatic statements by the USA and UK that dissemination and military 
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instruction were important preventive tools.
48 
There is little evidence that the current, 
very brief formulation, focusing on dissemination only, reflects a substantive consensus. 
 
In May 1977, in response to diplomatic rumours that the final draft of the whole treaty 
would not be agreed, Pakistan proposed a radically shorter version of the treaty, deleting 
the draft Art 37 and replacing it with its current brief text. 
49 
Multiple draft Articles that 
had received careful substantive consideration were similarly deleted. There was no 
substantive discussion on the dissemination provision, so the value of the earlier 
substantive debate and arguable consensus is lost in a hurried attempt to agree a draft of 
the entire Protocol by June 1977. Additional Protocol II’s dissemination provision is 
genuinely ambiguous or obscure in its scope, justifying the use of the travaux 
préparatoires as an aid to interpretation.
50 
It is far from settled that all delegates  agreed 
that in NIAC, Additional Protocol II should be merely disseminated and not the subject 
of more stringent training. The ICRC Commentary explains that soldiers need to be 
taught ‘exactly the same behaviour’ for international and non-international armed 
conflicts alike.
51
 
 
Article 19 of Additional Protocol II is not the last word on whether or not there is an 
obligation to integrate the IHL of non-international armed conflict into military instruction. 
The provision can be read with reference to the IHL training obligation in IAC. As it is both 
obligatory and possible for armed forces to be trained in IAC IHL, then ‘disseminated as 
widely as possible’ extends to training the armed forces in Additional Protocol II. If it is 
possible for armed groups to train their fighters, then ‘as widely as possible’ confers an 
obligation also to train them in the provisions of Additional Protocol 
Other treaties applicable in NIAC contain a military instruction obligation. Amended 
Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons includes an IHL training 
obligation, as does the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention on Cultural Property,
52
 
both of which clarify that their ‘parent’ Convention’ and Protocols apply to IAC and 
NIAC. 
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The ICRC Customary IHL Study reviewed multiple military manuals and found no 
evidence of divergent practice in training between international and non-international 
armed conflicts, suggesting there is an IHL training obligation applicable  to 
international and non-international armed conflicts (although the negative conditional 
language used is not the strongest advocacy for a finding of an obligation).
53 
As the 
IHL of NIAC binds both states and armed groups, then a putative customary IHL 
training obligation similarly applies to both armed forces and armed groups. There has 
been little scholarly attention on this aspect of the ICRC Customary IHL Study: most 
debate centres on states’ objections to the Study’s methodology.54 The argument by 
Turns that Rule 142 is customary only in relation to the IHL of IAC is unpersuasive, 
however.
55  
Turns  infers  a  customary  obligation  in  IAC  from  art  87  of  Additional 
Protocol I, which is not universally ratified; and declines to find a customary IHL 
obligation on armed groups to train their members in the IHL of NIAC because he does 
not believe that armed groups show sufficient practice and recognise a legal obligation  
to train their members in IHL. This forgets that the practice of armed groups is not 
required to form evidence of a customary rule: the ICRC recognised this, classifying the 
practice of armed groups under ‘Other Practice’ in the CIHL Study, and not collecting 
any such practice in relation to Rule 142. A better approach would be to design a study 
on the extent of state practice and opinio juris available for military training on NIAC 
IHL, because such work is yet to be done. Authority for an obligation to train both  
armed forces and armed groups in IHL can also be found in Security Council 
Resolutions on the protection of civilians passed under Chapter VII.
56
 
 
Case law provides only doubtful authority for a customary IHL obligation in relation to 
dissemination and military instruction. In its interlocutory decision in Tadic, the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found 
that Common Article 3 and ‘the core of Additional Protocol II’ were ‘declaratory of existing 
rules’ or evidence that customary rules had ‘crystallized’.
57 
It is possible to interpret Article 
19 of Additional Protocol II as ‘declaratory’ of an existing customary 
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rule that includes both dissemination and military instruction; but it is more difficult to 
argue that Art 19 is part of the ‘core’ of Additional Protocol II as interpreted by the Appeals 
Chamber. The Appeals Chamber reasoned that individual criminal responsibility exists for 
breaches of the IHL of NIAC, from Common Article 3 and customary IHL. Dissemination 
and military instruction were not the question before the court. 
 
2.4 Narrow and Broad Readings of the Obligation 
 
 
What is the temporal and material scope of the military instruction obligation? As to the 
temporal scope, it follows from the analysis above that states are obliged to provide military 
instruction, in peacetime and during armed conflict, in the IHL of IAC, and at a minimum 
the rules in Common Article 3. Where Additional Protocol II is ratified, it must be 
‘disseminated as widely as possible’. The frequency of civilian dissemination and military 
training is not set by the lex lata. Reading the IHL training obligation together with the duty 
in Common Article 1 to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for the Four Geneva Conventions ‘in  
all circumstances’, military instruction for deployable staff and for civilian officials with 
responsibilities in relation to IHL should take place sufficiently frequently in peacetime to 
enable a lasting knowledge of all relevant provisions; and to minimise gaps in institutional 
memory in case an armed conflict occurs. This is a broad reading of the temporal scope of 
the obligation, one that attempts to address the conundrum between military training in IHL 
and the prevention of violations. 
 
The simply-stated military instruction norm gives few details on its material scope. This 
necessitates decisions about who should be trained, based on the treaty obligations; in what 
they should be trained; and how the instruction or training should be designed. These 
decisions are best made by interpreting the military instruction obligation to ensure its 
effectiveness in Lauterpacht’s sense. Lauterpacht preferred to read treaty obligations 
broadly,  unless  there  was  evidence  that  a  restrictive  interpretation  was        required.
58
 
Lauterpacht’s principle of effectiveness aimed to elide ambiguity or state discretion that 
might otherwise undermine the effectiveness of international law. Critics might assert that 
these readings of the military instruction obligation broaden beyond the lex lata into lex 
ferenda. To meet this criticism, the following paragraphs rely closely on treaty texts, linking 
them to the characteristics of modern conflicts; and rely on published compendia 
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of state practice: the ICRC Customary IHL Database, and a survey-based dataset of 53 
states on their implementation of military instruction in IHL.
59
 
 
Who should be trained? 
 
In  Albania, only ‘[o]fficers and trainers’ are listed as  training recipients,60  leading    to 
questions about basic training and IHL instruction to enlisted personnel. Egypt’s entry 
raises similar questions, as only ‘[c]ommanders and officers’ are listed as recipients of 
training.
61 
It is possible that in these countries, IHL instruction is done entirely on a 
train-the-trainers basis, with unit commanders expected to distil the essence of IHL 
norms that they have learned in a classroom setting, but this is not made clear. If only 
‘commanders and officers’ receive IHL training in a given country, then this is too 
narrow a reading of the obligation to integrate the study of the Four Geneva  
Conventions into military instruction. It runs the risk of violations through ignorance by 
enlisted personnel. Yet the formulation of the IHL training obligation allows for just 
such a narrow interpretation. India’s entry suggests that training is only provided to 
‘[o]fficers and JCOs [junior commissioned officers]’, but law of armed conflict training 
also occurs at ‘unit level’, suggesting that a train-the-trainers approach is used.62 
 
Where Additional Protocol I is ratified, ‘any military or civilian authorities’ who assume 
responsibilities under Geneva law during an armed conflict should be ‘fully acquainted’  
with both the Four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I.
63 
The best interpretation 
is to require in-depth and regular professional training of government officials, including (at 
a minimum) the Prime Minister, President or equivalent, and office-holders at defence 
ministries and ministries of foreign affairs, and intelligence agencies. Mikos-Skuza calls for 
still broader instruction, to civil servants in Ministries of ‘…Justice, Health and Social 
Affairs, and Education,… politicians, diplomats and international officials’, to ‘medical and 
paramedical’ professions and law enforcement.
64  
Article 83(2) of Additional Protocol I 
places ‘Any military or civilian authorities’ with 
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responsibilities to comply with Geneva law on an equal footing; in effect elevating those 
civilian authorities into recipients of instruction (equivalent to that received by the 
military) rather than the civilian dissemination that should take place ‘as widely as 
possible.’ In conflicts where unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or drones are used, 
civilian drone operators, and the developers of autonomous and semi-autonomous 
weapons should also receive training in IHL targeting rules, and applicable IHRL. There 
is no explicit treaty obligation to train these individuals in IHL. 
 
Is there authority in customary IHL to provide instruction on a par with the armed forces 
to civilians with responsibilities in armed conflict? While several military manuals cited 
in the ICRC Customary IHL Study refer to the obligation from Article 83(2) Additional 
Protocol I to ensure that both military and civilian authorities with relevant 
responsibilities are ‘fully acquainted’ with treaty texts, these manuals do not provide 
information on the training of defence ministers, civilian drone operators, and members 
of private military and security companies. Arguably, military manuals are at best 
evidence of opinio juris, not of state practice on IHL training.
65 
As a result, they can 
include statements of aspiration or intent on military instruction in IHL, but current 
training materials or a summary of the training undertaken are not included. Peru and 
Mexico are two examples of states attempting to bridge the divide between military and 
civilian authorities in IHL training. Peru’s National Committee for IHL organises annual 
Miguel Grau IHL training course, for ‘representatives of the public sector: the executive 
branch of government, judges and law professionals, and members of the military and 
police forces.’66  It also conducts issue-specific training on the protection of cultural 
property in armed conflict.
67 Mexico’s Interministerial Committee applies a similar 
approach, with a strong commitment to IHL dissemination to officials and citizens alike, 
supplementing the government and ICRC’s role in IHL military instruction.68 These are 
only two states with evidence of a sustained commitment to training civilian officials in 
IHL. 
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It is easier to find evidence of flaws in IHL and IHRL training of intelligence agencies 
and of gaps in evidence on the training of civilian drone operators than any examples of 
state practice in this regard. The US Senate Intelligence Committee report into torture 
signalled that intelligence officers were trained in interrogation techniques but 
seemingly not trained in the prohibition of torture,
69 
which is shared by IHL and  IHRL. 
Open questions remain on the extent of IHL instruction (if any) received by civilian 
drone operators, and civilian contractors in the drone programme in the US. O’Connell 
believes that the CIA receives no training in IHL.
70 
If this is correct, it is a concern, 
given the uncertain legal framework regulating drone strikes (some strikes take place in 
armed conflict when IHL applies, while others take place outside armed conflict, so that 
extraterritorial IHRL might apply if the drone strike constitutes state agent authority  
over an individual or the state operating the drones has effective control of an area).
71  
It 
is also a concern because technical expertise in visual analysis and target   identification 
prior  to  drone  strikes  is  increasingly  contracted-out  to  civilians.
72  
The  problem  of 
civilian drone operators highlights the flaws in the IAC and NIAC treaty law that 
requires only ‘disseminat[ion]’ to civilians who might directly participate in hostilities. 
Where AP I applies, civilian drone operators can be read as ‘civilian authorities’ with 
responsibilities to upload Geneva law, so they should be ‘fully acquainted’ with the 
Geneva Conventions and AP I pursuant to Article 83(2) of Additional Protocol I. There 
is insufficient authority for a customary IHL obligation to train civilian drone operators, 
and no specific treaty norm requiring them to undertake instruction in IHL. 
 
Private  military  and  security  companies  (PMSC)  often  provide  security,  detention, 
technical and training services in armed conflicts or post-conflict environments.
73 
Tonkin notes that where PMSC provide training, particularly if they advise armed forces 
or groups on the conduct of hostilities or are present at the front line, this can amount to 
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DPH by the PMSC.
74 
Is there an obligation to train PMSC personnel in IHL? There is 
neither a binding treaty obligation nor evidence of a customary IHL obligation, but there 
is  a  non-binding  set  of  standards,  the  Montreux  Document  on  Pertinent  Legal 
Obligations and Good Practices for States related to Operations of Private Military   and 
Security Companies during Armed Conflict (Montreux Document),
75 
which strongly 
emphasises the wisdom of training PMSC in IHL. Five of the Good Practices call on 
States to train PMSC in IHL, often as a precondition for contracts to be concluded 
between States and those companies.
76 
PMSC also provide training in IHL and IHRL to 
state armed forces or law enforcement officials, and governments have been known to 
contract out their IHL training (and their training on religious and cultural sensitivity for 
example) to PMSC. The quality of this training is beyond the scope of this thesis, but 
should be the subject of future studies. 
 
What should they be trained? 
 
 
2.3 above establishes that training in the prohibitions and protections of Common Article 3 
should form part of the military instruction offered by all states, as the Four Geneva 
Conventions 1949 are universally ratified. The position under Additional Protocol II is more 
nuanced, but the final phrasing on dissemination only is evidence of the rush to agree a 
streamlined consensus draft of the Protocol, and does not fairly represent the substantive 
diplomatic debates. States parties to the CCW and its Protocols, and to the Hague 
Convention on Cultural Property and its Protocols should also train their armed forces in 
these norms, applicable in IAC and NIAC. The San Remo Manual on NIAC is also intended 
to be used in military instruction, despite its non-binding status.
77
 
 
Is there an obligation to train the armed forces in IHRL norms? At a minimum, IHL training 
must include the norms shared between IHL and IHRL which apply during armed 
conflict,
78 
or the instruction is left incomplete as regards binding IHL. IHL prohibits 
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torture and outrages upon personal dignity, cruel or humiliating and degrading treatment in 
international and non-international armed conflicts,
79 
and these prohibitions have analogues 
in IHRL.
80 
There are binding treaty obligations requiring the training of ‘law enforcement 
personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons’ who have 
responsibilities in relation to persons deprived of their liberty in a) the prohibition of torture 
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment;
81 
and 
the prohibition of, and the need to prevent, investigate and prosecute enforced 
disappearance.
82 
Whether IHRL training in general should extend to the armed forces is 
a matter of lex ferenda (the only IHRL treaties requiring training are those on torture 
and enforced disappearance), but where troops will be faced by a rapidly changing legal 
context on deployment, akin to the ‘three block war’,83 it is good policy to train them on 
the distinction between the use of force in the conduct of hostilities (governed by IHL) 
and the exceptional use of force in law enforcement situations (governed by IHRL). 
 
Peacekeeping missions have ROE influenced by IHRL standards on the use of force.  Blocq 
identifies ‘moral uncertainty’ and malleable ROE as part of a ‘fog of peacekeeping’,
84
 
given faltering authorisation to peacekeepers to use force to protect civilians under the 
provisional UN Standing ROE for peacekeepers. As the application of IHL to 
intergovernmental organisations’ peacekeeping missions is uncertain (customary IHL could 
be binding, but treaty law is in doubt), Blocq suggests IHRL training should substitute for 
traditional military instruction in IHL
85
. Should IHL training be given to peacekeepers,    or 
do they require bespoke training with a greater emphasis on IHRL? Both treaty and 
customary IHL on training are silent on the issue of peacekeepers. Only some states 
mentioned to the ICRC Customary IHL Study that they had a policy or existing practice on 
the training of peacekeepers or peace enforcement troops deployed from their state armed 
forces. Selected states in Blank and Noone’s directory referred to training for peacekeepers 
specifically, but this was not a question asked to respondents. There is non-binding  
authority in the UN Secretary-General’s Bulletin from 1999, where peacekeeping 
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troops are required to be ‘fully acquainted’ with IHL rules, in terminology which 
matches Additional Protocol I.
86
 
 
 
 
How should they be trained? 
 
 
The IHL training obligation provides no detail on how the training should take place. The 
customary rule on IHL instruction does not require that all soldiers are ‘totally familiar with 
every detail’ of IHL: training should be suited to the personnel’s ‘actual    functions’.
87  
The 
authors of the ICRC Customary IHL Study noted that most IHL training was classroom- 
based, but were concerned that this would be insufficient for compliance. The South African 
military manual  calls  for  training  to  instil  a  lawful  response  as  ‘second  nature’.
88 
The 
Customary IHL Study, like the Commentaries and non-binding Resolutions discussed in  
2.2, add precision which the binding treaty norm lacks. ‘War gaming’ appears alongside 
classroom instruction in 30 of the 53 state entries in Blank and Noone’s compendium of 
IHL training. The authors do not define this term, but they list it alongside field exercises in 
the  introduction  to  the  volume.
89  
These  thin  data  suggest  a  trend  towards  combining 
classroom and practical instruction in IHL, but 30 instances of suggested practice out of 53 
states is insufficient to build a customary IHL rule. Of these, South Africa lists 10% of the 
training in the classroom, with 90% on ‘training manuals, war gaming and field  
exercises’.
90 
While there might be the beginnings of state practice that combines classroom- 
based and practical or scenario-based training in IHL, there is no binding obligation to do  
so. In treaty law, the words ‘study’ and ‘instruction’ suggest states assumed the usefulness  
of a classroom-based approach. This does not mean that classroom instruction alone is 
sufficient to prevent violations and ensure compliance on future deployments; only that the 
treaty obligation was phrased simply, and without careful consideration of how IHL training 
might be designed to improve prevention and compliance. Chapter 3 addresses this aspect  
of the conundrum in depth. 
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2.5    Conclusion 
 
 
A genealogy of the obligation to instruct the armed forces in IHL reveals a durable 
assumption that dissemination and military instruction were necessary to prevent 
violations in future conflicts; coupled with some states’ resistance to detailed 
prescription on civilian dissemination and military instruction; and a nuanced 
institutional response: to leave treaty norms simply expressed, offering some guidance 
on best practice in non-binding resolutions and commentaries. The assumption that 
dissemination and training were necessary for compliance (if not a potential panacea for 
violations) lasted at least from Moynier’s statement to the Second International 
Conference of the Red Cross in Berlin in 1869 until the Diplomatic Conference of 
Geneva  in  1974-1977.
91  
There  was  insufficient  attention  to  the  difference between 
necessary and sufficient causes in diplomatic debates up until the 1980s, and a subtle 
increase in the specificity of the dissemination and training obligation only in selected 
treaty texts from the 1990s. This idealistic assumption governed diplomatic debates,  
with the relationship between dissemination and training, prevention and compliance 
asserted but unexplored. Delegates saw ignorance of the law as a cause of violations and 
proffered awareness or knowledge of the law as a solution. 
 
The assumption that knowledge of IHL will prevent violations is one explanation for the 
emphasis on dissemination as opposed to practical training in the Four Geneva Conventions 
of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 1977 and 2005. Treaty formulations which mention 
‘dissemination’ first imply that the same strategies should inform both civic learning and 
military training. Where resources are limited, an obligation to disseminate IHL ‘as widely 
as possible’ infuses an optional quality to the military training obligation. An emphasis on 
dissemination fails to acknowledge the distinctions between communicated norm and 
subsequent behaviour; and between understanding, knowledge and recall on the one hand, 
and adherence or willingness to comply on the other. 
 
The same assumption is one explanation for the laconic or simply stated phrasing of the 
obligation in treaty texts, and the absence of binding standards and monitoring of states’ 
implementation of the obligation. If awareness or knowledge actively prevents violations, 
and the dissemination and training obligation is an unqualified good, then (the assumption 
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runs) there is no need to delineate standards nor to monitor state practice. Further 
explanations lie in international law’s habitual resort to simple, discretionary norms for 
the domestic implementation of international law; and in states’ particular resistance to 
transparent monitoring of their practice in armed conflict. A draft third paragraph in 
what became Article 83 of Additional Protocol I, to allow for regular reporting to the 
ICRC on states’ implementation of dissemination and military instruction was rejected 
before the final text was agreed, and the reporting mechanism for the CCW and its 
Protocols yields only the thinnest data on military training.
92
 
 
The laconic phrasing means that treaty law gives scant guidance to states on how to design 
their dissemination and training. If a simply-stated training obligation is a problem for 
compliance, how detailed and prescriptive should it be? First, the extent of the obligation in 
IAC and in NIAC should be clarified. The IHL training obligation binds states in peace and 
war, in IAC and to a considerable extent in NIAC. The obligation on armed groups to train 
their members in the IHL of NIAC begins when an armed conflict breaks out. The hurried 
simplification of Additional Protocol II meant that substantive debate on IHL training in 
non-international armed conflict is not reflected in the final treaty text, which on its face, 
requires only dissemination ‘as widely as possible’. While Additional Protocol 
is not the last word on IHL training in NIAC, and military instruction should take place in 
Common Article 3, weapons law and the protection of cultural property, the very brief 
formulation on dissemination in Article 19 of Additional Protocol II risks gaps in military 
knowledge of the applicable IHL in these more prevalent armed conflicts. 
 
Second, the frequency of dissemination and training is not set by treaty law, but it is 
submitted that military instruction for deployable staff and civilian officials with 
responsibilities under IHL should take place with sufficient frequency in peacetime to 
minimise gaps in institutional memory. 
 
Third, it is necessary to clarify who should be trained. Relying on the  formal instruction 
only of officers risks gaps in IHL knowledge by enlisted personnel, but the phrasing of the 
IHL training obligation allows for such an interpretation. In addition, an evolving consensus 
is needed on the range of civilian authorities who should be ‘fully acquainted’ with the Four 
Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I. This should include heads 
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of government, office-holders at Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, intelligence 
agencies, private military and security companies, civilian drone operators and the 
developers of autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons. Thus far, there is no 
authority in treaty or customary IHL for requiring specific civilian authorities to be 
trained in IHL, and the risk is that they will receive ad hoc broad dissemination only. 
 
Fourth, at a minimum, military instruction in IHL should include the prohibitions shared 
between IHL and IHRL, including the prohibition on torture and inhuman treatment (as 
variously defined). There are treaty obligations in IHRL to train military law 
enforcement officials in the obligations to prevent, investigate and prosecute torture and 
enforced disappearance. Peacekeepers, and troops likely to be deployed to rapidly- 
changing asymmetric conflicts, should be trained in IHL and in IHRL’s distinctive 
standards on when to use force. 
 
Fifth, while there might be the beginnings of state practice to combine classroom 
instruction in IHL with practical or scenario-based training, the treaty obligation 
continues to emphasise ‘study’ and ‘instruction’ (which might address at best soldiers’ 
and officers’ understanding of IHL) disfavouring practical approaches to training (which 
has the potential to build their understanding and willingness to comply). 
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Chapter 3. Towards Standards for Military Training in International 
Humanitarian Law 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
Once assumed, a causal relationship between military training in IHL, the prevention of 
violations and future compliance is now in doubt. It is uncertain to what extent 
ignorance of IHL causes violations, and to what extent knowledge of IHL prevents  
them. Deficient military training has been implicated in the wilful killing of civilians 
and the torture of detainees, but in each case, there are causal threads from military 
culture, moral disengagement or unlawful orders operating alongside ignorance of IHL. 
For example, the soldiers involved in the My Lai massacre ‘were not adequately trained’ 
in ‘the Geneva Conventions, the handling and treatment of prisoners of war, and the 
treatment and safeguarding of noncombatants.’1 Their training had not prepared them to 
disobey ‘palpably illegal’ orders, nor to report IHL violations; and the directives on  this 
matter were unclear.
2 However, ‘a permissive attitude’ within the task force’s culture 
enabled the killing and rape of civilians, and the destruction of civilian objects. Orders 
were progressively ‘embellished’, in effect misleading troops that the civilian village 
was an enemy camp.
3
 
 
The report into the shooting of intruders, and the torture and death of a Somali teenager 
by Canadian peacekeepers also found deficits in ‘ongoing generic peacekeeping 
training’,  including  IHL.4  As  for the  My  Lai  massacre,  these  violations  was multi- 
causal, and deficient military training was but one contextual factor. There were failings 
in command responsibility and the supervision of subordinates, poor approaches to 
transparency and ‘public accountability’, cover-ups or denial, and the failure to track 
concerns about disciplinary offences by candidates for promotion or retention.
5
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The Taguba report into the torture of Iraqi detainees by American soldiers at Abu  
Ghraib discovered that the relevant military police battalion had received ‘very little’ 
instruction on the Third Geneva Convention 1949, and ‘few, if any copies’ of the 
Convention were made available to military police or detainees.
6  
There were   unlawful 
orders  to  ‘break’  prisoners,  and  to  subject  them  to  torture  and  inhuman treatment, 
including sexually degrading acts and taunts.
7 
The failure to implement the IHL training 
obligation was part of a context marked by poor leadership and the failure to report 
conduct that violates IHL.
8
 
 
The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, into the death following torture of an Iraqi civilian in 
British military custody in 2003, found a failure to ‘instil… lasting knowledge’9 in the 
British Army’s annual, 40-minute instruction in IHL, most of which consisted of a dated 
Cold War-era video on the conduct of hostilities, 
10 
with instruction on the treatment  of 
prisoners of war ending at the point of capture. Witnesses to the Inquiry understood that 
there was a requirement to treat detainees humanely, but they differed in their 
understanding of what this meant. There had been a doctrinal failure to communicate the 
prohibition on the ‘five techniques’ of hooding, wall-standing, stress positions, 
deprivation of food and sleep.
11 
In this case, IHL training took place, but was found 
wanting. Arguably, the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report, and the political discourse 
that followed, emphasised IHL training too much as a cause of the violations, and 
reforms to IHL training as a panacea.
12 Williams’ study of the court-martial reports that 
a deployed ALS officer and the chain of command may have authorised the prohibited 
treatment of detainees, with the euphemism that they were to be ‘conditioned’ for 
interrogation, although this was disputed by other witnesses.
13 
Baha Mousa suffered 
multiple injuries consistent with severe, prolonged beatings; a sustained assault quite 
different from the prohibited ‘five techniques’. It follows that deficiencies in legal 
training were at best a contextual factor, not a sufficient cause of these violations. 
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 This chapter gathers insights on IHL training from historic and modern, legal and 
interdisciplinary sources to build standards for military training in IHL, with a careful 
acknowledgement of the limits of training in the context of IHL’s contested norms, its 
moral compromise, and the enigma between norms, instruction and subsequent 
behaviour. A synthesis is overdue, because (as 3.2 shows) the theory on IHL training is 
fragmented and incomplete. Historic works which related IHL training to the 
psychology of the battlefield were lost only to recur in a subsequent era of scholarship. 
An emphasis on supplementing classroom-based with practical training was similarly 
lost, recurring in modern scholarship without attribution. This scholarship has gradually 
acknowledged the insufficiency of military training in IHL to prevent violations, with 
individual scholars providing detailed reflection; but taken as a whole, the literature  
does not systematically integrate social processes and individual learning. In contrast, as 
explored in 3.3, interdisciplinary work has demonstrated that military culture, moral 
disengagement and discourse about law and enemy forces may be more powerful causal 
factors for IHL violations than ignorance of the law. 3.4 examines the evolution of 
practice at the ICRC in relation to military IHL training, and at Geneva Call, in relation 
to the practice of armed groups. 
 
The analysis in this chapter proceeds on the basis that IHL training should aim at norm 
internalisation by soldiers, officers, and any civilian authorities or non-state armed 
groups to whom dissemination and training is directed. In this thesis, the constructivist 
notion of norm internalisation is applied to the level of the individual and group, in 
recognition of IHL’s strong disaggregation to soldiers, officers and armed group  
fighters; and of the communities of practice through which military culture and attitudes 
to IHL are disseminated. The overall aim is that IHL norms should be ‘taken-for- 
granted’14 cognitively and volitionally. This requires insights from social  psychological 
research on social learning theory and moral disengagement. The standards built in 3.5 
are based on individuals’ understanding, knowledge and recall of IHL, and both 
individuals’ and groups’ adherence or willingness to comply. They are suggested as a 
rubric for voluntary state reporting on the implementation of the IHL training  
obligation, by the next meeting of the RCRC in 2019. 
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3.2 A Chronology of Literature and Historic Insights Lost 
 
 
From the 1950s until the 1970s, scholarly reflections on IHL dissemination and military 
instruction looked backwards to the atrocities of the Second World War. Gregoric sees 
ignorance of IHL as one causal factor for violations,
15 
while Draper argues that ‘the general 
ignorance on this subject, not excluding that of lawyers, contributed to the widespread   and 
gross war criminality [of the Second World War].’
16 
Neither author is simplistic in their 
analysis or prescription. Gregoric acknowledges the limitations in IHL’s substantive and 
remedial norms, calling on instructors openly to acknowledge this, lest civilians believe that 
the  Four  Geneva  Conventions  of  1949  offer  an  ‘absolute  and  facile  protection’.
17 
His 
prescription for civilian dissemination is detailed, representing the experience of the 
Yugoslav Red Cross in the post-Second World War era, and requiring course materials, 
public lectures and media dissemination of IHL. Writing on training the armed forces in 
IHL, Draper’s writings show awareness of the need for interdisciplinary reflection (although 
he does not call it this). Draper recognises that training can build up ‘a certain psychological 
resistance to criminal orders’ (i.e. both understanding and willingness to comply sufficient 
to challenge a superior); yet ‘States do not welcome the querying of the validity of orders 
given  to  military  subordinates.’
18   
Draper  argues  that  during  the  Second  World   War, 
German and Japanese forces deliberately exploited soldiers’ ignorance of IHL, in a system 
of military discipline so rigidly enforced that criminal orders were implemented without 
question.
19
 
 
Siordet also recognises the social psychological dimension of armed conflict, and the 
challenges this presents to the prevention of violations. He is aware that ‘[t]he determination 
to survive or to win at all costs… blunts men’s consciences, rendering them less particular 
[to  restrictions on  the  means and  methods  of warfare].’
20  
Des Cilleuls offers a   different 
account of the interaction between ideology and dissemination. Dissemination, he argues is 
error-prone, ‘superficial’, and beset by arguments that the Geneva Conventions were 
outdated, and poorly suited to modern conflicts and military 
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necessity.
21 
This phenomenon did not arise with twenty-first century debates on the 
classification of conflicts or DPH. Des Cilleuls recognises the challenges to IHL  
training of ‘different ideological beliefs and … discordant interpretations’,22  suggesting 
a perennial challenge to IHL training from the influence of ideology on interpretation;  
or more precisely, the risks for compliance posed by discourse that undermines IHL. 
 
Jean Pictet’s working plan to disseminate the Geneva Conventions also emphasises the 
behavioural, echoing the norm internalisation in the Oxford Manual of 1880.
23 
The Four 
Geneva Conventions’ ‘humanitarian provisions should be natural conduct and instinctive’ 
for the armed forces and all individuals.
24 
While vaguely expressed, the creation of ‘natural 
… instinctive’ compliance with IHL requires repeated instruction in IHL norms, the first 
inferred thread of guidance from this post-war literature. Pictet reiterates a similar idea two 
months later. He argues that ‘continuing and co-ordinated action is required’ in IHL 
dissemination, so that compliance becomes ‘a natural reflex’.
25 
Pictet begins a second   and 
third thread of guidance: that IHL training differentiate between ‘officers and men’, where 
‘officers must have a precise knowledge’ of the Conventions’ scope and other service 
personnel must understand IHL rules on the treatment of the ‘wounded, prisoners of war, 
partisans and civilians, ... and hospitals’; and ‘must also rid the ordinary service-man of the 
erroneous notion that such rules are incompatible with the duties of a combatant.’
26    
These 
ideas become, respectively, the  obligation that IHL training be  ‘commensurate  with   their 
duties and responsibilities’;
27 
and the notion, echoed in interdisciplinary scholarship, that 
military culture and discourse about international law are often antagonistic to successful 
military  instruction  in  IHL.
28   
A  fourth  thread,  and  one  that  recurs  in  more      recent 
scholarship, is the need to supplement classroom instruction with practical exercises that 
integrate IHL. 
29 
A fifth thread is that of empathy, or at least recognising the common 
humanity of the enemy. This is vaguely expressed wherever it 
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appears;
30 
an example of the literature on IHL training merely hinting at the importance 
of social psychological insights. 
 
A recurring observation in the literature is states’ failure to implement the military 
instruction obligation. Siordet noted extensive failures in state practice: ‘apart from a 
few honourable exceptions, the majority of States parties … have not yet undertaken 
anything of a serious nature’ in terms of dissemination and military instruction.31 As 
noted in 6.2 below, Draper was sceptical about the UK’s implementation of the IHL 
training obligations in the 1960s and beyond. McGowan, writing on the US Army’s 
training in IHL in the aftermath of the My Lai massacre, documents the slow erosion of 
emphasis in Training Circulars of compulsory IHL training (although annual instruction 
was  still  supposed to  run to  three hours as  early as  1955).
32  
McGowan reports    that 
practical exercises in IHL were included in unit training exercises as early as 1970, but 
recommends a much more individual approach, in which the unit commander assesses 
each   individual   soldier’s   knowledge   of   the   Geneva   Conventions:33   an onerous 
obligation, but close to that in Additional Protocol I. Aldrich believes that by the early 
1990s, Western countries had not ‘even minimal success’ in IHL dissemination and 
military  instruction.
34   Aldrich  was  of  the  view  that  the  ICRC  ‘finds     inadequate 
dissemination of IHL to be nearly universal’:35 an overstatement given the descriptive 
accounts of military instruction and civilian dissemination collected in the early issues 
of the International Review of the Red Cross.
36
 
 
Throughout the 1970s, the literature remains fragmented and incomplete, with simple 
assertions about state practice combined with brief insights on how training and 
dissemination should be designed. Among these brief insights is Fleck’s, that ‘continuous 
instruction’ in IHL is ‘essential for its enforcement’, and that ‘thorough and regular 
indoctrination’ is necessary for officers to have the necessary awareness of IHL norms.
37
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96  
This interpretation, that repeated or ‘continuous’ IHL instruction is needed, substantially 
expands the treaty obligation simply to include treaty texts in military instruction. It 
emphasises the cognitive aspect of norm internalisation, and highlights that 
understanding, knowledge and recall can only be built with repeated training. 
 
From the volitional side, De Mulinen echoes des Cilleuls and Pictet in his account of 
military culture and discourse about IHL. Many officers and soldiers suffer from what 
he considers a psychological block: IHL’s merits might be recognised, but its 
applicability is questioned; while others think IHL presents dangerous or subversive 
risks to operational effectiveness.
38 
Verri echoes this in his conclusion that once an 
armed conflict is under way, military culture favours Clausewitz, believing that IHL can 
be  ignored.
39  
So  IHL  training  can  face  volitional  obstacles,  influenced  by military 
culture. There are hints, but not more, that social psychological reflection is needed for 
effective IHL training. 
 
Since the 1980s, scholarship on IHL training has evolved from the assumption that 
dissemination and training lead logically to compliance with the law. Writing in 1984,  
Junod still holds this assumption. She believes that the dissemination and training obligation 
is genuinely ambitious,  not  simple and  discretionary;  but  neglected in  practice.
40   
Junod 
approaches dissemination as a form of conscientious internalisation, but her words lack 
precision. For Junod, IHL principles should create a ‘reflex of solidarity’ and replace 
humankind’s primitive resort to violence.
41  
These are larger aims than IHL    itself, with its 
unwieldy balance between military necessity and humanity. Like Fleck,  Surbeck 
emphasises repeated training in IHL, to create reflex or automatic behaviours consistent 
with IHL;
42 
but like Junod (and like Kelsen, in the extract quoted in 1.1), he does not 
explain the gap between communicated norm and subsequent (automatic) 
 
 
 
Frédéric de Mulinen, ‘Diffusion Du Droit International Humanitaire Dans Les Forces Armées’ (1978) 60 
International Review of the Red Cross 58, 60 
Pietro Verri, ‘Institutions Militaires: Le Problème de L’Enseignement Du Droit Des Conflits Armés et 
de L’Adaptation Des Règlements a Ses Prescriptions Humanitaires’ in Christophe Swinarski (ed), Etudes 
et Essais sur le Droit International Humanitaire et sur les Principles de la Croix-Rouge en l’honneur de 
Jean Pictet (Studies and Essays on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour 
of Jean Pictet) (Martinus Nijhoff 1984) 608 
Sylvie-Stoyanka Junod, ‘La Diffusion Du Droit International Humanitaire’ in Christophe Swinarski (ed), 
(n 39) 368 
ibid. 
Jean-Jacques Surbeck, ‘La Diffusion Du Droit International Humanitaire: Condition de Son Application’ in 
Christophe Swinarski (ed) (n 39) 544 
Hampson (n 48) 115 (emphasis added) 
97 
 
behaviour. Surbeck recommends integrating IHL in military exercises, as the ICRC 
Commentary on Article 83 of Additional Protocol I was to do three years later.
43
 
 
De Mulinen’s work begins a more sophisticated approach. He argues that passive learning 
through lectures should be used as little as possible, and that ‘integrated learning’ (the first 
mention of integration by a scholar working on IHL training) should be preferred, to ensure 
that IHL is part of ‘normal military activities’.
44  
Integration requires no special   resources, 
but does require trainees’ active participation.
45 
De Mulinen’s approach also reflects on the 
challenges  of  translating  IHL’s  prohibitions  into  clear  and  easily  understood    military 
orders.
46 
This requires the prior interpretation of contested IHL norms, and is distinct  from 
a related effort in IHL training, to simplify and reduce the number of IHL rules included   in 
military instruction.
47 
Hampson continues the focused output. Among her recommendations 
is a combined discursive-practical approach to officer instruction in IHL: with practical 
exercises that involve debriefing and evaluation, to demonstrate compliance ‘in the chaos of 
conflict.’
48  
Hampson is another scholar to hint at the need for psychological research    into 
the causes of IHL violations, and she echoes Pictet and Cilleuls in pointing to the risk of 
soldiers’ alienation from IHL, and the opportunity in psychologically preparing troops by 
showing them that IHL rules conform to their existing moral compass.
49 
This is similar to 
Roberts’ subsequent recommendation that IHL should not be presented as a gospel that 
merely needs to be disseminated and applied [from Geneva to] … the rest of the world.’
50 
For Hampson, IHL training should aim at ‘an informed conscience’, so soldiers  ‘internalise 
their   knowledge,   to   make   it   part   of   themselves’;
51   
but   the   relationship   between 
communicated norm and the development of individual ‘conscience’ remains unexplained. 
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From 2000 onwards, there is a gradual recognition that IHL training is necessary but not 
sufficient for compliance. 
52 
Authors make discrete recommendations for improving the 
training in three strands: i) on the educational aspects of IHL training and soldiers as 
learners, given their particular rank and role, and given technological opportunities for 
dissemination and training; ii) on the still-elusive problem of using IHL training to change 
behaviour; and iii) the role of military culture as an opportunity and obstacle for instruction 
in IHL. The literature hints at the need for interdisciplinary insights (e.g. norm 
internalisation and communities of practice) but these are not systematically explored. 
 
In the first strand, scholars provide checklists for good teaching and instruction. The 
emphasis is the educational aspects of IHL training, and soldiers as learners, given their 
particular rank and role. Per Sénéchaud, the instructor should be ‘convincing’, while  
training should be ‘integrated’, ‘selective’, ‘simple and continuous’, ‘practical and 
relevant’.
53  
W. Hays Parks recommends trainers conduct a ‘terrain appreciation’ of the 
audience for their IHL training,
54 
to ensure that the norms taught are tailored precisely to 
that audience, and are ‘commensurate with their duties and responsibilities’.
55 
Hays Parks 
emphasises the importance of the instructor and his/her knowledge of the law, but asserts 
that the individual soldier or officer receiving training is more important than the  instructor 
and his/her training session. This approach is consistent with Sassòli’s argument that the 
‘individual to be convinced’ matters in IHL training,
56 
and with Kuper’s emphasis on 
tailoring IHL training to a soldier’s rank and to the deployment situations they are likely   to 
face.
57  
There  should  be some  selectivity,  because  working  memory can  only store   5-9 
pieces of information; and ‘schemas’ (structured examples) can help with recall and 
knowledge application.
58  
Kuper recommends a focus on principles, instead of   black-letter 
law.
59 
Klenner’s work begins to emphasise ‘integration’ of IHL (see 3.4 
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 below) into ‘leadership, tactical, logistics, and combat training’.60 Klenner endorses 
continuous IHL training of commanders, who then train those under their command in 
IHL.
61  
Murphy identifies  an educational  challenge  without  a solution:  that of how to 
translate ‘obtuse and unintelligible’ treaty norms into practical norms, without reducing 
them to a ‘half-hearted, “touchy feely”’ approach in the classroom.62 
 
There has been recent interest in integrating IHL in computer games, both as a tool for 
civilian dissemination (to correct the frequent portrayal of IHL violations as a winning 
strategy in existing games) 
63 
and to help motivate new recruits in their IHL training. 
64 
These projects have given rise to new virtual reality training tools,
65,66 
and remote learning 
opportunities, including projects established by the ICRC,
67 
and a mobile application   from 
Geneva Call.
68 
These novel approaches to IHL instruction may help with the accessibility  
of IHL training, for remotely-located armed forces and groups, and those for whom  literacy 
or  formal  classroom  instruction  is  a  challenge;
69   
but  technology  can  also  lead  to    a 
distancing effect, undermining the gravity of armed conflict.
70
 
 
In the second strand, scholars attempt to link IHL training and behavioural change. Kuper 
defines learning with reference to the behaviour required for compliance: ‘a relatively 
permanent change in behaviour that occurs as a result of practice or experience.’
71 
For  this, 
military training in general should avoid brutal initiation, because this brutality may be 
normalised and repeated on deployment. Training should be ‘disciplined [but] 
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humane’.72 Aside from Kuper’s contribution, the literature does not address the elusive 
relationship between communicated norm and subsequent behaviour, but instead 
recommends repeated drills in IHL norms to create an automatic behavioural   response. 
The South African military manual calls for the internalisation of IHL norms, so that 
they become second nature;
73 while Klenner (like Junod before him) thinks ‘correct and 
disciplined behaviour’ should become a ‘reflex’.74 This does not take account of 
Shalit’s observation that repeated ‘drills’ address skills only and fail to build moral 
courage.
75  
An  emphasis  on  practical  training  continues,  but  in  passing.  There  is a 
separate literature on the use of distributed simulation (training sites designed to emulate 
the geographic area where soldiers will be deployed),
76 
for mission-specific or pre- 
deployment training, which does not consider IHL training. 
 
The third strand examines the opportunities and threats presented by military culture. 
Dickinson uses organisational psychology to explain the influence of the US Judges 
Advocate General (JAG) in promoting compliance with IHL. She argues that the US JAG 
corps could promote compliance by influencing the cultural norms in the military 
community: ‘fostering greater compliance’ can be achieved not by new treaty norms, but 
instead by ‘subtly influencing organizational structures and cultural norms’.
77 
This ‘subtl[e] 
influenc[e]’ is achieved partly by the ‘commingling’ of the US Judges Advocate General 
corps with non-lawyers in the military. For Dickinson, this is consistent with organisational 
theory and promotes compliance, despite the violations at Haditha, where the JAG corps did 
not report violations.
78 
Where military culture is strongly supportive of IHL compliance,   it 
can facilitate soldiers’ and officers' ability to identify and resist an unlawful  order. This 
duty, explored in chapter 4 below, requires both understanding and willingness to comply. 
In her work on unlawful orders, Minow recommends the 'integration' of IHL into training 
programmes and military decision-making at all levels; and changes to military culture so 
subordinates see their commanding officers supporting 
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IHL compliance.
79 Lloyd Roberts addresses ‘barracks culture’ as a risk to IHL training, 
causing an ‘adjust[ment]’ (reinterpretation) of the IHL communicated to soldiers:80 a 
particular danger, in Lloyd Roberts’ experience, in counter-terrorism detention.81 In his 
experience  as  a military trainer,  IHL is  rarely perceived as  a priority:  ‘It  is  a   brave 
commandant who insists on maintaining a module on the law of war.’82 Murphy and 
Kuper echo these concerns, acknowledging competing pressures on officers.
83 
While  
the organisational culture of the Army as a whole is relevant to soldiers’ adherence to 
IHL norms, regimental culture differs and each regiment has its own ethos. Barracks 
culture is not a monolith, to be generalised across a single state case study, and certainly 
not across states. 
 
 
Scholarship has gradually acknowledged the insufficiency of IHL training to prevent 
violations. The literature is fragmented, with some historic insights on individual and 
social psychology lost. Yet an incremental consensus is building: first, that the repetition 
of IHL and its recurrence in military decision-making should result in norm 
internalisation (at least understanding and possibly willingness to comply), while 
discrete, marginal IHL training might not; second, that soldiers' understanding of IHL is 
necessary but insufficient for compliance, but that IHL training should aim somehow to 
translate communicated norm into lawful conduct; and third, that military culture can be 
an obstacle and an opportunity for IHL training. These works hint at interdisciplinary 
insights without thoroughly exploring them. A better explanation of the conundrum 
between IHL training, prevention and compliance is found by synthesising these 
fragmented insights with richer explanations from constructivist compliance theory and 
social psychology, as in 3.3 below. This review of the literature has focused on IHL 
instruction to armed forces. Scholarly works on dissemination and training of armed 
groups will be considered in 3.4 below. 
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3.3 Insights from Interdisciplinary Works 
 
 
Norm Internalisation 
 
 
Literature from IHL suggests that military training should inspire a taken-for-granted 
automatic practice in compliance with the law, but it lacks a complete account of how 
individuals and units can build this sense of normativity. It is as if the training is a form 
of physical conditioning, for which repetition and practice are sufficient; when the 
prevention of IHL violations requires attention to group and individual, cognitive and 
volitional aspects. It follows that interdisciplinary insights are needed for a mature 
synthesis of the literature. Norm internalisation from constructivist international 
relations is the first such insight. Finnemore and Sikkink propose that, after a norm 
emerges in the practice of a few entrepreneurial states, there is a ‘tipping point’ after 
which  socialisation  processes  occur.
84   
The  norm  might  then  be  accepted  into    or 
‘cascade’ into widespread state practice, and once multiple states accept it, the norm 
becomes  ‘taken-for-granted’,  no  longer worthy of debate.85  This  stylised  and   linear 
account has been questioned,
86 but the aim of ‘taken-for-granted’ norms is a starting- 
point for IHL training. More is needed to explore how these norms might be taken-for- 
granted, and what that means in the IHL context. 
 
Norm internalisation must also be explicitly adapted to the individual and group level. 
Sikkink’s ‘agentic constructivism’ and Scharf’s call to disaggregate the compliance 
inquiry from the state to that of individuals can help inform an individual soldier’s 
perspective on IHL training.
87 
Disaggregated norm internalisation can begin to build an 
account of understanding, knowledge and recall of IHL norms; and willingness to 
comply, which includes a willingness to question and disobey unlawful orders, and to 
report  or  intervene  when  IHL  violations  are  witnessed.
88   
Finnemore  and   Sikkink 
suggest that ‘iterated behaviour and habit consolidate norms among the members of a 
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profession.’89 Constructivist norm internalisation offers a theoretical basis for repeated 
exposure to IHL norms in military training. Finally, Finnemore and Sikkink observe that 
professional  training  does  not  only impart  skills  or  knowledge,  but  that  it ‘actively 
socializes people to value certain things above others’.90 Their work provides a glimpse 
into how military culture influences IHL training. So IHL norms are more likely to be 
‘taken-for-granted’ in military units that not only provide instruction in IHL, but also 
‘value’ IHL compliance more than competing pressures, such as resisting accountability 
or discouraging troops from reporting conduct that might violate IHL. 
 
From social psychology, Kelman offers an alternative account of ‘internalization’, as the 
third of three cumulative processes of attitude change. In the first, ‘compliance’, an 
individual defers to their group (or to another individual) on the simple basis of rewards 
or sanctions. In the second, ‘identification’, an individual seeks to define him or herself 
in relation to another individual or group. In the third, ‘internalization’, the individual 
finds group values ‘intrinsically rewarding’ and integrates them with his or her own 
values.
91  When taken together with constructivist communities of  practice,    Kelman’s 
work can help to explain how IHL training must be designed with awareness of the 
individual military recruit’s self-identification with the values of his or her unit. This 
notion of ‘internalization’ also explains the risks of a military culture which seeks to 
marginalise the importance of IHL. 
 
Communities of Practice 
 
 
Constructivist communities of practice, applied to international relations by Adler and 
Pouilot,
92 
and to international law compliance theory by Brunnée and Toope,
93 
justify a 
focus on IHL training from individual and group perspectives. Adler and Pouilot 
differentiate between agential and structural mechanisms in international relations, and 
hold that communities of practice continually mediate the relationship between the 
individual and the group. Constructivist communities of practice can help explain the 
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influence of military culture on individual soldiers’ and officers’ training in IHL and 
their subsequent compliance; and justify standards for IHL training which differentiate 
between the individual and group. Like Finnemore and Sikkink, Adler and Pouilot point 
to the shared norms communicated among professions or groups. Drawing on 
Bourdieu’s habitus, which they define as an ‘embodied stock of unspoken know- 
how’,94  Adler and  Pouilot  argue that knowledge and practice become  enmeshed    for 
experienced professions. In the literature on communities of practice, shared knowledge 
built through shared practice promotes compliance. This approach strengthens 
recommendations for practical and applied IHL instruction that recurs throughout the 
training cycle. Brunnée and Toope’s ‘practice of legality’ promotes an ‘attitude towards 
the law that is    part of actors’ identities’.95  Their ‘interactional’ theory of international 
law compliance is further theoretical authority for frequent or recurrent IHL training 
(they emphasise the frequent reassertion, but not the imposition of norms), to promote a 
‘practice’ of IHL compliance, and a willingness to comply (Brunnée and Toope’s 
‘fidelity’  to  a  law  or  legal  system),96  which  constructivists  would  see  as  part    of 
individual soldiers’ and officers’ identities. Neither Adler and Pouilot nor Brunnée and 
Toope apply their theoretical frameworks to armed forces or IHL. 
 
Military Culture 
 
 
Bell’s study of military training in the US armed forces uses the related concept of ‘military 
culture’ instead of communities of practice to explain the causal mechanisms for IHL norm 
internalisation.
97  
Bell’s  work  is  constructivist,  but  uses  political  science methodologies 
(quasi-experiments and comparative surveys). He finds that military training in IHL and 
ethics does influence cadets’ norms, with the intensive four-year programme at the US 
Military Academy at West Point producing comparatively greater respect for civilian 
immunity norms than the less intensive US Army Reserve Officer Training Corps, where 
force protection norms were more evidently part of cadets’ identity.
98 
Bell’s study is also 
evidence that immersive and practical IHL training provides stronger norm internalisation 
than less intensive, less practical instruction.
99 
The 
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scholarly emphasis on practical training is consistent with works in the education field. In 
Kolb and Kolb's approach to higher education, competence to understand, analyse and  
apply material is gained through a progressively independent, 'experiential' cycle.
100
 
 
Yet there are tensions between military culture, tasks and structures, and IHL. First, the  
aims of basic training (desensitisation, breaking down a soldier’s inculcated reluctance to 
kill, unit cohesion and obedience to the command chain) run counter to many of the aims of 
IHL training.
101 
Only if military culture is made explicitly consistent with IHL compliance, 
challenging unlawful orders, and accountability for violations is this tension overcome. 
Second, where the aims of basic training have been fulfilled but IHL norms are not ‘central 
to the soldier’s identity’, violations may result if cohesive military units become isolated in 
armed  conflict.
102  
Third, Grassiani  finds that  the  power  and  routine tasks of monitoring 
military checkpoints cause ‘physical, emotional, and cognitive numbing’ in combatants; and 
that this also numbs them morally;
103 
thinking that can be linked to Kelman and Hamilton’s 
‘routinization’ (see 1.4 above) and (below) to Arendt’s observation that Eichmann failed to 
think. Fourth, asymmetric conflicts with rapidly-shifting intensity and complexity as to 
applicable law delegate more authority than previously to the ‘strategic corporal’.
104 
Yet, as 
Johnson points out, these soldiers are often in their late teens and early twenties, drawing on 
their  peer  group  for  moral  decision-making.
105   
This  keeps  them  at  the  midpoint    of 
Kohlberg’s six-stage theory of human moral development, which ranges from naïve moral 
realism to pragmatic morality, to perspectives shared within a social group, a 'social system 
morality' which anticipates a loss of honour when an individual defaults, and finally the 
synthesis of human rights, social welfare and universal ethics (Kohlberg does not consider 
IHL).
106 
If Johnson’s application of Kohlberg is correct, there are particular challenges  for 
IHL norm 
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internalisation among military recruits and junior soldiers. Fifth and briefly, Bandura’s 
social learning theory provides an account of individual learning through observation of 
their  in-group.
107  
If  IHL  training  is  squeezed  in  the  curriculum,  treated  as  a mere 
bureaucratic requirement or considered antagonistic to military advantage, then 
individual soldiers and officers will perceive it accordingly. Military culture is a 
powerful causal mechanism, more powerful than deficits in IHL training alone to 
explain violations where these occur. Yet, as Bell’s research shows, military culture can 
also harness norm internalisation. 
 
Moral Disengagement 
 
Drawing on Bandura's reading of moral disengagement,
108 
the 2004 Roots of Behaviour 
in War Study surveyed former fighters in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Colombia, the Republic 
of the Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) and Georgia for the ICRC, and found that attitudes 
associated with a risk of violations were held by some fighters who had a good 
knowledge of the  law.
109  
This provides  additional  grounds  for a distinction  between 
understanding and willingness to comply; and points to the limits of IHL training to 
prevent violations and ensure compliance. It seems that (taken together with military 
culture and discourse about law and enemy forces) moral disengagement is a more 
powerful causal factor for violations than deficits in IHL training. 
 
As noted in 1.4 above, the Roots of Behaviour in War Study indicated that fighters’ 
willingness to disregard IHL is linked to two dimensions of moral disengagement: a) the 
justification of violations by a fighter’s own group (which in turn correlates with group 
cohesion), and b) dehumanising of the enemy.
110 
Further, the authors found that ‘What 
counts is esteem for their comrades, defence of their collective reputation and desire to 
contribute  to  the  success  of  the  group.’
111   
This  creates  a  tendency  to       ‘abidicat[e] 
…responsibility…induced chiefly by group conformity and obedience to orders.’
112 
This 
finding, that combatants lose autonomy as a result of the pressure to conform to the group, 
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echoes  Milgram’s  observation  that  individual  moral  responsibility declines  when an 
individual seeks to please authority figures within his or her own group.
113 
This is not 
dissimilar to Bauman’s finding that Nazi soldiers favoured self-preservation over moral 
duty, acting as unreflective automata; and his thesis that this would apply to any  human 
beings  living  in  circumstances  where  good  moral  choices  were  either  absent      or 
onerous.
114 Arendt’s observation of Adolf Eichmann also revealed a failure to think, 
although Eichmann in Jerusalem was a reflection on moral and intellectual mediocrity  
in one defendant, expressly not (as Arendt clarified in her Postscript) a generalised study 
of evil or of totalitarianism.
115 Arendt did generalise ‘non-thinking’ as a potential cause 
of atrocities in her later work: in a society where individuals are ‘shield[ed] from the 
dangers of examination’, they become accustomed to following heinous rules if they are 
current in a particular society.
116
 
 
The ICRC study also suggested a causal role for trauma in combat, finding a temporary risk 
of violations where combatants had experienced recent deployment. They called this the 
‘spiral of violence’.
117 
Finally (in an argument criticised by Stephens and not by the present 
author), the Roots of Behaviour in War study calls on armed forces to emphasise the 
normativity of IHL, rather than conflating IHL training with training in military ethics, 
because  combatants are  ‘not  morally autonomous’.
118  
Tripodi  found  a  variant  of moral 
disengagement in his study of documentary footage of those involved at abuses in Abu 
Ghraib that soldiers adapt to circumstances where violations occur. He found evidence that 
they fear the consequences of not obeying orders, and that they dissect or dissociate their 
own  personalities  as  a  coping  mechanism.
119  
This  dissociation  has  a  different   cause, 
according to Lifton: the ‘atrocity-producing situation[s]’ of Nazi Germany and 
counterinsurgencies such as Vietnam encourage individual psyches to form a ‘sub-self that 
behaves as if it is autonomous…’
120 
Neither Lifton nor Tripodi considered the role 
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of IHL, nor military training; but Lifton attributes moral blame both to the individual 
responsible for atrocity, and to political officials responsible for the policy of 
counterinsurgency war.
121
 
 
Discourse about Law 
 
 
Discourse about international law also influences IHL training, prevention and 
compliance, prospectively and retrospectively; and it is a powerful mechanism for IHL 
violations in its own right. During training, the indeterminacy of IHL norms might be 
stretched or contracted for political reasons, emphasising the lives of soldiers more than 
those of enemy civilians,
122 
and weighing force protection strongly in a  proportionality 
calculus.
123 This illustrates the limits of training in the context of IHL’s contested  
norms and its moral compromise. Lauterpacht’s legal adviser might be best served to 
avoid  ‘humility’  in  the  face  of  a  discourse  about  IHL  that  eviscerates  its   central 
principles.
124 
More generally, if military trainers and the chain of command imply   that 
IHL is an unwarranted restriction on military advantage or the flexibility of mission 
command, IHL training might be resented, and understanding and willingness to comply 
affected as a result. Following alleged or proven violations, a scornful approach to 
investigations, prosecutions or civil suits might undermine the legitimacy of the IHL in 
which soldiers are trained.
125 
Where fighters seek to justify violations by their own 
group,
126 IHL’s constraints are marginalised. 
 
Discourse about Enemy Forces 
 
 
Research  suggests  that  dehumanising  discourse  about  the  enemy  also  causes    IHL 
violations, independently from fighters’ knowledge of IHL.127 It can be found in the 
racist epithets commonly used by British armed forces in decolonisation conflicts and in 
 
 
 
ibid. 
Gabriella Blum, ‘The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers’ (2010) 2 Journal of Legal Analysis 115; cf. Eitan Diamond, 
‘Before the Abyss: Reshaping International Humanitarian Law to Suit the Ends of Power’ (2010) 
Israel Law Review 414 
Asa Kasher and Amos Yadlin, ‘Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: An Israeli Perspective’ (2005) 4 
Journal of Military Ethics 3 
Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War’ (1952) 29 British Yearbook of 
International Law 360, 382 
7.5 
Muñoz-Rojas and Frésard (n 109) 197 
ibid. 
 Afghanistan and Iraq;
128 
and the attempted justification of violations based on the 
enemy’s perceived willingness to violate IHL.129 Discourse that dehumanises the  
enemy or enemy civilians
130 can be seen as part of Bandura’s moral disengagement, but 
preventing it requires its own policy responses, beyond IHL training. Attempting to 
justify violations on the basis that the enemy either has or would violate IHL if given the 
chance is linked to the problem of false reciprocity in IHL,
131 
and violations committed 
in ‘anger, revenge and rage’.132 
 
Tripodi calls the latter ‘situational atrocities’, in contrast to violations ordered by the state 
and those influenced by the perpetrator’s personality.
133 
Yet a discursive approach to    IHL 
training can and should begin to address the obligatory nature of IHL and the need for 
restraint even when the enemy has committed IHL violations. The affective dimension of 
close-knit military units should be explicitly acknowledged by policy-makers, as revenge 
and rage at the death of comrades are risk factors for IHL violations,
134 
and these cannot be 
eradicated by military instruction in IHL. Mackmin cites psychological research that 
individuals predisposed to aggression use violent outbursts to re-establish their emotional 
equilibrium.
135 
Where this factor is present alongside ‘the “strangeness” of an opponent’,  a 
perception that the enemy has committed a crime,
136 
or unlawful orders, the risk of IHL 
violations is magnified. Mackmin gives the example of General Patton’s speech to Allied 
troops in Sicily in 1943, when troops were persuaded that, as the enemy did not respect IHL 
and   had   killed   many  of   their   comrades,   they  should   take no   prisoners.
137   
Where 
‘dehumanization’ is present alongside ‘authorization’ and ‘routinization’, all three 
conditions for a ‘sanctioned massacre’ pertain, implicated in the Holocaust and My Lai;
138 
and in the torture at Abu Ghraib.
139
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Understanding and Willingness to Comply 
 
 
A final insight from analytic jurisprudence addresses the enigma between IHL norms, 
military instruction and subsequent behaviour, while building a distinction between 
cognitive and volitional norm internalisation (or in shorthand, understanding and 
willingness to comply). Applying Hart’s ‘“internal” aspect of rules’ to IHL training does 
not only require instruction leading to understanding, knowledge and recall, but also 
calls for ‘a critical reflective attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a common 
standard’,140 and a recognition of IHL’s obligatory nature through ‘criticism  (including 
self-criticism), [and] demands for conformity…’ which are ‘insistent’.141 For Hart, this 
normativity is not a subjective ‘feeling of pressure or compulsion’,142 and nor is 
volitional norm internalisation or willingness to comply. Hart’s ‘internal aspect of rules’ 
begins to explain how social pressures and the availability of sanctions or accountability 
processes assist an individual’s norm internalisation. Obligation follows, he argues: 
 
when the general demand for conformity is insistent and the social pressure 
brought to bear upon those who deviate and threaten to deviate is great.
143
 
This is a richer account than Kelsen’s notion of legislated rules with sanctions   entering 
into an individual’s conscience,144 and is more consistent than Kelsen’s with the social 
psychological works discussed in this chapter. 
 
Synthesising Hart’s ‘internal aspect’ with the research on military culture and 
communities of practice above, if the discourse within the armed forces insists upon 
compliance with IHL, then this will harness social pressure to internalise IHL norms. If 
moral disengagement and discourse that marginalises law or dehumanises the enemy is 
treated as a ‘threat … to deviate’ from IHL, then social pressure can be applied to 
improve compliance. Hidden in Hart’s account is a distinction between the cognitive  
and volitional, as MacCormick points out.
145 On MacCormick’s reading, Hart   ignored 
this affective dimension, and did not consider that the cognitive ‘internal aspect’ was 
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contained within a volitional attitude,
146 
which is summarised here as willingness to 
comply. This thesis uses MacCormick’s reading of Hart to explain how IHL norms can 
be perceived as binding, closing the gap between communicated norm and subsequent 
behaviour. However, there is no reason to assume that cognitive norm internalisation  of 
IHL norms ‘presupposes’ or is ‘parasitic upon’ the volitional, as MacCormick asserts, 
because social psychological research has shown that knowledge of IHL is independent 
from moral disengagement or an attempted justification of violations.
147 
For this  thesis, 
cognitive and volitional norm internalisation (understanding and willingness to comply) 
are distinct; and the design and delivery of IHL training need to take account of both. 
 
3.4 An Evolution of Practice by the ICRC and Geneva Call 
 
 
The ICRC: From Dissemination to Integration and Prevention 
 
 
The ICRC’s activities combine authority and self-censorship. It has crafted new IHL norms 
(Finnemore considers the ICRC’s role more significant than that of states in the creation of 
the First Geneva Convention of 1864)
148 
and interprets them,
149 
often with an emphasis on 
the principle of humanity instead of military necessity. Yet the ICRC’s role in protection 
and assistance to the victims of armed conflict depends upon states’ agreement, e.g. to 
permit the ICRC to visit its detainees in a NIAC. This has led to tension between its role as 
norm-creator and IHL advocate on the one hand and its work with victims and their military 
gatekeepers on the other. As a result, the ICRC’s efforts to persuade states to comply with 
IHL are usually confidential good offices, shielded from outside scrutiny. This enables the 
continued disuse of IHL’s implementation mechanisms, and the intransigence of some  
states when monitoring of their practice is suggested.
150 
Ratner concludes that the   ICRC’s 
protection mandate will often take precedence over strong advocacy for IHL compliance in 
the event of a conflict between the two.
151 
The 
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ICRC’s role in IHL is pragmatic, which Ratner criticises as ‘settl[ing]’ for ‘action  
merely in conformity’ with IHL rather than its internalisation.152 
 
The ICRC’s expanding work on IHL training and the prevention of violations postdates and 
somewhat contradicts Ratner’s critique. Over the past two decades, the ICRC has gradually 
shifted its IHL outreach activities from dissemination of the law to an emphasis on 
integration,
153 
and subsequently to prevention (considered below). Integration has had  two 
main outputs: first that IHL be interpreted and then recur in a ‘continuous process’ 
throughout a soldier’s training and education cycle, being relevant to ‘doctrine, training, 
education, equipment and sanctions’;
154  
and then, that IHL become continuously   relevant 
to decision-making and communication within the military chain of command.
155
 
 
In its first iteration, integration requires the prior interpretation of the law, an 
understanding of its operational consequences, and the adoption of ‘concrete 
measures…to  permit  for  compliance  during  operations.’156  In  recognising  that IHL 
training alone is insufficient for compliance, the ICRC acknowledges that ‘the mere 
teaching of legal norms will not result, in itself, in a change in attitude or behaviour’.157 
This position on the limits of a dissemination model of IHL training, or one based only 
in classroom instruction, reflects the consensus in the literature. The integration model 
emphasises IHL’s continued relevance when soldiers and officers learn about a new 
weapons system (‘equipment’), so that they can learn whether it can be used lawfully in 
civilian areas, or whether it can cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.
158
 
Further, an integration of IHL training with an understanding of military discipline and 
international criminal law (‘sanctions’, read broadly) has the potential to reduce 
misconceptions about international law among service personnel.
159
 
 
In integration’s second iteration, IHL is continuously relevant to military decision- 
making, before and during armed conflict.
160 
In this formulation, integration begins to 
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close the gap between historic treaties’ emphasis on giving ‘instructions’ (orders) consistent 
with IHL,
161 
and the assumption from the Four Geneva Conventions and the Pictet 
Commentary that dissemination and military instruction in IHL would help ‘ensure  respect’ 
for the law.
162  
This approach emphasises ongoing communication about IHL     throughout 
the command chain.
163 
In relation to IHL training, it is the commander’s responsibility to 
verify subordinates’ knowledge of the law, moving away from the ‘train the trainers’ 
delegation  of  the  IHL  training  obligation  and  towards  a  process  of  ongoing    internal 
evaluation of IHL training.
164  
If IHL is continually relevant to communication within   and 
by the chain of command, IHL training will not be confined to a single, discrete classroom 
session. Integration should allow soldiers the opportunity to clarify the lawfulness of a 
mission  or  specific  order,  ‘if  time  and  situation  permit’.
165  
This  disrupts  concepts  of 
conformity and unthinking obedience to the chain of command, and endorses the obligation 
only to carry out lawful orders. Integration also emphasises the continuous nature of IHL’s 
duties, with reference to targeting, precautions and logistics. IHL sets the parameters of 
target selection; obliges commanders to settle uncertainty in intelligence which might affect 
IHL  compliance,
166  
and  to  desist  from  any  attack  from  the  moment  that  intelligence 
suggests it would be indiscriminate or disproportionate. The lawfulness of targeting must be 
kept under ‘constant review’.
167
 
 
The ICRC’s emphasis on the continuous communication and relevance of IHL is consistent 
with Brunnée and Toope’s interactional theory, where a continuous practice of legality 
grounds compliance and obligation.
168 
It is also consistent with (but does not guarantee) 
both cognitive and volitional norm internalisation. Norms that are continuously relevant to 
military decision-making, with IHL recurring in ‘doctrine, education, equipment’, training 
and ‘sanctions’ are more likely to be ‘taken for granted’
169 
by soldiers and officers than 
norms introduced in a single classroom lecture. Recurrent 
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mention of IHL will build Finnemore and Sikkink’s ‘iterated behaviour and habit [to] 
consolidate norms’ within an armed force or armed group.170 
 
Yet the integration model is not perfect: (i) there is no instrument to codify the 
approach, so for now, it remains an ICRC in-house approach with no power to bind 
states. At best, those armed forces and armed groups with in-depth knowledge of the 
ICRC’s approach, or outreach by the ICRC in their military training, will be able to 
integrate IHL into their training and decision-making. (ii) It focuses on target selection 
and verification where commanding officers are involved; but does not address 
systematically the challenges of the ‘strategic corporal’ on patrol with a small group of 
colleagues,
171  
or a soldier with responsibility for detainees. (iii) Evaluation is    missing 
from the integration model, and this misses an opportunity. 
 
The ICRC’s ‘prevention’ strand is broader than its work on integration, and is more 
explicitly grounded in interdisciplinary research. Differentiated from ‘protection’, 
‘assistance’, and ‘cooperation’, prevention ‘aims to foster an environment conducive to the 
respect for the life and dignity of persons’ affected by armed conflict and violence; and to 
ensure  that  armed  actors  respect  the  ICRC’s  role.
172   
It  recognises       dissemination’s 
insufficiency, includes integration, and creates an interdisciplinary toolkit for potential IHL 
compliance. Prevention includes the identification of appropriate stakeholders to create and 
maintain national legislation, sanctions and reparations to implement IHL; and dialogue 
with armed forces, armed groups, government officials, academia and civil society to 
promote IHL compliance and importantly, to reduce public discourse which might 
encourage  violations  of  the  law.
173   
Prevention  is  also  implicitly  a  process  of     norm 
internalisation: ‘the shift from simply imparting knowledge and explaining IHL’ and to the 
internalisation of IHL ‘within specific systems of knowledge, values and norms of a 
particular group’.
174 
Prevention builds on but goes further than the findings of the first 
Roots of Behaviour in War study. A follow-up study due for publication in 2018 critiques 
the emphasis on IHL’s binding nature in the Roots of Behaviour in War study; and further 
critiques integration’s emphasis on making IHL continually relevant to the command 
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chain, because of its premise that all armed groups will have the necessary hierarchical 
structure to make this possible.
175
 
 
The Prevention policy is not yet the subject of scholarly work. Bussmann and 
Schneider’s recent work purports to evaluate the ICRC’s dissemination and advocacy 
efforts as a tool for IHL compliance; finding no evidence that the ICRC’s dissemination 
efforts prevent violations.
176 
However, their study does not take account of the latest 
version of Integration, nor of the ICRC’s Prevention policy, so the materials cited are  
out of date. Bussmann and Schneider assert that IHL violations in Darfur and Bosnia 
show that IHL violations preceded ‘naming and shaming’ by the ICRC, and they cite 
this as evidence for the ineffectiveness of the ICRC’s advocacy. Their conclusion is 
unpersuasive, as the ICRC makes public statements about IHL violations only in 
exceptional situations where serious violations have already occurred. 
 
In contrast, Brassil creates goals for a dissemination and capacity-building programme  
based on the ICRC Prevention policy, and argues that dissemination can influence  
‘attitudes, knowledge and behaviours’ if ‘its objectives have been specifically   defined.’
177
 
Brassil recommends a three-stage process to apply the Prevention policy more   effectively: 
(i) to identify flaws or ‘gaps’ in the national implementation of IHL, e.g. absence of relevant 
domestic legislation; (ii) an assessment of whether these flaws are caused by ‘a deficiency  
in …. knowledge, attitudes and behaviour’; and (iii) ‘capacity 
building   activities’   specifically   to   change   behaviour   in   relation   to   prevention and 
compliance.
178  
This  three-step  process  can  guide  state  officials,  but  it  is  premised on 
dissemination’s ability to change attitudes and behaviour; and on states’ ability to identity 
the precise causal influence of gaps in knowledge or training. This does not fully take 
account of the Roots of Behaviour in War Study’s own research, which Brassil cites, that: 
 
…behaviour is more effectively changed by modifying the environmental 
conditions that influence it than by directly trying to alter people’s opinions, 
attitudes or outlooks.
179
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Literature and Practice on IHL Dissemination and Outreach to Armed Groups 
 
 
Sivakumaran points to the value of IHL instruction within armed groups, and the 
potential for compliance by one armed group constructively to influence the practice of 
others.
180  
For  Sivakumaran,  the  dissemination  and  training  obligations  in  the Four 
Geneva Conventions extend to Common Article 3, and states which have ratified 
Additional Protocol II are obliged to disseminate its content during peacetime, with both 
states and armed groups obliged to do so once there is a NIAC.
181 
Instruction, distinct 
from dissemination, must be supplemented by ‘non-classroom’ forms of training to be 
effective.
182 
However, Sivakumaran sees dissemination as only part of the toolkit for 
compliance in NIAC. As the IHL of NIAC is underregulated, and its norms of 
prevention   or,   more   traditionally,   ‘implementation   and   enforcement’,   are       no 
exception.
183  
So  dissemination  and  military instruction  enmeshes  with  legal advice, 
unilateral commitments by armed groups, the drafting of codes of conduct, and  
sanctions for violations; with extra-legal enforcement through non-governmental 
organisations, the UN, and even public opinion.
184
 
 
Elsewhere, Sivakumaran has written on the variable detail in unilateral declarations, in 
which armed groups expressly commit themselves to respect provisions of IHL and/or 
IHRL.
185 
For example, the Polisario Front of Western Sahara made a unilateral  declaration 
to be bound by the Four Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I in its conflict   with 
Morocco.
186 
Usually, armed groups are bound only by the law of NIAC (Common Article 3 
and Additional Protocol II where ratified), unless Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I 
applies, and an armed group has made such a unilateral declaration. Other commitments 
might be reached through ad hoc bilateral agreements, perhaps as part of a ceasefire.
187
 
Yet, necessary engagement with armed groups is politically and 
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legally  fraught.  In  the  US,  the  Supreme  Court  considered  IHL  dissemination   and 
outreach  to   be  material   support   for  terrorism,
188   
not   a  potentially    constructive 
contribution to IHL compliance. Building on compliance theory research on why armed 
groups might violate or choose to engage with IHL, Sivakumaran argues that these 
commitments and dissemination are less useful than sanctions (which can stop diaspora 
funding, for example) for groups whose reason for existence is the deliberate targeting 
of civilians, whereas those seeking legitimacy, statehood or a favourable peace deal 
might be persuaded to engage with IHL dissemination efforts or a Deed of 
Commitment,
189  
whether  its  content  relates  to  part  of  IHL  or  a  selective  range of 
binding law and standards.
190
 
 
Geneva Call 
 
 
Geneva Call conducts outreach to 61 non-state armed groups on the prohibition of anti- 
personnel mines, respect for humanitarian norms, child protection, gender in armed conflict, 
and since 2017, displacement.
191 
Armed groups are invited to sign any of three Deeds of 
Commitment, prohibiting anti-personnel landmines, protecting children from the effects of 
armed conflict, and prohibiting sexual violence and eliminating gender-based discrimination 
in armed conflict.
192 
The Deed of Commitment on anti-personnel landmines has its own 
dissemination obligation. When a Deed of Commitment is signed, Geneva Call and the 
armed group agree on steps for its implementation, including ‘policy revision, 
dissemination,  monitoring,  sanctions  and  protective  measures.’
193   
Unlike  the    ICRC’s 
outreach, confidential as a matter of operational policy,
194 
and therefore outside academic  
or intergovernmental scrutiny, Geneva Call does monitor armed groups’ compliance with its 
Deeds of Commitment,
195 
and issues publicly available reports. 
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Décrey-Warner argues that no armed group approached by Geneva Call has ever refused 
a  delegation,  even  when  the  group  is  alleged  to  have  violated  IHL.
196  
It  is    also 
suggested that those armed groups which seek legitimacy are willing to engage with 
monitoring mechanisms, e.g. on children and armed conflict.
197
 
 
Geneva Call has had success in disseminating a range of international norms within and 
beyond the limited IHL of NIAC. However, there are shortcomings in the Deeds of 
Commitment. The IHL principle of distinction, listed as Rule 1, in the ICRC Customary 
IHL Study, applicable in both IAC and NIAC, does not yet appear explicitly in the 
Deeds  of  Commitment,  although  institutional  debate  on  this  is  ongoing.
198 
Geneva 
Call’s  training  module  distils  IHL  and  IHRL  principles  into  only  fifteen  ‘rules  of 
behaviour’ for armed group fighters’.199 Does pragmatism or the logistics of training 
require such normative selectivity? Saul lists selective engagement by some armed 
groups as a further flaw in the process: some groups will not engage with Geneva Call at 
all, while others will omit ‘strategically sensitive issues’, such as improvised   explosive 
devices or hostage-taking, from discussions with the group.
200 
This is an important 
limitation on the value of this ad hoc, optional norm promotion. There are structural 
issues too: the fragmentation of armed groups means that Deeds of Commitment may 
not be transmitted to all fighters, and norm internalisation reduced. 
 
What is the status of this practice by armed groups? Deeds of Commitment are not treaty 
texts, and an armed group’s unilateral declaration to  be bound by treaty norms does not  
have the status of a ratification. The practice of armed groups cannot be evidence of 
customary   international   law,
201   
despite   the   proliferation   of   non-international armed 
conflicts and the factual relevance of such practice in the analysis of IHL compliance. The 
ICRC acknowledged that armed groups’ practice had an ‘unclear’ legal status, and 
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therefore classified it as  ‘other practice’ in the Customary IHL Study.202  Roberts    and 
Sivakumaran argue that to give nonstate armed groups equivalent law-making powers to 
those of states would risk undermining humanitarian protection (through practice that 
undermines IHL) and would be politically unacceptable to many states, but ‘unilateral 
declarations, hybrid treaties, and possibly hybrid custom’ would allow for armed groups 
to acknowledge existing customary IHL norms and to accept new obligations.
203
 
 
3.5 Standards to Build Understanding and Willingness to Comply 
 
 
A synthesis of historic and modern, legal and interdisciplinary literature on IHL training 
yields standards to guide state practice. The standards below are based on individual and 
group factors, understanding and willingness to comply; and they attempt to bridge the 
gap between disseminated norm and subsequent behaviour that is at the centre of the 
conundrum between IHL training, prevention and compliance. The distinction between 
individual and group factors below is somewhat fluid, recognising Adler and Pouilot’s 
distinction between agential and structural factors, mediated by communities of 
practice.
204 Given states’ willingness to make pledges at the 32nd RCRC Meeting on 
IHL dissemination and training, there is scope for engagement between states, the ICRC 
and academic research on a collaborative rubric that might enable states to share their 
practice, subtly eroding the longstanding resistance to monitoring in IHL.
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Understanding 
 
 
1. Acknowledge literacy concerns before designing IHL training 
 
 
The individual soldier and armed group fighter matters to the design and delivery of IHL 
training.
206 
His or her capacity to read and understand complex terminology is relevant to 
how the training is delivered.
207 
Individual soldiers and armed group fighters might lack 
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the literacy or confidence in classroom settings to understand IHL’s complex terminology 
when it is rendered in standard lecture format or in word-dense PowerPoint slides. 
 
Consider education theory when balancing simple communication with IHL’s 
complexity 
 
Although the simplification of IHL to its core principles is highly problematic (Rowe 
argues that soldiers in charge of detainees must be given ‘specific and detailed orders’ 
and  instruction),
208  
IHL  training  which  is  over-inclusive  can  hinder understanding, 
knowledge and recall. Kuper’s work reminds us that individuals can recall only 5-7  key 
items.
209 
Brassil acknowledges that the IHL dissemination and training obligation does 
not only require that the text of the Conventions is shared widely, but also that its 
component ‘principles’ are ‘translated’ into education and training.210  This   persuasive 
reading suggests that IHL’s complexity can be distilled through clear training materials 
without losing the normativity of the whole treaty text. 
 
Use diverse learning strategies and reiterate IHL’s relevance throughout 
training and military communication 
 
To help an individual soldier internalise IHL norms, there should be explanation, clarity, 
repetition of core prohibitions,
211 
and above all a blend of practical, discursive and 
classroom-based techniques. Reliance on only classroom teaching should be avoided, as 
this encourages passive learning and is distanced from the realities of deployment. As 
the ICRC’s ‘integration’ insists, IHL is relevant throughout the training cycle, and to 
decision-making in the chain of command, but not merely in targeting decisions, as the 
second iteration of the ‘integration’ might imply. A diversity of dissemination tools can 
also assist norm internalisation within armed groups, but these would need to take 
account of the resources available and of how geographically diffuse the armed group is. 
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Include practical examples to emphasise IHL’s continual relevance to armed 
conflicts and belligerent occupation 
 
Where IHL terminology is rushed in classroom-style instruction, this is dissemination of 
terms  of  art  without  translating  them  to  deployment.
212  
Unless  this  translation    is 
carefully managed through explanation and repetition, it could increase soldiers’ 
distance from the IHL being trained; training designed from a lawyer’s perspective and 
not that of the soldier and officer being trained. 
 
Review training materials to ensure their relevance to individual soldiers’ ranks 
and responsibilities, and to complex, asymmetric conflicts 
 
IHL     training     should     be     ‘commensurate     with     [individuals’]     duties    and 
responsibilities’.213 This involves intermittent review of training materials to ensure 
they cover the circumstances in which soldiers will be deployed; and in particular 
complex or asymmetric deployments, where the applicable legal framework can  change 
rapidly from a conduct of hostilities paradigm to one based on IHRL law enforcement 
standards;
214 
or where the classification of conflict is uncertain. 
 
Ensure commanders’ and superiors’ understanding, knowledge and recall of IHL 
 
 
The individual officer’s understanding also matters. Without this, there is a ‘fog of 
knowledge’ communicated down the chain of command, which increases the risk of 
unlawful    conduct by subordinates.
215  
This risk is particularly acute where IHL norms are 
contested or indeterminate, such as the principle of proportionality; and where military 
culture encourages a discourse about law and about enemy forces that implies IHL is an 
unwanted restraint on behaviour, or that enemy forces will not honour IHL constraints. 
Failures to attend to officers’ understanding of IHL also has an impact on command 
responsibility to ‘repress… suppress … [and] prevent’ violations of IHL, and puts at risk 
commanders’ obligations to ensure IHL knowledge among their subordinates, especially if 
officers deliver IHL training.
216 
A train-the-trainers model of IHL instruction has value 
 
Andrew J. Carswell, ‘Converting Treaties into Tactics on Military Operations’ (2014) 96 International Review of 
the Red Cross 919 
Amended Protocol II to the CCW 1996, Article 14(3), cited by Hays Parks (n 54) 
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in social learning theory, as soldiers will be trained by one of their own, directly 
perceiving IHL’s relevance to their unit or community of practice. This model has 
disadvantages, however, if officers have gaps in their knowledge or if they cannot 
answer soldiers’ questions about IHL. 
 
7.   Evaluate IHL training, tracking individuals’ understanding norm-by-norm 
 
 
It is important to monitor and track each soldier or fighter’s understanding, norm-by- 
norm. This can be done through individual discussion on deployment, spot checks in 
armed groups; and by thoughtfully-designed spreadsheets in armed forces. No need for 
millions to be spent on a new computer system: the systems should just be designed  
with IHL understanding in mind. Military and political officials can decide to track 
understanding of particular IHL norms following reforms to training, to evaluate the 
quality of these reforms. Norm-by-norm evaluation is particularly important where there 
have been recurrent violations by a particular state, or problems with IHL compliance in 
a particular regiment or group; or where some norms have been neglected in IHL 
training, with institutional memory limited. This is particularly true in the UK context,  
as the case study in chapters 6 and 7 reveals recurrent violations in the prohibitions 
shared between IHL and IHRL, and a tendency still to conceptualise the prohibition of 
torture (prohibited in both branches of law) as a matter of ‘human rights’ and not the  
law of armed conflict.
217 
These evaluation tools can also be adopted by armed    groups, 
for outreach and discussion with the ICRC and Geneva Call. 
 
Willingness to Comply 
 
 
Careful design and delivery of IHL training, and its repetition may instil understanding, 
knowledge and recall; but does not fully capture willingness to comply. Standards to 
improve willingness to comply are those that address the risks of violations from military 
culture, discourse about law and enemy forces, moral disengagement and revenge or 
misunderstood reciprocity. Particularly where soldiers or armed group fighters in their late 
teens and early twenties are making decisions in relation to their peer group,
218 
it is a 
 
 
 
 
6.3, 7.5 
Johnson (n 105) 
123  
misnomer to consider an individual’s willingness to comply as distinct from the military 
culture or community of practice of the unit in which they are trained. 
 
Recognise that brutality within military training risks confusion about 
permissible action on deployment and consequent violations of IHL 
 
Brutal training dehumanises recruits and implies that brutality to those in their power 
fighters who are hors de combat (through wounds or detention, for example) is 
authorised as part of the military norm. This risks a cognitive and empathic ‘distancing’, 
which affects willingness to comply with IHL, and confusion as to the binding status of 
IHL prohibitions based on the principles of humanity and restraint where military 
training is punitive or brutal. The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry found that personnel who 
had experienced brutality in conduct-after-capture training were mostly unaware that the 
treatment to which they were subjected is prohibited in IHL.
219 
An officer who   trained 
the soldiers involved in the My Lai massacre believed that the purpose of military 
training was ‘the spirit of the bayonet’: to break down an individual human being’s 
willingness to kill.
220 
He had scant knowledge of IHL. 
 
Both IHL training and military culture should foster the ability to challenge 
unlawful orders 
 
Individual soldiers must know enough IHL (in breadth and depth) to be able to 
recognise an unlawful order; but military culture must enable them to seek clarification 
and if necessary to disobey the order; and to intervene and report upon violations 
witnessed. This requires a commitment to IHL by the chain of command: (i) to 
recognise that IHL compliance requires occasional independence of action instead of the 
reflex obedience favoured by general military training; (ii) to facilitate IHL training, to 
recognise the parameters IHL imposes on mission command, and to be vigilant against 
discourse or organisational culture which casts law as the enemy. 
 
10. Both IHL training and military culture must facilitate the reporting of violations 
 
 
 
 
 
6.4.2 
Yorkshire Television, Four Hours in My Lai, transcribed interview with an ex-Sergeant 2nd Platoon, 1988 
(LHArch) 
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Where soldiers and officers who witness ongoing violations either do not understand 
them to be unlawful or believe that reporting them would be taboo, breaches of IHL will 
go unreported. The same result occurs where ‘authorization’, ‘routinization’ and 
‘dehumanization’ are present;221 where ‘responsibility is diffused’;222 and where   units 
are  isolated  from  the  broader  military  structure.
223   
IHL  training  can  respond    by 
emphasising the duty on all soldiers to intervene to stop, or to report violations they 
witness. This would be in addition to command responsibility to ‘repress’ and  
‘suppress’ violations by subordinates.224 
 
Remedy discourse that dehumanises the enemy or attempts to justify IHL 
violations 
 
The chain of command should address and correct any discourse that dehumanises the 
enemy or which attempts to justify IHL violations, recognising that these attitudes risk IHL 
violations and exist independently of soldiers’ and armed group fighters’ knowledge of IHL. 
Discourse that maligns enemy civilians or implies that their IHL protections are not 
deserved is a related and more complex problem, linked to specious arguments from recent 
just war theory. These theorists attempt to erode the principle of distinction by weighing 
force  protection  more  strongly  than  the  principle  of  humanity;
225  
challenge   civilians’ 
immunity from attack if they have voted for a government pursuing an unlawful war,
226 
or 
argue that soldiers fighting an unlawful war are not morally equivalent    to soldiers fighting 
for a just cause.
227 
Where these ideas are present, for example in military ethics training, 
soldiers might misunderstand IHL and be less willing to comply. 
 
 
A related concern is how to remedy discourse that implies violations would be justified 
because enemy forces have themselves violated IHL, or as revenge for enemy IHL 
violations. This is a misunderstanding of reprisals in IHL and causes particular concern 
where it occurs alongside moral disengagement and a military culture that does not report 
violations. Rowe gives an example of this false reciprocity: soldiers involved in handling 
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detainees may believe that if a detainee did not or would not have treated British Army 
detainees humanely, he should not be treated humanely.
228
 
 
Rectify discourse that implies that investigations and prosecutions for IHL 
violations threaten operational effectiveness 
 
Part III of the thesis reveals a ‘legal siege’ rhetoric which implies that investigations, 
prosecutions and civil suits for alleged violations of IHL by the British armed forces are a 
threat   to   operational   effectiveness   or   troops’   morale.
229    
This   rhetoric   has   some 
commonalities with the idea that IHL is a peripheral irritation to the business of waging 
war,
230 
and like that related rhetoric, ‘legal siege’ risks undermining soldiers’ and  officers’ 
willingness to comply. It also casts accountability as optional. Instead, political and military 
leaders should endorse investigations and disciplinary sanctions unequivocally where 
evidence suggests that IHL has been violated. Remedying this discourse helps to embed  
IHL in military culture, and to shield IHL instruction from politicisation and anti-law 
rhetoric. Where military leaders address and amend an anti-IHL rhetoric, they assist the 
social learning theory needed for IHL compliance. Bandura argues that ‘moral actions are 
the products of the reciprocal interplay of personal and social influences’ and that ‘social 
systems’ need ‘safeguards’ marked by compassion instead of cruelty.
231 
In the IHL context, 
these ‘safeguards’ should include the legitimacy of investigations, prosecutions and civil 
suits where IHL is alleged to have been breached. 
 
There is one predicted critique. Do standards based on willingness to comply expect 
IHL training to do too much? Moral disengagement can be tracked in another way, 
through personnel screening and careful monitoring of the effects of combat trauma on 
behaviour  while  a  deployment  is  ongoing.
232   
This  is  the  role  of  recruiters      and 
commanders and not of an IHL trainer. If soldiers grieving for killed colleagues or eager 
for revenge begin to express an intent to harm detainees or wounded enemy fighters, 
then the remedy for this is not more training but command responsibility to intervene in 
an attempt to prevent these predicted violations. 
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3.6 Conclusion to Part I 
 
 
Assumptions that mere dissemination of IHL prevents future violations rest on the 
premise that action or restraint on and after the battlefield is caused by awareness of  
IHL norms; and that ignorance of those norms (or the absence of IHL dissemination) 
causes IHL violations. These facile causal assumptions (present in the literature at least 
until the late 1980s) conflate necessary and sufficient causes. IHL dissemination 
(resulting in broad or superficial awareness of norms) is but one step which might 
prevent violations and ensure compliance. Military instruction in IHL is juridically 
necessary (required by treaties and custom), empirically necessary (barring a 
coincidental or morally-motivated convergence between soldiers’ conduct and the 
content of IHL where soldiers have no knowledge of IHL) but empirically insufficient  
to prevent violations and ensure compliance. 
 
Juridical necessity is demonstrated by the genealogy of the IHL training obligation, which 
shows a simply-phrased, discretionary norm, influenced by assumptions that dissemination 
and training would contribute to the prevention of violations. Empirical necessity can be 
tentatively demonstrated from cases where deficits in IHL training are implicated as one 
among several causes for violations, including the My Lai and Abu Ghraib inquiries in the 
US, the Commission of Inquiry into Canadian troops’ actions in Somalia, and the Baha 
Mousa Public Inquiry in the UK. However, public inquiries are not designed to assess 
necessary and sufficient causal mechanisms, but to make findings of fact to satisfy  
particular terms of reference. There is no burden of proof for finding IHL training to be 
adequate or inadequate, and identifying flaws in training elides more complex, politically 
controversial questions of individual behaviour and social psychology. In contrast, each of 
these cases showed evidence that military culture, moral disengagement and unlawful orders 
are powerful causal factors for IHL violations, potentially more significant than ignorance  
of IHL. This finding is bolstered by interdisciplinary research that shows the antagonism 
between military culture and IHL compliance, and the role of discourse about law and 
enemy forces (or enemy civilians) in atrocity crimes. IHL training is empirically insufficient 
because of the gap between training and behaviour, understanding and willingness to 
comply. Social psychological research suggests that former combatants’ knowledge of IHL 
does not necessarily 
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correlate with a moral adherence to IHL norms:
233 
the moral disengagement which 
precedes atrocity could occur even in former fighters who had good knowledge of the 
law. 
 
In addition to the explanatory gap between communicated norms and subsequent 
behaviour, the conundrum between IHL training, prevention and compliance is also 
characterised by a distinction between understanding and willingness to comply. It is an 
unproven assumption that mere ‘study’ or ‘instruction’ in IHL is capable of instilling 
understanding, knowledge and recall on the one hand, and individual soldiers’ and units’ 
willingness to comply with IHL and to prevent or respond to violations (by reporting 
them or urging comrades to desist) on the other. To assume that it can and does is to 
entrust IHL dissemination and classroom-based training with too much preventive 
power. It also risks cursory responses to violations, where improving IHL training is 
assumed to solve problems of prevention and compliance in the next conflict and the  
one after that. The conundrum is also how to build restraint in trained killers, and partly 
how to implement contested norms in complex deployments. Where IHL norms are 
poised between military necessity and humanity; they can be stretched or contracted by 
various actors. Genuine complexity in asymmetric warfare is a further complication: 
individual soldiers are expected to know if law enforcement or armed conflict rules 
apply, and to apply either branch of law in rapidly-changing   deployments.
234  
Trainers 
need to translate complex or contested IHL norms into relatively simple and clear 
military instruction, without losing the detail needed for compliance in practice. 
 
3.2’s chronology of the literature on IHL training shows that historic insights were lost 
on the psychology of armed conflict, and the importance of practical training in IHL, 
only to recur in much later works. Gradually, the literature began to articulate a range of 
educational and behavioural parameters for military IHL training, but it hinted (without 
more) that interdisciplinary insights were required. 3.3 offers a disaggregated account of 
constructivist norm internalisation, broadened to include both understanding and 
willingness to comply; and explores the role of communities of practice in IHL training. 
It cites recent work on the value and risk of military culture for norm internalisation in 
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IHL and explores the causal role of moral disengagement and discourse about law and 
enemy forces in IHL violations. 3.4 argues in favour of the ICRC’s work on integration of 
IHL and its wide-ranging prevention toolkit, while summarising the work of Geneva Call in 
IHL dissemination and outreach to armed groups. 3.5 yields standards that begin to close  
the causal gap between IHL training, compliance and the prevention of violations. In their 
focus on both understanding of and willingness to comply with IHL, these standards have 
relevance beyond the mere dissemination of IHL in classroom settings. They require 
reflection on the military culture in which IHL training takes place, and on the subtle 
interplay of individual and group factors present in military communities of practice. As 
such, the standards represent a broad reading of the IHL training obligation, grounded in the 
literature. Yet each of the behavioural standards detailed in this chapter relates to binding 
IHL, including the obligation to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for IHL ‘in all 
circumstances’,
235  
command responsibility to ‘repress … suppress … [and] prevent’    IHL 
violations,
236 
the provision of qualified persons and legal advisers to the armed forces,
237 
and the duty to clarify, and if necessary to disobey, manifestly unlawful orders.
238 
The next 
chapter studies these norms of prevention. 
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Part II. Building Theories of Prevention and Compliance in 
International Humanitarian Law 
 
Chapter 4. Laconic Norms of Prevention in International 
Humanitarian Law 
 
4.1    Introduction 
 
Unlike international environmental law and IHRL,
1 
prevention is not a term of art in 
IHL, with the exception of the ICRC’s interdisciplinary use of the term.2 Instead, IHL 
scholars and practitioners focus on the ‘implementation’ and ‘enforcement’ of IHL;3 
addressing the ongoing present tense and violations in the past, without a    sophisticated 
understanding  of  what  is  required  to  prevent  future  violations.  The  prevention   of 
violations (especially those that impinge on the principle of humanity and non- 
combatant immunity) is implicit in IHL’s substantive norms, including the obligation to 
‘take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack’ to avoid and 
minimise incidental civilian harm.
4 
Yet there is no developed theory of prevention in 
IHL. The simple, laconic phrasing of IHL’s norms of prevention, and the failure to 
delineate IHL’s architecture of preventive norms are problematic for state practice. If 
each norm of prevention is pithily expressed, and subsequently viewed as a discrete 
obligation, the preventive potential of IHL’s norms is reduced. 
 
4.2 below sets out a three-part typology of IHL’s norms of prevention, norms of 
monitoring, and norms of enforcement. Each of these sets of norms is treaty-based, so 
despite their procedural nature, they are equally binding on states parties as IHL’s 
substantive norms. 4.3 then reads the IHL training obligation together with four other 
norms of prevention, explaining why they interrelate. 4.4 argues that this synthesis of 
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preventive norms encourages states to view them as interlocking duties, instead of 
discrete, simply-phrased obligations. This helps to solve the conundrum by encouraging 
more than a superficial approach to military IHL training; but a full account of 
prevention in IHL requires more detailed engagement with norms of prevention in 
Hague law and in NIAC. 
 
4.2 Norms of Prevention, Monitoring and Enforcement 
 
 
IHL’s implementation mechanisms are ‘even less satisfactory and efficient’ than those in 
other branches of law; in fact, their    ‘decentralized structure’ is ‘inherently insufficient and 
… even counter-productive.’
5 
Sassòli, Bouvier and Quintin locate these inadequacies in the 
‘astonishing’ proposition that the peaceful settlement of inter-state disputes (the  foundation 
of the implementation of much of international law) can occur in armed conflicts.
6 
Yet, 
there are cumulative weaknesses in IHL’s procedural norms: they are for the most part 
simply expressed, delegated to state discretion without transparent oversight or monitoring 
of state practice, and there is no consensus on how they interrelate. Laconic phrasing does 
not doom the implementation of any international law obligation in the abstract, as 
subsequent practice, case law and scholarship can set the contours of a norm. It is in IHL’s 
specific context of state discretion with minimal monitoring that simply-phrased procedural 
norms become problematic. 
 
The terms ‘secondary norms’
7 
or ‘secondary rules’ are not used here, because this broad 
category includes rules which regulate the primary rules within a legal system,
8 
e.g. their 
validity, how they can change and be adjudicated;
9 
or how they can be ‘enact[ed], 
modif[ied]… terminate[d]…interpret[ed and] appl[ied].’
10 
IHL’s procedural norms are 
much narrower. Secondary rules’ relationship with the notion of a ‘self-contained regime’ 
also adds confusion which is not useful for the analysis in this chapter. Briefly, IHL’s 
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procedural norms do not constitute a complete regime for handling breaches, so these 
‘secondary norms’ do not make IHL a self-contained regime in the same sense as  
Article 55 of the ILC Articles on State Responsibility;
11 
nor does IHL cover a specific 
‘(territorial, functional) problem-area’,12 as it regulates multiple factual configurations 
of IAC and NIAC; but IHL’s substantive norms can be lex specialis (and therefore the 
third sense of a self-contained regime)
13 
in the jurisprudence of the International   Court 
of Justice,
14 so that IHL’s principles can either oust, or shape the interpretation of co- 
applicable IHRL (see 5.3 below). 
 
IHL’s procedural norms are usually classified as ‘implementation’ and ‘enforcement’.15 
While implementation and enforcement are valid descriptors and an established 
terminology in IHL, they do not capture the range of purposes in these  procedural 
norms. This section argues that IHL’s procedural norms can be subdivided into norms of 
prevention, monitoring and enforcement. It begins a scholarly discussion about 
prevention as a term of art in IHL. It also permits a focus on IHL’s neglected monitoring 
mechanisms.
16 This chapter aims to sketch a framework of IHL’s procedural norms,   to 
see how discrete obligations interrelate, and to problematise their weaknesses. All  three 
categories of norms are ‘primarily aimed at building legality’,17 but the framework 
distinguishes norms of prevention from norms of monitoring, and from norms of 
enforcement, to facilitate states’ and scholars’ focus on each set of norms. 
 
The obligation to disseminate international humanitarian law and to integrate it into 
programmes of military instruction and training is one of IHL’s laconic norms of 
prevention. Norms of prevention operate in the present and future tense, aiming to 
prevent violations of IHL and to suppress those in progress. Other norms of prevention 
include the obligation to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for IHL ‘in all circumstances’;18 
the requirement to ‘train qualified persons’ in the application of the Four Geneva 
Conventions and AP I, and to provide legal advisers to the chain of command, inter alia 
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to advise on ‘appropriate instruction’ in IHL to the armed forces;19 command 
responsibility to ‘repress … suppress … [and] prevent’ IHL violations,20 and to ensure 
subordinates’ knowledge of IHL;21 and the duty to clarify, and if necessary to disobey 
manifestly unlawful orders.
22
 
 
The first of these is an open-textured erga omnes norm,
23 
with intra- and inter-state 
dimensions. The second is obviously related to the IHL training obligation, while legal 
advice to the chain of command is a slim approach to ‘integrating’ IHL within military 
decision-making, as the ICRC suggests in the second iteration of its work on   integration.
24
 
Article 6 AP I’s simple phrasing means there is no definition of ‘qualified persons’, and 
Article 82 merely requires that the legal advisers are available to commanders, not that their 
advice be heeded. The third, command responsibility, is a detailed norm, with another clear 
link to military instruction in IHL, with patches of under-specificity. Article 86 is a mirror 
image of Article 87, with the former addressing the requirement on High Contracting  
Parties and other Parties to the conflict to ‘repress grave breaches, and take measures 
necessary to suppress all other breaches’ which would result if they were to fail to act,
25
 
and introducing the concept of command or superior responsibility for such failure to act.
26 
The latter addresses the positive obligation on military commanders to ‘prevent and, where 
necessary, to suppress and report to competent authorities breaches [not limited to grave 
breaches]’ of the Geneva Conventions and AP I;
27 
to ensure that ‘members of the armed 
forces under their command are aware of their [IHL] obligations’;
28 
and, if a commander  is 
aware that his subordinates will commit or have committed a violation, ‘to initiate such  
steps as are necessary to prevent’ them, ‘and, where appropriate, to initiate disciplinary or 
penal action against violators.’
29 
Art 87(1) and (3) set up a continuum between    prevention 
and accountability: both the reporting of breaches, and ‘disciplinary or penal action’. For 
states parties to AP I, therefore, an 
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emphasis  on  IHL training as  a preventive  norm  is  insufficient  if obligations  are  not 
honoured to ‘suppress and report’, to prosecute or impose penalties for breaches.30 It   is 
necessary to allow for differing circumstances, and therefore not to specify the ‘steps … 
necessary to prevent’ violations, so the under-specificity is justified in Art 87(3).  
Finally, the fourth of these preventive norms, derives from international criminal law 
and customary IHL. The customary IHL rule is not so much laconically-expressed as 
sketched and constructed from cases that gradually eroded a defence of acting under 
superior orders, so that soldiers should be expected to identify and then disobey 
‘manifestly  unlawful  orders’.31   Military  instruction  in  IHL  is  a  precondition     for 
identifying unlawful orders, whether they are manifestly unlawful or less obviously so. 
 
The variable detail in these norms prompts a question: are discretionary norms still legal 
norms? Vöneky sees ‘flexibility’ and ‘decentralized implementation’ as a ‘structural’ 
weakness in international law as a whole, as the norms to support the implementation of 
erga  omnes  and  jus  cogens  are  weak.
32   
Lauterpacht  offers  a  more  forceful   account, 
applicable to IHL’s norms of prevention: ‘an obligation whose scope is left to the free 
appreciation of the obligee’, he argues, ‘so that his will constitutes a legally recognised 
condition for the existence of a duty, does not constitute a legal bond.’
33 
For Lauterpacht, 
influenced by Kelsen, a legal norm must not be discretionary.
34 
In addition, Lauterpacht 
believed  that  states  should  not  decide  for  themselves  that  they  have  implemented   an 
obligation,  while  denying  courts  the  opportunity  to  judge  this  impartially.
35   
IHL     is 
different, however, from a case before the ICJ. Its monitoring mechanisms are inadequate 
and discretionary preventive norms problematic in this context, but IHL’s procedural norms 
remain binding on states parties as a result of their promulgation in treaties and subsequent 
ratification by states. They are no less binding than the norms in substantive IHL, including 
those in which prevention is implicit, such as the obligation to ‘take all 
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feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack’ to avoid and 
minimise incidental civilian losses.
36
 
 
Norms of prevention can be distinguished from norms of monitoring and of enforcement. 
Norms of monitoring include the enquiry procedure, by which an alleged violation of the 
Four Geneva Conventions may be investigated ‘in a manner to be decided between the 
interested Parties’ or an agreed ‘umpire’.
37 
Enquiries in IAC have as their aim the cessation 
of violations. The Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions also require the Parties to a  
conflict to allow ICRC delegates or the delegates of a Protecting Power full access to visit 
prisoners of war and internees, and to interview them without witnesses. These visits can 
only be prohibited by ‘imperative military necessity’.
38 
Additional Protocol I provides   two 
more norms of monitoring, but neither are in active use: the International Humanitarian 
Fact-Finding Commission (tasked with enquiring into alleged grave breaches or other 
serious violations and restoring respect for Geneva law)
39 
and inter-state communication 
about  IHL  implementation.
40  
These  norms  of  monitoring  operate  in  the  present tense, 
covering the recent past. However, they only apply to IAC where Additional Protocol I is 
ratified, and are largely in disuse. Without a regular meeting of states, such as that foreseen 
by the consultation phase in the Strengthening Compliance Initiative, these norms of 
monitoring cannot provide an account of state practice in IHL.
41
 
 
Norms of prevention and monitoring are both distinct from retrospective norms of 
enforcement that set consequences for grave breaches and other serious violations of IHL. 
These include the obligations to criminalise, and to prosecute or extradite those suspected of 
being responsible for grave breaches of the Four Geneva Conventions and Additional 
Protocol I;
42  
and not to absolve states of liability for grave breaches.
43  
The latter is a 
neglected norm of enforcement, which entails not only inter-state compensation but also 
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 transparent investigation.
44 
Norms of enforcement oblige states to provide consequences 
(intra- and inter-state) for grave breaches and other serious violations in IAC. 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Integrating the Training Obligation with IHL’s Other Norms of Prevention 
 
 
This section reads the IHL training obligation together with four other norms of 
prevention, recognising the continuum between IHL training, the provision of legal 
advisers and command responsibility to ensure subordinates’ knowledge of Geneva law; 
and articulating the less obvious connection between IHL training and the duty in 
Common Article 1 to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for IHL ‘in all circumstances’,45   and 
command responsibility to prevent and suppress violations by subordinates. The logical 
thread between IHL training and a duty to disobey unlawful orders is obvious but 
incomplete: on the one hand, soldiers must understand enough IHL to be able to identify 
an unlawful order (it is suggested below that the duty is not merely to disobey  
manifestly unlawful orders, but all unlawful orders), but military culture and general 
training must permit sufficient independence of action to enable a soldier to disobey 
where necessary. Greater or lesser deference in the national culture may influence how 
easy this is to implement in the armed forces. 
 
This is not the first attempt at a synthesis of IHL’s norms of prevention, but it is a call for 
consensus, because existing accounts vary in the number of norms selected, arguably 
because IHL lacks ‘prevention’ as a term of art, and ‘implementation’ and ‘enforcement’ are 
terms of variable breadth. Writing just after the Additional Protocols were agreed, Draper 
connects Additional Protocol I’s provisions on legal advisers, ‘qualified persons’ and 
dissemination  and  training.
46  
The  ICRC  Commentary  relates  Article  83  of  Additional 
Protocol I on dissemination and training to the requirement in Article 6 to train ‘qualified 
personnel’ to ‘facilitate the application’ of the Protocol; to Article 82’s obligation to provide 
legal advisers, to offer advice ‘where necessary’ to military commanders on applying the 
Protocol and on IHL instruction; and to Article 87 on command 
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responsibility.
47 
The ICRC Customary IHL Study subdivides state practice between the 
norm as stated in Article 83 of Additional Protocol I, and commanders’ responsibility to 
ensure subordinates’ knowledge of IHL in Article 87(2).48 Kuper also links Arts 83  and 
87(2).
49
 
 
Fleck takes a strategic approach, drawing on research by Sivakumaran and others on 
IHL compliance by armed groups in NIAC, and recognising the absence of these norms 
of prevention in NIAC. He recommends ‘an extended spectrum of activities’,50 inspired 
by Common Article 1’s obligation to ‘respect and ensure respect [for IHL] … in all 
circumstances’. These include outreach by states to armed groups, a combination of 
pressure and administrative support; the development of incentives for compliance, and 
a facts-based investigation of what causes violations in NIAC, alongside war crimes 
prosecutions.
51   Durham   and  Massingham’s  approach  is  broader  still.52     Counter- 
intuitively classifying prospective norms of prevention as ‘accountability mechanisms’ 
(a term which suggests a retrospective approach), they begin to theorise IHL’s 
architecture of prevention. They address dissemination, an obligation on commanders to 
seek legal advice (rather than a requirement on states parties to AP I to provide legal 
advisers),
53 
the requirement to review new means and methods of warfare,
54 
and an 
inferred obligation on urban planners and defence ministries to locate military targets 
away from populated areas.
55
 
 
The Obligation to ‘Respect and Ensure Respect’ 
 
 
The Pictet Commentary to the Four Geneva Conventions sees IHL dissemination and 
training as logically prior to the obligation to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for the 
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Conventions ‘in all circumstances’,56 in Common Article 1 of the Four Geneva 
Conventions and in Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol I. Yet this logical link between 
IHL training and Common Article 1 needs to be carefully articulated. Both Pictet and 
Sandoz recognised the need for states to supervise ‘details of the execution’ of IHL 
dissemination  and  training;
57   
prevention  and  compliance  do  not  occur  simply   by 
ordering that training take place. In the updated ICRC Commentary to Common Article 
1, Henckaerts makes subtle links between the two norms: explaining that states cannot 
abrogate their obligations under Common Article 1 when their armed forces participate 
in a multinational force and that adequate instruction and training are part of that duty.
58
 
Henckaerts emphasises that a state’s duty to ensure respect of Geneva law and the 
related duty not to encourage, aid or assist violations also applies where it trains the 
troops of another state.
59  
The updated Commentary argues that the duties in    Common 
Article 1 apply to IAC and NIAC alike;
60 
consistently with the ICRC Customary IHL 
Study’s position on rule 139, and with practice on the obligation to ‘respect’ IHL in 
NIAC  collected  from  the  Netherlands,  the  Philippines,  and  Uganda.
61  
The Federal 
Court of Canada recently ruled, following expert evidence from Michael Schmitt and 
others, that Common Article 1 does not apply to NIAC, and did not require Canada to 
prevent the export of military equipment to Saudi Arabia for use in Yemen. On a closer 
reading, however, this case might be confined to its facts, as the reasoning relates only  
to the outward-looking duty to ‘ensure respect’; the judgment says nothing about the 
duty to ‘respect’ IHL in NIAC.62 
 
Case law and scholarship distinguish between the intra-state duty to ‘respect’ Geneva law, 
and the inter-state duty to ‘ensure respect’. It is the former that relates to a state’s own 
military training in IHL, while the latter can include, as Henckaerts explains, a state’s 
training  of  another  state’s  troops.
63  
Kalshoven  believed  that  a  state’s  obligation under 
Common Article 1 was to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for the Conventions and Additional 
Protocol I by their own armed forces, citizenry and any armed groups the state controls, 
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while there was only a moral obligation to speak out against violations by other states.
64 
Palwankar holds a similar view, but recommends a range of measures of diplomatic 
pressure  and  non-violent  retorsion  to  ‘ensure  respect’  for  IHL,  and  a  data  bank of 
national implementation measures.
65  
The  ICJ Advisory Opinion on the  Wall    differs, 
seeing Common Article 1 as an erga omnes obligation, binding states not to recognise 
the unlawful situation created by the Wall, nor to render aid or assistance.
66 
Focarelli 
casts ‘respect’ as ‘individual-compliance’ and ‘ensure respect’ as ‘state-compliance’, 
where the latter includes third states’ duties ‘to do everything in their power’ to  prevent 
violations by parties to a conflict. 
67 
De Chazournes and Condorelli offer    a maximalist 
interpretation, arguing (like Focarelli) that the obligation in Common Article 1 also 
applies to NIAC regulated by Common Article 3; that ‘respect’ refers to a state’s 
obligation to ‘do everything it can to ensure’ that its own agents comply with IHL, while 
‘ensure respect’ means both parties to a conflict and third states ‘must take all possible 
steps to ensure that the rules are respected by all’.68 Dörmann and Serralvo sketch a 
duty on all third parties (states, international organisations and non-state entities) not 
merely to discourage ‘but also to take measures to put an end to on-going violations and 
to actively prevent their occurrence’ as part of a ‘due diligence’ interpretation of the 
obligation to ‘…ensure respect’ for the Four Geneva Conventions ‘in all circumstances’, 
both IAC and NIAC.
69  
The unconditional nature of the obligation is recognised in    the 
ICRC Customary IHL Study, where rule 140 provides that ‘The obligation to respect 
and ensure respect… does not depend on reciprocity.’ 
 
Legal Advisers 
 
 
The obligations in Articles 6 and 82 of Additional Protocol I to make ‘qualified persons’ 
and legal advisers available were both conceived as means to support IHL dissemination 
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and military instruction. The text of Article 82 makes this clear (states parties must make 
legal advisers available to advise, ‘where necessary’ –a discretionary formulation - on the 
Protocol’s application, and on military instruction in IHL), while the link between Article 6 
and  dissemination  is revealed  by the  travaux.
70  
The  ICRC  Commentary envisages   that 
qualified  persons  might  form  consultative  groups  within  government  to  facilitate    the 
execution of the Convention.
71 
Such experts could include the ‘civilian authorities’ who 
should (according to the argument built in 2.4) receive instruction equivalent to military 
instruction, and not mere dissemination. Article 82 also requires that legal advisers are 
available to commanders, facilitating command responsibility to prevent and suppress 
violations, but the treaty text does not specify that the advice be heeded. In negative 
conditional language, the ICRC Customary IHL Study indicates that there is no difference  
in state practice between the provision of legal advisers in IAC and in NIAC, although the 
obligation in Article 82 only exists in Additional Protocol I.
72 
Literature suggests some 
complexity in the effects of legal advice. While legal advisers might help to prevent IHL 
violations by ‘commingling’ with an Army’s organisational structure,
73 
the opposite can 
also  occur,  with  legal  advisers  being  ‘taken  captive’  by  the  agenda  and  retrogressive 
interpretations of a broader military culture.
74
 
 
Command Responsibility 
 
 
The obligations to ‘repress grave breaches, and take measures necessary to suppress all  
other breaches’; to ‘prevent, and, where necessary, to suppress and report’ violations to 
‘competent authorities’ and to ensure subordinates’ awareness of IHL set up a continuum 
between prevention (including IHL instruction), and accountability: both the reporting of 
breaches,  and  ‘disciplinary  or  penal  action’.
75  
The  obligations  are  adjacent, suggesting 
different actions are required, but together, they establish a continuum between an officer’s 
duty to prevent violations, to stop violations in progress, and to begin disciplinary or court- 
martial processes. The doctrine of command responsibility is recognised in Rule 153 of the 
ICRC Customary IHL Study (applicable in IAC and NIAC), 
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which holds commanders and other superiors criminally responsible for war crimes 
committed by their subordinates if the commander or superior knew, or had reason to 
know that the subordinate was about to commit, or in the process of committing the war 
crime, and if the commander or superior failed to prevent or punish the relevant act.
76
 
Williamson  sees  command  responsibility as  an  ‘affirmative  duty to  act’,  leading  to 
‘liability by default or omission.’77 This is persuasive, but the Article offers greater 
theoretical depth than this. If High Contacting Parties to Additional Protocol I  
emphasise IHL training but do not honour the obligation to ‘suppress and report’ 
breaches to ‘competent authorities’ then command responsibility (and state 
responsibility) has not been fulfilled. 
 
Unlawful Orders 
 
 
States’ obligation to ‘respect …’ IHL ‘in all circumstances’ entails that soldiers 
understand sufficient IHL from their training to be able to recognise, seek clarification, 
and if necessary, disobey unlawful orders. Whether or not a soldier can identify an 
unlawful order depends on the quality of his IHL training, which can be facilitated by 
legal advisers’ involvement in military instruction. Command responsibility to ‘prevent’ 
grave breaches and other violations of IHL requires that orders not be unlawful in the 
first place, and legal advice to commanders can assist with this. However, the duty to 
resist unlawful orders (and not merely the duty read from international criminal law to 
resist manifestly unlawful orders – see below) still needs to be articulated as a norm of 
prevention. It is in tension with much military culture and general training to obey 
superior  orders  without  question.
78   
The  duty  to  disobey  unlawful  orders  and    the 
prevention of IHL violations requires that military culture allow soldiers sufficient 
independence of action to question and disobey unlawful orders. 
 
Article 33 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 establishes that a 
defendant will not be relieved of criminal responsibility as a result of following an order 
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 from a commander or superior, unless the defendant was under a legal obligation to 
follow the order, did not know the order was unlawful and the order was not manifestly 
unlawful.
79  
A defendant would be expected to recognise an order to commit    genocide 
or crimes against humanity, as such an order would be considered manifestly unlawful 
under Article 33(2) of the Rome Statute, but there is no explicit expectation that an  
order to commit any of the full gamut of war crimes in Article 8 of the Rome Statute 
would be ‘manifestly unlawful’. Gaeta criticises this specific aspect of Article 33, as it 
implies that war crimes (and the then-unsettled crime of aggression) might be less 
seriously unlawful than genocide and crimes against humanity; and she further argues 
that Article 33 departs from customary international law, which supported the 
Nuremberg principle that obedience to superior orders should never be a defence.
80 
The 
phrasing ‘so manifestly unlawful’ derives from the case of R v. Smith, in relation to 
breaches of the law of armed conflict in the Boer War;
81 
but it was not until 1944 that 
British and US military manuals modified their prior requirement to obey all superior 
orders, so that unlawful orders did not have to be obeyed.
82 
This approach is also  found 
in the Peleus case,
83 where the Judge Advocate confirmed that ‘There can be no duty to 
obey that which is not a lawful order.’84 Yet, in that case, it should have been obvious  
to the defendants that an order to kill survivors of a sunken ship was unlawful. The 
Judge  Advocate  acknowledged  that  it  might  not  have  been   ‘fair’   to       prosecute 
subordinates for carrying out an order where a ‘careful consideration’ was required to 
determine unlawfulness. This suggests that prosecutorial fairness explains the adjective 
‘manifestly’ in modern international criminal law. The London (Nuremberg) Charter 
denied the defence of superior orders, but    allowed mitigation;
85 
the approach Dinstein 
recognises as a current reflection of customary international law.
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Minow prefers to restrict the defence of superior orders to enhance the ‘symbolic ideal 
of individual  responsibility’;87  recognising that  IHL compliance will  be  attained only 
through ‘changes to military incentives, culture, and practices’, improved training and 
officers’ good faith in applying IHL.88 It is this contextual approach that justifies a 
different, prospective approach to unlawful orders in IHL. Nolte and Krieger infer  a 
duty  to  disobey  unlawful  orders  from   IHL’s  object  and  purpose,   and  not     from 
international criminal law.
89
 
 
There is every reason for the defence of superior orders to be restricted in international 
criminal law, but no reason to restrict a soldier’s duty to comply with IHL so that he 
must carry out all orders which are possibly or probably unlawful, only disobeying 
manifestly unlawful orders. As international criminal law and IHL have different 
purposes and operate at different times (retrospectively in the case of international 
criminal law and prospectively in the case of IHL’s norms of prevention), there is no 
reason for the two branches of law to be coterminous. Simply transplanting international 
criminal law phrasing does not satisfy the demands of Common Article 1. Yet the ICRC 
Customary IHL Study does use the phrasing ‘manifestly unlawful’, when it finds in rule 
154 ‘a duty to disobey a manifestly unlawful order’ in IAC (no practice was found in 
relation to NIAC). The Study’s authors draw on international criminal law and the 
obligation to respect IHL. They cite military law requiring obedience to ‘lawful’ or 
‘legitimate’ orders; and practice from three states to support a right to disobey an 
unlawful order, but they conclude that ‘practice is unclear’ in relation to  combatants 
who disobey an unlawful (but not a manifestly unlawful) order.
90
 
 
The error here is in assuming that there is sufficient practice to support a prospective duty to 
disobey manifestly unlawful orders (where that practice derives in part from retrospective 
criminal trials) and then requiring evidence from state practice to displace the presumption 
that the adjective ‘manifestly’ circumscribes the obligation in IHL. In truth, the practice 
collected is mixed, with some references in military manuals to a duty to disobey orders to 
commit obvious crimes (US practice from 1995), other references to 
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‘manifestly unlawful’ (Canada), and others to ‘unlawful order[s]’ (US practice from 
2007, UK practice from 1981). The Study fails definitively to prove that there is a 
customary IHL duty to disobey only those orders that are ‘manifestly’ unlawful. The 
Customary IHL Study cites the UK LOAC Pamphlet (1981): ‘Military personnel … 
must not obey unlawful commands’; this phrasing is replicated in the Operational Law 
Training Directive 2014, suggesting a duty to disobey unlawful orders in general in the 
UK context.
91 
A counterargument comes from the Calley case following the My Lai 
massacre, which is cited in the ICRC Customary IHL Study. The US Army Court of 
Military Appeals approved of military instructions which stated a soldier may only 
challenge and disobey an order if it is ‘so manifestly beyond the legal power or 
discretion of the commander as to admit of no rational doubt of their unlawfulness…’92 
 
Several of the military manuals cited in the Customary IHL Study imply a duty first to 
clarify and then, if necessary, to disobey unlawful orders. This seems to be an accurate 
reading of the available practice, but query the extent to which soldiers will feel able to 
challenge a superior in strongly hierarchical military units. O’Connell takes a similar 
approach, but is too trusting, firstly in the superior who should initially decide if a 
dubious order is lawful; and secondly, in soldiers’ willingness to comply with ‘the 
principles  of  humanity  and  …  follow  their  conscience.’93  This  presents difficulties 
where neither the superior nor the subordinate understand the unlawfulness of an order, 
or where one or both of them is motivated by revenge or moral disengagement. 
 
4.4 Implications for Theory and Practice 
 
 
What does this analysis bring to IHL theory and its implementation in practice? The 
typology of norms of prevention, monitoring and enforcement enables a more precise 
understanding of the purposes behind IHL’s procedural norms than current approaches  
based on ‘implementation’ and ‘enforcement’ can allow. The typology sets up a temporal 
continuum between prevention (mostly prospective), monitoring (ongoing present tense) 
and enforcement (retrospective), but as 4.3 has shown, command responsibility is itself a 
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temporal continuum, with obligations relating to preventing violations and responding when 
they are predicted or have just taken place. In cases before the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights and in soft law, training in IHRL and IHL can be a form of reparation,
94
 
specifically a guarantee of non-repetition;
95 
a prospective, preventive form of reparation. 
 
By linking the IHL dissemination and training obligation to other norms of prevention  
in IHL, the network of norms which aim to prevent violations of IHL becomes clearer. 
They are not discrete norms for which lip service in peacetime is sufficient. Prevention 
in IHL depends upon an understanding of where IHL training fits within this network of 
norms, and how related norms of prevention set the scope of the training obligation.  
This begins to address the problem of discretion caused by the laconic phrasing of the 
IHL training obligation, which is one aspect of the conundrum between training, 
prevention and compliance. IHL training and legal advice must be sufficient to the task 
of allowing soldiers to identify unlawful orders, and enabling commanders to honour 
their obligations to ‘prevent’, ‘suppress’ and ‘report’ grave breaches and other serious 
violations of IHL. Interlocking these obligations slightly reduces the discretion inherent 
in their mostly laconic formulation. 
 
What is missing? This first sketch of interlocking norms of prevention in IHL is skewed 
towards IAC, and particularly Additional Protocol I, which is not universally ratified. 
While some of these norms are said to exist in customary IHL, practice does not always 
include NIAC. Norms of prevention in weapons treaties are also absent from this brief 
chapter. The next step in articulating a theory of prevention in IHL would be to address 
norms of prevention, monitoring and enforcement in Hague law, supplemented by an 
analysis of the obligation to review new means and methods of warfare in Article 36 of 
Additional Protocol I. An account of prevention in NIAC is also needed, but of 
necessity, this will not be treaty-focused and doctrinal, but will need to focus on the 
tools of prevention used by the ICRC and Geneva Call. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
 
 
One facet of the conundrum between IHL training, prevention and compliance is states’ 
willingness to agree to simple norms of prevention without attending to how these  
norms interact and how they should be implemented. A solution to the conundrum 
between IHL training and prevention requires an understanding of where IHL training 
fits with other laconic norms of prevention, including the obligation to ‘respect and 
ensure respect… in all circumstances’; the provision of military legal advisers; 
commanders’ duties to ensure that their subordinates know IHL; command 
responsibility inter alia to ‘prevent’, ‘suppress’ and ‘report’  IHL violations;  and the 
duty at the very least to clarify and if necessary, to disobey unlawful orders. The IHL 
training obligation’s pithy, discretionary formulation is not ideally suited to promoting 
compliance and preventing violations, but its potential is increased by explicitly linking 
IHL training to several other norms of prevention. This enables states to see IHL norms 
of prevention as interlocking or interdependent duties. It subtly reduces the scope for 
discretion or superficiality in the implementation of military instruction in IHL, as the 
related norms set the aims of training. For example, soldiers must know enough IHL to 
be able to detect a potentially unlawful order, to seek to clarify it; and they must have 
sufficient willingness to comply with IHL to disobey unlawful orders if necessary. 
Restricting the prospective duty to disobey orders that are manifestly unlawful only sets 
a low bar for IHL training and subordinates’ understanding of IHL. 
 
However, there is an important caveat. This sketched theory of prevention is biased 
towards the IHL of IAC, and two of the five norms of prevention are found in  
Additional Protocol I, which has 174 states parties, and applies to conflicts between 
states and armed groups only if the conditions in Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I 
are made out. A fuller theory of prevention in IHL needs to depart from this narrow, 
doctrinal, IAC-focused approach; to take account of non-binding Deeds of Commitment 
and other tools of prevention among armed groups.
96 
This chapter has begun a scholarly 
conversation, arguing that prevention should be a term of art in IHL scholarship (as 
distinct from the ICRC’s interdisciplinary, pragmatic use of the term)97 with norms of 
prevention, monitoring and enforcement distinguished. 
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Chapter 5. Towards a Compliance Theory for International 
Humanitarian Law 
 
5.1    Introduction 
 
 
O’Donoghue has written that IHL exists in ‘splendid isolation’ from the remainder of 
international legal theory; that it is a technician’s discipline, not a theorist’s.1 In the past 
five years, this statement has lost its resonance, with an increase in scholarly attention to 
compliance theory in IHL. With that in mind, 5.2 is a snapshot of the literature. It   maps 
general   compliance   theories   on   a   sliding   scale   from   unitary   (state-centric)  to 
disaggregated (individual and group-focused) approaches; and charts their principal 
debates. 5.2 also distils the state of the literature on IHL compliance in both IAC and 
NIAC; works that are largely constructivist in orientation. 
 
5.3 argues in favour of a distinctive compliance theory for IHL, because of IHL’s seven 
compliance challenges (the high stakes for its indeterminate or contested norms; questions  
of conflict classification and applicable law; the co-applicability and convergence of IHL 
and IHRL; the challenges of interoperability where different states in a coalition have 
differing interpretations of IHL or rates of treaty ratification; IHL’s strong disaggregation to 
soldiers, officers and armed group fighters; the relics of reciprocity and its 
misunderstandings, which can lead to violations committed in revenge; and IHL’s disused  
or absent monitoring mechanisms, which leave much state practice hidden from  scrutiny).
2
 
5.3 evaluates which of these challenges are truly distinctive to IHL, and which exist to a 
matter of degree throughout international law; with a brief paragraph on the theoretical 
fragmentation that might result if IHL compliance theory is perceived as separate from 
broader work. 5.4 proposes a constructivist compliance theory, focusing on norm 
internalisation and communities of practice, as the best available theoretical account of the 
relationship between IHL training and compliance, but it is not a complete solution to the 
conundrum. 5.5 concludes Part II. 
 
 
 
1 Aoife O’Donoghue, ‘Splendid Isolation: International Humanitarian Law, Legal Theory and the 
International Legal Order’ (2011) 14 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 107 
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5.2 General and IHL-Specific Compliance Theories 
 
 
Traditional typologies of compliance theory are state-centric and chronological, moving 
from realist accounts to rational choice, liberal institutionalism, New Haven  and 
international legal process schools, transnational legal process, managerialism, and 
constructivism. 1.4’s compliance theory literature review began with such an account, but 
alternative framings are available. First, general compliance theories can be mapped on a 
sliding scale between state-centric, transnational, and disaggregated (individual or group- 
focused) theories. Second, they can be framed in relation to particular debates: such as the 
role of treaty ratification, regime type or norm precision and contestation. And third, 
compliance theories can be specific to a particular branch of international law. 
 
A Sliding Scale: From State-Based to Disaggregated Theories of Compliance 
 
 
This critical account of compliance theories sets up a sliding scale between unitary theories 
of state preference and pluralistic or disaggregated accounts. Realism doubts the normativity 
of international law given the absence of international enforcement, and considers any 
coincidence between treaties and state self-interest as a mere ‘epiphenomenon’.
3  
A    realist 
starting-point places the state in the centre, fictionalising its preferences, often in opposition 
to  international  law;
4  
and  leading  to  the  personification  of  the  state.  This continues in 
rational choice theory, which casts states as individual but rational actors, concerned with 
inter-state reciprocity, retaliation for breaches, and the reputational costs/benefits of 
compliance.
5 
State-centricity only works if positivism (where states consent to be bound  by 
treaties, and only state practice and opinio juris counts in the formation of customary 
international law)
6 
is a sufficient framework. In IHL, it is not, because armed groups are 
outside the law-creation process:
7 
they cannot ratify treaties, but are bound by the IHL on 
non-international armed conflict. There is normativity without consent, and a reliance on 
peremptory (jus cogens) and erga omnes obligations, which bind states and armed groups 
regardless of treaty ratification and 
 
 
 
Richard H. Steinberg and Jonathan M. Zasloff, ‘Power and International Law’ (2006) 100 American 
Journal of International Law 64, 74 (citing Krasner’s re-reading of Morgenthau) 
Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford University Press 2005) 
Andrew T. Guzman, How International Law Works: A Rational Choice Theory (Oxford University 
Press 2008) 
Statute of the International Court of Justice 1945 UNTS Chapter 3(1), Art 38(1) 
Anthea Roberts and Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Lawmaking by Nonstate Actors: Engaging Armed Groups 
in the Creation of International Humanitarian Law’ (2012) 37 Yale Journal of International Law 107 
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evidential thresholds for customary international law. In addition, IHL compliance is 
strongly disaggregated to individual soldiers and officers, and armed group fighters. 
State-centric  accounts do not sufficiently ‘lift the state veil’,8  disaggregating the    state 
into individual units, regiments and armed forces personnel, and recognising that IHL 
violations are either ordered by political officials and the chain of command, or 
committed by sub-state actors and armed group fighters.
9 
IHL demonstrates the need for 
disaggregated approaches to compliance theory. 
 
Theories at the mid-point between unitary and disaggregated accounts address 
compliance in intergovernmental organisations and professional groupings. They  
include Slaughter’s liberal institutionalist approach, which recognised the role of 
transborder   relationships   between   ‘parts   of   states’10    (e.g.   judges     cooperating 
internationally in horizontal networks), and supranational compliance mechanisms  such 
as the EU and ICC (vertical networks).
11 Goodman and Jinks’ account of  
‘acculturation’ (as distinct from ‘material inducement’ from rational choice theory    and 
‘persuasion’, a thin account of constructivism) is also at that mid-point. 12 Acculturation 
involves states assimilating their beliefs and practices about international law as a result 
of their membership in international organisations and networks. This can result in 
compliance, ‘deleterious norms’ or a ‘race to the middle’.13 
 
Constructivist insights are the most flexible, with relevance throughout the sliding scale. 
Finnemore and Sikkink assume multiple processes between states and between norms and 
states in  their account  of norm emergence and internalisation.
14  
Their approach  does   not 
consider norm internalisation by individual actors within a state. Betts and Orchard argue 
that constructivists should instead focus on ‘implementation’ (the process by which a norm 
becomes part of domestic law or policy and compliance becomes ‘routinize[d]’).
15
 
 
 
Samantha Besson, ‘The Authority of International Law: Lifting the State Veil’ (2009) 31 Sydney Law 
Review 343 
James D. Morrow, Order within Anarchy (Cambridge University Press 2014) 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press 2005) 6 
ibid., 24 
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, Socializing States: Promoting Human Rights Through International 
Law (Oxford University Press 2013) 
ibid., 42, 75-76, 188 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998) 52 
International Organization 887 
887, 895 
Alexander Betts and Phil Orchard (eds), Implementation and World Politics: How International Norms 
Change Practice (Oxford University Press 2014) 5, 269 
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This  is  an  intra-state  perspective,  but  not  a  fully disaggregated  (individual-focused) 
account. Sikkink’s ‘agentic constructivism’16 is more instructive for a study of 
individual actors’ IHL training and compliance with IHL. Brunnée and Toope’s 
interactional theory also focuses on individual actors and their communities of  practice: 
‘the salient actors are individuals’ and ‘it is an abstraction to speak of compliance by 
“states”’.17 Constructivists focus on the fluidity of norms,18 and norms’ constitutive  
role for states as they participate in intergovernmental organisations. While 
constructivists  reject  the  idea  of  fixed  state  preferences,  settled  before international 
norms  are  formed,
19   
their  emphasis  on  inter-state  deliberation,
20   
argument,
21  
and 
repetition,
22 
helps to account for consensus in international law interpretation and 
practice.  These  approaches  stand  outside  the  state,  looking  at  how  norms,  ‘shared 
understandings’,23 and participation in normative discourse shape state behaviour. 
 
Debates in General Compliance Theory 
 
 
Contrasting realism/rational choice approaches with constructivism is a simple    binary, 
opposing ‘instrumentalist’ and ‘normative’ conceptions of state compliance,24 but it 
does not take account of the range of sophisticated constructivist approaches in   modern 
compliance theory.
25 
The newest compliance theories are aggregates of the  quantitative 
and qualitative,
26 and like Goodman and Jinks’ study, combine rational choice, 
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University Press 2011) 
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constructivism and sociological approaches.
27 
Compliance theory in the aggregate  justifies 
an alternative framing, based on its principal debates on the effect of treaty ratification, 
regime type, norm precision or its opposite. Hathaway presented the counterintuitive finding 
that human rights treaty ratification would ‘offset pressure for change’ in state practice 
instead of ‘augment[ing] it’.
28 
In the IHL context, it was political scientists who found  first 
that joint treaty ratification (by both parties to an IAC) and regime type had no statistically 
significant  effect  on  civilian  protection;
29   
and  in  contrast,  that  treaty  ratification   did 
improve IHL compliance, especially for democracies.
30 
Yet both of these studies have 
conceptual problems, Valentino et al employ a sui generis definition of ‘civilian’, and 
Morrow considers conduct to be an IHL violation even when a state has not ratified a treaty, 
without confirming a norm’s status in customary IHL.
31
 
 
In general compliance theory, Slaughter argued that liberal democracies were more likely 
than  non-democracies  to  comply  with  international  law,
32  
but  liberal  institutionalism’s 
focus on regime type has been criticised for its US-centricity.
33 
Weiss is sceptical, because 
in democracies, public opinion or particular interest groups can lobby against   international 
law.
34   
Hillebrecht  found  that  some  democracies,  including  the  UK,  would      practise 
‘begrudging’ compliance if particular issues were politically sensitive;
35 
and  Simmons 
found a pro-compliance effect in human rights law where states had recently 
democratised.
36 
A beneficial effect of democracy on compliance is less likely where there is 
‘limited statehood’, a term that includes central governments with limited control of 
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sub-state actors, and states where warlords, transnational corporations or  organised 
crime operate.
37
 
 
Norm precision or its opposite is another debate in general compliance theory. Textual 
determinacy (both clarity and specificity) was for Franck one dimension of a rule’s 
‘compliance pull’, and proportional to legitimacy: ‘…the more determinate a standard, the 
more difficult it is to justify non-compliance.’
38 
Yet in very clear, ‘idiot’ rules, per Scobbie: 
‘rule determinacy can undermine legitimacy when it results in perceived injustice’,
39 
so 
clarity alone is not a guarantee of ‘compliance pull’.
40 
In contrast, sophist rules are 
interpretively complex, liable to be stretched or contracted at whim,
41 
suggesting that norm 
complexity  (a  form  of  precision)  would  result  in  variable  interpretations  and  variable 
practice,  making  compliance  harder  to  identify  and  measure.  In  contrast,    managerial 
accounts hold that precise norms facilitate state compliance and monitoring  mechanisms.
42
 
Weiss differentiates these two effects, arguing that precise norms make it easier to 
determine compliance, but that ‘it does not necessarily follow that states will comply with 
precise obligations’ more than with simply stated norms.
43 
Goodman and Jinks note that 
norm precision is preferred by both the realist/rational choice and constructivist/managerial 
approaches, but each of these approaches acknowledge that treaty negotiations are often 
easier when norms are simply phrased. In their acculturation model, however, norm 
precision does not always correlate with compliance.
44
 
 
IHL-Specific Compliance Theories 
 
 
Compliance theorists rarely considered IHL in depth until the current decade. One exception 
was Posner’s model, influenced by his rational choice perception of states as self-interested 
actors, in which he reasoned that the laws of war (especially weapons law) were not 
designed to constrain state action in armed conflict; but instead to ‘limit… states’ 
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Franck (n 40) 68 
ibid., 79, cited by Scobbie (n 39) 915 
Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International 
Regulatory Agreements (Harvard University Press 1995), cf. 10-11 
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investment in military conflict.’
45 
This is a teleological, economic theory of Hague law. 
Prorok and Appel used quantitative methods to demonstrate that compliance with both 
Geneva and Hague law was more likely where a party to an IAC had strong ties to 
democratic states, trade partners and intergovernmental organisations. This approach 
acknowledges the role of ‘third party coercion’ in IHL compliance;
46 
a quantitative test  for 
the obligation to ‘respect and ensure respect’.
47 
From a constructivist perspective, Dill finds 
that international law does ‘make a [counterfactual] difference for state behaviour’ (it is 
‘behaviourally relevant’). She finds that a ‘logic of efficiency’ (where military advantage or 
the protection of combatants matters more than the principle of humanity) determines US 
practice in air targeting, but ‘IHL is not normatively successful’ because it does not satisfy 
public legitimacy, which is influenced by IHRL.
48
 
Benvenisti and Cohen investigate IHL’s ‘principal-agent problem’, or its strong 
disaggregation to soldiers, officers and armed group fighters, and the ‘intra-state 
conflicts of interest’ between different civilian and military authorities.49 They find  that 
most IHL violations are committed by subordinates, so states with large armies prefer to 
rely on IHL and on external bodies to enforce IHL; international criminal law in 
particular serves to remind troops of the need to comply with IHL. These external 
enforcement mechanisms counteract the problem of ‘agency slack’, so that IHL 
compliance has long-term advantages, including for the state’s reputation.50 
Most recently, Clark et al cast doubt on the viability of compliance and effectiveness 
terminology in IHL. They argue that states’ and armed groups’ legitimacy calculations 
have a greater causal impact; and IHL’s problem of compliance is better addressed 
through a ‘new social bargain’ than through managerial (monitoring) or enforcement 
mechanisms.
51
 
Jo and Bryant find that constructivist factors such as concerns for legitimacy and social 
pressures influence armed groups’ incentives to comply with civilian protection norms, 
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while the extent of a group’s centralisation into a hierarchical structure facilitates 
compliance.
52 
Clark et al’s focus on legitimacy is supported by Jo’s study of ‘compliant 
rebels’: armed groups that seek legitimacy are more likely to comply with IHL.53 Jo and 
Thomson tested this theory in relation to states’ and armed groups’ willingness to accept 
ICRC visits to detainees. They found that legitimacy-seeking (expressed by a state’s 
democratic regime, or an armed group which has a political wing, controls territory  and 
receives international support) explains the choice to allow ICRC access to detainees, 
despite the absence of a binding obligation to do so in NIAC.
54 
These findings cast 
doubt on Lamp’s earlier contention that asymmetric ‘new wars’ present an intractable 
problem for IHL compliance.
55
 
 
Wood investigates armed groups’ motivations to violate IHL, finding that the intentional 
targeting of civilians ‘is a short-term strategy’ when a group’s ‘viability … is threatened 
or when it faces significant military setbacks.’56 Krieger’s study of IHL compliance    in 
areas of ‘limited statehood’ concludes that persuasion (including IHL dissemination, 
where organisations such as the ICRC provide a ‘shadow of (state/intergovernmental) 
hierarchy’) and incentives (including sanctions or the possibility of criminal  
prosecution) can still work in NIAC, if humanitarian non-state actors step in where third 
states are unwilling to do so, and where hierarchy is imposed through possible sanctions 
and prosecution.
57 
Hers is a combined account of rational choice and constructivist 
approaches, applicable where armed groups operate in states with a limited or non- 
existent law enforcement infrastructure. This is in line with Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s 
view that where there are ‘degrees of statehood and of the centralization of compliance 
decisions’, insights are needed on ‘regime type and social or material vulnerability’ 
alongside constructivism.
58
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 5.3 Does International Humanitarian Law Need its Own Compliance Theory? 
 
 
None of the works on compliance specific to IHL attempt to generalise their conclusions 
to other branches of international law, and IHL is thought to be a problem case for 
compliance  theory.
59  
Yet  it  does  not  automatically  follow  that  IHL  needs  its own 
compliance theory. Krieger’s and Dill’s work both draw on existing rational choice and 
constructivist perspectives, while Clark et al see the flaws in compliance and 
effectiveness scholarship, seeking to add a causal inquiry based on legitimacy. In 
contrast, Wood, Jo, and Jo and Thomson present findings that appear to be confined to 
NIAC, while Benvenisti and Cohen’s ‘principal-agent problem’ speaks to the strong 
disaggregation that is distinctive to IHL. 
 
1.1 identified seven reasons why IHL was at Lauterpacht’s ‘vanishing point’ of 
international law; seven distinctive reasons presenting problems of compliance for IHL. 
These were the high stakes for its contested norms; debates on conflict classification and 
applicable law; the co-applicability and convergence of IHL and IHRL; the challenges  
of interoperability where different states in a coalition have varied interpretations of IHL 
or rates of treaty ratification; IHL’s strong disaggregation to soldiers, officers and armed 
group fighters; the traces of reciprocity and its misunderstandings, which can lead to 
violations committed in revenge; and IHL’s disused or absent monitoring mechanisms, 
which leave much state practice hidden from scrutiny. 
 
This section argues that existing frameworks from compliance theory are insufficient to 
explain these distinctive problems of compliance in IHL, and that traditional, state- 
based compliance theories need to be adapted as a result. While contested norms, co- 
applicable regimes and disaggregation exist to a matter of degree in general  
international law, all seven compliance challenges justify an adapted compliance theory 
for IHL, which can draw on general compliance theory or depart from it as needed. An 
adapted compliance theory does not create theoretical fragmentation, but broadens and 
enriches compliance debates with the addition of IHL’s distinctive contexts. 
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IHL’s contested or indeterminate norms present a problem for compliance, especially 
where military necessity is expanded at the expense of the principle of humanity or 
civilian protection; but also where the discretion in IHL’s procedural norms means legal 
advice  to  the  command  chain  is  deemed  not  ‘necessary’.60  Some  controversies are 
intractable, such as the factual and temporal scope of the lawful targeting of a civilian 
who directly participates in hostilities;
61 
while others, such as the treatment of the 
wounded and sick, are not subject to open debate. Dill argues that IHL’s indeterminacy 
‘impose[s] a much higher cognitive burden on the conscientious individual’, and  makes 
it  harder  to  predict  IHL’s  effect  on  state  behaviour.62  Yet,  all  legal  norms require 
interpretation, and contested norms are found in all branches of international law. 
General compliance theories have already provided the insight that unsettled, imprecise 
norms  can  cause  problems  for  compliance;
63  
and  that  sustained  reinterpretation  of 
norms can produce ‘a shift in the norm itself’.64 Constructivists have begun to study 
interpretive communities to explain why these norm contests occur,
65 
while  others 
argue that norm  contests  are inevitable because  of  law’s ‘semantic pragmatism’    and 
‘structural indeterminacy’.66 This is not a problem limited to IHL. As argued in 1.1 
above, it is IHL’s high stakes in human lives, and the scope for politicised, irresponsible 
rhetoric that renders its contested norms a problem for compliance. This aspect of IHL  
is a distinctive problem for compliance, but by itself, it does not justify IHL having its 
own compliance theory. 
 
The classification of conflicts and consequent debates about applicable law are arguments in 
favour of an adapted compliance theory for IHL. NIAC outnumber IAC, but there is much 
greater normative regulation in IAC than NIAC. Case law and customary IHL points to an 
increasing  convergence  between  IAC  and  NIAC,
67  
but  treaty  IHL  remains   divergent. 
Increasingly, NIAC have a transborder element, or IAC and NIAC coincide 
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within the same territory or territories.
68 
These facts were not anticipated when  
Common Article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions and Article 1(1) of Additional 
Protocol  I were agreed. Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol  I is a creature of  its    time, 
intended to extend IAC protections to conflicts fought ‘against colonial domination  and 
alien occupation and against racist regimes’. These criteria do not cover the majority of 
modern NIAC. In NIAC, IHL binds armed groups despite their inability to ratify treaties 
(Kleffner explains that the standard reasons for this tend to be assumed rather than 
explored)
69 
so there is normativity without consent. Conflict classification also bears on 
IHL’s procedural norms: there is no obligation within the treaty law of NIAC to provide 
legal advisers to the chain of command, nor command responsibility to ‘prevent’, 
‘suppress’ and ‘report’ violations.70 Such obligations need to be crafted from customary 
IHL; while an obligation to provide instruction or training (as distinct from 
dissemination) in IHL is built from treaties other than Geneva law, and from the 
diplomatic  history.
71   
No  other  branch  of  international  law  leaves  unregulated    or 
underregulated the bulk of situations for which it is designed to apply. 
 
Despite the increasing acceptance in case law that IHL and IHRL are co-applicable,
72 
and 
can in defined circumstances be mutually influencing,
73 
IHL is not ‘a subset of human 
rights’.
74 
Instead, there are continuing debates on the meaning of the principle lex specialis 
derogat legi generali:
75 
whether this should mean that IHL is always lex specialis in armed 
conflict, and should therefore displace IHRL;
76 
whether either IHL or 
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IHRL can be the lex specialis, offering more specific regulation for particular norms and 
particular circumstances;
77  
or if the lex specialis concept is outdated and    unhelpful.
78
 
ECtHR jurisprudence establishes that the ECHR can apply extraterritorially where a 
state party has ‘effective control of an area’79 or exerts ‘state agent authority’ over an 
individual.
80 
This has expanded the reach of the substantive and investigatory aspects of 
Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the ECHR to the use of force by troops, military detention, and 
checkpoints.
81 
But these cases say nothing about theoretical debates on compliance with 
IHL. They provide individual remedies in IHRL where none exist in IHL. Of greater 
theoretical interest is states’ varied responses to the co-applicability of IHL and IHRL, 
and state practice on prohibitions shared between IHL and IHRL.
82 
Also significant  for 
IHL compliance is the effect of legal uncertainty from flux in case law and rapidly 
changing circumstances in deployment, which means that the legal framework on the  
use of force can oscillate between the conduct of hostilities and a law enforcement 
(IHRL) paradigm.
83  
These matters  justify an adapted compliance theory for  IHL   that 
takes account of the variable state practice caused by IHL and IHRL co-applicability  
and convergence. 
 
Contested norms, differential treaty ratification, and differing views on the co-applicability 
of IHL and IHRL will lead to strain within multinational deployments. This problem of 
interoperability is another distinctive compliance challenge in IHL. It means that 
‘compliance’ varies according to coalition states’ treaty ratifications and interpretation. The 
US has resisted the co-applicability of IHL and IHRL, so its ROE will differ from those of 
European states which must take account of ECtHR jurisprudence.
84 
Similarly, the US   has 
long held doctrines identifying dual-use (military and civilian) objects, and ‘war-sustaining’ 
objects (such as opium fields in Afghanistan) as legitimate 
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military objectives; doctrines with which European coalition partners have  disagreed.
85
 
Interoperability difficulties can yield research questions for qualitative semi-structured 
interviews with military leaders, to parse the extent of these interpretive difficulties, and 
how inter-state discussions in coalition have promoted or eroded IHL compliance from 
the perspective of each state. Such research would be specific to  IHL  compliance 
theory, and not generalisable to other branches of international law. 
 
IHL has a particularly acute principal-agent problem,
86 
with strong disaggregation of  many 
of its norms. Sub-state actors including soldiers, officers and civilian authorities have 
responsibilities in relation to IHL, while non-state actors including armed groups,  PMSC 
and civilians directly participating in hostilities are also relevant to IHL’s implementation. 
The ‘strategic corporal’ must act swiftly and with a good understanding of IHL, even in 
deployment  situations where  the  applicable  legal  framework often changes.
87  
Arguably, 
more junior personnel have greater responsibilities in land forces than air or sea forces, 
given the likelihood that the latter are involved primarily in planned targeting operations, 
whereas land forces will engage in both planned and opportunistic targeting, with some 
arrest and detention. Principal-agent and structure-agent problems are not unique to IHL, as 
much of international law is implemented by individuals.
88 
An ‘agentic constructivism’ has 
value  in  compliance  theories  within  and  beyond  IHL,
89   
but  the  extent  of  IHL’s 
disaggregation is unusual. An adapted compliance theory for IHL would place individuals 
and communities of practice at the centre of the research inquiry; enabling a richer account 
of individual understanding and willingness to comply, and of the military culture in which 
IHL training, and the investigation and prosecution of grave breaches and other serious 
violations of IHL takes place. An adapted compliance theory for NIAC could also take 
account of the fragmentation or factionalisation of armed groups 
– a form of disaggregation which is more horizontal than vertical – and which presents 
problems for outreach and IHL dissemination. 
 
Reciprocity is increasingly marginalised in IAC, and never established as a tool of IHL 
enforcement in NIAC. Historically, belligerent reprisals were employed to encourage 
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opposing forces to cease violations of the laws of war, but following the Second World 
War, reprisals were prohibited against prisoners of war, and then against civilians and 
civilian objects. In customary IHL (applicable in IAC and NIAC), the obligation to 
‘respect  and ensure respect’ for  IHL does  not  depend on reciprocity.90  Yet,  there are 
relics and misunderstandings of reciprocity, including soldiers’ conviction that some 
violations may be justified because of the enemy’s actual or asserted IHL    violations.91 
These misunderstandings are a false justification of IHL violations, linked to moral 
disengagement and revenge. Inter-state enforcement through reprisals is not unique to 
IHL, but as for contested norms, the human stakes are higher in IHL where the relics of 
reciprocity are misunderstood or misused. An adapted compliance theory for IHL might 
evaluate the extent to which false reciprocity is present in discourse about law and 
enemy forces.
92
 
 
There are three monitoring mechanisms in IAC (Protecting Powers, an enquiry 
procedure, and the IHFFC) but these have fallen into disuse. In NIAC, no monitoring 
mechanisms exist, and a de minimis proposal of a voluntary meeting of states was 
rejected  at  the  32
nd  
RCRC.  Pejic explains  that no  other  branch  of  international law 
relies on state consent to trigger monitoring mechanisms to this extent.
93 
This is perhaps 
the most distinctive aspect of IHL, and its greatest challenge to compliance, justifying  
an adapted compliance theory for IHL. If monitoring is either non-existent or (at best) 
consultative, consensus-based and de minimis, devoid of scrutiny on individual states’ 
practice, then is acculturation inapplicable? Constructivist and managerial insights  
might be tested in relation to the indirect monitoring of practice in IHL by the UN 
Security Council, General Assembly, and Human Rights Council, but these mechanisms 
are ad hoc and do not encompass all state and armed group practice in IHL. 
 
There are three nuances to the argument that IHL should have its own compliance theory. 
First, disaggregated approaches to compliance theory, and constructivist accounts of 
individuals and communities of practice already exist, and are relevant to a constructivist 
account of compliance in IHL. Constructivist and managerial work on norm precision or 
contestation is also of use, but existing compliance theories do not take account of 
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interoperability, false reciprocity, and states’ resistance to external monitoring; nor of the 
extent of IHL’s disaggregation to non-state actors which cannot ratify treaties. Second, 
arguing that IHL is distinctive in several respects from other branches of international law 
does not entail ignoring the substantive norms which converge between IHL and IHRL. It 
also does not ignore the IHL norms which have influenced international criminal law. 
Transferable insights from IHRL (if they are relevant to norms applicable in armed conflict 
or belligerent occupation) are not excluded from an IHL compliance theory. Third, partly a 
result of norm convergence,
94 
an adapted compliance theory for IHL does not exacerbate 
the problem of fragmentation in international law. It is a theoretical choice only, reflecting 
that armed conflicts are a distinctive yet variable social fact, presenting particular cognitive 
and behavioural challenges for compliance. 
 
 
 
 
5.4 Theorising Training and Compliance in International Humanitarian Law 
 
 
A constructivism of individuals and of their communities of practice provides the best 
account of IHL training from the perspective of the individual soldier and the barracks 
culture in which he is trained. It enables an account of normative interpretation and flux; 
of ‘shared understandings’ and IHL training as a  ‘practice of legality’;95  and    outlines 
the cognitive and volitional aspects required for compliance with IHL. An account of 
individuals’ and groups’ understanding of IHL and their willingness to comply begins to 
close the gap between communicated norm and subsequent behaviour; explaining the 
conundrum between IHL training, prevention and compliance. Constructivism 
acknowledges the interaction of norms with a social context, so it is suited to explaining 
the intersection between IHL training and discourse about law and enemy forces; it is 
also suited to an explanation of misunderstood reciprocity. Further research on IHL 
compliance should investigate communities of practice among negotiating states, and 
among those civilian and military authorities which oppose investigations, prosecutions 
or civil suits into IHL violations. 
 
Constructivism’s breadth gives the flexibility needed to explore IHL compliance in NIAC, 
by diffuse armed groups with different ideologies and concepts of legitimacy, and 
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 in ‘areas of limited statehood’. Realism, rational choice, process-based and managerial 
accounts are too steeped in state and inter-state machinery to explore the motivations of 
armed groups in relation to IHL. Yet a constructivist account is not a complete solution: 
constructivism exists at the disciplinary boundary between international relations, 
international law and sociology, but it does not provide a thorough social psychological 
account for behaviour on the battlefield. Social psychological insights, on moral 
disengagement and social learning theory, are also needed to explain the difference 
between norm and behaviour, understanding and willingness to comply. Constructivist 
approaches in general should articulate where their insights end and where sociological 
contributions begin. 
 
 
 
5.5 Conclusion to Part II 
 
 
Part II has made two contributions to the literature: an initial theory of prevention and  
an adapted constructivist compliance theory for IHL. The first begins a scholarly 
endeavour in IHL; responding to the lack of a theory of prevention in IHL, and to the 
disparate ways in which the ‘implementation’ of IHL has been categorised; while the 
second contributes to an increasingly rich scholarly debate. 
 
The IHL training obligation is related to several other norms of prevention which  
are usually treated as discrete, unrelated norms. Understanding the relevance of IHL 
training to the duty to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for IHL, to provide legal advisers 
in armed forces; command responsibility and the duty to clarify and if necessary 
disobey unlawful orders makes the aims of IHL training subtly clearer. Soldiers and 
officers need to understand and be willing to comply with substantive IHL at least to 
the extent that they can also fufil these obligations, with the obligation to ‘respect’ 
IHL ‘in all circumstances’ being the broadest. However, two of these five linked 
norms of prevention apply de jure only in international armed conflicts where 
Additional Protocol I is ratified; the customary status of all of these norms is not 
beyond doubt in other IAC and NIAC. 
IHL requires an adapted compliance theory in part because of states’ resistance to 
external scrutiny and monitoring, and the factual and political contexts in which IHL 
applies (IAC and NIAC, where the latter might occur in ‘areas of limited 
statehood’). Meta-state, peacetime truisms about international law compliance 
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 not generalisable to IHL. A constructivist compliance theory, which takes account  
of the strong disaggregation to individual soldiers, officers and armed group  
fighters, is a first theoretical solution to the conundrum between training, prevention 
and compliance in IHL. A second step is to integrate social psychological findings 
on armed conflict and atrocity into a constructivist account of military training, and 
as a matter of policy, to instil it into military communities of practice. A third, 
related step (for future research) is to address constructivist communities of practice 
among negotiating states, and those civilian and military authorities who oppose 
scrutiny of or accountability for IHL violations. 
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Part III. A Case Study of the British Army’s Training in International 
Humanitarian Law 
 
Chapter 6. The Conundrum in Practice: The British Army and 
Deficits in Training, Prevention and Compliance 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
 
The UK’s Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict sees ‘as wide a knowledge … as 
possible’ being ‘the first step to enforcement of the law of armed conflict’.1 
Dissemination (both military and civilian) is the dominant model,
2  
facilitated    by legal 
advisers in relation to military instruction in IHL.
3 
The Manual acknowledges the 
obligation in Art 83(2) of Additional Protocol I that military or civilian authorities   with 
responsibility for applying Geneva law ‘must be fully acquainted’ with it,4 but gives  no 
detail on how the UK fulfils this obligation. The Manual exemplifies the UK’s approach 
to military training in IHL until very recently. It acknowledges the obligation to 
disseminate IHL and to instruct the armed forces in its provisions, but it shares very  
little detail on how the UK trains its forces in IHL. 
 
A Freedom of Information request to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)  
revealed a heavily-redacted set of minutes of the UK Inter-Departmental Committee on 
International   Humanitarian   Law.
5   
This  shows   tentative,  minimal   provision   for  IHL 
dissemination for ‘civilian authorities’. As at 2001, IHL featured in the FCO’s International 
Law Course, but the Civil Service College believed IHL too specialised for its introductory 
curriculum. The minutes reflect that individual government departments should receive 
‘something imaginative to point out … that IHL was relevant to them’, e.g. the potential for 
detention of prisoners of war within the UK involving the Home Office.
6  
There is an 
elliptical reference to a ‘top-down’ review of IHL training within the 
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armed forces during 2001. As all proper nouns are redacted from the document, the 
institutions responsible cannot be identified.
7 
By 2015, there were two references to 
IHL in Key Stage 4 of the National Curriculum; the FCO had updated its publication on 
‘The UK and International Humanitarian Law’, and by the end of 2016, a Handbook and 
Field Guide for Media Professionals in IHL was to have been published.
8 
There are   no 
further details as to how ‘civilian authorities’ will become ‘fully acquainted’ with the 
provisions of the Four Geneva Conventions 1949 and Additional Protocol I.
9
 
 
A similar trend can be found throughout the archival and Hansard evidence explored in 
this chapter. The UK’s implementation of the dissemination and training obligation is 
asserted but rarely described in detail. This chapter begins the retrospective part of a 
critical case study, asking how the UK’s record on IHL training exemplifies the 
conundrum between training, prevention and compliance in IHL. The British Army’s 
IHL training was selected because of significant flaws found in that training for troops 
deployed to Iraq in Operation Telic;
10    
and because of much-mentioned reforms to that 
training following the publication of the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry in 2011.
11 
As the 
research progressed, however, patterns emerged of assertion (that IHL training takes 
place or that reforms have already been implemented, without more detail about which 
reforms and when), of violation (especially in the prohibitions of torture and inhuman 
treatment shared between IHL and IHRL), and of institutional response (resistance to 
external scrutiny of the armed forces’ activities, and to the application of IHL to non- 
international armed conflicts and decolonisation conflicts). 6.2 explores the history of 
the British Army’s training in IHL, 6.3 identifies patterns of violations and institutional 
response, 6.4 examines court-martial prosecutions and public inquiries, and 6.5 explains 
how this retrospective part of the study illustrates the conundrum between IHL training, 
prevention and compliance, and the new insights it builds. 6.6 concludes. 
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6.2 A History of the British Army’s Training in International Humanitarian 
Law 
 
 
The consensus used to be that IHL had little relevance to the First World War; to the 
conduct of hostilities and to military training. Isabel Hull’s research broke this 
consensus, with evidence of the centrality of international law (both on the use of force 
and on the conduct of hostilities) to each of the Great Powers before and during the 
conflict.
12 
On military training and the inclusion of law of armed conflict treaties in 
military manuals, Hull finds that Britain and France began to incorporate Geneva and 
Hague law into field manuals significantly earlier than Germany (1904, 1903 and 1911 
respectively); and criticises Germany’s delay in disseminating instructions consistent 
with the Hague Regulations until 1914 (for officers) and preparing instructions for 
mobilised troops only in December 1911. There are no archival findings in Hull’s study 
on British military instruction in the law of armed conflict, but she finds that  
Oppenheim and Edmonds’ 1914 Military Manual, included ‘ready-made forms, and 
detailed instructions  clearly designed for … use  in the field.’13  The Manual   reflected 
Hague and Geneva law in some detail, plus prohibitions on asphyxiating gases, 
bombardment, and the St Petersburg Declaration 1868 on explosive projectiles. At the 
time, British military doctrine permitted reprisals and collective punishment of civilians 
(the destruction of civilian homes) with some limitations; but urged against hostage- 
taking and the killing of hostages.
14 The 1914 Manual is an early example of Britain’s 
resistance to IHL’s application to conflicts with colonised peoples: 
 
It must be emphasised that the rules of International Law apply only to warfare 
between civilised nations…They do not apply in wars with uncivilised States  
and tribes.
15
 
 
As Mégret points out, Britain was the only state at the 1899 Hague Conference to argue that 
dum-dum bullets should be permissible in colonial warfare.
16 
This implicit denial of the 
equal humanity of individuals in colonised states recurs in the Mau Mau emergency 
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in Kenya and subsequently. The 1914 Manual is idealistic as to the causes of IHL 
violations, asserting that they are ‘almost invariably’ the result of ‘ignorance or excess  
of zeal’, and that deliberate violations occur ‘increasingly rarely’;17 consistent with   the 
assumption that ignorance causes violations and dissemination prevents them. The 
inclusion of IHL in the 1914 Military Manual is not proof of the comprehensive 
implementation of the IHL training obligation in Article 26 of the 1906 Geneva 
Convention. 
 
Superior orders were still considered a defence to war crimes during the Second   World 
War until the 1944 amendment to the Military Manual,
18 
and its 1958 edition.
19 
From 
1944, soldiers were expected to question and if necessary to disobey ‘obviously  illegal’ 
orders, despite the tension this created with military discipline.
20 
Yet Britain was not   a 
champion of IHL. Crossland believes that Britain cast itself ‘as the enforcer of  
pragmatic restraint upon the ICRC’s humanitarian ambitions’ in the Second World War; 
a longstanding position as the organisation was perceived as pacifist and as 
unnecessarily intruding on military matters.
21
 
 
By the Korean War in 1951, soldiers were reminded that they were bound by both 
domestic and international law. Bennett notes that ‘traditional attitudes towards 
obedience’ persisted, and the chain of command ‘neglected to disseminate to either 
officers or men the duty to refuse illegal orders.’22 Bennett found gaps in the archive, 
with Sandhurst’s syllabus missing for 1945-1949,23 but ‘military law’, including aspects 
of  military  justice,  e.g.  the  rules  of  evidence,  was  taught  at  Sandhurst  from  1950 
onwards.
24 
The Staff College also taught military law in the post-war era, but   National 
Servicemen received only sixteen weeks of training. Bennett notes that their training 
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syllabus lacks detail, so he could not assess whether soldiers were taught the duty to 
disobey unlawful orders.
25
 
 
A hypothesis emerges that, for reasons of colonial self-interest and nuclear security, Britain 
was at the periphery of IHL standard-setting and implementation, with IHL training no 
exception. Bennett’s reading of the travaux préparatoires for the Four Geneva Conventions 
reveals the UK’s ‘open hostility’ to Common Article 3, in case it might be said to apply to 
colonial conflicts.
26 
This was the cause, according to Bennett, of the UK’s delay in ratifying 
the Geneva Conventions until 1957; and the failure in the post-war era to instruct troops   in 
the Conventions’ prohibitions.
27 
Archival findings for this thesis suggest in 1956, the 
Foreign Office was opposed to an ICRC resolution on internal conflicts, lest this mean   that 
the ICRC could visit prisoners in the UK’s colonial territories.
28 
The Foreign Office   wrote 
that such violence should be classed as an ‘internal disturbance’, neither IAC nor NIAC;  
and asked the British Red Cross Society (BRCS) delegation to oppose the ICRC resolution, 
recalling ‘[t]he circumstances in which … it has been found necessary to resort to collective 
punishment in Malaya and Kenya…’
29
 
 
The incompatibility of the Geneva Conventions and a nuclear deterrent was a concern 
known to the BRCS.
30 
It seems also to have delayed IHL training. Having concluded 
that Parliament may have been misled when Ministers asserted that IHL training was 
taking place,  Draper  reached  the  ‘painful  and  reluctant  conclusion’  that  the Service 
Departments  knew  IHL  instruction  could  jeopardise  acceptance  of  the  legality    of 
‘nuclear   and    thermo-nuclear    weapons’,   and    that   that   explained   the    delayed 
implementation of the IHL training obligation.
31 
However, the relevant archive shows 
only Draper’s letter to the BRCS on this point; no reply, nuance or disagreement. 
Draper’s conclusion might have been correct, but it is not corroborated. 
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Yet military culture could also explain the UK’s tendency to place IHL at the periphery. 
For forty years after the Second World War, no Defence White Papers mentioned  
IHL.
32  Rogers  and  Risius  attribute  this  to  a  ‘widespread  view  that  British soldiers 
instinctively knew how to behave properly on operations’ and that IHL rules had been 
introduced ‘primarily for the benefit of other states.’33 Variants of this view appear to 
this day, in assertions that military ethics can be caught, not taught, by ‘institutional 
osmosis’;34 or that a British Army officer or Sandhurst cadet already understands  ‘right 
and wrong’ and would be ‘embarrassed’ to be taught it.35 There is another view, that 
IHL is too complex, requiring too much deliberation
36 
and expertise to be compatible 
with mission command,
37 
a doctrine that favours clear expression of orders and intent 
from  commanders  to  subordinates,  and  swift  implementation  of  those  orders,  with 
flexibility to the subordinate’s immediate context. On this view, IHL is presented as   an 
encumbrance to military decision-making. 
 
 
In December 1948, shortly after Emergency Regulations were declared by the colonial 
administration in Malaya, 24 unarmed civilians were killed by the members of the Scots 
Guards in the village of Batang Kali. As noted by the Court of Appeal and the Supreme 
Court,
38  
there  was  ‘limited  training’  for  counterinsurgency  operations,  and  a  rapid  of 
turnover  of National  Servicemen  (evidence  corroborated by Nolan’s archival research),
39
 
but neither court comments on the IHL training, if any, they received. The majority of the 
Supreme Court held that the UK was not obliged under Article 2 ECHR to hold a public 
inquiry into the killings. Lord Neuberger for the majority reasoned that the killings 
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predated the ‘critical date’
40 
on which the Article 2 ECHR obligation might have applied 
(despite new evidence coming to light in 1969 and 1970, after that ‘critical date’);
41 
that 
there was no investigatory obligation under customary international law; and that judicial 
review principles could not apply to determine whether the government’s decision not to 
hold an inquiry under the Inquiries Act 2005 was lawful and rational, in part because of 
assertions that IHL training had been recently reformed.
42
 
 
During the violence in Kenya from 1952-1960, torture and inhuman treatment were 
widespread in British military/colonial detention. Approximately 150,000  suspected 
Mau Mau insurgents were detained, suffering beatings, stress positions, rape and sexual 
degradation.
43 
In June 2013, the UK government made a £14m settlement with five 
claimants from Kenya (four living, and the estate of a deceased claimant). The claimants 
alleged torts of assault, battery and negligence in relation to acts of torture, castration 
and other sexual violence committed in British military detention during the Mau Mau 
uprising from 1952-1960. The UK government had argued that its colonial 
administration had operated separately from the UK government at the time, and that the 
claims should be struck out and dismissed in a summary judgment. The High Court 
dismissed this application in June 2011, and in October 2012, the High Court applied 
section 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 to allow a trial on the facts.
44
 
 
Archives had been systematically concealed. The Court heard from expert witnesses that six 
hundred new documents (the Hanslope Disclosure) revealed that the British military had 
been involved in widespread torture in detention camps; that the Colonial Office had tried to 
cover up investigations and that documents had been systematically destroyed, and removed 
from Kenya from 1958-1963.
45 
Archival documents revealed in the Court’s judgment point 
to the need for immediate deployment of ‘European’ and ‘African’ 
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personnel to guard ‘hastily constructed’ detention camps, and the acknowledgement that 
‘it was virtually impossible to give them the required training’.46 
 
In Malaya and Kenya, deficient military training correlated with brutality and violations 
of IHL and IHRL, but there were additional legal issues at stake. UK authorities 
systematically opposed the extension of IHL to colonial conflicts, Common Article 3 
was widely ignored in conflicts between Western powers and their colonial territories 
(Bennett judges that it became binding as customary IHL between the mid-1970s and  
the late 1980s),
47 
and Bennett considers the ECHR, which the UK ratified in 1951 
shortly before the Kenyan Emergency, was binding only on paper,
48 
with the right of 
individual petition decades away, and debates on its extraterritorial effect further into  
the future. The ECHR entered into force in October 1953. Bennett notes a gap in legal 
protection for the worst excesses of the Kenyan Emergency, which he dates from 
October 1952 to June 1953.
49
 
 
The initial hypothesis is strengthened by these examples: throughout the 1950s, the UK 
remains at the periphery of IHL, and UK state practice fails to acknowledge IHL’s 
applicability to colonial violence, and the importance of training in IHL. Hypotheses 
from chapter 3 are also strengthened: specifically, that flaws in training merely correlate 
with violations of international law in British military detention. Further patterns 
emerge: of concealed and destroyed archives, and of a durable resistance to 
investigations into past atrocities. Duffy’s research on the Hanslope documents reveals 
another institutional response: that of the government’s ‘sophisticated propaganda 
machine’, pathologising men from the Kikuyu ethnic group as irredeemably violent, 
asserting that torture was ‘necessary’, and that Kenyan survivors’ testimony had no 
value.
50 
Variants of these discursive responses have continued in investigations into 
torture and other abuses in Aden, Northern Ireland, and Iraq.
51
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In contrast to Kenya, where ICRC outreach was blocked, the High Commissioner in 
Aden permitted ICRC intervention and allowed limited reforms. The Bowen Report 
from 1967 led to an amended Joint Directive on Military Interrogation in Internal 
Operations Overseas, which paraphrases most of Common Article 3.
52  
Bennett   argues 
that this ‘brought reputational benefits’, making concessions to the ICRC’s confidential 
good offices while attempting to undermine public allegations of torture by Amnesty 
International.
53 Yet the Aden case study shows ‘forced wall standing, enforced 
nakedness, and beatings’,54 similar to inhumane treatment suffered by Baha Mousa and 
those detained with him.
55 
Detainees who alleged torture were dismissed with racist 
generalisations,
56 
a more blatant variant of the tendency to dismiss the bulk of evidence 
from Iraqi witnesses in the Al-Sweady Inquiry.
57
 
 
The UK resisted the application of IHL to the Troubles in Northern Ireland (1968-1998), 
but did allow the ICRC to visit detainees.
58 
It was in this context that the UK signed 
Additional Protocols I and II, but delayed ratification until 1998, four years after the 
Provisional  IRA’s  ceasefire.59   Haines  argues,  applying  Article  1(2)  of   Additional 
Protocol II,    that the violence reached the threshold of a NIAC between 1971 and 1974, 
especially during 1972.
60 
On 30 January 1972, 14 civilians were shot and killed by 
soldiers at a demonstration in Derry/Londonderry, in what became known as the Bloody 
Sunday atrocity.  A report into the killings  was  published in  2010,
61  
but  it  does    not 
address training given to troops in applicable law. 
 
Like Kenya, Malaya and Aden, the UK’s actions in Northern Ireland show violations of 
prohibitions shared between IHRL and IHL, in particular the prohibition of torture and 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Article 3 of the ECHR, and of ‘cruel 
treatment and torture’, ‘humiliating and degrading treatment’ in Common Article 3 (1)(a) 
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and (c) of the Four Geneva Conventions. Internment without charge or trial had been 
used intermittently since the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 
1922, and was used again from 1971 to gather intelligence about the provisional Irish 
Republican  Army  (IRA),  and  for  preventive  detention.
62  
There  were  five notorious 
interrogation techniques (hooding for interrogation and solitary confinement, subjection 
to continuous noise, the deprivation of food and of sleep, and wall-standing – a stress 
position). Boyle reports that the Compton Committee, which was commissioned by the 
UK government and reported in 1971, considered them separately, identifying them as 
physical  ill-treatment  but  not  brutality.
63   
These  concepts  have  no  reference        to 
international law, and neglected mental suffering. The majority in the 1972 report of the 
UK-established Parker Committee considered that the techniques could be lawful if 
proper  safeguards  were  in  place  to  prevent  them  being  used  excessively.
64       
The 
European Commission of Human Rights considered the techniques in combination to be 
‘inhuman treatment’, in violation of Article 3 ECHR.65 The European Court of Human 
Rights found them to be inhuman and degrading treatment, but not to cause ‘suffering of 
the  particular  intensity  and  cruelty  implied  by  the  word  torture’.66  In  March 1972, 
Edward   Heath   PM   announced   to   Parliament   that   these   techniques   would    be 
discontinued.
67 
In 2014, Irish documentary-makers discovered archival evidence that 
showed the UK government was aware of the severe, lasting suffering that these 
techniques could cause; and that this awareness was withheld from the original case 
before the European Commission and then Court of Human Rights. Subsequently, the 
Irish government sought to reopen the case, and at the time of writing, the Belfast High 
Court has reserved judgment following judicial review hearings in February 2017.
68
 
There is an additional fragment from archival research for this thesis which should not go 
unmentioned. During the Falklands War, British soldiers forced Argentinian prisoners of 
war to move unstable napalm (a weapon held by Argentinian forces). An investigation 
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showed that the soldiers should have been aware of their obligations under the Third 
Geneva Convention, but their training was deficient in this respect.
69
 
 
 
6.3 Patterns of Violations and Institutional Response 
 
 
Historical research reveals recurrent patterns of violation and institutional response; with 
findings emerging from the research data and confirming existing hypotheses. There are 
recurrent violations of those norms shared between IHL and IHRL. IHL prohibits ‘torture 
and inhuman treatment’ as a grave breach in IAC,
70 
with ‘torture of all kinds, whether 
physical or mental’, prohibited by AP I;
71 
and ‘cruel treatment and torture’, ‘humiliating 
and degrading treatment’ in NIAC;
72 
while IHRL prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment.
73 
British torture and inhuman treatment featured 
remarkably similar techniques: the ‘five techniques’ from Ireland v. UK were present in 
Kenya and Aden, so they were not new during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Sexual 
abuse and beatings occurred in British detention during the Mau Mau insurgency, and in 
Aden, detainees were also exposed to extremes of temperature by being forced to sit near an 
air-conditioning unit.
74 
The same patterns of brutality recur in the Baha Mousa case,  where 
detainees were forced to sit near a generator.
75 
The recurrence of similar techniques casts 
doubt on the consensus since the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry that there had been a mere loss 
of institutional memory in relation to the prohibition of the ‘five techniques’.
76 
6.4 below 
reveals continued violations of these norms, but others too: the drowning of looters, and the 
killing of the wounded, to cite just two examples.
77 
Historical research reminds us that 
recent violations have antecedents, and that deficits in IHL training do not fully explain 
proven brutality. This finding supports the note of caution built in chapter 3 about failures in 
IHL  training  merely  coinciding  with  violations,  and  conversely,  about  IHL   training’s 
capacity to prevent violations. 
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The history of the British Army’s training in IHL reveals trends in the UK’s approach to 
IHL’s applicability, standard-setting and implementation. In the years before and 
immediately after the UK’s ratification of the Four Geneva Conventions, IHL training 
was delayed or slight; but archival gaps and concealed records yield more questions  
than precision about its full implementation. The delayed implementation of the IHL 
training obligation has a context: colonial self-interest was the reason why the UK 
resisted the development and application of the IHL of NIAC; and the choice to  
maintain a nuclear deterrent was why, according to Draper, it chose not to implement  
the IHL training obligation (lest those receiving dissemination were aware of the 
incompatibility of nuclear strikes and the principle of distinction).
78
 
Arguments about international law’s applicability to the actions of the armed forces recur in 
a different form in early twenty-first century conflicts. After a consistent rejection of the 
extraterritorial effect of the ECHR, the UK eventually conceded that it could apply 
extraterritorially to British military detention, where state agents had authority and control 
over a detainee.
79 
Prior to that, the MoD opposed IHRL litigation involving the actions of 
the armed forces overseas on the basis of a stringent separation of IHRL and IHL, regardless 
of the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in both branches of law; and a rejection of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction over the actions of combat troops abroad. Those preferring a 
separation between IHL and IHRL emphasise the technical, kinetic focus of IHL and the 
military lawyers’ insistence that IHRL is designed for peacetime and democracy. Military 
and political leaders in the UK have preferred a simple or strong interpretation of the maxim 
lex specialis derogat legi generali, assuming that IHL is lex specialis at least in IAC, and 
that it can oust the application of IHRL. Only since Hassan v. UK has the government 
argued that IHL can modify IHRL if it does not displace it. 
80 
The judgment of the Grand 
Chamber  in  Hassan  and  that  of  the  UK  Supreme  Court  in  Al-Waheed  and       Serdar 
Mohammed (which applied Hassan to authorise detention in NIAC)
81 
show that the two 
fields can be mutually influencing, while recent scholarship argues for either IHL or   IHRL 
providing the dominant interpretation in different factual contexts.
82 
Nowak’s account is 
different. He argues that for the prohibitions on torture and other ill- 
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treatment, IHRL is the more specific branch of law, and should set the contours of 
interpretation of  IHL’s  prohibitions on torture and other ill-treatment.83  The    ongoing 
resistance to the extraterritorial effect of IHRL is a potential cause of uncertainty on 
deployments, particularly in rapidly-changing situations, where rules on the use of force 
may shift between a conduct of hostilities paradigm to one based on law enforcement.
84
 
There are other recurrent patterns of institutional response concerning investigations. 
Bennett shows that witnesses to torture of Kenyan detainees were mistrusted as a group, 
and this recurred in Aden, with racist generalisations.
85 
This tendency returns in the  Al- 
Sweady Inquiry, where Iraqi witnesses are prima facie mistrusted on almost all their 
evidence, including in relation to their treatment in British military custody. Some had 
lied about their reasons for being present at the Battle of Danny Boy.
86 
Also in Aden,  it 
was asserted that investigations were affecting interrogators’ morale;87 an aspect of   the 
rhetoric that the armed forces are ‘under legal siege’ by human rights litigation and the 
possibility of criminal prosecution, explored in 7.5 below. There is also a lack of 
understanding of IHRL’s prohibition on the intentional infliction of severe mental pain 
and suffering, evident in the Compton Committee report into the ‘five techniques’.88 
This recurs in the Al-Sweady Inquiry, and in the MoD’s initial unwillingness to reform 
(as recommended by the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry) ‘harshing’, in which interrogators 
sought to intimidate while seeking intelligence, into ‘challenge direct’, which the Court 
of Appeal decided had sufficient safeguards to prevent inhuman and degrading  
treatment or punishment.
89 
Applicable in IAC only, Article 17 of the Third Geneva 
Convention provides that prisoners of war who refuse to answer questions ‘may not be 
threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any 
kind.’ This provision is more expansive than the prohibition in IHRL, and should not be 
neglected in military training. 
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6.4 Court-Martial Prosecutions and Public Inquiries 
 
 
6.4.1 Camp Breadbasket 
 
 
The Camp Breadbasket case is evidence of the causal role of a brutalising military culture in 
violations of international law; and a culture of secrecy and destroyed evidence when a 
court-martial was pending. It is also evidence of deficits in understanding and willingness to 
comply; specifically, the failure to recognise and to challenge an unlawful order; and of 
discourse about Iraqi civilian looters, and violations committed through an assumed right to 
punish. In May 2003, two weeks after IAC hostilities were declared to have ended, but 
while a belligerent occupation was in place in Iraq,
90 
an order was given to round up looters 
at the humanitarian aid depot nicknamed Camp Breadbasket, and to ‘work them hard’ to 
deter them from coming back and stealing more aid. More than 70 soldiers failed either to 
recognise or to challenge this unlawful order, because none of them wanted to be a  
‘grass’.
91  
The looters were stripped naked and forced to simulate sexual acts;
92  
and up    to 
20 men were made to carry milk containers on their heads and run with them, while  British 
soldiers beat them on the legs.
93 
One man was hoisted on the forks of a forklift truck. 
Implausibly, the soldier found guilty at court-martial for ‘disgraceful conduct of a cruel 
kind’ maintained that he did this to move the man away from the heat of the sun.
94   
Trophy 
photographs were taken of these so-called ‘punishments’,
95 
but none of the soldiers  present 
reported the abuse they witnessed. The chain of command sought to dismiss the significance 
of this, seeing those responsible as a ‘few bad apples’ or the violence as a result of deficits  
in training.
96
 
 
Following court-martial proceedings, three soldiers were sentenced to short prison terms, 
but the impact of this was lessened by a statement by the Chief of Staff, General Sir Mike 
Jackson,  that  the  sexual  abuse  of  detainees  was  ‘not  a  grave  breach.’
97   
The    sexual 
degradation to which the looters were subjected while they were in the control of British 
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 troops amounted to ‘inhuman treatment’ prohibited by Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, while the hoisting of an Iraqi man on the forks of a forklift truck
98 
might 
have been prosecuted as the grave breach of wilfully causing great suffering or serious 
injury  to  body  or  health  also  prohibited  by  Article  147  of  the  Fourth  Geneva 
Convention, or a wilful act seriously endangering physical or mental health or integrity - 
a grave breach in Article 11(4) of Additional Protocol I. 
 
 
General Sir Mike Jackson’s remark suggests that senior officers lacked a sufficient 
understanding of IHL’s prohibition of grave breaches and other serious violations of 
IHL. This bears on whether they would have the ability to exercise command 
responsibility to prevent, suppress and report grave breaches as required by Article 86 of 
Additional Protocol I; and of whether the chain of command sufficiently understands 
IHL to be able to train subordinates. The possibility emerges that senior officers 
recognise violations of IHL relating to the conduct of hostilities, but did not perceive the 
sexual abuse of looters as a matter for IHL. This selectivity, defining IHL so narrowly 
that some of its specific prohibitions are not recognised, raises questions about the 
quality of IHL training and about military culture. Welland locates the Camp 
Breadbasket incident on a ‘continuum traced back’ to training, and the myths of an 
‘asexual  and  disciplined’ military masculinity.99  As 7.4  below notes,  prohibitions  on 
sexual abuse are implicit and passim in newly-reformed LOAC training in the British 
Army, suggesting that a taboo on discussing international or domestic legal prohibitions 
on sexual abuse and humiliation remains. Were these abuses perceived as a human  
rights issue than one of IHL? The question of institutional perception where IHRL ends 
and IHL begins recurs in the following sections, and in 7.5 below. 
 
6.4.2 R v. Payne and the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry 
 
 
26-year-old Iraqi civilian Baha Mousa spent 36 hours in British military custody from 14-15 
September 2003. He was hooded with a hessian sack and forced to adopt painful and 
exhausting stress positions. He was also beaten, and was found to have stopped breathing. A 
post mortem revealed 93 ‘external injuries’,
100 
including fractures to his ribs and nose,  and 
concluded that he had died from positional asphyxia; a cause of death that implicates 
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both the beatings and the forced stress positions. The nine other men detained with Baha 
Mousa sustained injuries which were ‘physical and/or mental, some of them serious.’
101 
One of them reported that he ‘was kicked repeatedly to the kidney area, abdomen, ribs   and 
genitals whenever his arms dropped, and he had his eyes gouged.’
102 
If the detainees fell 
asleep, Corporal Payne would kick or punch them until they cried out; a sadistic game he 
called the ‘choir’.
103 
For Simpson, the proceedings that followed Baha Mousa’s death were 
extraordinarily broad, including prosecutions under the Army Act 1955, the International 
Criminal Court Act 2001, human rights litigation which began to set the scope of the 
extraterritorial effect of the ECHR,
104 
a settlement by the UK government to Baha Mousa’s 
family, and finally a public inquiry into Baha Mousa’s death.
105
 
Seven members of the British Army’s Queen’s Lancashire Regiment were prosecuted at 
a  court-martial;  the  first  prosecutions  under  the  International  Criminal  Court    Act 
2001.
106 
Three senior officers were charged with negligently performing a duty, a 
charge relating to the IHL doctrine of command responsibility; while the remaining four 
were charged with manslaughter, inhuman treatment, assault and battery.
107 
One of  the 
defendants, Corporal Donald Payne, was convicted of inhuman treatment in violation of 
the laws of war, following a guilty plea. He admitted using stress positions, hooding and 
handcuffing the detainees, including Baha Mousa, near a generator in the heat of a 
temporary detention facility.
108 
He was acquitted of manslaughter and perverting the 
course of justice.
109 
No-one was convicted of murder in relation to Baha Mousa’s  
death. The Judge Advocate observed that there was insufficient evidence to charge other 
personnel who had been guarding the detainees, because there had been a ‘more or   less 
obvious closing of ranks’.110  This slim finding emphasises the importance of    military 
culture not only in IHL violations, but in their concealment. 
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The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry was established in 2008 under the Inquiries Act 2005, and 
reported in September 2011. It found that deficient IHL training contributed to the  
inhumane treatment of the detainees, and to Baha Mousa’s death. The Inquiry found a gap  
in doctrine, and a failure to  ‘instil... lasting knowledge’
111  
of the prohibition    of the  ‘five 
techniques’   (hooding,   wall-standing   or   stress   positions,   subjection   to   white  noise, 
deprivation of sleep, deprivation of adequate food) in the case of Ireland v. UK,
112 
At 
Sandhurst, the training was longer, but still ‘at a level of broad generality and there is no 
indication that it covered the prohibition on the five techniques.’
113 
A causal thread was 
drawn between the brutalising effects of conduct-after-capture training, in which personnel 
experienced simulations of the torture and ill-treatment they might face as prisoners of war, 
without sufficient emphasis that these techniques were prohibited and must not be re- 
enacted upon Iraqi prisoners of war and civilian internees.
114 
Soldiers received 40   minutes 
of annual training in IHL, much of it based on a Cold War-era video, which was ‘somewhat 
perfunctory’,
115 
and offered little training for the asymmetric warfare they faced in Iraq. 
Witnesses reported forgetting the IHL they had been taught. Of the 30 witnesses who had 
attended  the  Army Staff  Course,  only  three  ‘gave  evidence  indicating  they specifically 
remembered’ the prohibition of the ‘five techniques’.
116
 
 
Testimony revealed differing understandings among soldiers of what constitutes     ‘humane 
treatment’,
117 
although all witnesses agreed that detainees must be treated ‘humanely’.
118 
The hurried nature of training prior to Operation Telic 2 was also noted, suggesting that 
training of short duration can contribute to violations of IHL.
119 
In particular, witnesses   to 
the Inquiry had inconsistent understandings of whether or not sight deprivation was 
permitted through blindfolding or hooding;
120 
and there was evidence of ‘[u]nauthorised 
and informal’ training on Conduct After Capture.
121 
Training in interrogation ‘included 
 
 
 
 
 
Report, Part XVIII (n 100) para 305 
Ireland v. United Kingdom, ECtHR (Application No. 5310/71), Judgment, 18 January 1978; Report of the Baha 
Mousa Public Inquiry, Summary, para 302, 205, Part I, I.81 
Report, Part XVIII (n 100) para 300 
Report, Part VI, paras 6.360-6.361 
Report, Part XVIII (n 100) para 310 
ibid., para 305 
ibid., paragraph 302 
Report, Part I, paragraph 1.81 
Report, Part XVIII, paragraph 332 
ibid., paragraph 316, 338 
ibid., paragraph 323 
180  
direct insults and permitted racist and homophobic abuse…also included the use of 
indirect threats to instil fear.’122 
The Baha Mousa Inquiry Report was comprehensive, but a finding of inadequate IHL 
training can become a neat veneer for the horror of violations, suggesting that brutality has a 
bureaucratic solution. This invests IHL training with too much explanatory power, and 
neglects the conundrum between training, prevention and compliance. First, the 
‘perfunctory’ training given before these soldiers’ deployment did repeat the duty to treat 
detainees  humanely,
123  
and  humane  treatment  cannot  be  construed  to  include repeated 
beatings. Second, evidence of the absence of the prohibition of the ‘five techniques’ in 
training materials does not explain the presence of those techniques in institutional memory, 
and does not account for the historical continuities between abuses by British troops in 
Kenya,  Aden,  Northern  Ireland  and  then  Iraq.
124  
If  the  prohibition  was  simply lost to 
institutional memory, then why did the techniques remain? The Report’s reasoning on 
conduct after capture training provides an incomplete account. Sir Peter Gibson’s Detainee 
Inquiry Report found that the intelligence services also had not been trained in the 
prohibition of the  ‘five  techniques’.
125  
It is implausible that there  would have  been   two 
unrelated yet blameless gaps in institutional memory and training. Third, implying the 
causality of insufficient IHL training skews the historical record. Deficient IHL training was 
part of the causal context, as at My Lai and Abu Ghraib.
126 
Multiple witnesses stated that 
unlawful orders were given: to deprive the detainees of sleep, and to make them stay in 
stress positions; while an Army lawyer, Nicholas Mercer, who witnessed maltreatment, 
voiced  his  concerns  and  was  silenced.
127  
These  orders,  and  the  response  to  Mercer’s 
concerns, show not merely a gap in training, but an authorisation of some of the treatment 
suffered by Baha Mousa and his fellow detainees. Military medical personnel, chaplains and 
the chain of command all failed to respond lawfully to the evidence of torture and inhumane 
treatment of detainees,    
128  
suggesting failures in training and military culture. Fourth and 
finally,  depicting these  failures as gaps in  doctrine or  training  is historically   misleading. 
Bennett shows that there was active opposition within 
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the Army to the 1972 ban on the ‘five techniques’; and that Ministers ‘naïve[ly]’   failed 
to oversee military doctrine to check the ban was included. 
129 
A Major who testified to 
the Inquiry believed that the conditioning techniques were lawful, a Private had been 
subjected to stress positions as punishment in his basic training, and a former Territorial 
Army officer  believed  he  might  not  have  the  right  to  intervene  when  he witnessed 
violations against Baha Mousa.
130 
These statements depict broader failings in military 
culture relevant to the prevention of IHL violations. 
 
 
 
6.4.3    The Al-Sweady Public Inquiry 
 
The Al-Sweady Public Inquiry was established in 2009 under the Inquiries Act 2005,
131  
and reported in December 2014. It investigated disputed allegations that British military 
personnel murdered and tortured up to 20 Iraqi detainees following the Battle of Danny Boy 
in 2004.
132 
It was the outcome of prolonged and stayed judicial review proceedings into 
disputed facts following the Battle of Danny Boy in al-Majar, Iraq on 14 May 2004. The 
uncle of one of the deceased (Mr Al-Sweady) alleged that his nephew may have been taken 
alive from the battlefield, subsequently to die in British military custody at Camp Abu Naji, 
raising a possible violation of Article 2 of the ECHR; while the five other claimants alleged 
violations of Articles 3 and 5 of the ECHR in British military custody at Camp Abu Naji 
and at the Divisional Temporary Detention Centre at Shaibah.
133 
The judgments of the 
Administrative Court strongly criticise the Secretary of State for Defence for his failure to 
honour his disclosure obligations (the Court found this ‘disturbing’ and attitudinal), 
134  
and 
his concession that he could not be confident the required materials could be disclosed;
135 
the earlier misuse of public interest immunity (PII) certificates to resist the disclosure of 
redacted information on the ‘limits of tactical questioning’;
136 
and the consequent waste  of 
court time and resources; while a Colonel 
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from the Royal Military Police, who was in charge of investigating the allegations, is 
also criticised for disclosure failures and unreliable evidence.
137
 
 
After witnesses were examined in the Inquiry proceedings, it was clear that some of the 
Iraqi participants had lied about their reasons for presence on the battlefield, while 
military witnesses gave inconsistent evidence. Counsel for the Iraqi Core Participants at 
the Al-Sweady Inquiry withdrew their allegations of murder following greater but still 
incomplete disclosure by the MoD in the course of the Inquiry, and an error in  
disclosure by their own solicitor.
138 
A junior solicitor for the Iraqi Core Participants had 
shredded one original Arabic document which was evidence that some of the Iraqi 
detainees were members of an armed group fighting the British occupation;
139 
actions 
that led to an unsuccessful prosecution of three solicitors and the firm Leigh Day before 
the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal.
140 
The document in translation was provided to the 
Inquiry. The Chair accepted the withdrawal of the allegations of unlawful killing by 
British troops.
141 
This was a boon to the military establishment (the Defence Secretary 
called the report an ‘incontrovertible’ rejection of ‘completely baseless allegations’).142 
 
There are three arguments in what follows: one, an apparent lack of even-handedness in 
the Inquiry’s sifting of evidence from Iraqi and military witnesses; two, the trivialising  
of findings that nine detainees had suffered ‘ill-treatment’, a term used expressly  
without reference to international law concepts;
143 
and three, assumptions that  asserted 
reforms to IHL training since the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry had been implemented and 
were sufficient to prevent future violations. 
 
The Report suggests a presumption of honour and honesty among military witnesses, 
and a presumption of exaggeration and dishonesty among Iraqi witnesses. These 
presumptions raise a possibility of ‘epistemic injustice’: ‘a wrong done to someone 
specifically in their capacity as knower.’144 Epistemic injustice has two elements: 
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‘testimonial injustice’ (‘when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of 
credibility to a speaker’s word’) and ‘hermeneutic injustice’ (where a concept is not 
shared by the speaker and hearer, perhaps because it has not yet been developed by the 
time the interaction takes place).
145 
Testimonial injustice is relevant to the apparent lack 
of even-handedness in the Inquiry’s treatment of military and Iraqi witnesses. 
Hermeneutic injustice does not quite fit the Inquiry’s trivialising of ‘ill-treatment’ by 
British Army personnel. 
 
Inconsistent  accounts  by  military  witnesses  are  viewed  as  good  faith  mistakes   of 
recollection, or at the very least not deliberate lies.
146 
Only if a military witness was a 
whistle-blower for ill-treatment does the Inquiry Chair treat their evidence as   dishonest 
and   self-aggrandising.
147    Soldiers’   ill-treatment   of   detainees   is   found   to      be 
‘unintentional’,148 while Iraqi witnesses as a group are tarnished by the withdrawal of 
allegations  by  their  counsel,  and  as  a  result,  the  Inquiry  Chairman  considered     it 
unnecessary to inquire into each of the injuries visible on the corpses of those  killed.
149
 
Detainees reported hearing a succession of screams, chairs being dragged and smelling 
blood. These corroborated allegations are dismissed as ‘falsehoods’ and ‘active 
collusion’,150 in a section of the report that does not explain why the allegations  should 
be so viewed. The Chair emphasises that the soldiers were acting in  self-defence, 
against a ‘deadly… ambush’ deliberately ‘planned’ by the Iraqi fighters.151 In   addition 
to a conflation of ‘is’ (the finding that some Iraqi detainees and those killed were 
members of an armed group) and ‘ought’ (the inference that all their evidence, even on 
unrelated points, must be dishonest), there is an ‘othering’ of Iraqi detainees, which is 
partly gendered and racist. While military witnesses’ testimony is prima facie trusted, 
and expert evidence presented as ‘unchallenged’,152 Iraqi witnesses’ allegations must be 
corroborated (e.g. by photographic evidence-where the detainees are clothed- from 
medical examinations, and if not so corroborated, the allegations or experiences are 
rejected.
153 Where Iraqi witnesses are cast as ‘overwhelmed’ or emotional and therefore 
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‘exaggerat[ing]’ their testimony, 154 rather than the ‘deliberate lies’ applied to some 
other witnesses,
155 
there is an implicit gendering as to their epistemic reliability vis-à- 
vis the soldiers whose testimony is trusted, without the need for additional 
corroboration. Racist generalisations were also part of the institutional response to 
abuses against detainees in Aden.
156
 
 
Yet there is nuance: the case of Mahdi Al-Behadili is an important example of epistemic 
justice, where the Chairman allows for subjectivity and does not consider that a detainee  
was lying: he accepts that Mr Al-Behadili’s nose may have been fractured, in view of 
photographic evidence,
157  
and gives weight to the lawyers for the Iraqi Core   Participants’ 
submission that the detainees’ ‘disorientation and shock’ might have affected how they 
spoke  about  their  experience  of  being  transported  into  vehicles  after  the  battle.
158  
In 
addition, several of the Iraqi Core Participants did lie on a number of points, suggesting that 
they deserved less credibility as a result. This limits the evidence of testimonial injustice in 
relation to these individuals. One detainee fabricated the death of his sister on the  
battlefield, when she did not die; while another alleged he had travelled to the battlefield to 
buy yoghurt for a wedding, when no stall selling yoghurt was located there. 
 
However, the Report contains too much assertion to be persuasive. The Chair repeatedly 
states that he has ‘no doubt’ and is ‘quite sure’ that for example no bodies were 
mutilated,
159 
despite being unwilling to examine post mortem evidence on the aetiology 
of each injury suffered.
160 
Yet the Chair dismisses as preconceived,
161 or ‘plainly 
inaccurate and untrue’162 the post mortem evidence collected in Iraq, which suggested 
evidence of torture and mutilation. Two Iraqi doctors who had examined the bodies 
were cross-examined at the Inquiry, and the Chair concluded that they ‘were so    caught 
up in the emotional turmoil and hostility’ towards the British Army that they included 
false information in death certificates.
163
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The second argument concerns the Inquiry’s apparent minimising of nine findings of 
‘actual or possible’164 ‘ill-treatment’. This occurs at conceptual and factual levels. The 
Chair explained that he did not have the power to determine whether any instance of  ill- 
treatment met the threshold of Article 3 ECHR,
165 
but this does not prevent him from 
expressing doubt that individual ‘trivial’ instances would be insufficient for a   violation 
of that Article.
166 The Inquiry’s concept of ‘ill-treatment’ appears without reference to 
the ‘torture and inhuman treatment’, ‘cruel treatment’, or ‘humiliating and degrading 
treatment’ prohibited in the IHL of IAC167 and NIAC,168 nor the cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment (to use the formulation in Article 7 ICCPR) 
prohibited by international human rights law (IHRL). This is not quite hermeneutic 
injustice in Fricker’s sense, because the concepts do exist, but are not shared between  
the Inquiry Report and international treaties. Fricker’s idea of hermeneutic injustice is 
closer to a blameless, circumstantial ignorance of concepts not yet defined or regulated 
by law. In using extra-legal terminology, the Inquiry Chair removes these instances of 
‘ill-treatment’ from the framing of international law violations; a decision which is 
redundant, given the undertakings by the Attorney General and others that no 
prosecutions would follow as a result of testimony before the Inquiry.
169
 
 
As to the facts, interrogators were shown to have free rein to intimidate blindfolded 
witnesses, by striking a tent peg on the desk, and threatening the safety of the detainees’ 
relatives.
170   
In  one  instance,  a  ‘clip  round  the  ear’  of  one  detainee  is        considered 
insignificant, while a detainee being repeatedly punched and kicked in the head, shins and 
ribs is considered to be merely ‘ill-treatment’,
171 
and an incident that    one military witness 
thought not worth reporting.
172 
Threats to a blindfolded detainee are similarly   categorised, 
with no recognition that the intentional infliction of severe mental pain and suffering is 
prohibited as torture in Article 1 of CAT, and the fear (possibly of imminent death) of that 
detainee might have satisfied that definition if the allegations had been considered by a  
court with full knowledge of the relevant treaties and case law. Just as problematic is the 
incoherent apologism that any ill-treatment when the detainees were transported from 
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the battlefield to their detention camp must have been ‘unintentional’,173 involving 
merely ‘firm, robust handling’ such as the recurrent over-tightening of plastic handcuffs, 
and the reported denial of water during such transport. 
 
This hermeneutic injustice may be caused by the Inquiry team’s lack of expertise in IHL 
and IHRL. The Counsel to the Inquiry is a construction lawyer, while the Chair is a 
retired barrister and judge with expertise in criminal law, and judicial service in the 
Technology and Construction Court, and administrative experience on judicial 
welfare.
174 
The choice of a non-expert in IHL and IHRL raises questions about the 
conceptual rigour valued by the Secretary of State in relation to inquiries on compliance 
with international law in armed conflict. 
 
The third argument concerns the Inquiry’s swift acceptance of assertions that IHL training 
had been reformed following the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, and that those reforms would 
be sufficient to prevent similar violations. There is a brief concession in the Al-Sweady 
Report’s recommendations that some of the reforms are ‘in the process of being 
implemented’.
175 
The only recommendations relating to training refer to the dating and 
archiving of training documents.
176 
Yet the IHL training was deficient before the Battle   of 
Danny Boy. A training document had instructed soldiers ‘never [to] offer any comforts’ to 
detainees being transported from the battlefield to their holding facility, but soldiers 
interpreted this to refuse water and to taunt those requesting it.
177  
Simple phrasing in 
training documents can be misconstrued.
178 
The findings relating to ‘ill-treatment’ also 
show failings in training, particularly one Private’s view that the arguable stress positions, 
kicks and hits to a detainee’s head that he witnessed were not worth reporting.
179 
Barely 
highlighted in the Report is the admission by several soldiers that they shot at  what 
appeared to be twitching dead or dying bodies in a ditch.
180 
The failure to instil IHL’s 
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prohibitions on despoiling or mutilating the dead
181 
and on targeting the wounded is not 
considered in the Inquiry report. 
 
6.4.4    R v. Blackman 
 
 
Alexander Blackman, a former Royal Marine Sergeant, shot at close range a wounded 
insurgent in Helmand Province, Afghanistan on 15 September 2011. A court-martial 
convicted  him  of  murder  in  November  2013,
182  
and  sentenced  him  the  following 
month.
183 
At the time of the offence, there was a non-international armed conflict in 
Afghanistan, and Blackman’s actions violated Common Article 3 of the Four Geneva 
Conventions, which prohibits ‘violence to life and person, in particular murder…’ of 
those who are hors de combat, such as the wounded. Subsequently, the Court Martial 
Appeal  Court,  relying on psychiatric  evidence,  confirmed the murder  conviction   but 
reduced Blackman’s sentence from a mandatory life term to that of 8 years;184 and then 
reduced the murder conviction to that of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished 
responsibility.
185 
He was released in late April 2017, the sentencing remarks confirming 
that Blackman still had ‘significant responsibility’, at a ‘medium’ level, for the 
deliberate killing of the wounded insurgent.
186
 
 
Blackman’s case gives the following three insights. First, the facts of the case strengthen the 
distinction between cognitive and volitional aspects of norm internalisation in IHL training, 
confirming the finding of the ICRC Roots of Behaviour in War Study that moral 
disengagement can be present even in fighters with a good knowledge of IHL. Blackman 
was filmed acknowledging that he had violated the ‘Geneva Convention’ (sic.) at the time  
of the  crime.
187  
The  evidence  at  trial confirms  the  role  of moral  disengagement,   false 
reciprocity, dehumanisation of the victim, attempted justification of and refusal to report 
violations of IHL explored in chapter 3.
188 
Second, the extensive campaign to overturn 
 
ICRC Customary IHL Study, rule 133 
Asser Institute, International Crimes Database, R v. Alexander Wayne Blackman a.k.a. Marine A, 
Summary 
R v. Sergeant Alexander Wayne Blackman, General Court Martial held at Military Court Centre Bulford, 2012CM00442, 
Sentencing Remarks, HHJ Jeff Blackett, 6 December 2013 
R v Alexander Wayne Blackman, Secretary of State for Defence intervening Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
[2014] EWCA Crim 1029 
R v Alexander Wayne Blackman (Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) [2017] EWCA 190 
R v Alexander Wayne Blackman (Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)), Sentencing Remarks [2017] EWCA 
325, para 10 
Audio recording, BBC Radio 4 Today, 9 November 2013 
3.1, 3.3 
 Blackman’s conviction, to reduce his sentence and to free him is consistent with the rhetoric 
of ‘legal siege’ explored in chapter 7 below: a rhetoric which resists both criminal and civil 
accountability for violations committed by the armed forces, and which is antagonistic to 
military IHL training and compliance.
189 
There is nuance here, as a ‘legal siege’ rhetoric  is 
the extra-legal context of the campaign to free Blackman. Other arguments identifying 
leadership failings at the time of the crime and analysing psychiatric evidence are subtler. 
They detract attention from the IHL violation committed, but are relevant evidence, with the 
latter ultimately successful in reducing the murder conviction to that of manslaughter.  
Third, the case is evidence of an uneasy relationship in military justice between crimes 
under international and domestic criminal law. While only the sentencing remarks and not 
the court-martial judgment are publicly available, Blackman’s murder conviction was 
explicitly linked to his violation of IHL, i.e. murder as a war crime,
190 
but Blackman was 
not prosecuted pursuant to the International Criminal Court Act 2001. The Armed Forces 
Act 2006 s.42 criminalises acts committed by the armed forces which would be offences if 
committed in England and Wales. Manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility 
(the conviction which stands after appeal) is an offence unknown to international law (either 
IHL or international criminal law). This new conviction removes IHL as the context, and 
puts domestic law first. 
 
As to the first of these insights: Blackman and his unit were on patrol as part of the United 
Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in Helmand.
191  
There had been 
clashes between British forces and insurgents earlier that day. An Apache helicopter 
lawfully targeted, killed and injured several insurgents, who were found by Blackman and 
his colleagues.
192  
Blackman disarmed one wounded insurgent and ordered the men    under 
his command to cease giving first aid, with recorded statements indicating that the Marines 
did not think him worth saving: evidence of dehumanisation and moral disengagement. In 
sharp contrast to this evidence, Blackman maintained at trial that he believed the insurgent 
to be dead before he shot him. The men under Blackman’s command moved the wounded 
insurgent ‘in a robust manner … causing him additional 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.5 
Asser Institute Summary (n 182) 
ibid. 
ibid. 
 
 
 
188 
189  
pain’,193 out of sight of the Persistent Ground Surveillance System (PGSS), and 
Blackman shot him at close range with 9mm pistol.
194
 
 
The conviction was obtained on the basis of video and audio recordings from Blackman 
and his colleagues’ helmet cameras, data retrieved by chance in investigations for 
another case. Video footage showed Blackman telling his colleagues: ‘Obviously this 
doesn’t go anywhere fellas. I just broke the Geneva Convention (sic.).’ There is subtle 
laughter by Blackman’s colleague, identified only as Marine B (‘Yeah, roge.’) in 
response.
195 
Blackman, through his own voice, shows understanding of IHL, but an 
explicit rejection of its normativity (confirming the distinction between cognitive and 
volitional norm internalisation built in chapter 3); confidence that his colleagues will not 
report him (they did not: evidence of unit cohesion being prized more than IHL 
compliance); and an attempted justification through false reciprocity. The footage 
includes Blackman saying ‘[S]huffle off this mortal coil, you c***. It's nothing you 
wouldn't do to us.’196 He assumed that if their roles were reversed, the wounded Afghan 
fighter would kill him too.
197 
This is a discourse of false reciprocity; one which seeks to 
justify a violation of IHL. Although Blackman understood the prohibition on killing a 
wounded enemy fighter, it is uncertain if he understood that perceptions of reciprocity 
are irrelevant to a soldier’s obligation to comply with IHL.198 
 
The second insight focuses on the implications of the rhetoric that surrounds the 
Blackman case, and the arguments made at trial. ‘[V]ociferous’ campaigns against the 
Marines’ trial,199 against the lifting of the anonymity order, at Blackman’s   sentencing, 
first and second appeals have made several overlapping arguments: i) that Blackman’s 
prosecution was designed to deflect from operational failings, including a failure by the 
Brigade Commander to challenge the ‘overly aggressive’ unit culture, and to respond to 
signs of ‘moral regression, psychological strain and fatigue’ among members of 
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Blackman’s unit;
200 
ii) that mitigating factors such as combat stress disorder
201 
(later 
rediagnosed as an adjustment disorder)
202 
were only considered at sentencing, and not at 
trial;
203 
and, iii) above all, that the prosecution should not have been brought, and  
Blackman should not have been imprisoned.
204 
Arguments i) and ii) give a compassionate 
context to Blackman’s crime, thus deflecting from the gravity of the IHL violation. Military 
spokesmen  supporting  these  arguments  invoke  military loyalty (acknowledging  that  the 
‘coin of courage’ had been spent) and the rule of law (Blackman’s prosecution was justified 
because he did not show an ‘honest belief’ in the lawfulness of his actions).
205
Argument iii) 
lacks this subtlety. The idea that Blackman should never have been prosecuted or sentenced 
is premised on a military loyalty that suppresses the rule of law. This is consistent with   the 
idea that the ‘armed forces are under legal siege’;
206 
a rhetoric which is resistant to civil 
and criminal accountability for violations of IHL and IHRL, and could undermine military 
training that emphasises IHL compliance.
207
 
 
The third insight is the uneasy relationship in military justice between international and 
domestic crimes, and the questionable reliance on domestic criminal law in a case which 
could have been prosecuted as a war crime. Blackman’s conviction was reduced to that of 
manslaughter on the basis of diminished responsibility by the Court of Appeal in March 
2017.
208 
At the original trial, Blackman’s defence team did not submit evidence relating  to 
the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime. Three subsequent psychiatric 
assessments concluded that he was suffering from an adjustment disorder brought on by 
combat stress at the time of the crime. His statements on the helmet camera footage should, 
the psychiatrists argued, be understood in the light of the adjustment disorder. The helmet 
camera data and the psychiatric evidence were considered sequentially, with the latter 
deemed to negate the logical conclusions of the former.
209  
It is an unpersuasive    judgment 
because it seems to conflate correlation with causation: the presence of a mental health 
condition with diminished responsibility. Section 52 of the Coroners and Justice 
 
Royal Naval Command, (2014) ‘Operation Telemeter - Internal Review’, Executive Summary, 5 
R v Alexander Wayne Blackman, Secretary of State for Defence Intervening Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) 
[2014] EWCA Crim 1029 
R v Blackman (Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) [2017] EWCA 190 
BBC Radio 4 Today, 11 September 2015 
Petition, Free Sergeant Alexander Blackman, at: https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/108570 
(debated in Parliament 16 September 2015) 
Major Streatfield, BBC Radio 4 Today, 9 November 2013 
HL Deb 14 July 2005, vol 672, col 1236 per Baron Boyce of Pimlico 
7.5 
R v Blackman (Court of Appeal (Criminal Division)) [2017] EWCA 190 
ibid. 
191  
Act 2009 defines diminished responsibility: the defendant had an abnormality of mental 
functioning (unusual, considered abnormal), from a recognised medical condition,  
which affected his ability to understand his actions, exercise self-control and/or form a 
rational judgment. Adjustment disorders are common in the general population and 
among military personnel,
210 and the helmet camera data indicate Blackman’s ability to 
reason and understand his actions. Blackman was able to recall his IHL training, so it 
seems unlikely he had lost self-control at the time of the crime. 
 
The partial defence of diminished responsibility is not known to international criminal 
law, so the choice to prosecute him under domestic law without reference to 
international law deflects from Blackman’s violation of IHL. Grady and Cooper present 
a slightly different picture: if Blackman had been prosecuted under the ICC Act 2001, s. 
56(1) of that Act provides that the ‘principles of the law of England and Wales’ would 
have  applied  to  the  prosecution.
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It  follows  that  such  a  prosecution  might   have 
enabled him to plead diminished responsibility. However, this does not detract from the 
uneasy relationship between international and domestic criminal law; nor from the 
questionable choice not to charge Blackman with murder as a war crime. 
 
6.5 Theory-Testing: Does the Case Study Solve the Conundrum? 
 
 
The analysis in this thesis’ early chapters can be grouped into five theoretical categories, 
of which the first four are tested in this critical case study. The categories are as follows: 
the IHL training obligation is laconically-phrased, delegated to state discretion, and until 
recently was assumed to prevent violations, but state practice is not subject to transparent 
oversight and monitoring; ii) an explanatory gap between communicated norm and 
subsequent behaviour; iii) the gulf between cognitive and volitional norm internalisation; or 
between understanding, knowledge and recall of IHL, and willingness to comply; iv) the 
problem of how to build restraint in trained killers; and v) linked to this, how to implement 
contested norms in complex deployments. This retrospective chapter in the critical case 
study illustrates the problems flowing from i)-iv), but does not yield much on category v). 
In addition, the chapter yields several emergent findings, to 
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build additional theory on the relationship between IHL training, prevention and 
compliance; and on state attitudes to IHL and IHRL that are specific to the UK context. 
 
As to i), the discretionary IHL training obligation was asserted in Parliament to have been 
implemented but in reality, its implementation was delayed. Parliamentary scrutiny was 
absent, and in the absence of transparent monitoring of state practice in IHL, these delays 
were  discovered  by  one  contemporaneous  expert,
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and  subsequently  through archival 
research. Research on this point yielded additional contextual findings about the UK’s 
attitude towards IHL: and in particular its unwillingness to permit IHL’s applicability to, or 
ICRC visits to detainees in colonial wars. Historic assumptions that IHL training prevents 
violations continue to the present day in the UK context, where asserted reforms to IHL 
training following the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report are assumed to be sufficient to 
prevent future, similar violations. This neglects the inductive findings in 6.3 about recurrent 
patterns of violation of the prohibitions of torture and inhuman treatment. The long 
‘pedigree’ of violations against detainees adds weight to a scepticism that the prohibition on 
the five techniques was merely forgotten or an inadvertent gap in institutional knowledge  
for both the armed forces and intelligence agencies by the time of the death of Baha Mousa 
in 2003. This historical research dispels the simple apologist narrative that has emerged as  
an unintended result of the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report; that regrettable gaps in 
doctrine and training were the sole cause of the death of Baha Mousa, and that these gaps 
have been swiftly resolved through reforms to training, without more scrutiny of these 
reforms. Chapter 7 returns to this theme. Deficits in training and omissions in institutional 
memory provide only a partial causal explanation for violations, but a convenient one; as 
training documents can be reformed and broader problems of prevention and compliance; 
accountability and monitoring marginalised. 
 
As to ii), the critical case study continues to explain the relationship between communicated 
norm and subsequent behaviour. In the Camp Breadbasket case, both IHL training and 
military culture failed significantly to prevent and recognise grave breaches. In the Baha 
Mousa case, the simplistic communication of a duty to treat detainees humanely was 
insufficient to overcome unlawful orders, failures of command responsibility and failures to 
report witnessed violations. IHL training occurred, but marginally compared to the 
requirements of the situation. The closing submissions to the 
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Al-Sweady Public Inquiry reveal that instructions not to give comforts to detainees in 
transit meant that they were deprived of water. The Blackman case exemplifies social 
psychological research on moral disengagement and discourse about law and enemy 
forces which shows that IHL violations are still possible when the violator has a good 
knowledge that his action is prohibited in IHL. This was an example of wilful disregard 
for IHL norms which had been communicated clearly in training. 
 
The Blackman case is a persuasive example of the distinction between understanding, 
knowledge and recall of IHL; and subsequent willingness to comply. The case study 
continues to show the role of military culture, moral disengagement and discourse about law 
and enemy forces, as causal factors for IHL violations, alongside deficits in IHL training. 
The case study is a cautionary tale about inattention to both understanding of IHL and about 
willingness to comply. Where the chain of command lacks knowledge of grave breaches, as 
in the Camp Breadbasket incident, there has been a failure to integrate 
IHL’s laconic norms of prevention. Where enemy fighters and civilians are 
dehumanised, with punishment beatings or stress positions authorised, and violations 
left unreported, IHL training is insufficient to prevent violations and ensure compliance. 
 
iv) All of the cases discussed in 6.4 shed light on the problem of how to build restraint in 
trained  killers,  or  the  dilemma  between  the  ‘spirit  of  the  bayonet’
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(basic   training 
designed to overcome recruits’ unwillingness to kill) and IHL compliance. Of course, the 
lawful targeting of combatants or civilians directly participating in hostilities is compliant 
with IHL, and these incidents do not appear before courts-martial or public inquiries. It is 
where violations are alleged or demonstrated that the brutality of conduct-after-capture 
training, or punishment beatings given to recruits become causally relevant to the abuses of 
Baha Mousa and those detained with him, and the unthinking acceptance of physical 
punishments as a means to deter looting at Camp Breadbasket. These experiences cause 
either confusion or a sense that IHL violations are implicitly authorised. 
 
v) The failings in training and the violations perpetrated did not focus on IHL’s 
indeterminate norms, or norms about which states disagree, but on clear prohibitions on 
torture, inhuman treatment, other grave breaches such as those perpetrated against looters, 
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and the wilful killing of a fighter who was wounded. This case study does not therefore 
investigate a causal pathway between IHL’s indeterminate or contested norms and 
subsequent IHL training, prevention and compliance. 
 
Points i)-v) were explored deductively in this chapter, but the following inductive 
findings have also emerged: There were recurrent assertions that the IHL training 
obligation had been implemented, and that reforms were in place or in progress. 7.3 
below considers a recent example of this. 6.2 and 6.4 reveal recurrent patterns of 
violation, particularly in the prohibitions shared between IHL and IHRL. There were  
also recurrent patterns of institutional response when alleged violations come to light. 
These range from outright denial to non-disclosure, to a lack of even-handedness, with 
military witnesses’ testimony trusted while others’ is viewed with suspicion. 7.2 and 7.5 
continue this theme with examples of ad hominem attacks on those seeking 
accountability and their lawyers, assertions that investigations, prosecutions and civil 
suits will harm morale or otherwise endanger operational effectiveness. 
 
Finally, the Al-Sweady Public Inquiry in particular neglects international law prohibitions 
on severe mental pain and suffering. This reflects the MoD’s ambivalence about the 
interrogation technique that used to be known as ‘harshing’. In the closing months of the 
Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, the MoD sought legal advice and slightly modified its 2010 
interrogation policy. In a partially redacted document shared with the Inquiry,
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the   MoD 
sought to retain some aspects of the ‘loud harsh’ (shouting, but without threats of violence, 
coercion or direct physical contact; insults, humiliation, degradation, or the ‘berating’ of the 
‘drill sergeant; the frequency and duration of shouting was redacted); and the 
‘cynical/sarcastic harsh’ (a similar approach, using sarcasm and intended for use against 
‘self-important’ detainees, but with ‘particular care’ taken not to insult a detainee).
215 
These 
lists beg several questions, not least how it is possible to be cynical or sarcastic with a ‘self- 
important’ detainee without insulting his or her self-importance; and how it is possible to 
shout at a detainee for an indeterminate time without causing fear, coercion or even an 
implied threat of violence. The document shared with the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry 
sanitises the potential infliction of mental pain and suffering, with a suggestion that ‘harsh’ 
is not the appropriate term; and while it acknowledges risks which 
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might be mitigated by training, the document also suggests that the ‘harsh’ approach has 
helped secure the release of hostages in Iraq. This suggestion is not backed up by 
specificities. 
 
In a challenge relating to the lawfulness of these policies in Afghanistan, the Divisional 
Court held that the modified policies were lawful, and the Court of Appeal agreed that 
there were sufficient safeguards in training and in the policy itself for ‘challenge direct’ 
to fall short of the prohibition on torture/inhuman treatment in Common Article 3 of the 
Four Geneva Conventions (applicable in non-international armed conflicts) and the 
prohibition of coercion, threatening or insulting conduct, or unpleasant or 
disadvantageous behaviour as prohibited by Article 17 of the Third Geneva 
Convention.
216  
Hegemonic assumptions are implicit in the assumption that   ‘harshing’ 
or ‘challenge direct’ can yield intelligence of value, and might be equally present in the 
Court of Appeal’s judgment in Hussein, that policies allowing shouting (but not insults, 
coercion or threats) for an indeterminate period of time would only be a ‘short, sharp 
shock’; phrasing that implies a right to ‘shock’ or to punish. While the judgment of the 
Court of Appeal that even the prohibition on unpleasant or disadvantageous behaviour 
must have a minimum threshold is in line with jurisprudence on a minimal threshold for 
ill-treatment in human rights law, the threshold for this conduct in the Third Geneva 
Convention might be passed by ‘challenge direct’, given that IHL is more stringent and 
specific on the treatment of detainees than IHRL. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
 
Archival research suggests that, despite Parliamentary assertions to the contrary and the 
inclusion of IHL in military manuals, the UK armed forces conducted little or no IHL 
training at least until the early 1960s. Concerns that the ICRC might visit detainees in 
Kenya led to the UK rejecting the applicability of IHL to decolonisation conflicts. 
Subsequently, the UK resisted the applicability of the IHL of NIAC, and of AP I (under 
Article 1(4)) by protesting that the Troubles in Northern Ireland were not an armed 
conflict. Delayed ratification of IHL treaties was followed by even more delayed 
implementation of the IHL training obligation. From the 1950s to the current decade, 
there have been recurrent patterns of assertion (that IHL dissemination and training take 
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place, or have been reformed); violation (especially of the prohibitions on torture and 
inhuman treatment); and institutional response (including denial of alleged violations, 
arguments that either IHL or IHRL should not apply, racist language, testimonial 
injustice, and assertions that investigations harm the Army’s morale and operational 
effectiveness). 
 
The Camp Breadbasket case shows the interaction of flaws in IHL training with 
unlawful orders, discourse about Iraqi civilian looters, and violations committed in 
revenge or assumed punishment. It is also evidence of ignorance of IHL in the chain of 
command, where one officer interviewed failed to understand that troops’ acts were a 
grave breach of the Four Geneva Conventions. Camp Breadbasket is an example of the 
sexual abuse of civilians by the British Army; a trend found in earlier and later cases. 
The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry was a comprehensive investigation into the operational 
and training context behind the death of an Iraqi civilian in British military custody; but 
its conclusions in relation to IHL training tempt the reader to assume that mere doctrinal 
gaps and failures of institutional memory were the cause of the fatal injuries suffered by 
Baha Mousa. Deficient IHL training and the failure to include the prohibition on the 
‘five techniques’ in institutional memory were part of the causal context; but there is no 
doubt that Baha Mousa was beaten to death, that unlawful orders were given, and 
witnessed maltreatment ignored. Basic training and conduct-after-capture training had 
normalised brutality, while a single discrete IHL training session was insufficient to 
prevent some troops from violating IHL. In addition, there had been inadequate IHL 
dissemination to military medical personnel, chaplains and the chain of command. 
 
The Al-Sweady Public Inquiry is anomalous. It finds evidence of ‘ill-treatment’ by British 
troops against Iraqi detainees, but trivialises this; with an apparent failure to understand that 
the definition of torture in CAT Article 1 explicitly includes mental pain and suffering. 
While some witnesses to the Inquiry did lie, alleging they were civilians and not armed 
group fighters, the Inquiry seems biased against the testimony of Iraqi witnesses as a group, 
and biased in favour of military witnesses. In the Al-Sweady Inquiry (and subsequently, as 
chapter 7 will show) reforms to IHL training following the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry are 
assumed to be a panacea for future violations. Finally, the case of R v. Blackman is an 
example of the distinction between understanding of IHL and willingness to comply; and of 
discourse about law and enemy forces as causal factors for 
an IHL violation. It is also an example of a sharply politicised trial, and of an uneasy 
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relationship between IHL violations and domestic criminal law, as the offence of 
manslaughter by diminished responsibility (to which Blackman’s conviction was 
reduced on appeal) does not exist in international criminal law or IHL. 
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Chapter 7. Towards a Solution? Belated Reforms to the British 
Army’s IHL Training in a Time of ‘Legal Siege’ 
 
7.1    Introduction 
 
 
The case study now moves from chapter 6’s largely retrospective approach to a critical 
analysis of current UK state practice on IHL training, prevention and compliance. Since 
MoDREC’s decision to block the proposed qualitative research which would have tested 
soldiers’ and  officers’  understanding of  IHL,1  it  was  necessary to  explore  the UK’s 
approach to IHL at a Ministerial and Army level. To this end, Chapter 7 analyses recent 
and ongoing investigations, probes delays in implementing reforms to IHL training 
following the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, and analyses recent and current training 
materials obtained by FOI requests, to see to what extent these solve the flaws in IHL 
training identified in chapter 6. There follows an inductive section, building new theory 
and making predictions for the Army’s future practice in IHL training, prevention and 
compliance. 
 
More specifically, section 7.2 offers context on the ICC Preliminary Examination into 
allegations of war crimes by British forces in Iraq; and the first critical account of MoD- 
based inquiries: the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT), the Iraq Fatality Investigations 
(IFI), the Systemic Issues Working Group (SIWG), and briefly, Operation Northmoor, into 
alleged violations of international law in Afghanistan. At first sight, there was the 
discrepancy  between  a)  government  assurances  in  Hansard,
2  
before  the  Defence Select 
Committee,
3 
and to the Al-Sweady Public Inquiry
4  
that the reforms to    military training in 
international law had been ‘implemented’ or ‘addressed’; and b) the subsequent decision by 
MoDREC in the summer of 2014 to block the proposed qualitative research for this project 
on the basis that the new Operational Law Training Directive had not been implemented. 
7.3 asks how, when and why was IHL training reformed; with 
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what oversight; and if these reforms are now fully implemented, revealing a nuanced picture 
of gradual reforms. 7.4 evaluates the Operational Law Training Directive of February 2014, 
and the instructional and assessment materials for the Military Annual Training Tests 
(MATT 7) in the Law of Armed Conflict; closing with a reflection on materials unavailable 
because of security classification or insufficient data recording within the MoD. 7.5 is an 
inductive section, building new theory on limited transparency, and the risks of an anti- 
accountability, anti-IHRL ‘legal siege’ rhetoric for future IHL training, prevention and 
compliance. 7.5 begins to sketch a narrative arc between a state’s approach to accountability 
for alleged violations of IHL and the prevention of future violations. 7.6 concludes Part III, 
by gathering the findings of the case study as a whole. 
 
7.2 Recent and Ongoing Investigations 
 
 
ICC Preliminary Examination 
 
 
The ICC Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) has twice opened preliminary examinations into 
war crimes allegedly committed by the UK in Iraq. In 2006, evidence suggested ‘a 
reasonable basis for an estimated 4 to 12 victims of wilful killing’ and ‘less than 20’ 
‘victims of inhuman treatment’.
5  
This small number of victims did not pass the    additional 
threshold of gravity in Article 8(1) of the Rome Statute: there was no evidence, according to 
the then Prosecutor, that war crimes had been ‘committed as part of a plan or policy or as 
part of a large-scale commission of such crimes’; nor would the allegations pass the ‘general 
gravity threshold’ in Article 53(1)(b).
6  
The OTP reopened its preliminary examination    on 
13 May 2014,
7 
following the receipt of many additional allegations, including a detailed 
brief from Public Interest Lawyers and the European Center for Constitutional and   Human 
Rights.
8 
In 2016, the OTP was in the process of sifting 831 
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‘victim accounts’ relating to 2350 allegations of torture and inhuman treatment  in 
British military detention in Iraq from March 2003-July 2009.
9
 
 
The preliminary examination is still ongoing. If at a later stage, the OTP decides that it 
has subject-matter jurisdiction to proceed with an investigation, the case must still pass 
an admissibility threshold. Under the principle of complementarity in Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute, a case is inadmissible unless ‘the State is unwilling or unable genuinely  
to carry out the investigation or prosecution’.10  There are three disjunctive criteria    for 
determining a State’s unwillingness genuinely to investigate: a) national proceedings or 
a national decision have the ‘purpose of shielding’ a potential defendant from criminal 
responsibility for a crime in the ICC’s substantive jurisdiction; b) ‘unjustified delay’; c) 
a lack of independence or impartiality in the proceedings, or proceedings ‘conducted in  
a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an intent to bring the person 
concerned to justice’.11 In the event that the subject-matter jurisdiction is established, 
the OTP will scrutinise the Iraq Historic Allegations Team (IHAT) to ensure that none 
of the three disjunctive criteria of unwillingness is met. 
 
Iraq Historic Allegations Team 
 
 
IHAT was set up by the MoD in 2010 and closed in 2017. It investigated allegations of 
unlawful killing and of torture and other ill-treatment by British troops in Iraq, with the 
possibility of prosecution (by referral to the Director of Service Prosecutions (DSP)) 
where criminal offences have been committed. The MoD asserted that IHAT satisfied 
not only the investigatory obligations in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR on Articles 2 
and 3 of the ECHR, but was also a genuine investigation by the UK which might 
preclude a full ICC investigation under the complementarity rule in Article 17 of the 
Rome Statute. IHAT also studied whether any of the findings of the Baha Mousa Public 
Inquiry Report should lead to the prosecution of service personnel.
12
 
 
There are five arguments. First, the case law which led to the establishment of IHAT 
showed a prior lack of independence in the investigations; and prolonged delays in 
deciding which cases should be referred for prosecution; which raise allegations suitable 
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for a coroner’s-style investigation, which raise systemic issues, and which should be 
dismissed. IHAT was established during judicial review proceedings in which a public 
inquiry was sought into alleged violations of Article 3 of the ECHR (the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment).
13 
In a subsequent test  case, 
it  was  acknowledged  that  these  allegations  raised  systemic  issues,  including  about 
military training in international law.
14 
Initially, the MoD appointed the Royal Military 
Police (RMP) to oversee the investigations, but replaced the RMP with the Military 
Provost (Navy) following a judgment of the Court of Appeal that to involve the RMP 
(which had been involved in detention operations in Iraq) made IHAT insufficiently 
independent to fulfil Article 3’s investigatory obligations.15 The lack of independence 
meant that it was ‘no longer tenable’ for the Secretary of State to wait for the outcome  
of IHAT’s investigations before establishing a public inquiry into alleged torture and ill- 
treatment.
16  
When the case was remitted to the  Divisional Court, these changes    were 
found to fulfil the independence criterion.
17 IHAT’s caseload had expanded to 
investigations of unlawful killing (alleged violations of Article 2 ECHR) as well as 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Court noted its  concern 
on  ‘recurring slippage’ (delays) in  and  the inadequate resources  devoted  to    IHAT’s 
work,
18 but dismissed the claimants’ call for a public inquiry into alleged Article 2 
violations.
19 
Instead, the Court ruled that an inquisitorial process, modelled on a 
coroner’s inquest, should be held to investigate the lawfulness of each death where 
IHAT  had  decided  there  would  be  no  criminal  prosecution.  The  narrative   reports 
produced by each inquiry could study, unlike IHAT, the quality of the military training 
given.
20 
This IFI, discussed below, was established to provide this inquisitorial process. 
 
In 2015, the Divisional Court found that IHAT had completed only 19 investigations from 
its original caseload of 53 allegations of unlawful killing, of which one had resulted in 
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referral to the DSP.
21 
There had been five investigations (each involving multiple  victims), 
with one referral to the DSP – charges were not brought; and three of these were ongoing at 
the time of the judgment, each involving allegations of rape and serious sexual assault in 
British military custody.
22 
Following the very substantial increase in caseload from   clients 
represented by Public Interest Lawyers in November 2014, IHAT initiated a pre- 
investigation screening process to sift out cases where a reasonable person would not think  
a service offence had been committed; and began to set up a ‘problem profile’ to consider 
ill-treatment cases in groups, with the exception of allegations of rape and serious sexual 
assault, which were to be investigated individually.
23 
The Designated Judge considered  the 
lack of progress on the investigations ordered by the Divisional Court in 2013 ‘deeply 
disappointing’, with the overall situation for IHAT ‘bleak’.
24
 
 
By 2016,  the Secretary of State’s  continued delays  and  disregard of court orders    are 
strongly criticised.
25 Four test cases, where allegations were added to IHAT’s   caseload 
over a decade after the relevant events occurred, were selected to study the effect of 
delay on investigatory obligations under Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR. Of these, the  
two relating to Article 2 were so delayed that evidence relating to the death was no 
longer available, meaning that an investigatory obligation no longer existed; whereas the 
two credible allegations of torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment led 
to an ongoing investigatory obligation, to be discharged by an IHAT investigation.
26
 
 
Second, as noted on IHAT’s MoD webpage, of the ‘more than 3390’ investigations received 
by IHAT,
27 
1666 were rejected, and a further 696 were either recently closed or about to be 
closed.
28 
By February 2017, media reports suggested the remaining 1050 cases had been 
reduced to fewer than 250,
29 
prior to IHAT’s hurried closure in June 2017. These numbers 
raise prima facie questions about the quality of the evidence supplied to 
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IHAT,
30 
the reasons for such rapid rejection of alleged violations of IHL and IHRL, and the 
quality of the pre-investigation screening process. A succession of Quarterly Reports into 
IHAT’s work refer to circumstances outside the control of IHAT preventing travel by IHAT 
investigators to interview Iraqi witnesses. This scheme, known as Operation  MENSA, 
allows ‘vulnerable or intimidated complainants’ or witnesses to be interviewed in a third 
country in the Middle East, but the authorities in that third country were unwilling to allow 
an  expansion  of  the  programme  or  increased  frequency  in  the  visits.
31  
There  were no 
Operation  MENSA  deployments  at  all  in  the  period  prior  to  the  23  November   2016 
Quarterly Update, nor in the period before the 25 July 2016 Quarterly Update.
32 
Yet this 
period correlates with the greatest number of investigations dismissed. This raises questions 
as to the depth of investigation each case receives, and whether cases are dismissed without 
witnesses being interviewed to check any uncertainties in the raw material of their translated 
witness statements. The quality of the evidence supplied to IHAT is reportedly poor, with 
the author of the Review of IHAT describing it as ‘sparse, often inaccurate as to identities, 
dates, times etc.’, with some statements ‘unsigned’.
33 
As such, these are not full witness 
statements, and necessitate more resources and rigour, rather than less, to determine the 
evidence within these documents. 
 
Third, there was a tendency to group allegations for subsequent referral or rejection. The 
Deputy Head of IHAT decided on 19 September 2016 and 24 October 2016 to 
discontinue investigations on 68 and then 489 ‘lower-level allegations of ill-treatment’ 
(where this term and the true severity of the allegations was left undefined, much as it 
was in the Al-Sweady Public Inquiry Report).
34 
These gradations of wrongdoing are not 
found in IHL or IHRL’s substantive prohibitions, or the obligations to ‘repress’ grave 
breaches in the IHL of IAC, and to investigate and prosecute some violations of IHRL, 
including torture. This raises questions about the conceptual quality and evidential 
thresholds used in the pre-investigation screening process. 
 
Fourth, IHAT’s quarterly updates and periodically-released tables of work completed 
lack transparency as to the methodology and reasoning employed in the sifting of 
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allegations. The Quarterly Reports present numerical information on the number of cases 
received, in the pre-investigation, investigation stages, being closed and terminated, for each 
of 22 caseloads (11 relating to unlawful killings and 11 relating to torture or other ill- 
treatment).
35 
These data are thin, and do not include any contextual information, such as the 
name of the alleged victims, or the substance of what is alleged. IHAT’s obscure 
methodology and limited transparency are problematic: observers are encouraged simply to 
trust in the rigour of IHAT’s investigations. There is no reference to media reports in 
September 2016 that three service personnel, two of them serving, were to face  
manslaughter charges for the death by drowning of teenager Said Shabram in 2003.
36
 
 
As to the Work Completed as at December 2016, in some cases, it is clear that conflicting 
witness statements are the reason for investigations being stopped.
37 
In others, the 
involvement of other Coalition troops is the reason, e.g. a death of a prisoner of war in a 
US-controlled camp, or Danish involvement in the death of an Iraqi civilian.
38 
In two cases, 
Public Interest Lawyers was reportedly unable or unwilling to provide further information 
to IHAT investigators, so cases were discontinued.
39 
In still others, allegations made at  the 
Al-Sweady Public Inquiry are rejected because the Inquiry found that the deceased either 
had not died, or were directly participating in hostilities when they were targeted and 
killed.
40 
These decisions may be justified, but others lack transparency in their reporting, 
e.g. it was alleged that Ali Alwan Sadoun Abdullah Al Sbehawi was unlawfully killed by 
British troops, but IHAT rejected the case, concluding that the evidential sufficiency test 
was not met for a prosecution of murder or manslaughter to take place.
41  
There is no 
reasoning to justify the failure to reach the evidential sufficiency threshold in relation to 
allegations that a soldier had subjected an Iraqi person to a ‘mock execution’.
42 
A referral to 
the RAF Police was made in relation to a trainer who allegedly recommended hooding   and 
blindfolding detainees, and restraining them with collar and rope.
43 
There are no further 
updates on that investigation. 
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Fifth and finally, following a Review of IHAT’s work in 2016,44 the MoD announced 
that IHAT’s pending case load would be reduced to 60 cases by the middle of 2016,  
with IHAT’s closure predicted for 2019. In February 2017, its closure was brought 
forward to later in 2017, with the same target of 60 remaining cases for summer 2017 
(later modified to a target of 20 remaining cases by the official closure of IHAT on 30 
June 2017).
45 
There is no reasoning expressed behind these targets, nor as to the merits 
of remaining cases which are to be closed. These data suggest political pressures to 
hasten the closure of IHAT; pressures unrelated to the substance of allegations. The 
Secretary of State for Defence repeated assertions that greeted IHAT’s   establishment46 
when he announced its closure: that the majority of claims are false and the 
investigations  harm  service  personnel.
47  
The  announcement  that  IHAT  would close 
followed and appeared to depend upon Shiner’s striking-off by the SDT,48 for a range  
of offences, including dishonesty. Disciplinary proceedings against his firm Public 
Interest Lawyers and unsuccessful proceedings against Leigh Day were begun after   the 
Secretary  of  State  for  Defence  passed  a   “dossier”  to  the  Solicitors        Regulation 
Authority.
49 
The proven dishonesty of one solicitor does not remove international law 
obligations to investigate and prosecute serious violations of IHRL and IHL. The 
Defence Subcommittee questions the premise that allegations of unlawful killing and 
torture should be investigated (by opposing the obligation to investigate allegations  and 
soldiers’ welfare needs),50 instead of delving into the quality of those investigations. 
 
Iraq Fatality Investigations 
 
 
The IFI was established in 2014 to implement the order of the Divisional Court in Ali 
Zaki Mousa No. 2, that there be ‘inquisitorial inquiries modelled on coronial inquests’. 
51  
The  IFI  aim  to  fulfil  Article  2  ECHR  obligations  to  bereaved  relatives.
52   
The 
investigations are extra-statutory, and separate from ongoing civil suits, applications for 
judicial review, criminal investigations or proceedings. The Terms of Reference prohibit 
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the Inspector, Sir George Newman, from inquiring into civil or criminal liability.
53 
At 
the start of each case, he requests assurances from the DSP, the Prosecutor of the ICC, 
and the Attorney-General (if necessary also the counterparts to the Attorney-General   in 
Scotland and Northern Ireland) that soldiers’ witness statements will not be used to 
incriminate them, nor to facilitate subsequent prosecutions.
54 
Cases are referred to the 
IFI if IHAT and the DSP decide there will not be a prosecution, or if a court-martial has 
been terminated or has resulted in a not guilty verdict. Soldier witnesses are granted 
anonymity, but the IFI has the capacity to compel a witness.
55 
The relatives of the 
deceased may suggest questions for the Inspector to ask witnesses.
56 
The first two 
reports of the Inspector, Sir George Newman, followed the early termination of court- 
martial proceedings, and focus on the deaths of Nadheem Abdullah and Hassan Abbas 
Said.
57 
At this writing, the IFI has released six reports, into the deaths of Nadheem 
Abdullah and Hassan Abbas Said,
58 
Muhammad Salim,
59 
Ahmed Ali,
60 
Ali Salam 
Naser,
61 
and Captain Abdul Hussan Taleb Hassan.
62
 
 
Three general analyses emerge. One, the reports are qualitative and wide-ranging, with 
detailed Appendices that consider the training materials and/or forensic data relevant to 
each case. The Inspector is required to look into the ‘immediate and surrounding 
circumstances’ of each death investigated, and to produce a ‘narrative account’.63  None 
of the criticisms relating to limited transparency and thin, quantitative data from the 
analysis of IHAT above applies to the IFI. Two, the tone of each report is even-handed 
and nuanced, with no loaded language suggesting that military or Iraqi witnesses as a 
group should be trusted or mistrusted as a group. Therefore, the criticisms of the Al- 
Sweady Public Inquiry in 6.4.3 do not apply to the IFI. Three, ‘[i]f circumstances 
demand’, the Inspector’s terms of reference allow him to inquire into the ‘instructions, 
 
 
IFI, FAQ <http://www.iraq-judicial-investigations.org/faqs.aspx> 
ibid. 
IFI <http://www.iraq-judicial-investigations.org/index.aspx> 
ibid. 
HC 27 March 2014, col 30WS 
Sir George Newman, ‘The Iraq Fatality Investigations: Consolidated Report into the Death of Nadheem 
Abdullah and the Death of Hassan Abbas Said’ (2015) Cm 9023 
Newman, ‘Iraq Fatality Investigations: Report into the Death of Muhammad Abdul Ridha Salim’ (2016) 
Cm 9238 
Newman, ‘Iraq Fatality Investigations: Report into the Death of Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali’ (2016) Cm 
9324 
Newman, ‘Iraq Fatality Investigations: Report into the Death of Ali Salam Naser’ (2017) Cm 9410 
Newman, ‘Iraq Fatality Investigations: Report into the Death of Captain Abdul Hussan Taleb Hassan’ 
(2017) Cm 9409 
IFI, Terms of Reference, reproduced in an Annex to each completed report 
207  
training, and supervision’ received by service personnel whose involvement is alleged in 
each  death,
64  
and  as  such,  the  IFI  can  include  contextual  analysis.  However, such 
substantive inquiries are limited by the MoD’s retention of secret files at Swadlingcote 
(see 7.5 below), the destruction of others, and search terms or tools which yield either  
no relevant materials or ‘disproportionate’ results, so that the MoD claims the workload 
would be too onerous to permit disclosure.
65
 
 
The IFI Reports yield the following findings relevant    to training and international law: 
(i) The Card Alpha of ROE for deployments other than IAC
66 
shows that IHRL (and 
specifically the ECHR and UN standards on the use of force and firearms by law 
enforcement officials)
67 influenced the ROE in Iraq. ‘[N]o more force …than absolutely 
necessary’ must be used, with ‘firearms … only… used as a last resort’, and, while the 
soldier’s right of self-defence remains, he ‘may only open fire against a person… 
committing or about to commit an act likely to endanger human life’ where opening fire 
is the only available action to prevent this.
68
 
 
The consolidated report into the deaths of Nadheem Abdullah and Hassan Abbas 
Said shows an over-reliance on the institutional memory from operations in Northern 
Ireland about the use of force that can be used at a vehicle checkpoint: in particular, the 
peacekeeping role in Northern Ireland differed from the ‘warfighting’ role that soldiers 
could  anticipate  in  Iraq.
69   
There  were  time-pressured,  possibly  contradictory   training 
sessions on LOAC (in this instance, the IHL of international armed conflict) and the Card 
Alpha  (relevant  to peacekeeping missions  and the  use  of minimal  force).
70  
‘Courageous 
restraint’ (whereby soldiers are required to show restraint when they approach a potential 
security threat, instead of firing immediately in self-defence), and the ‘ladder of response’ 
(whereby an increasing level of force can be used if a threat remains and warnings are not 
heeded) are identified as complex issues requiring reflection and the development of further 
training.
71 
Yet the Inspector concluded that deficits in training (both in LOAC and 
ibid. 
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in relation to vehicle checkpoints) did not cause the death of Nadheem Abdullah,
72 
who 
died from blows to the left side of his head, inflicted by British soldiers after he failed to 
stop at a checkpoint.
73
 
 
The report into the death of Muhammad Salim makes no recommendations relating 
to IHL training, but the Appendices include a copy of the ROE for Iraq dated July 2003, 
which integrates Hague Convention IV and the Fourth Geneva Convention 1949. The 
‘use of minimum force’ is authorised at numerous points in the ROE, including   against 
those  planning  ‘hostile  act(s)’  against  British  forces.74   Restraint  of  detainees   and 
internees at the point of arrest should also have occurred using only the authorised 
‘minimum force levels’, and humane treatment is required, but not further specified.75 
 
The report into the death of Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali found that soldiers  who 
detained four looters then forced them into the Shatt al Basra canal on 8 May 2003. When 
Mr Ali went under the water and did not reappear, the soldiers left without trying to rescue 
him. The Inspector found that their actions caused Mr Ali’s death, and that soldiers had not 
been ‘trained in policing methods’ nor how to deal with looters; and that the attempted 
punishment of looters through soaking them in water was commonplace within the 
Battlegroup.
76 
As at September 2017, the second part of the report into the death of Ahmed 
Ali is still awaited. It will report on the practice of “wetting” looters, the flaws in training 
that may have contributed, and the extent to which the chain of command in the 
UK knew about this apparently broader practice of “wetting” looters. 
 
 
The inquiry into Captain Hassan’s death noted that the soldiers who shot him inside 
his car had not seen a published Guidance for the Use of Warning Shots, as this was 
produced a week after their pre-deployment training.
77 
There are no findings on the IHL 
training received by the soldiers involved. 
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Systemic Issues Working Group 
 
The Systemic Issues Working Group (SIWG) is an MoD body.
78 
It has no inherent 
investigatory capacity. Its task is to review reports from IHAT investigations, ‘judicial 
proceedings (e.g. public inquiries)’, and (as and when they become available) reports 
from investigations into operations in Afghanistan,
79 with a view to ‘identifying, 
reviewing, and correcting’ what it terms ‘systemic issues’.80 The SIWG’s working 
definition is: 
 
…areas where its doctrine, policy or training has been insufficient to prevent 
practices or individual conduct that breach its obligations under domestic and/or 
international law.
81
 
and: 
 
…shortcomings of doctrine, policy, training, or supervision that result in 
unintentional breaches … inter alia situations where an individual has complied 
with policy and training, but these have been flawed; where policies issued at 
different levels have been contradictory, leaving individuals unable to determine 
whether their actions are correct; and where supervision has been insufficient to 
identify and address such confusion, or failure to understand and apply training 
correctly. Deliberate acts by individuals in knowing contravention of the law and 
of doctrine, policy or training are not systemic issues, and are punishable 
through the Service Justice System. 
82
 
This definition appears comprehensive, but can be questioned. It implies too glib a 
distinction between ‘unintentional breaches’ where policy, training or supervision is 
flawed, and ‘deliberate acts… in knowing contravention’ of law, training etc. It is possible 
for training and supervision to be flawed and for deliberate, knowing wrongdoing to 
coincide. The definition implies that deliberate criminal acts occur without a relevant, 
systemic organisational culture. This ignores the serious deliberate offences perpetrated 
against Baha Mousa and those detained with him; scholars’ research on the findings of 
the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry;
83 and the research on military culture’s relevance to the 
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development of soldiers’ understanding of and willingness to comply with applicable 
law.
84 
Focusing on training as simple teaching also ignores the role of training in 
addressing  soldiers’  willingness  to  comply  with  IHL  in  the  heat  of  battle,     when 
traumatised  or  angry  by  enemy  attacks  on  soldiers’  colleagues.85  The  reference to 
‘deliberate acts by individuals’ recalls the now-discredited86 rhetoric that ‘a few bad 
apples’ were responsible for violations in Iraq. The distinction is too glib in practical 
terms too. Flaws in ‘doctrine, policy or training’ might emerge from a court-martial 
prosecution of an individual for deliberate, knowing acts.
87
 
 
Of the first three reports from the SIWG, released annually from 2014-2016, the first 
reviewed three reports of IHAT investigations, synthesising 19 possible ‘gaps in doctrine, 
policy  and  training’.
88   
The  morally  neutral  term  ‘gaps’  implies  blameless   omissions, 
blameless violations, and easy bureaucratic solutions. Yet the first SIWG report is wide- 
ranging and details a number of safeguards and reforms to military training and the 
specialised training of interrogators and Army medics. These are useful data both on the 
reforms implemented since the death of Baha Mousa, and on the SIWG’s views as to the 
sufficiency of these reforms. For example, the first systemic issue (related to the fourth 
about pre-deployment assessments and a probationary first tour) was that interrogators 
should practise their reformed training. As a result, interrogators now have ‘development 
exercises’, and can gain experience through a 3 year ‘extended posting’. They may attend 
training courses with the police and other government departments, and their interrogation 
courses    are    reviewed    annually,    with    six-monthly    inspections.
89     
The      second 
recommendation was that military training must ensure that captured persons must not be 
‘humiliated or verbally abused such that they feel physically threatened.’
90 
As the judicial 
review in the Hussein case confirmed that the Challenging Approach did not violate 
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Article 3 ECHR,
91 
and as the MoD’s Interrogation and Tactical Questioning policies and 
training have been amended, the SIWG believed this issue had been addressed.
92 
Other 
systemic issues are less precise, implying a fundamental problem left uncorrected by new 
policy documents and instructions: e.g. ‘clarity’ is needed in interrogators’ training in  what 
is permitted and prohibited.
93 
There follows analysis of reforms on preventing each of the 
‘five techniques’,
94 
and the need to prevent assaults on detainees.
95 
The SIWG believes that 
changes  to Tactical  Questioning and  Interrogation courses,  including their legal  briefings 
are  both  necessary and  sufficient to  prevent  these.  At  one  point, the  SIWG  infers  that 
‘[f]ailure to adhere to these prohibitions would require wilful disobedience by a large 
number of complicit individuals… including failures of leadership and failures of the 
inspection regime.’
96 
Yet the existence of policy and training documents and an   inspection 
system does not preclude failures of leadership and wilful disobedience. 
 
 
In its subsequent report, the SIWG considers further instances of blindfolding (three of them 
in the Al-Sweady Public Inquiry), and one additional IHAT case where a detainee was 
denied water. In both instances, the SIWG considered the implementation of training 
reforms to be adequate to declare these cases ‘resolved’, implying that there would be no 
recurrence.
97 
This ignores the potential tension between a regiment’s institutional   memory 
and the newly-implemented training reforms.
98 
There is also a concerning path  dependence 
in the SIWG’s analysis. The SIWG considers ‘resolved’ the instances of blindfolding and 
the need to ensure that personnel understand ‘recognised norms’ (and not misunderstand 
what is required to maintain the ‘shock of capture’) because Sir Thayne Forbes declined to 
make recommendations on these issues in the Al-Sweady Public Inquiry, believing the MoD 
to have fully implemented the reforms required by the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry.
99 
At the 
time of the first SIWG report in 2014, not all the reforms to IHL training were fully 
implemented.
100 
A similar dependence on other investigations 
 
Hussein v Secretary of State for Defence [2013] EWHC 95 (Admin); R (Haider Ali Hussein) v Secretary of 
State for Defence [2014] EWCA Civ 1087 
Systemic Issues, July 2014 (n 78) Issue A2 
ibid., Issues A3, A5 
ibid., Issues B6-8, B10-11 
ibid., Issues B9, B12 
ibid., Issue B11 
Ministry of Defence, ‘Systemic Issues Identified from Investigations into Military Operations Overseas: July 
2015, Issues 9, 12, p.4 
Victoria Nolan, Military Leadership and Counterinsurgency: The British Army and Small War Strategy 
Since World War II (I.B. Tauris 2011); Sergio Catignani, ‘Coping with Knowledge: Organizational 
Learning in the British Army?’ (2014) 37 Journal of Strategic Studies 30 
Systemic Issues, July 2015 (n 97) Issues 9, 15, pp.4-5 
7.3 
212  
is found in relation to issue 42, the ‘need to ensure that those responsible for guarding 
captured persons are appropriately trained’.
101 
The SIWG agreed that this issue should be 
reconsidered if further instances of assault on detainees arise, but reasons that ‘changes to 
doctrine, training and monitoring arrangements have been implemented since 2003… and 
the Army Inspector’s two inspections have verified their implementation.’
102
 
 
There are encouraging aspects to the analysis: the recognition that military culture might 
risk ‘inappropriate conduct’, with reference to what it called a ‘wall of silence’ in the 
Baha Mousa Inquiry, and what the IFI termed ‘self-serving’ attitudes by those called to 
give statements in relation to the death of Nadheem Abdullah. The ‘need to ensure that 
armed forces culture does not perpetuate inappropriate conduct’ was retained for further 
consideration by the SIWG if similar situations are brought to its attention;
103 
and   was 
considered once more, in relation to the failure to act on an email to the Royal Air Force 
legal advisers that training in 2004 had recommended hooding, blindfolding and 
restraining prisoners using collar and rope. While the training has since been reformed, 
the failure to follow up on reported deficits in training was retained as a possible 
systemic issue.
104
 
 
Despite the weakness in the SIWG’s definition of ‘systemic issues’ and the lack of 
institutional independence from the MoD, the Systemic Issues Reports yield useful data on   
a range of policy and training reforms, and on the MoD’s attitudes to the identification of 
systemic issues. The SIWG also shows some early awareness of the risks that military 
culture may perpetuate what it calls ‘inappropriate [unlawful] culture’. Yet the tendency to 
assume an issue is resolved because of the absence of recommendations by the Al-Sweady 
Public Inquiry or because reforms have taken place ignores much of the research on IHL 
training and compliance. There is insufficient awareness of the gulf between training for 
understanding and training to promote a willingness to comply. The SIWG reports are not 
quite a missed opportunity, but they have significant shortcomings. 
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Operation Northmoor 
 
 
Operation Northmoor was a brief investigation into several hundred claims of torture and 
other ill-treatment in British military custody in Afghanistan.
105 
It was led by the RMP  
from October 2015, with the MoD announcing in July 2017 that the RMP ‘had found no 
evidence of criminal behaviour by the Armed Forces in Afghanistan to date’ and that   ‘over 
90%  of  the  675  allegations  made’  had  been  discontinued.
106  
Like  IHAT,  there  is  no 
transparent discussion on the methodology for discontinuing hundreds of investigations. 
 
 
Operation Northmoor’s launch was accompanied by a blog post on the MoD website, 
from the Armed Forces Minister, noting the government’s manifesto commitment to 
‘ensure our armed forces overseas are not subject to persistent and sometimes ludicrous 
legal claims’.107 In early 2017, the chair of the Defence Subcommittee, Johnny   Mercer 
MP, had spoken of his disgust at the existence of an inquiry into troops’ actions in 
Afghanistan, and called for Operation Northmoor to close.
108 
In July 2017, the Royal 
Military Police was said to be investigating members of the Special Air Service (SAS) 
for the alleged murder of civilians and subsequent fabrication of evidence to suggest  
that the victims were Taliban insurgents.
109  
Aside from this report, and the MoD’s 
statement that ‘less than 10’ (we do not know how many) investigations remain, there is 
no further information available in the public domain about the status of the 
investigations, and how many, if at all, have been referred to the Service Prosecution 
Authority. The lack of transparency about Operation Northmoor means that this 
investigation cannot be the topic of research or other independent evaluation. It also 
means that the ‘legal siege’ rhetoric studied in 7.5 below is left unchallenged by facts 
relating to current investigations. MoD statements on Operation Northmoor are 
themselves examples of ‘legal siege’ rhetoric, and the Defence Subcommittee appears to 
encourage the MoD to close pending investigations. This is surprising, when 
Parliamentary scrutiny might be used to improve transparency. 
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However, there was a single document which is a caveat to this general lack of  
transparency: a table of investigations released in 2014 as part of the MoD’s weekly updates 
of materials released pursuant to FOI requests. This table details 36 allegations of 
‘mistreatment’  of Afghan  nationals by British  troops.
110  
The  table  covers incidents from 
March 2010 until January 2014, and includes the court-martial against Alexander Blackman 
and colleagues for the murder of a wounded insurgent in September 2011.
111 
Of the other 
cases, one soldier was found guilty of assault occasioning actual bodily harm for stabbing 
an  Afghan  boy  whose  family  refused  medical  treatment.
112  
Three  more  soldiers were 
prosecuted at a court-martial for two incidents involving the sexual touching of Afghan 
children.
113  
These  were  not  apparently  prosecuted  as  sexual  assaults,  nor  as  offences 
against children. One soldier pleaded guilty to two charges of conduct to the prejudice of 
good order and service discipline; while a second soldier pleaded guilty to a racially 
aggravated offence likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress. A third soldier was cleared 
of failing to perform a duty.
114 
In a single other case, an airman was referred to the chain of 
command and fined for an incident of threatening behaviour and disobedience to lawful 
commands, by pointing his gun at a local civilian driver.
115
 
 
This document has similar flaws in transparency to IHAT’s pithy quarterly releases. In 
particular, it raises concerns as to the methodology used in deciding that there was 
insufficient evidence for a case to be referred to the Service Prosecuting Authority. 
References to ‘insufficient evidence’, ‘[a]fter carefully considering the case the 
Independent Service Prosecuting Authority decided not to prosecute’, and ‘no realistic 
prospect of conviction’ appear in all other cases except for those where a complainant 
withdrew his allegations. There is no further detail as to the reasoning used, and the 
conceptual gap between the facts alleged and the finding of ‘insufficient evidence’ or a 
similar decision is startling. In several cases, minor injuries incurred at the point of 
capture lead to a finding of ‘insufficient evidence’.116 This raises the possibility (but not 
more) that charging decisions are less likely for minor assaults or what IHAT would 
consider ‘lower-level ill-treatment’. This would be consistent with the trend in the Al- 
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 Sweady Public Inquiry to marginalise such findings, but it is not proven in this table of 
investigations. 
 
In other more serious cases, there is no explanation for a decision not to prosecute. One 
soldier was reported for murder, having shot a local civilian several times while on 
sangar (lookout) duties. The stated outcome of investigation was: ‘After carefully 
considering the case the Independent [SPA] decided not to prosecute’, with no details on 
the reasons behind that decision.
117 
In a further case, soldiers were referred to the   SPA 
for the war crime of outrages upon personal dignity, for cutting off the fingers of enemy 
fighters killed in action, purportedly for forensic examination. The same outcome of 
allegedly careful consideration and a decision not to prosecute is stated.
118 
Such a   case 
raises issues either of deliberate IHL violations, and/or serious flaws in training and 
supervision, yet there is no contextual information available. There are significant flaws 
in transparency in this partial release of information on investigations on Afghanistan, 
and questions as to the methodology used by the SPA. 
 
The lack of transparency in relation to each of these internal investigations raises 
questions about the government’s understanding and willingness to comply with IHL’s 
obligations to repress grave breaches, and to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for the Four 
Geneva Conventions ‘in all circumstances’; its willingness to investigate alleged 
violations of Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR, and to conduct a genuine investigation into 
alleged war crimes under the Rome Statute. 
 
 
 
 
7.3 ‘Addressed’ versus ‘Implemented’: Belated Reforms to IHL Training 
 
 
The Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report issued 73 recommendations, of which 
Recommendations 47-58 are highly relevant to IHL training, while Recommendations 
59-66 and 67-69 relate to training on tactical questioning and interrogation, and training 
on survive, evade, resist and extract (SERE);
119 
both of which bear on future prevention 
and compliance with IHL. The Report recommended that training on the handling of 
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Captured Persons (CPERS) be both practical and theoretical, conveying prohibitions  
and good practice; ‘woven into the full range’ of military training (an unacknowledged 
paraphrase of the ICRC’s integration), and simulation exercises should not stop when a 
detainee is captured.
120
 
 
Inconsistencies were to be removed from training materials; with the MATT 7 DVD 
amended and reviewed to ensure that the prohibition on the ‘five techniques’ is 
communicated  as  applying in  all  contexts,  not merely interrogation.
121  
The  prisoner 
handling DVD used in training was to be amended to clarify the prohibition of the ‘five 
techniques’ and sight deprivation; and service personnel should receive guidance on 
differentiating between prohibited stress positions and the legitimate use of force to 
effect a search or arrest.
122  
Both MATT 7 and mission-specific training should be 
amended to include information on the risks of positional asphyxia when a detainee is 
restrained.
123  
Better recording was needed of those who receive    annual  IHL  training 
throughout the armed forces, and training should be up-to-date in ‘content… style and 
means of delivery’, with ‘different media’, an avoidance of the ‘stale and routine’, and a 
balance  between  consistent  delivery of  training  year-on-year,  and  ‘some variety’.124 
References to maintaining the ‘shock of capture’ were to be removed from general 
training, with ‘calm, neutral and professional’ or ‘firm, fair and efficient’ preferred.125 
 
To supplement MATT 7 training on LOAC, MATT 6 on Values and Standards ‘should 
include discussion and role play scenarios’ and ‘avoid any risk of complacency’ by 
including  instances  where  UK  forces  have  violated  IHL.
126  
The  recommendations  on 
tactical questioning and interrogation required an ongoing review of training materials, the 
removal of a hint of the then-under-review ‘harsh’ approach; the removal of the ambiguous 
word ‘conditioning’, and a preference for the removal of terminology relating to 
‘maintain[ing]’ or ‘prolong[ing] the shock of capture’.
127  
SERE training materials    should 
include a reiterated prohibition on the five techniques, a reminder to comply with MATT 7 
training, and a warning that the training demonstrates violations of IHL which 
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must not be perpetrated by UK forces.
128 
SERE training must never involve the 
demonstration of ‘any of the prohibited five techniques… conduct after capture or 
resistance  to  interrogation training’.129  The latter two  forms  of  training  demonstrate 
violations of IHL in order to prepare troops for such conduct from enemy forces, and the 
Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report found that troops receiving such training might 
believe the unlawful conduct to which they were exposed was permitted by IHL. 
 
In its Closing Submissions to the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, the MoD noted that some 
improvements to military training were under way. MATT 7 and MATT 6 training were 
being adapted, with a Royal Navy training package based on MATT 7 in development; 
DVDs had been updated, and scenario-based training for MATT 6 was being developed.
130
 
The MoD noted, following the Army Inspector’s report of 2010, that further improvements 
were required, including ‘whether unit commanders are in practice delivering the training’, 
and on adequate recording of ‘how many’ soldiers undertake it.
131 
The MoD accepted the 
need for further improvements in Tactical Questioning training.
132
 
 
In total, the MoD accepted 71 of the 73 recommendations in the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry 
Report, initially accepting 72. When the Report was published, the then Defence Secretary 
acknowledged the ‘shocking displays of brutality’ from British service personnel, and that 
‘violent and cowardly abuse and assaults’ as identified in the Report were the cause of Baha 
Mousa’s  death,  with  deficits  in  training  as  part  of  the  context.
133  
He  accepted  all the 
Report’s recommendations with the exception of ‘a blanket ban … on certain verbal and 
non-physical techniques’.
134 
By the time of the Report’s publication, the MoD had renamed 
and adapted the ‘harsh’ approach to tactical questioning to ‘challenge direct’ and ‘challenge 
indirect’, which the Court of Appeal found to have adequate safeguards to be lawful under 
Article  3  ECHR.
135  
Subsequently,  the  Minister  for  the  Armed  Forces  announced  that 
Recommendation 44 (of external inspection of 
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military detention facilities, perhaps by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Prisons) would also 
be rejected.
136
 
 
There was a succession of statements before and after the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry 
Report’s publication to indicate that reforms to IHL training were in progress or complete. 
None of them addressed individual recommendations relating to IHL training; these were 
blanket assertions. In March 2014, it was asserted that the MoD had ‘taken action to 
consider and address all the accepted recommendations in the report.’
137 
In a   Government 
Response to a Defence Select Committee report shortly thereafter, the recommendations 
were said to have been ‘implemented’.
138 
In the MoD’s Closing Submissions to the Al- 
Sweady Public Inquiry, the term ‘implemented’ is used again, with Recommendation 44 
described as ‘accepted and implemented’, because consideration was given to the 
recommendation, but it ‘did not lead to any policy change’.
139
 
 
At first sight, there is a discrepancy between these assurances that training reforms were 
implemented and the summer 2014 decision by MoDREC to block the proposed surveys 
and interviews for this thesis on the basis that the February 2014 Operational Law Training 
Directive had not been implemented.
140 
It was not until April 2015 that the Operational 
Law  Training  Directive  had  been  fully  negotiated  with  the  chain  of  command      and 
introduced without amendment into the MATT 7 instructional materials for   2015-2016.
141
 
While some aspects of the British Army’s reforms to IHL training and some specific 
recommendations from the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry may have been fully implemented at 
the time of the Government’s assurances to Parliament, the Defence Select Committee and 
the Al-Sweady Public Inquiry, these statements do not specify which recommendations had 
been so implemented. The use of the terms ‘implemented’ and ‘addressed’ interchangeably 
suggests some ambiguity. ‘To implement’ refers to putting a decision or plan into action, or 
fulfilling an undertaking; while ‘to address’ refers to ‘think[ing] about and begin[ning] to 
deal with’ a particular issue.
142 
In the case of the Operational Law Training Directive  2014 
itself (which is both broader and narrower in scope than the recommendations of the Baha 
Mousa Public Inquiry), ‘implemented’ was 
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inaccurate in spring 2014, when the document merely existed, and had not been 
negotiated with the chain of command prior to its implementation in MATT 7. These 
government assurances show little understanding that implementation is a continuum, 
worthy of theoretical study in its own right.
143
 
 
This case study research has revealed a more nuanced position: minimal improvements 
to IHL training, prevention and compliance from 2004-2011, with more substantive (but 
still gradual) reforms from 2011-2015. The Aitken Report acknowledged that in 2004, 
pre-deployment training on detainee handling was improved, to include a specific 
prohibition on hooding.
144 
In 2005, and again in 2007, two editions of a confidential 
Ministry  of  Defence  Policy  on  Tactical  Questioning  and  Interrogation:  Support   to 
Operations were produced.
145 
Soldiers who completed conduct after capture (CAC) 
training before 2003-4 had to be ‘revalidat[ed]’ before they could conduct  interrogation 
and tactical questioning.
146 
In 2006, an Operational Law Branch was established,   inter 
alia ‘to improve the quality of legal advice in training’ and to ‘review… all material 
taught in both the adaptive foundation and on pre-deployment training.’147 This led to 
the introduction of the first MATT, also in 2006;
148 
but as 7.4.2 below notes, the 
instructional materials remained dated, and the testing materials elliptical and lacking in 
comprehensiveness.  In  2010,  the  Army  Inspectorate  Review  found  ‘no  evidence to 
suggest that pre-deployment and in-theatre training are failing to prepare forces to  carry 
out detainee handling’;149 but the materials used for these trainings remain inaccessible 
to independent research or Parliamentary scrutiny.
150 
The period prior to 2011 features 
reactive, minimal improvements, and assertions from internal reports that all is now well 
with the British Army’s IHL training. 
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These assertions on reformed IHL training are not dissimilar to the assertions before 
Parliament in the late 1950s and 1960s that the UK was implementing its obligations to 
disseminate the Four Geneva Conventions and integrate them into military training; 
assertions that Draper found unpersuasive.
151 
The gradual reforms from 2011-2015  are 
more substantive, echoing Bennett’s findings that the MoD did not begin substantive 
reforms to doctrine and training until the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry was under way.
152 
The  Consolidated  Guidance  to   Intelligence  Officers   and  Service  Personnel      was 
published in November 2011,
153 
just after the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry Report.   The 
2
nd 
edition of JDP 1-10 (2011) refers to the prohibition of the five techniques in all 
operations, implementing one of the recommendations of the Baha Mousa Public 
Inquiry. Issue 5 (2013) of the MATT 7 included audio-visual instruction on detainee 
handling that was a marked improvement on previous iterations. As 7.4.2 below will 
explore, this material alone implemented several but not all of the recommendations 
from the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry. Further turning-points include the Operational  
Law Training Directive of February 2014, its implementation in a comprehensively 
expanded MATT 7 in 2015,
154 
and the 3
rd 
edition of JDP 1-10 on CPERS, also in 2015. 
This document includes valuable personnel screening tools as a technique to prevent 
torture and inhuman treatment in British military detention; shows awareness of the 
risks of ill-treatment from racist epithets and moral disengagement; and urges command 
responsibility and an obligation to report instances of ill-treatment.
155
 
 
Implementing reforms to the British Army’s IHL training was far more gradual than the 
MoD’s assertions to Parliament and public inquiries might suggest. The gradualism does 
raise questions: why did it take almost 12 years after the death of Baha Mousa fully to 
implement an ambitious pro-compliance approach to IHL training? The assertions that 
all accepted reforms from the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry had been ‘implemented’ were 
prima facie misleading, although many of them had been ‘addressed’. The lack of 
specificity in these assurances speaks to a lack of transparency at the MoD about IHL 
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training, and a willingness to rely on bald statements instead of precision. There is a  
lack of awareness that Parliamentary scrutiny and independent research might benefit 
the quality of these belated reforms. The following section delves into the gradual 
reforms to IHL training following the death of Baha Mousa, and the much more 
comprehensive recent changes to IHL training with the Operational Law Training 
Directive, and its implementation in MATT 7. 
 
7.4 Analysis of Training Materials 
 
 
Summary of Current LOAC Training 
 
 
The UK armed forces’ LOAC training policy is set by the Development Concepts and 
Doctrine  Centre  (DCDC),  at  the  Defence  Academy  in  Shrivenham;
156  
with  individual 
services detailing the knowledge that their personnel are expected to achieve. All recruits to 
the armed forces receive training in LOAC in Phase 1 of their training, and will receive 
continuation training in Phase 2 if their ‘overall course length exceeds 6 months’.
157 
New 
recruits to the British Army are trained in the law of armed conflict once during the 14-week 
phase 1 of initial, generalist training. This takes place at Individual Training Centre (ITC) 
Catterick, Army Training Centre (ATR) Pirbright, ATR Winchester, ATR Grantham (for 
recruits to the Reserves), and the Army Foundation College Harrogate (for recruits aged 16- 
17.5).
158   
As  infantry  recruits  progress  to  Phase  2,  they  may  receive    special-to-arms 
individual training in the LOAC relating to the weapons systems they will use, e.g. in the 
Royal Regiment of Artillery or the Royal Corps of Signals. At the Royal Military Academy 
Sandhurst (RMAS), there is a longer course for officer cadets. The LOAC training at  
RMAS is based on MATT 7, and there is a pass rate (not necessarily a first-time pass rate)  
of  100%  for  the  LOAC  module.
159  
At  RMAS,  the  final  practical  exercise,  Operation 
Broadsword, incorporates IHL,
160 
and the role of the ICRC in humanitarian assistance. It is 
established practice to allow a representative of the ICRC to attend as an observer, and to 
debrief officer cadets on their compliance with IHL.
161
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Sandhurst also hosts a five-week course for officers in the Reserves, and a longer course for 
medics, lawyers and padres. The Head of ALS also asserted that judgemental training 
incorporates IHL, but there are no corroborating documentary sources available.
162
 
 
Continuation training is the responsibility of each service: annual training is now 
mandated for the Royal Navy as part of Core Maritime Skill (CMS) 7,
163 
while Hansard 
records from 2005 suggest this was not required then.
164 
There is a train-the-trainers 
model in the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, whereby the Command Team of each 
unit  receives  training  from  legal  advisers,  and  are  then  expected  to  pass  on   their 
knowledge of LOAC to the Ship’s Company via CMS 7.165 Members of the Royal   Air 
Force (RAF) receive continuation training in LOAC as part of Individual Reinforcement 
Training (IRT) (referred to as Common Core Skills Training in 2014)
166 
and of the 
Generic   Education   and   Training  Requirement   for  those   progressing   through the 
ranks.
167 
In the Army, soldiers and officers must receive LOAC training once annually, 
and pass all nine MATT each year, of which the seventh focuses on operational law (see 
7.4.2 below). Continuation training in the Royal Marines is also based on the MATT, 
and includes LOAC.
168 
This continuation training, in which individuals are assessed, is 
classroom-based; but there may also be collective training involving practical exercises, 
where whole units are assessed on their knowledge, including of IHL. This collective 
training is ‘designed to identify and fix any systemic knowledge gaps at each level of 
command.’169 
 
Each service sets its own policy for the knowledge of LOAC expected at junior and senior 
levels. The Operational Law Training Directive 2014 sets these criteria in ‘formal training 
statements’ for ‘generic soldier’ and ‘officer’. ALS run training courses on LOAC in the 
Defence Academy’s Joint Officers Tactical Awareness Course (JOTAC), and  the 
Command, Leadership and Management course (CLM) at the Joint Services Command and 
Staff College. LOAC training for more senior officers, such as on the Advanced 
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Command and Staff Course (ACSC) is arranged on a tri-service basis and integrated  
into the postgraduate-level syllabus, which is developed by King’s College London. 
Until recently, LOAC and military ethics were taught together; risking consequentialist 
or just war theory arguments infecting officers’ understanding of IHL.170 
 
Pre-deployment and mission-specific training must include LOAC for all ‘those   deploying 
to a theatre in which LOAC may apply’.
171 
This will be specific to the conflict and ‘the 
nature  of  the  operation’,  so  the  training  is  developed  by  Joint  Force  Command,   and 
delivered by lawyers for each service.
172 
Pre-deployment training is based on the ROE   for 
each mission. The training materials are not publicly available as a result; and this also 
means that the MoD’s classification of particular conflicts as either international or non- 
international armed conflicts is inaccessible to researchers. This is a significant limitation in 
the available dataset on the British Army’s training in IHL, as 7.4.3 notes. 
 
7.4.1    The Operational Law Training Directive 2014 
 
 
Prior to the Operational Law Training Directive of February 2014, the British Army’s 
approach to IHL training was perfunctory and time-limited. The Individual Training 
Directive (Army) 6, in versions from 1998 and 2003, provided that one period of 40 minutes 
annually should be devoted to knowledge of LOAC;
173  
while 23.5 periods of 40    minutes, 
over 15 hours was devoted to weapons training. The training time devoted to learning about 
LOAC was half that given to learning about the risks of substance misuse.
174 
In 1998, this 
annual training comprised a pamphlet    on LOAC, supplemented by a  ‘brief explanation of 
the different roles of the soldier in peace support operations’.
175  
Field exercises using 
scenarios which incorporated LOAC were a possibility for mission-specific/pre-deployment 
training.
176 
In 2003, the annual training had expanded from the pamphlet, also to include an 
Aide-Mémoire in Annex B to the pamphlet on LOAC, a 15 minute film and 24 slide 
PowerPoint lecture.
177 
Both Directives evidence a train-the- 
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trainers model, with Army lawyers available to provide advice and guidance, and non- 
lawyer officers (warrant officers, senior non-commissioned officers) training soldiers 
and junior non-commissioned officers within their unit.
178 
As these officers would have 
been trained in brief annual sessions at earlier stages in their career, it is questionable 
whether their knowledge had sufficient depth to impart it to soldiers in their command. 
The train-the-trainers model would have been consistent with the narration of pamphlets 
and PowerPoint slides; and a passive, non-reflective form of learning. A pseudonymous 
former officer opined that the content of LOAC training was often boring, the train-the- 
trainers model unhelpful, and LOAC training somewhat resented. Trainers would be 
‘reading out a badly-scripted PowerPoint…half-heartedly as if the entire thing is a 
tiresome imposition standing between them and tea and toast.’179 
 
A passive mode of learning is evident elsewhere in these Individual Training Directives. 
Personnel must merely ‘attend’ the LOAC training once a year, with their attendance 
recorded.
180  
The  training  objectives  similarly  favoured  passive  learning. Instructors 
should ‘[d]escribe the effect of the Law of Armed Conflict on military operations’; 
‘formative and summative assessment’ is mentioned briefly alongside ‘an appropriate 
instructional environment’ and resources under the ‘conditions’ for the training to take 
place, but the 1998 and 2003 Directives provide no centralised instruction on how to 
design these assessments, nor to ensure that they take place.
181 
It is suggested that these 
Directives did not provide for assessment or evaluation, and merely mandated 
attendance at a brief annual LOAC training session. 
 
Both these Directives were disclosed to the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, and the 2003 
Directive has an Annex with an unattributed, undated (approximately mid-2005) internal 
Army document about LOAC training reforms. Implicit in this document is the suggestion 
that the first deployment of troops to Iraq in Operation Telic did not receive pre-deployment 
training in LOAC, because such training is stated to have begun in the second phase, or 
Operational Telic 2.
182 
The document has no identified author, but he or she does not know 
whether in-theatre guidance was given on LOAC in Operation Telic 
 
 
ITD(A) 6 LOAC 1998, para 10; ITD(A) 6 LOAC 2003, para 9 
‘Lawyers to Right of Them, Lawyers to Left of Them’, The Economist, 9 August 2014, comment by 
Camberley4PQ (a pseudonym for a former Army lawyer) 
ITD(A) 6 LOAC 1998, paras 5, 17; ITD(A) 6 LOAC 2003, paras 4, 16 
ITD(A) 6 LOAC 1998, 2-6-1; ITD(A) 6 LOAC 2003, 2-6-1. 
‘Trg (sic.) Policy/Theatre Guidance on Handling of Prisoners’, annexed to ITD(A) 6 LOAC 2003 
225  
1.
183 
The author refers to a review of the Individual Training Directive on LOAC, and 
the future intention to test troops’ knowledge of LOAC. Test papers were to be trialled  
in September-December of the year the document was written, and introduced in   April 
2006.
184 
This would have been the beginning of the first MATT in LOAC. Despite   the 
intention to introduce testing, there was little comprehensive reform of the content, 
duration or learning style encouraged by these Individual Training Directives. The 
training received by troops in the years following the death of Baha Mousa was 
inadequate, lacking an appropriate priority in the curriculum. 
 
The Operational Law Training Directive, written in February 2014, is remarkable in its 
scope and commitment to LOAC training, and has several advantages. It is far broader 
than the Individual Training Directives that preceded it, and does not focus merely on 
individual continuation training (MATT 7). The 2014 Directive is relevant to all training 
sites  that  provide  ‘individual,  collective  or  mission  specific  training’.185  Only   the 
specialist education of ALS officers is outside its scope.
186 
There is emphasis on the 
‘command responsibility’ to ensure that operational law training is implemented in 
accordance with the Directive, and the chain of command must ensure the completion 
and auditing of MATT 7.
187 
The aim is to make LOAC part of general training, so it 
‘seeps in’ and becomes ‘second nature’.188 This statement of ethos, the only citable part 
of an otherwise off-the-record meeting, is almost made out in the Directive itself, but the 
modalities for what a constructivist would  term norm internalisation,
189  
and what    the 
ICRC would consider a slim version of ‘integration’,190 are only partly achieved. 
 
First: how is the training delivered? While there is much to commend in the range of norms 
that both soldiers and officers are expected to understand (these are set out in Operational 
Performance Statements in the Annexes to the 2014 Directive and discussed below),
191  
the 
Directive selects a standardised, scripted approach for individual, continuation training, 
where (if an ALS lawyer is unavailable to deliver the training) non-lawyer officers read out 
verbatim notes to support PowerPoint slides: MATT 7 must be 
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shown in full and the script followed to ensure that the training objectives are met.’192 
Standardised delivery of training materials is an important safeguard against variation in 
the content delivered between training sites, but this scripting reinforces the British 
Army’s primary reliance on a dissemination model of instruction. MATT 7, under the 
Directive, also retains the train-the-trainer model from previous Individual Training 
Directives.
193 
Scripting and the training delivery by non-lawyers carries risks in relation 
to complex and often misunderstood IHL concepts. While much of the material for 
individual training is delivered visually, in PowerPoint slides and video format, literacy 
concerns may still be relevant to the development of soldiers’ conceptual understanding, 
especially as IHL terms are polysyllabic. Literacy concerns are widespread in the armed 
forces, with many standard-entry recruits having few school qualifications and often 
experiencing unease in classroom settings. The UK House of Commons Defence Select 
Committee report found that the minimum literacy standard for armed forces recruits 
was that of a seven to eight-year-old child, yet of those recruited to the Army in 2012, 
39% had an 11-year old’s level of literacy. Only 3.5% were assessed to be at the 
minimum  entry  level.
194  
With  this  in  mind,  scripting  LOAC  training  suggests that 
complex concepts such as the IHL principle of proportionality will be heard but perhaps 
not understood by troops whose experiences of formal education has led to literacy 
difficulties or an unease in classroom settings. 
 
The 2014 Directive’s provision for collective training is more practical, better suited to 
soldiers with literacy difficulties, and encourages a more active form of learning, with 
informal evaluation of the training’s effectiveness built in. Collective training ‘(both 
foundation and mission specific) [should] be structured to provide opportunities to confirm 
participants’  understanding’  and  the  unit’s  correct  application  of  operational     law.
195
 
Collective training is also the Directive’s best attempt at the ICRC’s ‘integration’. 
Operational law scenarios should form part of collective training exercises ‘whenever 
possible’, and especially to practise and evaluate units’ understanding and compliance with 
the law relating to CPERS.
196 
While pre-deployment training is not the responsibility 
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of ALS’ Operational Law Branch, the 2014 Directive recommends that this training also 
include ‘confirmatory exercises’ about operational law.197 
 
Second, what is trained? The Directive has comprehensive aims for LOAC knowledge. 
These are detailed in Operational Performance Statements and Formal Training 
Statements in the Annexes, and differentiated approximately by ‘generic soldier’ and 
‘generic officer’.198 These are the objectives on which initial and continuation   (MATT 
7) training will be based.
199 
Advice should be sought from Army lawyers about the 
relevant operational law issues in special-to-arms (weapons) training.
200 
There is much 
to be commended about the breadth of knowledge in these Operational Performance 
Statements. There are 22 categories of required knowledge, with a significant    majority 
of each category’s constituent elements applicable to both soldiers and officers. 
 
 
The difference between IAC and NIAC must be understood, alongside the principles of 
military necessity, humanity, distinction and proportionality.
201 
Both soldiers and officers 
must be able to identify military objectives and civilian objects; to act appropriately to all 
categories   of   persons   (combatants,   civilians,   refugees);   to   understand   and respond 
accordingly to civilians directly participating in hostilities and the concept of  levée en 
masse.
202 
Both soldiers and officers must be able to identify and abide by prohibitions on 
certain weapons,  and understand perfidy and  ruses,  and the prohibition  on using   civilian 
shields.
203   
They   must   understand   and   comply   with   rules   on   target  identification, 
precautions and warnings before an attack and determine responsibility for ending an attack 
which might be indiscriminate. Civilian objects, cultural property, medical facilities, and 
work and installations containing dangerous forces must all be recognised and protected.
204
 
Rules  on  a  range  of  protective  emblems,  white  flags,  truce  and  surrender  must  all be 
understood, and their misuse identified.
205 
Soldiers and officers must both know how to 
differentiate a military objective and a civilian object, limiting attacks to 
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military objectives only. LOAC protections must be given to civilians, medical and 
religious personnel.
206
 
 
Rules relating to protected persons, including the wounded, sick, shipwrecked, and 
CPERS (prisoners of war, civilian internees, and other detainees) must be understood; 
and each of the five techniques are set out as prohibitions which must be understood. 
Soldiers and officers must both identify correct questioning and handover procedures  
for CPERS, and report abuse or death ‘to the chain of command and Service Police’ 
without delay.
207  
These training requirements implement several recommendations   of 
the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry. As such, they are reactive, and dependent upon the 
findings of one Inquiry, but the comprehensive training requirements in the Operational 
Law Training Directive dispel any concerns about selectivity in these reactive reforms. 
 
There is an important progressive step towards linking military training in IHL with 
other laconic norms of prevention: individual and professional, criminal and command 
responsibilities must all be understood, including some basic international criminal law. 
Personnel must understand that they have the responsibility to intervene if a LOAC 
violation is in progress, and to recognise and report LOAC violations, war crimes, 
crimes against humanity and genocide.
208 
Soldiers and officers must be able to  identify 
an unlawful order, and to know that they must follow lawful orders while not  following 
unlawful  orders.
209  Warrant  Officers  and  above  must  be  able  to  ‘[r]ecognise what 
action should be taken in response to an unlawful command’. The training requirements 
to identify and act upon command responsibility are sensibly greater for officers than 
soldiers, who must also ‘issue lawful orders, … [a]pply command responsibility for the 
actions of subordinates… [and i]nterpret state accountability for LOAC    violations.’210 
Knowledge requirements on the use of force and ROE follow.
211
 
 
Knowledge of human rights ‘principles’ applicable in armed conflict is also stipulated, but 
the knowledge required is imprecise and general. Soldiers and officers must recognise the 
framework of human rights law, to whom it applies, the ‘implications of breaching 
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basic human rights principles’, and must ‘carry out the process of reporting human 
rights  violations.
212   There  is  very  little  precision  here:  do  ‘basic  human       rights 
principles’ refer only to civil and political rights, or to economic, social and cultural 
rights as well? If only the former, how are the ‘basic … principles’ identified? Only the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child is included in the Formal Training Statements: 
there is no mention of the ECHR, the HRA, nor the obligation in Article 10 of CAT to 
train anyone from ‘civil or military’ law enforcement, or anyone who would have 
custody of a detainee in the prohibitions therein. The UK is not yet a state party to the 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance 
(CED), and enforced disappearance is absent from the Directive. 
 
Yet, in a contrast of tone and substance to public statements by MoD officials and some 
military spokespeople, the co-applicability of IHL and IHRL is recognised as possible, 
particularly in non-international armed conflicts, but the parameters for co-applicability 
have not been fully settled.
213 
Although this is far from an acceptance that IHRL always 
applies alongside IHL in armed conflicts (whether IAC or NIAC), this nuanced 
approach is more knowledgeable and less politicised than the opinions stated from 
Ministerial sources, and is a considerable advance on the position that IHL should apply 
alone in armed conflict, as a lex specialis that ousts any other branch of international 
law.
214 
The comprehensive ambitions for LOAC knowledge and this nuanced approach 
to IHRL applicable in armed conflict begins to suggest that ALS is a distinct community 
of practice from those who hold the view that the armed forces are under ‘legal siege’, 
or that operational effectiveness is somehow undermined by the co-applicability of IHL 
and IHRL.
215
 
 
The remaining categories require soldiers and officers to integrate their Values and 
Standards (MATT 6) knowledge and conduct with their LOAC knowledge, although how 
this integration will take place is not detailed in the Directive. For officer training courses, 
the Directive provides a requirement to understand the legal framework and offences 
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applicable to deployed operations, and to undertake military aid to government and 
civilian entities.
216
 
 
The Directive implies by omission that LOAC consists of the law of IAC and belligerent 
occupation. It is silent on the law of NIAC, except for the requirement that soldiers and 
officers  ‘identify  the  difference’  between  IAC  and  NIAC;217  and  one  reference to 
Additional  Protocol  II,  which  appears  as  part  of  a  non-exhaustive  list  of     LOAC 
treaties.
218 
At first sight, this looks like a lack of precision; but on a second,   contextual 
reading, it promotes IHL compliance. As the IHL of IAC offers more detailed 
protections than the IHL of NIAC, it speaks to the ambitions of the Directive’s authors 
for comprehensive IHL training. Questions of conflict classification are the domain of 
pre-deployment, mission-specific training. The MoD will decide on the classification of 
a conflict, and will decide upon the customary IHL to apply as part of confidential ROE. 
The ROE will then be communicated in pre-deployment and in-theatre training. This 
leaves open the possibility that selected norms from the IHL of IAC will be applied to a 
NIAC as customary IHL, improving the protections granted to non-combatants as 
compared to treaty law alone. However, pre-deployment training materials are classified 
owing to their reliance on the ROE,
219 
so this remains an unproven possibility only. 
 
Third, what is the scope for recording and evaluating the training? Here, the findings are 
more critical. Each Training Delivery Authority should use the Operational Deployability 
Record (ODR) to record soldiers’ and officers’ LOAC training attendance, completion and 
test  results.
220  
Training sites must  give  annual  reports on  the  training conducted  to  the 
Director  of  Operational  Law  at  ALS,  for  the  purposes  of  internal  evaluation.  This  is 
supplemented by an external evaluation, using the ‘Army SMART Evaluation Policy’.
221
 
The ODR’s testing and training records will not yield data on the effectiveness of military 
instruction for each category of LOAC norm. This will be thin data only; a human resources 
approach to IHL training. Such an approach may help resolve the Systemic Issue flagged by 
the  SIWG that  some  individuals might  miss the  relevant training,
222  
but it will  do  little 
more. The procedures for internal evaluation also cannot establish an 
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 individual soldier’s learning norm-by-norm, or category-by-category; a problem that 
recurs in the recording of data from MATT 7. External evaluation is not external in the 
sense of an independent or transparent audit of the Army’s IHL training. 
 
Fourth, what of the timing of the Directive’s publication and its subsequent 
implementation? The Directive is a belated response to the recommendations of the  
Baha Mousa Public Inquiry. There was a fourteen-month ‘transition’,223 between the 
Directive’s appearance and its full implementation in MATT 7,224  during which    time, 
ALS negotiated its implementation with the chain of command. Despite this lengthy 
period of negotiation, the Directive was implemented without amendment from its 
February 2014 version. The need for this negotiation exemplifies the limited power of 
the ALS to decide upon and ensure the swift implementation of necessary reforms to 
IHL training. More importantly for the UK’s IHL compliance, it took 11 years and 7 
months from the death of Baha Mousa in British military custody until the 
implementation of comprehensive reforms to the British Army’s IHL training into 
annual continuation training. 
 
Looking forward, the Operational Law Training Directive 2014 is ambitious in its 
commitment for comprehensive instruction in IHL. In its linkage of command 
responsibility and the recognition of unlawful orders, the Directive just begins to  
connect training and prevention. The Operational Law Training Directive successfully 
moves beyond the Army’s limited and perfunctory approach to IHL training, and as  
such it represents a valuable step towards soldiers’ and officers’ understanding of IHL. 
Yet a dissemination model is retained for individual training, with practical scenarios in 
collective training attempting a slim sense of the ICRC’s ‘integration’. Observers cannot 
know whether understanding will be sufficient, and detailed knowledge retained unless 
data collection and evaluation processes are improved. As might be expected in a policy 
document, there are no references to insights from social psychology and compliance 
theory. No predictions can be made from the Directive alone as to the volitional aspects 
of soldiers’ and officers’ future compliance with IHL. 
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232  
7.4.2 Military Annual Training Tests on the Law of Armed Conflict 
 
 
The MATT on LOAC has evolved from a perfunctory approach to initial and annual 
instruction and assessment in 2006-2011, not much improved from the training before 
Operation Telic in 2003; to a progressively more ambitious set of classroom-based and 
multimedia resources. The current MATT 7 integrates the requirements of the 
Operational Law Training Directive, includes relevant IHRL norms in the Modules on 
CPERS and the Use of Force, and now includes Investigations and Accountability.
225
 
Each year, all personnel must pass the first three Modules, while staff in deployable 
roles (including Reserves warned for operations) must also pass the fourth, on the Use  
of Force.
226  
Soldiers receive almost three hours of training across MATT 7’s four 
Modules.
227 
These latest reforms to IHL training offer a comprehensive approach to 
classroom-based instruction, with video and e-learning tools to help soldiers who 
struggle with literacy or classroom-based instruction; while the emphasis on command 
responsibility and obeying only lawful orders begins to connect IHL training, prevention 
and compliance. The continuation of a train-the-trainers model offers unit ‘ownership’ 
of the materials, so that soldiers are trained by an officer they know, but runs the risk 
that that an officer merely reads the script, without clarifying misunderstandings on 
substantive IHL. 
 
In 2006, LOAC training was combined with Values and Standards, Substance Misuse and 
Equality and Diversity awareness, with LOAC taught in a 22-minute video and tested in 10 
multiple choice questions. 
228 
This was the first time LOAC knowledge was tested. 
229 
In 
2008, LOAC was given its own MATT, but many of the multiple-choice questions reflected 
policy and not law, e.g. ‘What is the main reason why you should always treat the local 
population humanely?’ was correctly answered by ‘It will help to win the battle for hearts 
and minds.’ There is no reference to binding IHL, nor to the specific duties involved in 
‘treat[ing]’ them ‘humanely’.
230  
The past papers broach the issues of unlawful orders    and 
the prohibition on ordering that there be no survivors, but the multiple-choice 
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format does not test depth of understanding or the ability to apply knowledge in diverse 
operational circumstances. Discursive, or scenario-based training and testing would be 
more helpful to teach these skills. The multiple-choice questions in 2009 and 2011 
might have misled soldiers, for example a question about the purpose of LOAC included 
three wrong answers, of which the first, that LOAC is intended to ‘Make war-fighting 
more  difficult’231  might  be  chosen  by soldiers  influenced  by  ‘legal  siege’ rhetoric; 
while a 2011 question implied that ROE or the presence of medical personnel could 
authorise hooding prisoners.
232 In 2012, test papers included a useful gauge of soldiers’ 
and   officers’   understanding   of   command   responsibility  and   their   duty  to report 
violations, and a question to elicit misunderstandings of reciprocity.
233   
Norm-by-norm 
data collection would have allowed units to track soldiers’ misunderstanding. 
 
The  March  2013  Policy Update  for  the  Military Annual  Training Tests was the   second 
turning point towards genuine, comprehensive improvements to annual training.
234 
The 
Policy Update explains that from 1 April 2013, significantly updated DVD instructional 
materials  are  available,
235   
including  audio-visual  material  on  CPERS  and     increased 
precision in the lecture materials for LOAC.
236 
The 2013 lecture on CPERS precisely 
defines prohibited stress positions (‘painful, extremely uncomfortable or exhausting to 
maintain’),  the  prohibition  of hooding (‘at  any time  and  for  any purpose’),  and required 
humane  treatment  (‘all  CPERS  must  be  protected  from  assault,  abuse,  and  any   other 
humiliating or degrading treatment’)
237 
to reflect the recommendations of the Baha  Mousa 
Public Inquiry Report, but not quite to attain the standards in Article 17 of the Third Geneva 
Convention, in which prisoners of war who refuse to answer questions ‘may not be 
threatened, insulted, or exposed to any unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any 
kind.’
238   
The  definition  of  ‘humane  treatment’  does  not  expressly  prohibit     sexually 
degrading acts, perhaps reflecting an unwillingness to acknowledge the abuses perpetrated 
in Kenya, Iraq and elsewhere. Physical vulnerability is acknowledged more readily: 
‘…some CPERS may be vulnerable persons, and special rules may apply 
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to them.’239 The script on CPERS in the 2015 MATT 7 explains the risks for positional 
asphyxia and the need for medics to be available.
240 
While this implements the 
recommendations  of  the  Baha  Mousa  Public  Inquiry,  it  sits  uneasily with  the clear 
definition and prohibition of stress positions in the audio-visual materials on captured 
persons from 2013 onwards, as there should be no risk of positional asphyxia from  
stress positions if stress positions are never used. The prohibition on verbal abuse is 
briefly acknowledged: ‘CPERS must not be abused either physically or verbally….’241 
 
Reciprocity features in relation to CPERS’ nutrition and medical treatment. CPERS 
should have three meals a day; soldiers can ration detainees’ water or food if that also 
applies to UK forces (‘If you are on rations, then so are they.’) 242 In the audio-visual 
materials, an actor playing a soldier is overheard saying (at the point of capture)  ‘D’you 
want some water?’243 This instruction considerably improves the direction prior to 2004 
to refrain from giving comforts to detainees, which was interpreted after the Battle of 
Danny Boy to permit the refusal of water.
244 
If captured persons are more seriously 
injured than British personnel, ‘they get treated first’. They should receive ‘equivalent’ 
medical treatment for British personnel and CPERS: ‘it is about parity.’ 
 
Troops are reminded of their obligations to ‘seek out ICRC’ and give detainees the right 
to complain,
245 
to protect POW from insults and public curiosity, 
246 
and of   individual 
and command responsibility for IHL violations. 
247 
From 2016 onwards, training on 
CPERS has a practical component for individual and collective training. A CPERS 
Handling Drill must be included in basic and continuation training for all ranks, in 
mission-specific (pre-deployment) training and in-theatre training for troops who    miss 
the pre-deployment training.
248 This is ‘integration’ in the ICRC’s sense, and provides 
practical learning opportunities alongside the classroom-based approach in MATT 7. 
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The LOAC Module for the 2015 MATT 7 reflects the Operational Law Training 
Directive 2014. It is ambitious and scripted, using complex terminology, so the trainer 
(whether lawyer or not) may not be sure that individual service personnel understand all 
the terms of art. The script covers the distinction between IAC and NIAC; military 
necessity, humanity, distinction and proportionality in more detail than previous 
versions.
249 
The train-the-trainers model will continue in most units, with ALS  officers 
scripting the lecture material  and  non-lawyers  delivering it  verbatim.
250  
This    offers 
standardised training, limiting variation between training sites, but points of 
misunderstanding or gaps in knowledge may not be shared with ALS by those  
delivering the training. Non-lawyer trainers may not have sufficient knowledge of every 
aspect of MATT 7 to clarify when soldiers and officers under their command ask 
questions, but the instructors are ‘encouraged to add emphasis’ to the compulsory script 
‘with examples from practical experience.’251 
 
The Module on the Use of Force is partly classed ‘Official Sensitive’, including those 
on the content of the Card Alpha carried by soldiers.
252 
The unclassified sections 
explain ‘offensive force’ (governed by LOAC and ROE) and force in ‘self-defence’ (a 
soldier can open fire if he has an ‘honest belief’ that there is an ‘imminent threat’ to 
human life, 
253 but ‘once the threat stops, you must stop’).254 The legal basis for   ‘self- 
defence’ is unspecified: it could be the standards governing peacekeeping missions,255 
domestic criminal law, or Art 2(2)(a) of the ECHR. The Module on the Use of Force 
does not teach soldiers how to differentiate between situations in which LOAC targeting 
applies and those in which self-defence rules apply. 
 
 
Finally, the Module on Investigations and Accountability was apparently created for 
structural reasons, to move material already present in an over-long LOAC Module.
256 
However,  it  has  substantive  impact  beyond  this,  training  troops  in  IHL’s  norms of 
prevention,
257 and clarifying the ICC’s jurisdiction and that of national courts. The 
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Module emphasises the obligation to disobey unlawful orders (first asking for ‘clarification 
or explanation’),
258 
to intervene to end a war crime being committed by UK personnel   (‘if 
you judge it safe to do so’)
259 
and to report war crimes by UK personnel  (reassuring 
soldiers that there should be no repercussions for doing so).
260 
Ranks above lance corporal 
have   command   responsibility   to   ensure   that   subordinates   understand   their   LOAC 
obligations; to report, and if necessary, stop war crimes committed by their subordinates. 
Module 2 begins to correct the view that only ‘other’ armed forces and armed groups 
commit violations of IHL; as recommended by the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry.
261 
Briefly,  
it also addresses the risk of violations perpetrated through a sense of false reciprocity (‘You 
are never allowed to breach the law just because the enemy has done so’),
262 
although   this 
can and should be emphasised to a greater extent in MATT 7. 
 
7.4.3 A Note on Unavailable or Restricted Materials 
 
 
Although FOI requests yielded past papers and recent policy documents, lectures and 
audio-visual materials for MATT 7, and a full version of the Operational Law Training 
Directive, there is much left inaccessible to the researcher. First, there are no data on 
pre-deployment training in IHL and mission-specific training following deployment, as 
these would integrate LOAC and classified ROE. 
 
Second, there was a single redaction in the Use of Force lecture slides from the FOI 
copies of MATT 7 from 2014 and 2015, apparently because of an error in a lecture slide 
which implied that the proportionality calculus was set as a ‘number of  estimated 
civilian casualties and estimated damage to civilian objects’.263  The correct    phrasing, 
intended for inclusion in MATT 7 for 2016 was: 
 
The Targeting Directive adds specific policy constraints on WHAT effect the 
commander can have on a target: such constraints include limitations for 
collateral damage including civilian casualties.
264
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This text implies a qualitative standard, or qualitative policy constraints perhaps 
underpinned with a numerical limitation on estimated civilian casualties. However, as 
the Targeting Directive is itself classified, it is impossible for a non-military researcher 
to parse the significance of this difference. 
 
Third, even the ambitious Operational Law Training Directive and MATT 7 from 2015 
onwards can illustrate only the intended understanding of IHL from those designing the 
training, not the depth of understanding of service personnel following these 
terminologically complex presentations. The ODR, which records serving personnel’s  
record on the MATT, is inaccessible to researchers for good data protection reasons, and no 
data exist on how many new recruits have to retake MATT 7 during their Phase 1 
training.
265 
The Army Secretariat offered alternative data, the total volume of those starting 
and finishing Phase 1 Army training, but this is not informative as to the number of recruits 
who might fail, retake, and fail again the LOAC component of their training. 
 
Fourth, as noted above, the ODR provides only pass/fail data for the nine MATT, so it is 
not fit for purpose as a norm-by-norm evaluation of soldiers’ and officers’  
understanding of the training given. 
 
Fifth (a related point), while a select few MATT 7 questions might gauge the volitional 
aspects of troops’ internalisation of IHL, there are no centrally collected data on how 
troops respond, for example, to questions about disobeying an unlawful order. 
 
Sixth, there is no publicly-available audit of personnel’s understanding following 
practical exercises or simulations which integrate IHL. 
 
Seventh and finally, while these documentary sources have provided ‘thick’ data as to the 
intended scope and content of the British Army’s IHL training, and of its evolution from a 
perfunctory annual requirement to a genuinely comprehensive attempt at improving the 
Army’s knowledge of IHL, this cannot substitute for in person (or in vivo) qualitative data 
from surveys and interviews, especially on the effect of the current climate of mistrust of 
lawyers, investigations and litigation on the Army’s record in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
Without qualitative data, a researcher can neither prove or rule out troops’ resentment of 
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IHL or IHL training, any measurable effect of ‘legal siege’ rhetoric on their norm 
internalisation; nor of justification of violations even in the presence of a good 
understanding of IHL, a risk noted by the first ICRC Roots of Behaviour in War Study. 
MoD concerns that qualitative research may yield dated findings (where they relate to  
an older iteration of the MATT) or that soldiers might unintentionally reveal classified 
ROE training instead of LOAC training suggest fear on the part of an institution and a 
preference for secrecy, when these insights are needed to assess the British Army’s 
current training in IHL. 
 
7.5 Theory-Building: New Insights from the Case Study on Training, Prevention 
and Compliance 
 
Limited Transparency 
 
6.2 demonstrated gaps in the archive in relation to historic training in IHL,
266 
6.4.3 
showed the MoD’s sharply limited disclosure  at  the judicial  review that  preceded  the 
Al-Sweady   Public   Inquiry,
267   
while   this   chapter   has   demonstrated   the  MoD’s 
institutional culture of limited transparency. IHAT’s closure leaves questions 
unanswered about investigations that were grouped together and swiftly dismissed. Prior 
to this, IHAT’s quarterly releases relied on minimal descriptive detail, and numbered 
ciphers were given to cases, making it difficult to trace allegations from earlier judicial 
review and civil proceedings and subsequent IHAT decisions. 
 
While the IFI seeks and includes contextual detail on IHL training where it is available, 
the Deputy Head of the MoD’s Disclosure Coordination Unit (DCU) cited workload 
concerns, disproportionate search results, and a history of retained hard copy archives 
(while others are destroyed if not deemed worthy of preservation) as reasons for paltry 
disclosure on specific pre-deployment training received by two  regiments  in   2003.
268
 
None of the search terms outlined in the witness statement referred to training in IHL or 
LOAC; some of the disproportionate search results were triggered by broader search 
terms relating to pre-deployment training. With such ineptly broad search terms, it is not 
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surprising that the search results were large in number. This witness statement is further 
evidence of the MoD’s enduring habit of limited transparency. 
 
More than 66,000 files are thought to have been retained in breach of the 30-year rule at 
an archives site in Swadlingcote, Derbyshire; far more than the trove of documents 
belatedly released  by the  FCO  in  the  2011  Hanslope  Disclosure.
269  
The  SIWG has 
similarly obscure methodologies, and the substance of investigations in Operation 
Northmoor were almost entirely concealed. 
 
There was a prima facie contradiction between assertions to Parliament that IHL training 
had been reformed, and ASAC/MoDREC’s decision in August 2014 to block qualitative 
research because the implementation of these reforms was incomplete. 7.3 found that the 
government’s frequent assertions that IHL training had been reformed hid a more nuanced 
reality, of de minimis improvements to IHL training from 2006-2013, and greater attention 
to reform from 2013-2016. There was also a failing of Parliamentary oversight of reforms to 
IHL training and their implementation. On the contrary, the Defence Subcommittee takes 
the Baha Mousa Inquiry’s finding of doctrinal gaps in relation to the prohibited five 
techniques at face value, implying that that was the sole cause of violations,
270 
and that   all 
reforms to training had been implemented. It called on the MoD to ensure that no service 
personnel are investigated by the IHAT, the ECtHR or the ICC for violations of  
international law committed when IHL training was flawed, and (in an approach  that 
ignores the obligation to disobey unlawful orders) where personnel were ‘unwittingly, at 
risk’ of violating international law.
271
 
 
Limited transparency and a lack of objective Parliamentary scrutiny make for an apologist 
narrative, in which training reforms are assumed to prevent future violations, and other 
causes of IHL violations are ignored. When reforms to IHL training are offered as an easy 
panacea, or a pretext to discontinue ongoing investigations, the conundrum between  
training, prevention and compliance becomes more apparent. Essentially, IHL training is 
forced to do greater explanatory and exculpatory work than it can. 
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The MoD’s record is more nuanced in relation to academic research. There are multiple  
gaps in the archival records on the existence and quality of IHL training. This may derive in 
part from instructions to destroy out-of-date training materials, which appear in each 
introduction to MATT 7.
272 
While this removes the risk that outdated materials will be used 
in training, it also means that the quality of IHL training is lost to the archive. A welter of 
materials has been shared as part of FOI requests, but these do not include pre-deployment 
training materials, because the ROE on which they rely are classified. The decision to block 
qualitative research means that the perspective of soldiers and officers on their IHL training 
is lost to research, and the Army’s own data collection processes do not record soldiers’ and 
officers’ understanding norm-by-norm, nor their willingness to comply with IHL. Where the 
scope for academic research is limited through bureaucracy or redaction, the perspective of 
the sub-state actor is lost and valuable compliance insights postponed. A resistance to 
transparency is a common trait in states’ approaches to IHL. Indeed, transparency is 
obligatory in IHRL, but conspicuously absent in IHL.
273
 
 
‘Legal Siege’ Discourse and its Implications 
 
 
The Former Chief of the Defence Staff Admiral Lord Boyce spoke in the House of  
Lords in 2005 about the armed forces being ‘under legal siege’, not only from law but 
also  from  ‘political  correctness’.274   He  claimed  that  the  chain  of  command    was 
undermined by ‘tortuous rules not relevant to fighting’, and that officers’ ‘instinct to   be 
daring and innovative is being buried under the threat of liabilities…’275 The context of 
the remark seems to be a response to human rights lawyers, or in Lord Boyce’s words: 
‘those who have no concept of what is required to fight and win;’276 while the ‘tortuous 
rules not relevant to fighting’ are implicitly IHRL. 
 
‘Legal siege’ rhetoric, and the related assertion that litigation against the armed  forces 
causes uncertainty on operations or a ‘fog of law’,
277 
are distinctively British ideas. They 
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oppose civilian investigation and adjudication of the conduct of the armed forces and/or 
decisions made by the MoD, resisting accountability in international and domestic 
law.
278 They derive from political discomfort with the ‘juridification’279 of the  military 
caused by the extraterritorial effect of the ECHR, and the availability of civil litigation 
under the Human Rights Act 1998 to challenge actions by the armed forces. Resistance 
to legal accountability remains, whether claimants are bereaved family members of 
service personnel,
280  
or foreign fighters previously detained by British troops.
281     
But 
‘legal siege’, ‘legal encirclement’282 and the ‘fog of law’ are related to broader trends in 
states’ responses to calls for accountability for international law violations, including 
‘Lawfare’.283  As Vennesson and Rajkovic argue, states and ‘transnational    advocates’ 
engage in a ‘coercive language game’, with states ‘turn[ing] the table’ on human   rights 
advocates.
284 ‘Legal siege’ discourse also carries risks for soldiers’ and officers’ 
willingness to comply with IHL (the volitional, group aspect of norm internalisation), as 
it casts international legal processes as the enemy of operational effectiveness. In turn, 
this could limit troops’ willingness to report violations they witness. 
 
 
These approaches are characterised by overblown causal assertions, chiefly that the 
availability of civilian adjudication adversely affects operational effectiveness;
285 
and by an 
institutional shock that this civilian adjudication is available.
286 
Much of the discourse 
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occurs in Parliament, on the occasion of the launch of the Al-Sweady Public Inquiry 
Report,
287  
or when    the then-government announced its intention to derogate from the 
ECHR in future significant military deployments.
288 
Political partiality and poor 
reasoning also feature in the two reports on the ‘fog of law’ from the think tank Policy 
Exchange. The first of these objects to the abandonment of the common law doctrine  of 
combat immunity, so that the Crown might be sued by service personnel for  negligence 
or for damage to property or persons in armed conflict;
289 
and secondly, to the eroded 
‘primacy’ of LOAC given its co-applicability with IHRL. The authors argue that the 
latter ‘constrains the ability of commanders to react…’ 290and affects soldiers’   morale, 
but their premise is that members of the armed forces, and the Ministry of Defence as a 
whole, should be immune from accountability in civilian courts, because litigation 
against the MoD ‘…weaken[s] the defence of the realm… also a moral threat to the 
culture and ethos of the military’.291 They call for legislation to remove the MoD   from 
liability for corporate manslaughter, and to reinstate combat immunity.
292
 
 
The second report blames judges for litigation against the British armed forces and calls 
for a wholesale derogation from the European Convention on Human Rights,
293 
with no 
awareness of non-derogable rights in the ECHR. This call was subsequently endorsed 
by government policy,
294 
with a planned inquiry into this policy by the Joint Committee 
on Human Rights prematurely concluded when Parliament was dissolved before the 
general election of 8 June 2017. ‘Fog of law’ discourse places the blame on lawyers and 
litigants for soldiers’ confusion, without considering recent fundamental deficiencies in 
IHL training. In a similar way, Forster argues that ‘juridification’ has now led judges to 
arbitrate on issues previously based on trust,’295  and that any ‘rights-based culture’ 
causes instability and flux, notwithstanding the necessary changes prompted by the  
Baha Mousa Public Inquiry. 
296
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Others question the veracity of these protests. For Waters, ‘legal encirclement’ is ‘fear- 
mongering’ and a ‘failure of leadership’ by the military, because ‘warfighting’ has 
received only ‘light touch’ intervention from civilian courts.297  As Hampson notes, 
media reports consistent with ‘legal siege’ rhetoric ‘conflate several objections to 
investigations’, and the first Policy Exchange report on the ‘fog of law’ appears to  
object ‘to any form of legal accountability.’298 Wicks, Ziegler and Hodson conclude 
that government statements to the media about human rights cases (before domestic 
courts and at the ECtHR) are ‘often misleading, uninformed and one-sided … 
alienat[ing] large sectors of the public from …judicial decision-making.’299 Rowe   sees 
the  expansion  of  civilian  jurisdiction  to  include  the  armed  forces  as  a  logical and 
principled application of the rule of law.
300 
Similarly, Bennett concludes that 
‘juridification is happening because the old model of internal self-governance has   been 
proven  inadequate’.301  The Defence Select  Committee concluded that  there was     no 
evidence of the misuse of domestic or international law through litigation.
302
 
 
‘Legal siege’ is related to but distinct from ‘lawfare’, or: ‘the strategy of using – or misusing 
law’, for good or ill;
303 
or for specific anti-American ends.
304 
Luban defines lawfare in its 
dominant, pejorative sense: ‘accusations by non-state actors of war crimes by a powerful, 
modern  army’.
305  
Lawfare  usually  refers  to  dishonest  allegations,
306  
to  maximise  the 
pejorative connotation. In lawfare, but not in most UK accounts of ‘legal siege’ and ‘fog of 
law’, there are accusations of cowardice, or even perfidy-by-litigation: that non-state armed 
groups (including those designated as terrorists) use legal arguments instead of kinetic  
force. ‘Lawfare’, ‘legal siege’ and the ‘fog of law’ are related but distinct. All respond to the 
civilianisation or humanization of IHL,
307 
to its dissemination 
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in the media and in civilian courts. All three express or imply counter-accusations to 
those who allege war crimes or torts against armed forces. However, while ‘legal siege’ 
rhetoric casts blame on foreign-born applicants, it does not make allegations of perfidy- 
by-litigation, but instead seeks to remove the availability of legal proceedings against  
the armed forces. 
 
‘Legal siege’ reflects some aspects of Cohen’s work on states of denial,308 although this 
is a better account of the MoD’s overall discursive approach to violations from Northern 
Ireland onwards. There is a combination of ‘partial acknowledgement’ (where some 
claims are settled, including in relation to the death of Baha Mousa), ‘spatial isolation’ 
(assertions that the armed forces as a whole are honourable, and there have been only a 
few ‘bad apples’), ‘self-correction’ (assertions that reforms to training are all-solving 
and swiftly in place),
309 and also ‘denial of the victim’ (where assertions are made   that 
the vast majority of claims are false).
310 However, ‘legal siege’ has a more targeted, 
anti-law message than Cohen’s concept of denial. ‘Legal siege’ has the following 
possible consequences: 
 
First, ‘legal siege’ might risk false dissemination, leading to mistaken perceptions about 
international law among soldiers and officers. In particular, it gives the impression that 
the prohibitions cast as ‘human rights’ are not (or should not be) applicable in armed 
conflict. The misleading impression is that the only international law alleged to have 
been violated is IHRL, and not IHL, whereas some norms (including the prohibition on 
torture and inhuman treatment as variously defined) are shared between these two 
branches of law. A strong separation of ‘LOAC’ and IHRL in this way risks defining 
applicable IHL as the conduct of hostilities only. The rhetoric can affect understanding, 
knowledge and recall of IHL. 
 
Recent reforms notwithstanding, there is empirical evidence that soldiers and officers 
hold false perceptions about international law. Major W.G.L. Mackinlay found that 
commanders in all three forces, but especially the Army, had misconceptions about the 
International Criminal Court Act 2001 and its putative detrimental influence on 
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operations.
311 
These misconceptions were consistent with a further finding in 
Mackinlay’s sample that commanding officers thought their existing international law 
training was inadequate. Perceptions about international law are part of the barracks 
culture in which  IHL is taught and  IHL norms internalised. However, legal    discourse 
can be harnessed for compliance, instead of against it. If,    per Stieger,
312  
international 
criminal law can have an ‘educative effect’, potentially deterring and preventing future 
violations, then accountability mechanisms, including domestic litigation, prosecution 
and public inquiries have the potential to disseminate IHL and to serve as ‘general 
deterrence’. These teachable moments are missed when legal siege rhetoric distracts 
citizens and soldiers from IHL compliance. 
 
Second, even though ‘legal siege’ is primarily directed against IHRL, it could risk 
alienating soldiers and officers from all international law, including IHL. If law is cast  
as the enemy of morale or operational effectiveness, troops may not listen  to  legal 
norms communicated in their training. While this is a prediction without data to support 
it, there is strong explanatory force in the argument that recurrent failures in 
accountability and recurrent resistance to international law within any military force 
begets failures of prevention by undermining the legitimacy of the law being trained. 
Social learning theory and communities of practice can help explain the risk posed by 
‘legal siege’ rhetoric to soldiers’ and officers’ willingness to comply. If investigations, 
civil litigation and public inquiries are deemed illegitimate, it is less likely that troops 
will report violations they witness. A discourse of justification might be a consequence 
of ‘legal siege’ and ‘fog of law’ rhetoric.313 If soldiers see all law as   an impediment to 
their safety, they might seek to justify unlawful orders, obeying authority; or submit to 
group pressures to violate the law. If commanders believe ‘legal siege’ rhetoric, they 
may take less seriously their duty to prevent, suppress and report breaches of IHL. 
 
Third, the discourse of ‘legal siege’ and ad hominem responses to human rights lawyers 
operate as a silencing technique, casting litigation and public inquiries as threats to troops’ 
safety and morale, while marginalising findings of ill-treatment or unlawful killings. It 
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silences the horror of the violations that have been proven, and distracts attention    from 
them. The rhetoric is also found when investigations are prematurely stopped.   
314  
The 
quality of Parliamentary scrutiny is undermined, as ‘legal siege’ and related assertions 
dominate. In the debate to mark the conclusion of the Al-Sweady Public Inquiry, 
lawyers were likened to a ‘firing squad’.315 
 
The involvement of the MoD in passing a ‘dossier’ to the SRA is a concerning trend 
with the executive attempting to influence professional disciplinary proceedings against 
claimant  lawyers.
316  
Government  briefings  against  individual  lawyers  might  have a 
chilling effect on the representation of clients suing the armed forces, and government 
action could be inconsistent with the UN Basic Principles on the Role of Lawyers.
317
 
During the proceedings against Leigh Day, there were allegations that the SRA used the 
MoD’s interest in these cases to lobby the government for reforms.318 
 
However, there are caveats. As Waters notes, ‘[i]t is difficult to know how widely the 
legal encirclement view  is shared  by officers or  enlisted personnel.’319  There are    no 
data to prove that it affects norm internalisation as this section has hypothesised. Just 
because ‘legal siege’ discourse exists, it does not mean that all soldiers and officers  
think alike and agree without knowledge or nuance. Nonetheless, ‘legal siege’ rhetoric  
is one mechanism by which state responses to accountability processes might affect IHL 
training, the prevention of violations and compliance with IHL in armed conflict. 
 
7.6    Conclusion to Part III 
 
 
Findings 
 
 
The case study illustrates the conundrum between IHL training, prevention and compliance, 
and offers new insights. Chapter 6’s archival research revealed delayed implementation of 
the IHL training obligation, amid assertions that military IHL training was taking place. The 
UK resisted both the ICRC’s involvement and the applicability of 
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IHL to conflicts in Kenya, Malaya, Aden and Northern Ireland. This led both to delays 
in the development of the law of NIAC, and to the UK’s own delayed ratification of 
Additional Protocols I and II. From the 1950s, there were recurrent patterns of assertion 
in relation to military IHL training, of violations against detainees (especially in the 
prohibitions shared between IHL and IHRL), and of institutional resistance to 
investigations into those violations. Case law and public inquiries strengthened the 
findings in chapter 3 about the multi-causal nature of IHL violations, and of the causal 
role of military culture, moral disengagement and discourse about law and enemy forces 
in those violations. Deficient IHL training was relevant to the Camp Breadbasket and 
Baha Mousa cases, but testimonial injustice was a feature of the Al-Sweady Public 
Inquiry, despite findings of ‘ill-treatment’. The Blackman case corroborates the 
distinction between understanding of IHL and willingness to comply; because Blackman 
knew that his actions were a violation of the Geneva Conventions, yet attempted to 
justify his actions and expected his colleagues not to share what they had witnessed. 
 
Chapter 7 offers the first academic study of IHAT, the IFI, the SIWG and Operation 
Northmoor. Findings include limited transparency and the hurried closure of both IHAT 
and Operation Northmoor, but wide-ranging, contextual analysis by the IFI’s account 
inter alia of the training given on the use of force. The SIWG inquires specifically into 
‘gaps’ in training, but only as part of a flawed dichotomy between intentional IHL 
violations, and ‘unintentional violations’ caused by ‘flawed’ training or doctrine.320 The 
rush to close by the hundreds pending investigations at IHAT and Operation Northmoor 
means that the prevalence of violations in Iraq and Afghanistan is unknown, with facts 
suppressed. As we do not know the extent of the violations, we cannot fully audit the 
training reforms needed fully to ensure troops understand IHL, and the change in 
military culture that is needed to address their willingness to comply. 
 
As explored in 7.3, while the MoD repeatedly asserted to Parliament and public inquiries 
that the reforms to IHL training had been ‘implemented’ or ‘addressed’, in reality, these 
reforms were delayed, and were still in progress at the time of these assertions. Assertions  
as to reformed training mirror the earlier Parliamentary assertions that IHL training was 
taking place; assertions that Draper found to be misleading. 
321 
However, 7.4’s analysis 
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of the Operational Law Training Directive and MATT 7 show that Draper’s concerns are, 
finally, moot. The training materials aim for comprehensive instruction in IHL, with 
ambitious targets for troops’ understanding. The multimedia and lecture materials on 
CPERS scrupulously implement the recommendations of the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry, 
and the new restructured Module on Investigations and Accountability explains and 
emphasises sanctions including prosecution for IHL violations, and goes some way towards 
instilling a duty to intervene and report violations witnessed. Yet there is insufficient 
attention to individual and social psychology; to the role of military culture, discourse about 
law and enemy forces; and the risk of violations committed in revenge or pursuant to false 
understandings of reciprocity. The training does not provide safeguards against each of 
Bandura’s mechanisms for moral disengagement. It is detailed chalk-and-talk, a good faith 
comprehensive dissemination, which just begins to close the gap between IHL training, 
prevention and compliance. The new training materials only tentatively integrate IHL in the 
ICRC’s sense, and they certainly fall short of the ICRC’s broad, interdisciplinary approach 
to prevention. There is no information available on the extent to which IHL is integrated  
into practical or scenario-based training, merely a stated commitment that this is part of the 
ethos and requirements of the Operational Law Training Directive 2014. It is an open 
question to what extent IHL’s inevitable terminological complexity is understood by  
soldiers who may struggle with literacy. Data collection systems are inadequate, with a 
failure to track norm-by-norm understanding as revealed by MATT 7 test results.
322 
If these 
data were available, they would enable ALS to predict future areas of difficulty, to compare 
and audit specific training sites, and if necessary, to amend or rephrase training materials. 
 
Predictions for Future Practice 
 
 
There is a narrative arc between accountability processes, states’ responses to them, and 
their willingness to emphasise reforms to IHL training as a panacea. Just as the MoD 
marginalised or resisted investigations into alleged violations, it asserted that proven IHL 
violations (such as the beatings and inhumane treatment that killed Baha Mousa) were 
caused by deficits in IHL training, and that reforms to that training would prevent similar 
violations in the future.
323 
These assertions were accepted without question or scrutiny by 
 
 
7.4.2 
7.3 
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the Defence Subcommittee,
324 
yet they force IHL training to explain and absolve more than 
is possible; neglecting the conundrum between IHL training, prevention and compliance. In 
the British Army case study, limited transparency, a perception that some norms are 
exclusively matters of ‘human rights’, and resistance to civilian adjudication of the armed 
forces are three durable preoccupations which are likely to continue. 
 
Limited transparency was a feature of the concealed archives at Hanslope and 
Swadlingcote, and the destruction of materials relating to the Mau Mau rebellion;
325 
just as it continues in relation to recent and current MoD investigations on Iraq and 
Afghanistan.
326 
This is likely to continue. For accuracy, old training materials held by 
units are to be destroyed once they are superseded. This is consistent with gaps in the 
archive for future researchers. A related phenomenon is the failure of Parliamentary 
scrutiny where government officials asserted that reforms to IHL training had been 
‘implemented’ and ‘addressed’ when these processes were on a continuum marked by 
ongoing negotiations.
327 
This failure is predicted to continue unless it is expressly 
challenged. 
 
While there is evidence of a continued rhetorical separation between IHRL and IHL, 
there has been a belated but genuine effort to integrate selected prohibitions from IHRL 
in IHL training, in particular the prohibition on the ‘five techniques’.
328 
Military instruction 
on  these  prohibitions  will  continue,  as  a  bulwark  against  the  recurrent  torture  and ill- 
treatment of detainees that marked UK state practice in IHL and IHRL in the late 20
th 
and 
early 21
st 
century. For these violations of the prohibition on torture and inhuman treatment, 
training reforms could constitute a guarantee of non-repetition.
329 
Yet in the case study, this 
idealism is not borne out. Reforms following the Baha Mousa Public Inquiry were belated 
and reactive, finally correcting a manifest gap in training materials. Limited transparency in 
recent investigations, and the acceptance of simplistic assertions 
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about the sufficiency of training reforms might prevent the scrutiny of other flaws in 
training and prevent subsequent reforms. 
 
(iii) ‘Legal siege’ rhetoric, and its related concepts, are similarly durable; evidence of a 
lasting institutional suspicion of civilian adjudication of the armed forces, and of the 
extraterritorial application of the ECHR. The case study exemplifies a government’s 
willingness to emphasise reforms to IHL prevention and compliance activities in 
response to selected high-profile accountability processes while endorsing an anti-law 
and anti-accountability rhetoric in Parliament and the media. However comprehensive 
the new Operational Law Training Directive, soldiers and officers will not understand 
where IHL converges with and diverges from IHRL. The risk is that service personnel 
will view all international law as a threat to safety, morale or the futures of their 
colleagues. If law (including IHL) is the enemy, troops may not listen to its norms. 
 
The effects of this rhetoric on government policy are harder to predict. The Queen’s 
Speech following the general election of 2017 made no reference to earlier 
announcements that the government intended to derogate from the ECHR before 
significant future military operations, nor to an intent, previously expressed, to replace 
the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights.
330 
From the IHL perspective, in 
February 2017, the bill on ratification of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property 
1954 received Royal Assent.
331  
Thus far, IHL training materials do not reflect the 
provisions of this Convention. It will take some years before its specific training 
requirements are fully integrated in initial and continuation training in the armed forces, 
and an amendment to the Operational Law Training Directive would be needed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cabinet Office and Prime Minister’s Office, Queen’s Speech 201, 21 June 2017 
Cultural Property (Armed Conflicts) Act 2017 c6, 23 February 2017 
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Chapter 8.  Conclusion: Solving the Conundrum 
 
8.1 Findings and Contributions 
 
 
What is the Conundrum between Military Training, Prevention and Compliance in IHL? 
 
 
IHL should be disseminated as widely as possible, and integrated in military  instruction 
or training,
1 
but this is a simply stated norm, delegated to state discretion in a branch  of 
international law that lacks transparent oversight and monitoring. The conundrum 
between training, prevention and compliance is characterised by: 1) causal uncertainty: 
deficient IHL training has been implicated in serious violations of IHL, but military 
culture, moral disengagement and discourse about law and enemy forces may be more 
powerful causal factors for IHL violations than ignorance of the law; 2) a predictive gap 
between communicated norm and subsequent behaviour; and 3) a distinction between 
the cognitive and the volitional – between soldiers’ understanding, knowledge and recall 
of IHL, and their willingness to comply. Moynier’s historic conviction that introducing 
the ‘spirit’ of  IHL  ‘into  the customs  of soldiers  and of the population  as  a    whole’2 
would serve to prevent violations and ensure compliance is now in doubt. Dissemination 
is insufficient to create both understanding and willingness to comply with the law. The 
prevention of violations and compliance with IHL requires two further tasks, which IHL 
training alone may not achieve. They are: 4) the problem of how to build restraint in 
trained killers; and 5) how to implement contested norms in complex deployments. 
 
How does a genealogy of the IHL training obligation explain the conundrum between 
military training, prevention and compliance? First, it reveals the durable assumption (at 
least from the 1860s-1980s) that dissemination and military instruction would prevent 
violations and ensure compliance with IHL in future conflicts. Second, it shows that 
states were willing to agree to laconic formulations of an obligation which was asserted 
to prevent violations, but they were unwilling to agree to criteria on how to implement 
the training, nor to a reporting requirement to ensure that dissemination and training was 
 
 
GC I, art 47; GC II, art 48; GC III, art 127; GC IV, art 144; AP I, art 83; AP III, art 7; CCW, art 6; CCW 
Amended Protocol II, art 14(3); CCW Protocol IV, art 4; CCW Protocol V, art 11; HCCP, art 25; Second 
Protocol to the HCCP, art 30; ICRC Customary IHL Study, rules 142-143 
Gustave Moynier, Compte-rendu des travaux de la Conférence internationale tenue à Berlin du 22 au  
27 avril 1869 par les délégués des gouvernements signataires de la Convention de Genève et des sociétés 
et associations de secours aux militaires blessés et malades (J.F. Starcke 1869) 74 
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taking place.
3 
As a result, guidance on IHL dissemination and training was confined to 
non-binding sources, such as the ICRC Commentaries, Resolution 21 to the Diplomatic 
Conference of Geneva 1974-1977, and a Plan of Action annexed to Resolution 1 of   the 
27
th 
RCRC in 1999. 
 
Third, the evolution of the obligation in IAC reveals a problematic emphasis on 
dissemination from the Four Geneva Conventions onwards. The emphasis on 
disseminating the Conventions and their Additional Protocols ‘as widely as possible’ 
infuses an optional quality to the obligation, and implies that the same awareness-raising 
approach is sufficient for both civic education and military instruction. Yet Additional 
Protocol I strengthens the obligation with legal advice on IHL training, commanders’ 
obligations  to  ensure their subordinates’ knowledge of  IHL,  4  and a requirement    on 
civilian and military authorities to be ‘fully acquainted’ with Geneva law; 5 and from 
the 1990s, there is some increased specificity on IHL training on the protection of 
cultural property and weapons law. 
 
Fourth, a genealogical approach reveals that the reference only to dissemination and not 
to military instruction in Article 19 of Additional Protocol II was part of the flurry to 
agree a consensus draft of the Protocol as a whole, and did not reflect the previous 
substantive debate on the provision.
6 
Nor is this Article the last word on a military 
instruction obligation for NIAC. The armed forces must be instructed in Common 
Article 3’s prohibitions as part of their IHL training, and Amended Protocol II to the 
CCW and the Second Protocol to the Hague Convention on the Protection of Cultural 
Property in Armed Conflict clarify that both these regimes apply to IAC and NIAC,  
their military training obligations included. One difference between IAC and NIAC 
relates to the temporal scope of the obligation for states as compared to armed groups. 
Civilian dissemination and military instruction obligations bind states in peace and war; 
with an obligation on armed groups to disseminate and to train their members in IHL 
triggered at the outset of a non-international armed conflict.
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1 
AP I art 87(2) 
AP I art 83(2) 
1.2, 2.3 
Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press 2012) 432 
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What questions are left unanswered by a genealogical analysis? Although the IHL 
training obligation persists in peace and war, the frequency of IHL training is not set by 
binding treaty law, and does not appear as a topic for diplomatic debate. A broad  
reading of treaty law and available databases on state practice and opinio juris can assist 
with this question, applying Lauterpacht’s principle of effectiveness to elide the 
ambiguity in the IHL training obligation.
8 
One risk of the laconic formulation of the 
IHL training obligation, and of the obligation on commanders to ensure IHL knowledge 
among their subordinates, is that some states might train only their officers and 
commanders, relying on ad hoc instruction through the chain of command.
9 
This   thesis 
has argued that where Additional Protocol I is ratified, civilian authorities including at a 
minimum the Prime Minister, President or equivalent, and office-holders at defence 
ministries and ministries of foreign affairs, and intelligence agencies, should receive 
IHL training on a par with the instruction offered to the armed forces. ‘[C]ivilian 
authorities’ can evolve as the technology of warfare develops, so that the developers of 
unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) or autonomous and semi-autonomous weapons, and 
civilian or military operators should also be trained in IHL.
10 
A similar principle applies 
to PMSC, where these are used, although the non-binding Montreux Document sets out 
IHL training for PMSC as a recommended requirement for contracts.
11
 
 
While a genealogical analysis can set the parameters of IHL training in IAC and NIAC, it 
does not tell us if there is an obligation to train the armed forces in IHRL. At a minimum, 
troops should be trained in the norms shared between IHL and IHRL which apply during 
armed conflict, including the prohibitions on torture and inhuman treatment as variously 
described in both branches of law. Where a state has ratified CAT and CED, military law 
enforcement and troops who may have custody of prisoners of war, internees or other 
detainees should be instructed about these prohibitions and the obligations to prevent, 
investigate and/or report torture and enforced disappearance.
12  
No binding treaty    requires 
the training of military personnel in IHRL in general (IHRL lacks a general training 
obligation, with treaty rules on training in the prohibitions of torture and enforced 
disappearances only), but policy suggests the wisdom of training peacekeepers and troops 
 
Hersch Lauterpacht, The Development of International Law by the International Court (revised edition, 
Oxford University Press 1982) 
Laurie R. Blank and Gregory P. Noone, ‘Law of War Training: Resources for Military and Civilian 
Leaders’ (2nd edition United States Institute for Peace 2013) 18, 24 
AP I, art 83(2); 2.4 
Montreux Document 2008, Good Practices 3(a), 10, 14 (e), 35, 63 
CAT, art 10; CED, art 23 
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who will be deployed to complex or shifting asymmetric conflicts (akin to the ‘three 
block war’)13 in the differential use of force in law enforcement situations. 
 
Finally, while treaty texts focus on ‘instruction’, ‘study’ and being ‘fully acquainted’ 
with  treaty texts,
14  with only selected treaties  using the terminology of  ‘training’,    15 
classroom-based instruction is thought insufficient to the task of ensuring compliance 
with  IHL.
16  
Collections  of  state  practice  suggest  an  early trend  towards combining 
classroom instruction and practical or scenario-based training in IHL,
17 
but there are too 
few examples of state practice to ground a customary IHL obligation to include practical 
training as part of the IHL instruction obligation 
 
How can it be solved? 
 
 
Chapter 3 begins to solve the conundrum’s causal uncertainty by demonstrating that that 
military instruction in IHL is juridically necessary (required by treaties and custom), 
empirically necessary (barring a coincidental or morally-motivated convergence between 
soldiers’ conduct and the content of IHL where soldiers have no knowledge of IHL)
18 
but 
empirically insufficient to prevent violations and ensure compliance. A range of cases 
demonstrate that a military culture that discourages the reporting of violations, or 
encourages unthinking obedience to unlawful orders is consistent with violations; while 
social psychological research demonstrates that moral disengagement and discourse about 
law and enemy forces may be more powerful causal factors for IHL violations than 
ignorance of the law. IHL training alone may be insufficient to build restraint in trained 
killers. Chapter 3 explains the gap between communicated norm and subsequent behaviour 
by integrating the fragmented literature on military training in IHL with insights from 
constructivism (specifically, norm internalisation by individuals and the role of  
communities of practice). Norm internalisation adds depth to the consensus that IHL  
training should be repeated, practical and discursive. The aim should be norms that are 
‘taken-for-granted’
19 
by soldiers, officers, and their communities of practice or wider 
 
Charles Krulak, ‘The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War’ [1999] Marines Magazine 
GC I, art 47; GC II, art 48; GC III, art 127; GC IV, art 144; AP I, art 83; AP III, art 7 
HCCP 1954, art 25; Second Protocol to the HCCP, art 30; CCW Protocol V, art 11 
ICRC Customary IHL Study, rule 142 
Blank and Noone (n 9) 6 
Janina Dill, Legitimate Targets? Social Construction, International Law and US Bombing (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 9 
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change’ (1998) 52 
International Organization 887, 895 
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military culture. The ICRC’s two iterations of ‘integration’ and its ‘prevention’ policy offer 
further depth, urging IHL’s relevance to all aspects of military training and decision- 
making, and exploring how to attain adherence to IHL among members of armed forces and 
armed groups.
20 
Standards to build soldiers’ understanding and willingness to comply  with 
IHL offer a starting-point for dialogue with states on their practice in IHL training.
21
 
 
The genealogy of the training obligation explored states’ willingness to agree to laconic, 
or simply-phrased norms of prevention without attending to how these norms interact 
and how they should be implemented. To explain this aspect of the conundrum, chapter 
4 articulates where IHL training fits with other laconic norms of prevention, including 
the obligation to ‘respect and ensure respect… in all circumstances’; the provision of 
military legal advisers; commanders’ duties to ensure that their subordinates know IHL; 
command responsibility inter alia to ‘prevent’, ‘suppress’ and ‘report’ IHL violations; 
and the duty at the very least to clarify and if necessary, to disobey unlawful orders.
22
 
The chapter argues that a typology of IHL’s procedural norms (of prevention, 
monitoring and enforcement) is overdue, that a greater focus on ‘prevention’ as a term  
of art in IHL, and an understanding of how these norms intersect will discourage states 
from seeing norms of prevention as discrete, discretionary obligations that are peripheral 
to substantive IHL. This should dissuade states from seeing military instruction as a 
tick-box requirement, as it is intrinsic to command responsibility, and the duty to 
disobey unlawful orders. This sketched theory of prevention for IHL is biased towards 
IAC and Additional Protocol I, but helps to explain the relationship between military 
training and the prevention of violations. 
 
Seven distinctive aspects of IHL place it at the ‘vanishing point’
23 
of international law 
compliance. These distinctive challenges are its contested norms, which present particular 
difficulties for military training and have high stakes in terms of human lives; questions of 
conflict classification and applicable law; the co-applicability and convergence of IHL and 
IHRL; the challenges of interoperability where different states in a coalition differ in their 
interpretations or ratifications of IHL provisions; a strong disaggregation to soldiers,  
officers and armed group fighters; misunderstood reciprocity and the risk of violations 
 
3.4 
3.5 
GC I-GC IV, art 1, AP I, art 1(1); arts 6, 82, 83, 86, 87, ICRC Customary IHL Study, rule 154; 4.3 
Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War’ (1952) 29 British Yearbook of 
International Law 360, 382; 1.1, 5.3 
 perpetrated in revenge; and disused or absent monitoring mechanisms (where some states 
have blocked the establishment of regular meetings of states). Chapter 5 contributes to an 
evolving body of work on compliance theory in IHL, by suggesting a sliding scale between 
state- and agent-focused compliance theories, noting the limitations of applying to IHL 
insights from general compliance theory on treaty ratification, regime type, and norm 
precision; and recommending a constructivist compliance theory for IHL which takes 
account of the individual soldier, officer and armed group fighter, and the community of 
practice in which they are trained. Constructivist accounts allow for norm contestation and 
flux, and for the potentially diffuse structures of armed groups. A focus on norm 
internalisation and communities of practice provides an account of the gap between 
communicated norm and subsequent behaviour, and of discourse about law and enemy 
forces within armed forces and groups. However, this is not a complete theoretical solution 
to the conundrum. Social psychological accounts are still needed to explain the role of  
moral disengagement in violations of IHL. 
 
The critical case study of the British Army’s training in IHL confirms aspects of the 
conundrum, and adds further insights. 1) Deficits in IHL training have been demonstrated: 
not only the delayed implementation of IHL training, but also a perfunctory approach, and 
historic failures sufficiently to instruct troops in the prohibitions of torture and inhuman 
treatment shared between IHL and IHRL. While these failures coincided with recurrent 
patterns of violations against those detained in British military custody, there is still 
uncertainty as to the role that these deficits in training have played in proven violations of 
IHL. Unlawful orders featured in the Camp Breadbasket and Baha Mousa incidents, as did a 
blatant moral disengagement; an unwillingness to report violations witnessed and to support 
those who raised concerns. The UK Government’s tendency to vaunt recent, comprehensive 
reforms to IHL training as a panacea for future violations and previously deficient training 
as the cause of recent violations vests IHL training with greater causal power than it has. 2) 
There remains a predictive gap between communicated norm and subsequent behaviour. 
Without qualitative research on the effectiveness of training reforms, and norm-by-norm 
recording of soldiers’ responses to annual tests on the law of armed conflict, training 
directives and test papers are the only data available. 3) These show what should be trained, 
and what should, ideally, be understood, but they do not give details on the military culture 
of units where the training takes place; and on whether there is a discourse about law or 
enemy forces that might 
undermine the training. The Blackman case strengthens the distinction between 256 
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understanding and willingness to comply, supporting the ICRC Roots of Behaviour in 
War study’s finding that moral disengagement and attempted justification of violations 
can occur in fighters who understand IHL. 
 
The case study does not solve the perennial challenge of how to build restraint in trained 
killers, although the emphasis in new training materials on the humane treatment of 
detainees is a considerable improvement on the perfunctory training of the past. 5) The UK 
case study also reveals a recurrent resistance to the application of IHL to colonial conflicts, 
and to the development of the law of NIAC, followed by a resistance to the extraterritorial 
effect of the ECHR, and domestic prosecutions and litigation affecting the 
armed forces. The latter has yielded a ‘legal siege’ rhetoric which risks presenting law  
as the enemy of morale and operational effectiveness. However, the case study does not 
offer new insights on the distinct issue of how to implement contested norms in complex 
or asymmetric deployments. The case study also reveals a durable problem of limited 
transparency affecting both investigations and academic research; a tendency in military 
doctrine to conceptualise the prohibition on torture and inhuman treatment as ‘human 
rights’ and not both IHL and IHRL, and, linked to ‘legal siege’ rhetoric, a lack of even- 
handedness especially in the Al-Sweady Public Inquiry. Finally, it illustrates a narrative 
continuity between the UK’s resistance to investigations, litigation and public inquiries, 
and a willingness to emphasise reforms to IHL training as a panacea for future 
violations. This uses the IHL training obligation as a rhetorical tool; a modern variant of 
the assumption that IHL training prevents violations. 
 
8.2 Limitations and Impact 
 
 
What is the potential and what are the limits of the proposed solution? 
 
 
The conundrum has been articulated and explained, with four distinct contributions: a) 
standards informed by a genealogy of the IHL training obligation and a synthesis of the 
literature. These might lead to a rubric for states to report publicly to the RCRC 
meetings on their IHL training; b) a sketched theory of prevention that links the IHL 
training obligation with four other preventive norms; c) a constructivist compliance 
theory that takes account of the perspective of soldiers, officers and armed group 
fighters; and d) a critical case study which confirms several aspects of the conundrum 
while building new theory. 
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Yet problematising the relationship between IHL training, prevention and compliance is 
not in itself a solution. The causal contribution between IHL training and the prevention 
of violations can never be definitively settled. There is no counterfactual conflict, in 
which no IHL training takes place, for analytic comparison with those where IHL 
training does occur, however imperfectly. If a violation has not occurred, we cannot 
measure if it would have occurred but for training in IHL. Further, the sketched theory  
of prevention is skewed towards IAC regulated by Additional Protocol I; more 
theoretical work is needed on NIAC IHL. 
 
Finally, the critical case study is rich, but its dataset is neither saturated nor free of 
availability bias. Archives are pre-sifted and incomplete; deliberately so given the 
retained MoD archive at Swadlingcote. IHAT and IFI records have suffered from this 
lack of transparency. Public inquiry data is not empirically probative: the evidence for 
each inquiry is trammelled by its own terms of reference, and the analysis is context- 
dependent; and, in the case of the Al-Sweady Inquiry, epistemically questionable. A 
dataset that focuses partly on investigations, courts-martial and public inquiries is biased 
towards those alleged or proven violations which have come to light. This reflects a 
systemic selectivity, where very few allegations of violations reach the public domain. 
Because focusing on violations alone causes selection bias, failing to count instances of 
compliance, 24 the case study triangulates data with plentiful training materials, but these 
focus on individual (not collective) training, with materials for mission-specific or pre- 
deployment training unavailable because the ROE on which they are based are 
classified. The qualitative study blocked by MoDREC in 2014 would have given the 
perspective of individual soldiers and officers, providing a thicker account of their 
understanding and willingness to comply with IHL. As for all critical case studies, this  
is a single case, which aims to provide a first test of theories and to yield new insights. It 
achieves this, but further, comparative research is needed thoroughly to explain the 
relationship between military IHL training, prevention and compliance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kai Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘International Law, International Relations and Compliance’ 
in Walter Carlnaes, Thomas Risse and Beth A. Simmons (eds), Handbook of International Relations 
(SAGE 2002) 540 
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Impact 
 
 
Although states’ resistance to transparent monitoring of their practice in IHL is  a 
durable problem, there is some scope for the sharing of state practice on IHL 
dissemination and training at the 33
rd 
Meeting of the RCRC in 2019. At that meeting, 
the results of the intergovernmental meetings pursuant to Resolution 2 of the 32
nd 
RCRC will be reported.
25 
Periodic voluntary meetings of states may be agreed. Also   at 
the 33
rd 
meeting, a range of states, the EU and NATO will report to the ICRC on  
pledges made at the 32
nd 
Meeting,
26 
which included specific commitments on IHL 
dissemination and training.
27 
The standards built in this thesis are the first step towards 
a collaborative rubric on military training in IHL. They can be developed and   reviewed 
by a roundtable meeting with military and ICRC officials, before the rubric is final. A 
pre-written reporting instrument would be more informative than a ‘tick-box’ approach 
and will be better for states’ putative resource constraints than expecting states each to 
devise their own reporting document.
28 
The aim would be to share research on IHL 
training with States, synthesising insights which are currently scattered in the literature; 
and for states to share best practice and future innovations on military training 
 
8.3 Further Research 
 
 
There are three avenues of further research. 1) The theories of prevention and compliance 
sketched or adapted in this thesis need to be supplemented by research on norms of 
prevention in Hague law, and in NIAC; and on communities of practice among negotiating 
states, and among civilian and military authorities who oppose accountability for alleged 
violations of IHL. 2) The findings of the critical case study can be strengthened or tested by 
qualitative research on the British Army’s training in IHL. Now the Operational Law 
Training Directive has been implemented, MoDREC’s temporal objection to the original 
research design should be moot. Ideally, this qualitative work 
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(Oxford University Press 2015) 597, 614 
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Zealand, Norway, Spain, the EU and NATO (32nd International Conference of the Red Cross and the Red 
Crescent, December 2015) 
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could form part of a comparative study on military training in IHL, drawing on the 
theoretical insights built in this thesis, and broadening the research questions to include 
the relationship between accountability processes and subsequent IHL training. 3) A 
further research project could consider the technological advances that challenge 
existing approaches to IHL training, including the implications of neuro-enhancement 
among soldiers,
29 
and the programming of autonomous weapons.
30
 
 
Military training in IHL, once assumed to prevent violations, instead makes a nuanced, 
variable and contingent contribution to compliance. It is dependent upon instruction and 
practical training, norm internalisation by individuals and groups, and a recognition that 
understanding, knowledge and recall of IHL are insufficient for future  compliance 
unless there is also adherence or willingness to comply. IHL training is one component 
of the duty in Common Article 1 to ‘respect and ensure respect’ for Geneva law ‘in all 
circumstances’, of the duty to resist unlawful orders, and of command responsibility to 
prevent, suppress and report violations. Military training in IHL is neither a panacea for 
past breaches, nor a sufficient tool to prevent future violations. 
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